tion: Who shall decide what is for the public welfare and what is reasonable? Where can be found the bar of reason to which appeal shall be made? In themselves, say the courts. A legislature may pass a law requiring barbers to be examined and to procure licenses before practicing their trade, and this is a reasonable interference with industrial freedom, because the barber comes in personal contact with others and may endanger health. A legislature may think that an unskilled plumber may also endanger health, but the courts say that such thoughts are unreasonable, "because the business of plumbing does not bring the plumber in personal contact with the public." A state legislature and court may think it reasonable to forbid the members of train crews to work more than sixteen hours out of twenty-four, but the United States Supreme Court deems it unreasonable to forbid men to work more than ten hours in bakeshops.

On the whole, the prevailing tendency has been to justify interference with industrial freedom, and so far the decisions of the year may be regarded as good. The courts, with one exception, even say that the liberty of the press may be restrained when used to make the boycott effective. These decisions have created a great deal of dissatisfaction in labor circles, but they are likely to stand, at least until our law recognizes inequalities among men. The citizen is guaranteed the right to bear arms, but he may be restrained from using them to the injury of his neighbor, and this, too, before the injury is done. Is it unreasonable to apply the same rule to the press? So far as the writer is aware, the blacklist has never been declared illegal; but, if a case were brought up involving this question, the court must, in the light of the boycott decisions, put the blacklist in the same category. Also combinations of capital to fight organized labor should be put under the ban.

UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS.

DAVID Y. THOMAS.

MR.

THE CONSTITUTION OF OKLAHOMA

R. BRYCE has commended to scholars the study of our state constitutions on account of their historic interest and their value for the science of comparative politics. In them, he urges with good reason, one may read the annals of legislative and political sentiment more easily and more succinctly than in any similar series of laws in any other country.' It may be added that these fundamental laws are all the more instructive to the student of practical politics, because they contain, in a large measure, the definite rules of law which are steadily being devised to meet concrete problems as social pressures from various directions bring them within the sphere of legislation. In fact, it is highly probable that the political philosopher who considered them in the abstract would go far astray; because they mainly reflect the legal adjustments which have accompanied the material development of our country and are well-nigh meaningless to anyone not acquainted with the course of our economic evolution during the past century. From this point of view, the constitution of the recently admitted state of Oklahoma possesses a unique interest, for its framers have searched with great assiduity among the fundamental laws and statutes of all the other states for the latest inventions known to American politics and have worked them into a voluminous treatise on public law-a mosaic in which the glittering new designs of "advanced democracy' appear side by side with patterns of ancient English make.

I. Structure of the central government.

In the bold framework of this new government, there is little that is novel or striking, and it would be a work of supererogation to describe it in detail. Accordingly we consider only the newer devices which have a special significance in showing the general tendencies in our constitutional development.

1 American Commonwealth, vol. i, p. 450.

In the midst of a movement, commended by the experience of many states,' toward an integration of the administrative system into a responsible hierarchy and the centralization of control in the hands of the governor, Oklahoma has gone almost as far as possible in the other direction. In fact, faith in the check and balance system as a guarantee of efficiency and justice in administration is expressly stated in the article ordering the legislature to provide by law for the establishment and maintenance of

an efficient system of checks and balances between the officers of the executive department, and all commissioners and superintendents and boards of control of state institutions, and all other officers entrusted with the collection, receipt, custody or disbursement of the revenues or moneys of the state whatsoever.

In accordance with this scheme of government, not only are the old executive officials-secretary of state, auditor, attorney-general and treasurer-elected by popular vote, but also the newer authorities-superintendent of public instruction, insurance commissioner, state examiner of state and county accounts, commissioner of labor, mine inspector and commissioner of charities. The corporation commission, which in New York is appointed by the governor by and with the advice of the Senate, is composed in Oklahoma of three members elected by the voters of the state for a term of six years, one member going out bien

'It must be admitted, however, that some of the states are going in the direction of popular election. Governor Blanchard, of Louisiana, in his message of May 14, 1906, said: "In my inaugural address I recommended to this General Assembly at its first session, that action be taken on the line of relegating to the people the filling by popular vote of offices under the state government that were filled by appointment of the governor. Much then was done in this direction. The judges of the supreme court, theretofore appointed by the governor, were made elective. The register of the State Land Office and the commissioner of agriculture and immigration, thereto. fore appointive, were made elective the same as other state officers. So also vacancies occurring in the offices of district judge, district attorney, sheriff and clerk of court, which vacancies when occurring had heretofore been filled by appointment of the governor, are now filled by election of the people at special elections called for the purpose." On the other hand, Governor Hughes, of New York, in his 1909 inaugural address inveighed against the irresponsibility engendered by the decentralized elective system.

nially. Over this decentralized and independent administrative system, the governor has only general supervisory power. He must, of course, see that the laws are executed, and he may require information under oath from all the officers and commissioners of the state on any subject relating to the discharge of their public functions; but he has no coercive authority over the chief administrative officers through the disciplinary power of appointment and removal. By way of compensation, however, he is given a term of four years in which to learn that art of control which is unknown to the formal legal methods.1

All elective state officers, including the justices of the supreme court, are liable to removal by the process of impeachment "for wilful neglect of duty, corruption in office, habitual drunkenness, incompetency, or any offense involving moral turpitude committed while in office."

In determining the number of members which the legislature shall contain, constitution makers in the United States have apparently arrived at no consistent principles. A study of twentyone states having a population of between one and three millions reveals an average of forty in the Senate and one hundred and fifteen in the House. Oklahoma somewhat approaches the average by having forty-four senators and one hundred and nine representatives; but when compared with the fifty-one senators and one hundred and fifty assemblymen in New York, with a population of over seven millions, the number seems decidedly out of proportion. Following the example set by a majority of the states, biennial election of the members of the lower house is provided 3 and the senatorial term is put at four years, one-half retiring biennially. Biennial sessions of the legislature are also provided; but to induce the members to confine their operations within a limit of sixty days it is ordered that they shall receive $6.00 per day during that period and

Goodnow, Politics and Administration, p. 173.

Dealey, Our State Constitutions (1907), p. 43.

According to Professor Dealey, three states in 1905 had quadrennial elections for the lower house; Georgia, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island and South Carolina had annual meetings; and all the other states held biennial elections. Ibid., p. 45.

only $2.00 for each day's attendance thereafter. Accordingly, unless patriotic devotion to law-making or some other important considerations are brought to bear, Oklahoma need not be expected to contribute more than her quota to that vast mass of statutes which Judge Parker estimated at 25,000 pages a year. This precise limitation, however, may impose on the legislators that "severe nervous strain" under which it is said Indiana law-makers labor to complete their necessary work within the sixty-one days prescribed by the constitution."

Except for some important limitations on procedure which will be considered below, the Oklahoma judicial system presents few features of interest. The justices of the supreme court, however, are selected by a rather novel process: the state is divided into five districts; in each district candidates are to be nominated at the primaries by the political parties or by petition; such candidates are voted for by the qualified voters of the state at large, no elector voting for more than one candidate from each district; and the candidates receiving the highest number of votes in the state are, severally, the justices-elect of the particular districts from which they are nominated. In order to expedite judicial business Oklahoma has not resorted to the drastic device of refusing to pay the justices of the supreme court until they have finally decided the cases before them—a method now in force in several states 3-but it simply orders them to render a written opinion in each case within six months after it has been submitted. This may have the salutary effect of abbreviating the absurdly long opinions which our courts are prone to inflict on the suffering public; at all events it will prove an interesting experiment."

II. Special restrictions on the authorities of the state.
The crowning restriction on the delegated authorities of the

1 Proceedings of the American Political Science Association, 1907, p. 105.
2 Ibid., p. 103.
3 Dealey, op. cit., p. 41.

4 It is estimated that there are in America alone over six thousand volumes of decisions, and that from one to two hundred volumes are being added annually. Proceedings of the American Political Science Association, 1907, p. 83. Certainly it is time to restrict the loquacity of our law speakers.