Chapter II," Political Entities," is a discussion of the " objects, sensible or imaginary, of political impulse." Among such entities are flags, coins, national names, songs, the state itself, local areas of government, newspapers, rulers and so forth. These are all used in constructive political work, and, lacking them, nation-building is uphill work. The task of the English statesmen of the twentieth century will be much more difficult than it was in the nineteenth, one reason being that the United Kingdom has not even a name with the necessary emotional associations for creating an imperial patriotism. Neither has it an anthem, a coin or a flag to aid in creating imperial unity.

Party is the most effective political entity in modern states, for human nature requires something simple and permanent, "something which can be loved and trusted, and which can be recognized at successive elections as being the same thing that was loved and trusted before; and a party is such a thing" (page 83). The relation between the party as an "entity" and political impulse is illustrated by the art of advertising, to which "party politics are becoming more and more closely assimilated in method" (page 87). The portion of this chapter devoted to what one may call the psychology of the political party is particularly interesting and suggestive.

Having learned that it is "human nature" to be governed, in political as in other matters of life, largely by impulse, by affection and instinct, and that the political entities seen by affection and instinct are not like the facts as revealed by deliberate observation and rational analysis, the reader is prepared in advance to anticipate the line of reasoning of the third chapter, on "Non-rational Inference in Politics." In essence the argument is designed to establish, what probably no thoughtful person has ever doubted, that "most of the political opinions of most men are the result, not of reasoning tested by experience, but of unconscious or half-conscious inference fixed by habit " (page 103).

Chapter IV, "The Material of Political Reasoning," deals with entities which can be reasoned about rather than those which serve as objects of non-rational or instinctive inferences. This material men have to create. The first thing for the serious student of politics is mastery of a treatise on psychology. The essential thing for the politician as well as for the intelligent citizen in a democracy, Mr. Wallas constantly strives to make clear, is an understanding of human nature -a knowledge of man as he is, not some ideal man who never existed outside of the imagination. "At present," he says, "the politician who is trained for his work by reading the best known treatises on

political theory is still in the condition of the medical student trained by the study of Hippocrates or Galen" (page 123).

Chapter V, on "The Method of Political Reasoning," is mainly a discussion of the tendency of political thinking and argument to change from qualitative to quantitative forms-terms which are practically equivalent to deductive and inductive. Since Jevons' time quantitative methods have taken the place of qualitative in economics, and it is time that a similar change should occur in politics. Such a change has, in fact already occurred, as is shown by a comparison of the methods of the present poor-law commission and the commission that framed the poor law of 1833-34. Experienced statesmen have always worked out complex problems quantitatively. Gladstone unconsciously employed that method in dealing with the problem of Irish home rule. His use of the quantitative method was, however, an operation of art rather than of science, while the history of human progress consists in the gradual and partial substitution of science for art, of the power over nature acquired in youth by study, for that which comes in late middle-age as the half-conscious result of experience" (page 153).

In the second part of the volume, under the title "Possibilities of Progress," Mr. Wallas attempts to estimate the influence of these new tendencies which he believes are beginning to transform the science of politics. One of the most important problems of "Political Morality" (Part II, Chapter I) is the question whether it is wrong for the politician to attempt to influence others by any means except "the severest process of logical thought." It was assumed by those who originally championed democracy that, since reasoning was an easy and certain process, men's minds would work automatically and of necessity when faced by problems affecting their interest; that, since reason would in a democracy guide the citizen in the use of the ballot, the politician to be successful must make clear to others his own conclusions and the grounds for them; that, in other words, good government would be secured if the voters had sufficient opportunity of listening to free and sincere discussion. This intellectualist assumption on the part of the early theorists of democracy is still made by the candidate "who comes fresh from his books to the platform." But he soon finds that it is not his logic that makes votes. It might appear, if the politician were to become a student of psychology, as advocated in this volume, that the result would be little short of disastrous. Would not the younger politicians abandon all ethical traditions and adopt" those methods of exploiting the irrational elements of human nature which have hitherto been the trade secret of the elderly and disillusioned "

(page 177)? This criticism Mr. Wallas meets by the assertion that, while a fuller knowledge of the obscurer impulses of man is being added to the equipment of the politician, an antidote is provided through the education of the voter. The latter is at the same time acquiring a higher degree of self-knowledge. Voters as well as the politician come to appreciate the part played by non-rational inference, so that they half-consciously at least see through "the cruder arts of emotional exploitation" (page 185). It is the business of our educational system to promote conscious self-knowledge of this sort, that it may keep pace with the political art of controlling impulse.

The chapter on "Representative Government" is concerned with the changes in the structure of political institutions that have been, or are likely to be, caused by an enlarged knowledge of "the causation of political impulse and of the valid conditions of political reasoning." It was early discovered in our experience with representative institutions that it would not do for the state to permit the politician to appeal to the elector through any kind of motives he chose. Consequently we have laws against bribery, laws fixing the maximum of election expenditure, laws punishing intimidation and so forth. To make the conditions as favorable as possible for effective political reasoning, campaigns are shortened by legal enactment, elections made fewer and held on the same day for the entire state or nation; and now we are coming to see in America that it is going against human nature to put before the voter a ballot containing a hundred names, more or less. To secure the best conditions for a rational use of the ballot, all modern countries employ the secret ballot and close the saloons on election day. Mr. Wallas suggests that elections should be held on Sunday, as in France, so that the voters could go to the polls with at least a few hours' rest, and in order that advantage may be taken of "the feeling of moral responsibility half consciously associated with the religious use of Sunday" (page 230). Better and more dignified buildings in which to hold elections might also help to secure sober thought.

A better understanding of political psychology may even lead to reopening the question of the best form of government. Representative democracy was introduced under the mistaken intellectual conception of human nature. Was not its introduction, therefore, a mistake? No, says Mr. Wallas; for though we may reject the traditional democratic philosophy, we can still defend our democratic institutions by reconsidering the purpose of representation, which is chiefly to secure government by consent; "and the degree of consent required may shade from the mere acceptance of accomplished facts, to the an

nouncement of positive decisions taken by a majority of the citizens, which government must interpret and obey" (page 200).

The chapter on "Official Thought" is chiefly in praise of the reformed civil service which experience has proved to be a necessity in a democracy. Mr. Wallas thinks that care in selecting candidates for appointment should be followed by careful and continuous training. The economic motive is not sufficient to secure the best official thought and service. The politician or statesman must therefore be enough of a psychologist to see that appeal is made to other motives. In reading these pages one somehow feels that it is Mr. Wallas's thought, unconscious perhaps, that if the modern statesman is grounded in psychology the greatest obstacle to the socialist state will be removed; for all that is necessary to make the government official as alert and efficient as could be desired is to keep him working under proper incentives.

Nationalism, conceived by Bismarck as possible of achievement through "blood and iron" and by Mazzini as based on a distinct and homogeneous type of man, is no longer possible in the face of new knowledge in the realms of psychology and evolution-knowledge that leads us directly to humanitarianism, "the most fatal solvent of empire." "Imperial egoism" is likewise deprived of all psychological basis. The new tendencies of thought started by Darwin's Origin of Species enable us to do what Mazzini thought impossible, namely, conceive of humanity as composed of individuals rather than a "mosaic of homogeneous nations." We now can and do think of the human race as a biological group, in which every individual "differs from every other not arbitrarily but according to an intelligible process of organic evolution." The immediate effect of the application of Darwinism to politics, however, was not to produce a general love of humanity. It was, on the contrary, used to justify the extermination of African aborigines by Europeans and, still worse, to prove that the "conflict among the European nations for the control of the trade routes of the world" is "a scientific necessity and a moral duty" (page 289), according to the law of the struggle for life and the survival of the fittest. But evolutionists are now telling us that improvement in the biological inheritance is not to be sought in conflict, but rather through what is coming to be known as the science of eugenics. Mr. Wallas therefore suggests that an international science of eugenics might well be substituted for extermination.

The reviewer is struck by what seems to him a general similarity between the ideas set forth by Mr. Wallas in the present volume and those of Mr. H. G. Wells in A Modern Utopia. No author (if one

may trust the index) is quoted with approval so frequently as Mr. Wells, though the parallelism of ideas is not fully revealed by the specific references to Mr. Wells's various writings. It would not be fair, however, to give the impression that Mr. Wallas's ideas are altogether utopian. He is himself a practical politician and a useful public official, and what he has written is full of practical suggestion and stimulating analysis. The illustrative material is well chosen, and the style nearly always above criticism. The argument is not always clear, although a rather full synopsis of contents makes this fault less serious. A serviceable index increases the value of the volume.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

CHARLES C. WILLIAMSON.

Studies in the American Race Problem. By ALFRED HOLT STONE. New York, Doubleday, Page and Company, 1908.—xxii, 555 PP.

In the work under review, Mr. Stone presents the views of a southerner on the Negro question. He marshals his facts well, and he evidently desires to discuss them logically and impartially. He is guilty, nevertheless, of glaring inconsistencies. Declaring that the problem is a national one, he shows impatience not only of much of the comment that comes from the North, but of the endeavor of northern men to contribute towards a solution. He warns the reader against generalizing from special instances, and then he cites a simple case from which he himself draws pessimistic conclusions. It relates to an experience on a southern plantation, where seventy-five Negro families worked under the orders of one overseer and where an unusual proportion of migrations occurred. Mr. Stone ignores the personal equation in the matter (it is surely possible that the Negroes did not like this particular overseer) and he bases upon this special instance a gloomy forecast of the future of the Negro.

The author expresses his discouragement over the fact that the Negroes on the Mississippi plantations are less successful than the Italian immigrants in making small farms profitable. He has not considered how severe a test it is to place the Negro of Mississippi in economic competition with a selected group from a thrifty and industrious European nation. The very fact that these immigrants have come to America shows them to be more resourceful and enterprising and intent upon success than their fellows who remain at home. Even our white American farmers cannot obtain from the land so large a yield as Italians trained in intensive farming.