to them by the party who shall so arm or augment the force of such vessels? If the first be unlawful, is the last lawful? 17th. Do the laws of neutrality, considered as aforesaid, authorize the United States to permit France, her subjects, or citizens, the sale within their ports of prizes made of the subjects or property of a power at war with France, before they have been carried into some port of France and there condemned, refusing the privilege to her enemy? 18th. Do those laws authorize the United States to permit to France the erection of courts within their territory and jurisdiction, for the trial and condemnations of prizes refusing that privilege to a power at war with France? 19th. If any armed vessel of foreign power at war with another, with whom the United States are at peace, shall make prize of the subjects or property of its enemy within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, have not the United States a right to cause restitution of such prize? Are they bound or not by the principles of neutrality so to do, if such prize shall be within their power? 20th. To what distance, by the laws and usages of nations, may the United States exercise the right of prohibiting the hostilities of foreign powers at war with each other, within rivers, bays, and arms of the sea, and upon the sea along the coast of the United States? 21st. Have vessels armed for war, under commission from a foreign power, a right without the consent of the United States, to engage within their jurisdiction seamen or soldiers, for the service of such vessels, being citizens of that power or of another foreign power, or citizens of the United States? 22d. What are the articles by name to be prohibited to both or either party? 23d. To what extent does the reparation permitted in the nineteenth article of the treaty with France, go? 24th. What may be done as to vessels armed in our ports before the President's proclamation? And what as to the prizes they made before and after? 25th. May we within our own ports sell ships to both parties prepared merely for merchandise? May they be pierced for guns? 26th. May we carry either or both kinds to the ports of the belligerent powers for sale? 27th. Is the principle that free bottoms make free goods, and enemies bottoms make enemies goods, to be considered as now an established part of the law of nations? 28th. If it is not, are nations with whom we have no treaties, authorized by the law of nations to take out of our vessels enemy passengers, not being soldiers, and their baggage? 29th. May an armed vessel belonging to any of the belligerent powers, follow immediately merchant vessels, enemies departing from our ports, for the purpose of making prizes of them? If not, how long ought the former to remain after the latter has sailed? And what shall be considered as the place of departure, from which the time is to be counted? And how are the facts to be ascertained? The first twenty-one questions by Alexander Hamilton. XVI. Heads of consideration on the conduct we are to observe in the war between Spain and Great Britain, and particularly should the latter attempt the conquest of Louisiana and the Floridas. The dangers to us, should Great Britain possess herself of those countries: She will possess a territory equal to half ours beyond the Mississippi. She will reduce that half of ours which is on this side of the Mississippi;-by her language, laws, religion, manners, government, commerce, capital;-by the possession of New Orleans, which draws to it the dependence of all the waters of the Mis sissippi;-by the markets she can offer them in the Gulf of Mexico and elsewhere. She will take from the remaining part of our States the markets they now have for their produce;-by furnishing those markets cheaper with the same articles, tobacco, rice, indigo, bread, lumber, arms, naval stores, furs. She will have then possessions double the size of ours, as good in soil and climate. Instead of two She will encircle us completely, by these possessions on our land-board, and her fleets on our sea-board. neighbors balancing each other, we shall have than the strength of both. Would the prevention of this be worth a war? one with more Consider our abilities to take part in a war. Our operations would be by land only. employ?—their cost? equal to this. How many men should we need to Our resources of taxation and credit Weigh the evil of this new accumulation of debt against the loss of markets, and eternal expense and danger from so overgrown a neighbor. But this is on supposition that France, as well as Spain, shall be engaged in the war; for, with Spain alone, the war would be unsuccessful, and our situation rendered worse. No need to take a part in the war as yet. We may choose our own time. Delay gives us many chances to avoid it altogether. In such a choice of objects, Great Britain may not single out Louisiana and the Floridas. She may fail in her attempt on them. France and Spain may recover them. If all these chances fail, we should have to re-take them. The difference between re-taking and preventing, overbalanced by the benefits of delay. Delay enables us to be better prepared to obtain from the allies a price for our assistance. Suppose these our ultimate views, what is to be done at this time? 1. As to Spain :— If she be as sensible as we are, that she cannot save Louis iana and the Floridas, might she not prefer their independence to their subjection to Great Britain? Does not the proposition of the Count d'Estaing furnish us an opening to communicate our ideas on this subject to the court of France, and through them to that of Madrid? and our readiness to join them in guaranteeing the independence of those countries? This might save us from a war, if Great Britain respected our weight in a war; and if she does not, the object would place the war on popular ground with us. 2. As to England?-say to Beckwith,— That as to a treaty of commerce, we would prefer amicable to adversary arrangements, though the latter would be infallible, and in our own power: that our ideas are, that such a treaty should be founded in perfect reciprocity, and would, therefore, be its own price: that as to an alliance, we can say nothing till its object be shown, and that it is not to be inconsistent with existing engagements that in the event of a war between Great Britain and Spain, we are disposed to be strictly neutral: that, however, we should view with extreme uneasiness any attempts of either power to seize the possessions of the other on our frontier, as we consider our own safety interested in a due balance between our neighbors. [It might be deemed advantageous to express this latter sentiment, because, if there be any difference of opinion in their councils, whether to bend their force against North or South America, or the islands (and certainly there is room for difference), and if these opinions be nearly balanced, that balance ought to be determined by the prospect of having an enemy the more or less, according to the object they should select.] July 12th, 1790. XVII. Heads of consideration on the Navigation of the Mississippi, for Mr. Carmichael, Aug. 22d, 1790. We have a right to the navigation of the Mississippi-1, by Nature; 2, by Treaty. It is necessary to us. United States is on the More than half the territory of the waters of that river. Two hundred thousand of our citizens are settled on them, of whom forty thouThese have no other outlet for their tobacco, sand bear arms. rice, corn, hemp, lumber, house timber, ship timber. We have hitherto respected the indecision of Spain, because we wish peace ;-because our western citizens have had vent at home for their productions. A surplus of production begins now to demand foreign markets. Whenever they shall say, "We cannot, we will not, be longer shut up," the United States will be reduced to the following dilemma: 1. To force them to acquiescence. 2. To separate from them, rather than take part in a war against Spain. 3. Or to preserve them in our Union, by joining them in the war. The 1st is neither in our principles, nor in our power. 2d. A multitude of reasons decide against the second. It may suffice to speak out one were we to give up half our territory rather than engage in a just war to preserve it, we should not keep the other half long. 3d. The third is the alternative we must adopt. How are we to obtain that navigation? (A.) By Force. I. Acting separately. That we can effect this with certainty and promptitude, circumstances decide. Objection. We cannot retain New Orleans, for instance, were we to take it. Answer. A moderate force may be so secured, as to hold out till succored. Our succors can be prompt and effectual. Suppose, after taking it, we withdraw our force. If Spain retakes it by an expedition, we can recover it by a |