February and August, 1880; authorities under ABOLITION, WAR POWERS, and REBELLION. The text of the two proclamations is in 12 Stat. at Large, 1267, 1268. See also 13 Wallace's Reports, 654; 16 Wallace's Reports, 68; 18 Wallace's Reports, 546; 92 U. S. Reports, 542; 20 La. Ann. Reports, 199; 43 Ala. Reports, 592.

ALEXANDER JOHNSTON.

ARRÊT DE

EMBARGO, ANGARIA, PRINCE. These three terms designate three different measures which the government of a country may take toward merchant vessels, whether they belong to its own subjects or to the subjects of foreign nations. These measures have this in common, that they are impediments in the way of freedom of commerce. They present certain differences, which the best authorities, such as Vinnius ad Peckium, De Nav. non excus.; Stypmannus, Ad Jus maritimum, part v., chap. i., 4, 32; Loccenius, De Jure marit.; Targa, Dé Ponderazione maritimme; Galiani, De Doveri de Principi neutrali, have not sufficiently set forth.Embargo is the act of the sovereign power in a country of detaining in its ports in time of war, or even in peace in the anticipation of war, or as a reprisal measure, the ships of subjects, of friends or enemies, of natives or foreigners, together with their cargoes, and of preventing their departure for a longer or shorter time, but without exacting any active service from them.The usual object of an embargo is to throw an obstacle in the way of the divulgation of facts which it is to the interest of the power laying the embargo to keep secret, such as preparations for an expedition, a revolt, or the death of a prince or sovereign. Justice and the rights of nations, in accordance with which each is completely independent of all others, can not approve such measures. Hence, a great number of treaties contain stipulations guaranteeing the ships of the nations signing them from embargo. History shows that these stipulations have not always been respected. In the wars of the Crimea, of Italy, of 1866, and of 1870–71, European governments did not have recourse to the measure of embargo. Far from laying an embargo upon the ships of the enemy, they allowed them all necessary time to return to their own country. An embargo is sometimes laid before the declaration of war; it is a forerunner of the rupture between two nations. If matters are amicably arranged between the parties, the embargo is raised. Embargo does not occasion neutral parties as much damage as does angaria; it causes detention, but does not force the ships on which it is laid into active service and the dangers which accompany it; hence it is not the custom to indemnify their owners.-The two most recent examples of embargo are that laid by England, on Jan. 14, 1801, upon the Danish, Swedish and Russian ships which were in the ports of Great Britain, and which was only ended by the maritime convention of 1801; and that by France

upon Dutch vessels, Nov. 7, 1832, which was raised after the capture of the citadel of Antwerp.-It is customary to stipulate in modern treaties for certain conditions to assure the subjects of the contracting powers established in the country of the other power sufficient time to enable them to leave and to remove the goods which belong to them. — Angaria (ayyapɛía, service or labor exacted against one's will,) is the making of a requisition, by a belligerent, of the foreign vessels in its ports or roads, and imposing on them, paying them a remuneration, which detracts in no wise from the arbitrary character of the measure, certain services of war, such as transportation of troops, arms and ammunition, in spite of their rights of neutrality. Angaria imposes an active service upon the vessels on which it is laid; embargo, on the contrary, imposes no active service. Angaria affects all ships which happen to be in a port or road; embargo ordinarily only those of a single nation; it is often in the nature of a reprisal. Very like angaria is the act by which the Prussian government, in the war of 1870–71, scuttled six English merchantmen, which were stationed in the lower Seine. The Prussian government, however, soon took pains to acknowledge that an indemnity was due from it to the proprietors of these vessels.-Some modern authors, in the first rank of which may be cited Hautefeuille, Des Droits et des Devoirs des Nations neutres, 2d ed., vol. iii., p. 415, etc., justly inveigh against the doctrines of the publicists of the last century and the early part of the nineteenth, who wished to legitimatize embargo and angaria, by considering them as a law, or as a consequence of the law of legitimate defense, etc. Custom, it is true, has for a long time authorized the practice; but the illegality of such measures is too evident and too contrary to the ideas of justice and morality to survive. It is one of the incontestable rights of sovereignty either to permit or refuse entry to a port, and the power of carrying on commerce there; but the vessel once admitted to sojourn and trade there, it is an arbitrary act to impose any service upon it, such as is authorized by angaria. There does not exist a treaty, a single international act, by which belligerents are authorized to violate the neutrality of ships stationed in their ports. So far from that, in the case of angaria, as in that of embargo, many international conventions stipulate that the ships belonging. to the contracting powers shall not be seized. Angaria "is less the exercise of a right than the abuse of power."-Is the neutral ship impressed by angaria exempt from confiscation if it happensto be taken by the enemy? Hübner, De la Saisie des Bâtiments neutres, vol. i., chap. vii., §2, decides this question in the affirmative; but his opinion can not be justified. The captor could not be expected to seek out the causes which have changed a neutral vessel into an enemy's vessel; and the ship taken under these conditions is evidently a fair prize. "Arrêt de prince" must not be confounded with either embargo or angaria. It con

sists, although peace may be in no danger, in seizing, on the plea of public necessity, a ship, whether it is still at anchor in port or has set out to sea, and in the latter case interrupting a voyage already begun. It is a species of angaria in time of peace. An arrêt de prince may proceed from the government of the seized ships, or from a foreign government. In the case of arrêt de prince, the seized vessel is yielded up to its owners, or its value and that of its cargo is paid; whereas embargo terminates almost always in the confiscation of the enemy's property.

CH. VERGÉ.

EMBARGO (IN U. S. HISTORY), a prohibition of commerce by national authority, which was laid in various forms and at various times from 1794 until 1815. In case of a general embargo American vessels were forbidden to leave port, foreign vessels were required to sail in ballast, or with only such cargo as they had on board at the passage of the act, and coasting vessels were required to give bonds to land their cargoes in American ports only. An embargo aimed at a particular nation was a modification known as a non-intercourse law. -The possibility of such a suspension of commerce was certainly considered by the convention of 1787 in framing the constitution. Madison, in discussing the power to tax exports, Aug. 21, 1787, spoke as follows: "An embargo may be of absolute necessity, and can only be effectuated by the general authority." - I. ORDERS IN COUNCIL. The opening of the French revolution, the abolition of all feudal taxes, honors and immunities, the emigration of those nobles not in sympathy with the new régime, and the practical dethronement of the king, were followed, in April, 1792, by a declaration of war by the French republic against Austria and Prussia, whose troops were drawing menacingly near the French boundaries, and whose soil was permitted to be a basis of operations for hostile emigrés. Nov. 15, 1792, the French national convention declared its hostility to any people which should maintain a prince or a privileged order, and four days afterward the same authority offered assistance to every people desirous of recovering liberty. Feb. 3, 1793, the French republic declared war against Great Britain and Holland, and before the end of the year France "had but one enemy, and that was Europe." By land the French arms were steadily successful; by sea, in spite of every public and private exertion in France, Great Britain maintained her accustomed superiority. The rule that "he who is not with us is against us" became the only international law thoroughly respected in Europe, and the steady determination of both the great belligerents to enforce the rule upon the western continent also is the key to most of the difficulties of the United States during the next twenty years.-A French agent (see GENET, CITIZEN,) was at once sent to the United States to rouse popular enthu

siasm there, and thus compel the government to engage in the war as an active or passive ally of France. May 9, 1793, in direct violation of the treaty of 1778 between France and the United States, the national convention authorized French ships of war and privateers to stop and bring into French ports all neutral vessels loaded with "eatables" or with enemy's goods, which latter were declared good prize. The representations of Morris, the American minister, only obtained a temporary and delusive suspension of the order. June 8, 1793, Great Britain, by orders in council to her navy, directed neutral vessels bound for France with breadstuffs to be seized and brought into British ports, where the cargoes were to be paid for by the government or bonded to be landed in countries at peace with Great Britain.

Another grievance, closely connected with the general embargo system, was the vexatious right of search and impressment claimed and exercised by British national vessels. American vessels were liable at any moment to be stopped, searched, and deprived of the services of any seamen whom a British lieutenant, backed by a file of marines, might decide to be Englishmen. Great Britain had always persistently denied the right of expatriation and change of allegiance by naturalization, and, now that she was engaged in a life or death struggle with France, she claimed the services on shipboard of all her maritime citizens, at home or abroad, no matter what ceremonies of naturalization, unrecognized by English laws, they might have undergone in any foreign country. Of course, under color of natural resemblance to Englishmen, many nativeborn Americans were thus forced into the British navy. The right of expatriation was at that time acknowledged by hardly any nation except the United States; but, even in the case of naturalized citizens, the right of search and impressment, vexatious enough in itself, was aggravated by the rigorous and merciless manner of its exercise by British officers of all grades, unrestrained by any probability of the disapprobation of their own government.-Many of the American politicians who had taken part in the war of the revolution retained a firm faith in the efficacy of restrictions upon British commerce as a means of compelling justice from Great Britain (see REVOLUTION), and Madison introduced into congress, Jan. 4, 1794, a series of resolutions for the imposition of prohibitory duties upon importations from Great Britain. These resolutions, though not finally adopted, laid the foundations of the "restrictive system," which was steadily followed out by the republican party until it culminated in the war of 1812. The republican leaders in 1794, Madison, Nicholas and Giles, admitted that "our trade with Great Britain was one-half our whole commerce, while Great Britain's trade with us was but one-sixth of hers;" but they insisted that the exports from the United States were essentials, while the imports were luxuries, and that an embargo, or tempo

tinuance of the negotiation. This decision, not so much in itself as in the refusal to back it by the instant and industrious preparation of a strong naval force, laid the foundation for most of the difficulties of the following eight years. It confirmed the bent of the dominant party in the United States against the formation of a navy (see DEMOCRATIC PARTY, II., III.; GUNBOAT SYSTEM), and it furnished fresh reasons and excuses for the growing anti-neutral disposition of the British government, which was not in the habit of paying any great attention to the remonstrances or arguments of a defenseless nation.May 16, 1806, the British government, by proclamation, declared a blockade of the coast of Germany, Holland and France, from Brest to the Elbe, a distance of about 800 miles. Against warfare of this kind Napoleon was powerless; the British islands were entirely beyond his reach, and there was no way to prevent the isolation of his European empire by the British fleets unless he could furnish those fleets with active occupation in some other quarter of the world. From this time, therefore, his consistent design seems to have been to irritate the British government into fresh exhibitions of anti-neutral temper by extra-ordinary reprisals of his own, in order thus to force the United States at last to assume the bur den of a naval warfare against Great Britain, while he should monopolize the glory and profit of the campaigns on land. The game was entertaining to the toreador, and probably to the bull also, but the United States certainly paid the expenses of the entertainment.-Nov. 21, 1806, after the battle of Jena, Napoleon issued his Berlin decree, in which he, who hardly possessed a vessel of war in blue water, assumed to blockade the British islands. The decree also ordered the seizure of all English property, persons and letters found on the continent. The whole decree, which began the so-called "continental system" of Napoleon, was alleged to be in retaliation for the English abuse of the right of blockade. During the ensuing year, according to Mr. Baring and the American minister to France, General Armstrong, no condemnations took place under the Berlin decree. It served its purpose better by drawing out the British orders in council of Nov. 11, 1807. This extraordinary document totally prohibited any direct trade from the United States to any port or country of Europe from which the British flag was excluded; it allowed direct trade, in American produce only, between the United States and Sweden; it ordered all articles of domestic or colonial production, exported by the United States to Europe, to be landed in England, whence their re-exportation, on paying duties, would be permitted and regulated; and it declared any vessel and cargo good prize if it carried a French consular certificate of the origin of the cargo. Napoleon retorted by the Milan decree, Dec. 7, 1807, in which he declared to be "denationalized" and good prize, whether found in continental ports or on the high seas, VOL. II.- - 6

59

any vessel which should submit to search by a British vessel, or should touch at or set sail for or from Great Britain or her colonies.-With this, for a time, both parties paused, for neither could well do or say more. To quote Jefferson's subsequent expression, "England seemed to have become a den of pirates, and France a den of thieves." Both had helped to make neutrality ridiculous. By sea, a British fleet had lately, without declaring war, swooped on the Danish navy and carried it off to England; by land, a French army had lately converted Portugal from neutrality by driving the royal family to Brazil. The United States and Sweden were the only civilized nations which were now permitted to enjoy a nominal neutrality; the latter was under the open protection of the fleets of Great Britain, and if the latest orders in council were to be submitted to, it was difficult to see, in the matter of foreign commerce, any great difference between the situation of the United States and that of any other British colony. Evidently, if the United States were to maintain rank as an independent nation, some measures of protection to their foreign commerce were imperatively demanded. The dominant party, however, was still opposed to a naval war, and Jefferson, who alone could have controlled his party, was silent; the result was a four years' effort to coerce Great Britain by the restrictive system, ending in the war of 1812. -II. THE EMBARGO. When congress met in October, 1807, (see CONGRESS, SESSIONS OF), the exercise of the right of impressment by British officers had become almost intolerable. The number of Americans impressed was afterward officially reported by the state department as 4,579 for the period March 11, 1803 - Sept. 30, 1810, omitting the time from Sept. 1, 1804, until March 31, 1806, for which the records did not account. Of this number 1,361 were released. No estimate can be made of the number of impressments never reported to a state department where no redress could be hoped for; but the muster-books of H. B. M. ships Moselle and Sappho, captured in the packet Swallow by Commodore Rodgers in 1813, showed that one-eighth of their crews were Americans; and in another ship, the Ceres, the proportion was one-third, if we may trust the affidavits of released sailors. June 22, 1807, the British frigate Leopard had taken four men out of the United States frigate | Chesapeake, after a shamefully feeble resistance. Oct. 19, 1807, the British government by proclamation had called upon all its maritime subjects serving in foreign ships to return to the service of their own country, and had directed its cruisers to enforce their return.-The proclamation, and the retaliatory orders and decrees of the great belligerents, as far as they had been received, were communicated to congress by President Jefferson in a special message of Dec. 16, as indicating the great and increasing dangers to American commerce, with the suggestion that an "inhibition of foreign commerce "would be of

advantage. The act known as "The Embargo' was at once introduced. It was passed after midnight of Dec. 21, after a consideration of four hours in the senate and three days in the house, and became law Dec. 22. A supplementary act of Jan. 9, 1808, provided that coasting vessels should not be allowed to go out without bonds to reland the cargo in some other port of the United States, and that foreign vessels should take out no specie or other cargo, except necessary sea stores. Another act, March 12, 1808, gave the executive authority to grant permission to send vessels to foreign ports to bring home American property, but this was repealed Jan. 9, 1809. -For a time the traditional belief in the efficacy of an embargo induced a sullen submission to it even by those upon whom it bore hardest, and it was formally approved by most of the state legislatures of the republican states. Within six months a great change had taken place. The suspension which the infant commerce of the United States had found tolerable for sixty days in 1794 was intolerable in 1808 to a commerce which had for fifteen years been fattening upon a dangerous but profitable neutrality. The exports, domestic and foreign, from the United States, which had risen from $20,753,098 in 1792 to $110,084,207 in 1807, fell in 1808 to $22,430,960. The change was too sudden; it injured not commerce alone, but every interest except domestic manufactures, and in May and June, 1808, Jefferson was constrained to admit that, unless Great Britain should speedily yield the principle of her orders in council, the embargo must be exchanged for open war. It was found that the embargo was quite satisfactory to both France and Great Britain. Napoleon praised it warmly, and even presumed to enforce it by the Bayonne decree, April 17, 1808, which ordered the seizure and sale of American vessels which should arrive in his ports in violation of it. Its surrender of the carrying trade to British merchants, and the consequent transfer of American capital to Canada and Nova Scotia, were equally pleasing to Great Britain. In the New England states, in which the remnants of the federal party were now concentrated, the embargo was believed to be unconstitutional, and was so decided by some of the state courts. The ground assigned was, that the unlimited suspension of the embargo was an annihilation of commerce; and was therefore a usurpation of power by congress, which was only authorized by the constitution to regulate commerce; the real reason was evidently the belief that the fundamental basis of the constitution had been violated by a factious and sectional combination of agricultural representatives for the passage of the embargo, which, though it ruined federalist New England, would save the rest of the Union the expense of war. It was therefore increasingly difficult to enforce the embargo in New England. The state legislatures, taking the ground of the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions, "intervened" for the protection of their citizens

by resolutions expressive of their emphatic condemnation of the embargo. Thus countenanced and emboldened, state judges took an attitude consistently hostile to the embargo, and the federal courts in New England seldom succeeded in finding juries which would convict even for themost flagrant violations of its provisions. Smugglers crossed and recrossed the Canada border almost in organized armies, and defied federal marshals; and, to encourage sea smuggling, an order in council of April 11, 1808, forbade interference by British cruisers with American vessels bound to British colonies, though without clearances. A supplementary embargo act of April 25, 1808, therefore, placed lake, river and bay commerce in the same category as sea-going vessels, and allowed the seizure of any merchandise which should in any way excite the suspicions of the collectors.-The second session of the 10th congress, which met Nov. 7, 1808, was at first obstinate in its support of the restrictive system. Resolutions to repeal the embargo were voted down by heavier majorities than at the first session, and on Jan. 9, 1809, an enforcing act was passed. By its terms any act done with intent to evade the embargo in any way worked a forfeiture of ship, boat or vehicle and cargo or contents, besides a fine of four times the value of both; collectors were to seize all goods "apparently on their way" to a foreign country; bonds were increased to six times the value of vessel and cargo; and absolute authority to prohibit departure, even when full bonds should be filed, was given to the collectors or the president. The act was pub-lished in mourning columns by the federalist newspapers in New England, with the motto "Liberty is dead!" Many collectors resigned, and seizures by others were met by the owners of the goods with suits for damages in state courts. Even in the United States senate a federalist declaration was made that the people were not bound to submit to the embargo act and would not submit to it, and that blood would flow in the attempt to enforce it. In February, 1809, John Quincy Adams, who had resigned his seat in the senatebecause his support of the embargo was disapproved by his state legislature, gave Jefferson and the other republican leaders an alarming account of the feeling in New England. He stated that the federalist leaders had now finally decided to break the embargo, that if the federal government should attempt to use force the New England states would temporarily or permanently withdraw from the Union, and that unofficial negotiations had already been opened for British assistance. A sudden panic, attributable either to the statements of Adams, to those of Joseph Story, then a republican congressman from Massachusetts, or to both, seized the majority in congress, and a house resolution was passed, Feb. 3, fixing March 4 for the termination of the embargo. (See KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS; SECESSION; : STATE SOVEREIGNTY; ESSEX JUNTO, HENRY DOCUMENTS; CONVENTION, HARTFORD.) - III.