which democracy may pass over into plutocracy; and it is indeed fortunate that the American people in its recent attitude toward the question of campaign contributions has begun to show an adequate realization of the danger confronting it.

To sum up the argument presented in the foregoing pages, it should be noted that while it is comparatively easy to formulate a definition of corruption, to point out the difference between the legal and ethical conceptions of the matter, to distinguish between bribery and auto-corruption and, in general, to mark out the logical boundaries of the field, the application of these definitions and distinctions is made immensely difficult by the variety of political institutions, the divergence of political practices and the conflict between general opinion and class opinions. A number of conclusions would nevertheless seem to deserve at least tentative expression.

(1) The prevalence of charges of corruption and of actual corruption in American politics is not of itself proof of our inferiority in political morality to the other great nations of the world.

(2) Considering opportunities and temptations, our current political morality is at least not yet proven to be inferior to our business and social morality in general.

(3) Unsupported charges of corruption are too frequently indulged in by practical politicians, reformers and conservatives, the results being a popular moral callousness and a loss of social confidence which render all constructive work more difficult.

(4) Acts involving corrupt motives range in current social estimation all the way from heinous felonies to minor foibles. The view that there are only a few "corruptionists," all of whom richly deserve criminal sentences and might receive them without unduly crowding our penitentiaries, is a grotesque misconception. Instead of this we must recognize frankly that self-interest and social interests are inextricably bound up as motive forces of our social machinery, often working in harmony and reinforcing each other, but sometimes colliding and presenting new questions for moral determination and social protective action.

(5) From among such cases of collision between social and self-interest we must endeavor to single out those most obviously harmful to society and the state, and, not content with branding them as morally bad, we must formulate legal prohibitions supported by penalties severe enough to check the evil. Particularly important in this field of work is a thorough solution of the whole question of party finances.

(6) Certain cases in which political action is determined by corrupt considerations may be more effectively combated with moral than with legal sanctions. These are cases which threaten no very serious consequences, cases in which the corrupt considerations are not directly material in character, cases in which personal advantage is not so much sought as the advantage of some social group, and all other cases of so subtle or undecided a character that definite legal action, at least under existing conditions, is impossible. In the presence of many such difficulties we can only plead for a clearer recognition by the individual of duty to the state and to society as a whole. On the other hand, society and the state as now constituted fall short of a full and humane ideal of justice and hence are partly responsible for existing corruption.

Finally it should be said that all effective work against corruption must be two-fold. On the one hand we must endeavor to raise moral and legal standards to a higher level. On the other hand we must unrelentingly prosecute actual offenses to the full extent of existing law. Work of the first sort must be either impersonal or based upon well authenticated facts. Work of the second sort must above all things be subjected to a wise restraint; sweeping charges resting merely upon suspicion must be scrupulously avoided; direct and well-founded. charges must be put into legal form and fought to the last resort. Reformers should learn to bring down all direct and personal accusations to the level of existing law, until they have succeeded in bringing the level of the law up to their ideal standard.

ROBERT C. BROOKS.

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI.

MUNICIPAL SOCIALISM AND ITS ECONOMIC

LIMITATIONS

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO CONDITIONS IN NEW YORK CITY

T

HE theoretic socialism which involves the destruction of

our existing society and its reconstruction on other bases has made little progress towards accomplishment. But as the increased coöperation necessary to enable modern civilization to perform its complex functions leads us each year further away from the simpler individualism of early life, we are drifting, for the most part unconsciously, toward a practical socialism, the tendencies and results of which it becomes highly important to analyze.

We call this movement municipal socialism, but, as in the case of the other, older and parent socialism, its definition is not easy. Viewed in its broadest aspect, it might mean merely the use which communities make of government in order to engage in coöperative effort. But this would be almost equivalent to making it a synonym for government itself. What is commonly understood by the term municipal socialism is the use by municipalities of the powers of general taxation to obtain special advantages which do not enure to the benefit of those who chiefly defray the cost. It is a phase of the universal struggle of those who have not to take from those who have. It signifies the tendency to depart further and further from those earlier ideas of justice in taxation, which required that the users of public utilities should pay for them, each according to the benefit he derived.

In the earlier stages of urban development, it was comparatively easy to adhere to such principles of justice. For example, in the days of the Dutch occupation of New York, when it was deemed necessary to pave the street known as "Prince's Graft "-inappropriate name!-each resident was required to pave that portion of the street which lay before his own door. While this service is now commuted by money payments, its

essential principle still adheres in our special assessments for benefits. The growth of the "fee system" also contemplated that the benefits of certain advantages of government should be paid for by those who use them. This is still an important factor in modern revenue systems. We have our court fees for litigants, writers of letters still pay postage, and the users of water still pay water rates. But with the growth of municipal functions it has been found impossible to apportion to each citizen his share of the public burden, based on the particular benefits he derives; and each year municipalities are led to depend more and more upon general taxation to meet the expenses of government. In a popular sense, any system of government is generally regarded as socialistic which enables the useless or thriftless drones of society to share equally with the workers those public advantages and conveniences which are provided at public expense. Yet our parks are free to tramp and millionaire alike, and our public schools not only permit but enforce, by means of truancy laws, the attendance of all children of a certain age.

The sense of justice which every man feels (and freely expresses when his own interests are not involved) demands that taxes shall, so far as possible, be equitably imposed. But the laws of the incidence of taxation and its economic effects are still matters of dispute among political economists; and, even if they were understood by the general public, it is clear that no workable system of taxation could be devised or administered which was based solely on the principle of quid pro quo.

If we regard, then, as socialistic any system whereby the property of one man is expropriated by forms of law for the benefit of another, it is manifest that in some degree this kind of theoretical injustice has long been with us. It is the extent of its development rather than its mere existence which is of practical interest.

Without tracing in detail the development of municipal revenue systems, it will be sufficient to show how far we have departed from the earlier ideas of justice in taxation by referring to the results of the operation by the city of New York of the Staten Island Ferry. This ferry is owned by the city and

is operated at an annual loss of about three-quarters of a million dollars. This sum does not fall far short of representing the entire amount of taxes paid by the borough of Richmond as its contribution towards all the expenses of city government. In view of the fact that this ferry is run practically for the sole benefit of the residents of this borough, justice in taxation would seem to require that this loss should be borne by them; and if we should imagine the taxes paid by the borough of Richmond to be devoted to this purpose, the result would be that every other service of a public character which that borough receives-police and fire protection, educational, correctional and charitable institutions, health service etc.-would have to be regarded as almost a free gift from the taxpayers of the other boroughs. Again: the taxes for 1908 levied on the property within the old village of Corona in the borough of Queens amounted to $132,085.39; whereas the amount spent in 1908 by the city of New York in this same district for educational purposes alone amounted to $107,174.70.

In commenting upon the subtle growth of municipal socialism, a recent writer remarks that "one of the striking peculiarities of the human animal is the readiness with which it accepts improved conditions and forgets that the previous conditions ever existed"; and then he proceeds to say: "In view of the general failure to realize the extent of the progress already made, it seems that Shaw was nearer right when he said: 'The practical abrogation of property, as it exists at present, will occur without being much noticed.'"

It is rather remarkable that the more influential advocates of municipal socialism at the present time are not found among the propagandists of socialism as a theory of government. Strange to say, it is in large part from individuals of the propertied class that the movement at present derives its impetus. Philanthropists impatient of the slow results of private benevolence, charity workers distrustful of the efficacy of privately

In 1907 the loss incurred in operating this ferry was $723,208; whereas the total of taxes levied on the borough of Richmond was $893,997.97.

* John C. Trautwine, Jr., Proceedings of the Engineers' Club of Philadelphia, vol. xxv, no. 2; April, 1908.