THE GREAT RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE IN JUNE.

The greatest movements of the year occurred in the Eastern Theatre, and in some respects these were the most important military events of the whole summer. The territorial gains achieved by the Russians were enormously greater than any which were made on the Western Front by the FrancoBritish Armies. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that although the Western Allies in their offensive in July failed to break the enemy's line, yet the Western Theatre was of pre-eminent importance in the sense that during this summer, as throughout the whole previous history of the war, the larger part of the German Army was stationed there. The deadlock in France and Flanders tended to mask the importance of that sphere of operations, and made it of less engrossing interest to the onlookers, but nevertheless it was there, and not in Russia, that the most powerful armies were in conflict with one another.

The Tsar was nominally the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, but executive power was really vested in his Chief of Staff, General Alexieff. This commander was determined not to strike before his supply of munitions, the dearth of which had been so fatal to the Russian Army in the previous year, was really sufficient. For weeks after the snows had melted, the Russians attempted no movement. But the imminent danger of a great Italian collapse at the beginning of June caused the Russians to strike at that moment, though apparently not more than a few weeks earlier than had been intended by the Muscovite General Staff. As explained in. Chapter I., Russia's main front was really divided by the Pripet Marshes into what constituted almost independent spheres of operations, north and south respectively of those huge swamps. In the southern area, from the Pripet Marshes to the Rumanian frontier, General Brussiloff was in command, and it was to this general that the chief honours of the whole summer's campaigning must be given. He was faced by forces which were partly German and partly Austro-Hungarian, but in this region the German soldiers were a small minority. Thus there existed several reasons for selecting this part of the front for the first blow; it was the section of the enemy's front which, being mainly Austro-Hungarian, was presumably the weakest section, and it was also clear that a success achieved against Austria herself would necessarily have the most immediate effect on the perilous situation in North-eastern Italy.

The first news of the great Russian move came from Vienna, through the official communiqué issued on June 4. It was stated that the entire Austro-Hungarian front was being subjected to a terrific bombardment, and that the firing was especially severe on the Dniester and the Lower Styrpa. The Austrian lines on the Dniester, 20 miles north of Czernovitz,

were completely wrecked, and it was here that the worst collapse took place. Another immense breach in the Austrian line was made further to the north-west, east of Luck, and the first, though ultimately not the most important, Russian advance was made in the neighbourhood of that great fortress. General Brussiloff's main object was to carry out a great advance upon Kovel, which was an important railway junction. The railway running from Brest-Litovsk to Kovel and thence bifurcating to Rovno and Vladimir Volynsk, was important as affording a direct means of communication between the Austro-German Armies north and south respectively of the Pripet Marshes. The other object was to seize Czernovitz and the eastern passes of the Carpathians and thus to threaten once more, as in the early days of the war, the great plain of Hungary.

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At first the advance on Kovel met with great success. infantry attacks began on June 4, and on the first day 13,000 prisoners were captured and in the next two days another 12,000 were taken, and also 27 guns. Eastward of Luck the whole Russian line was now on the move, and so completely had the Austro-Hungarian entrenchments been destroyed that the Russians were able to use cavalry on a large scale. The unexpected success of the Russian blow had a most demoralising effect on the Austrians. Pursued by the Russian horsemen, they were rounded up in masses, and surrendered in thousands. On June 7, 50 more guns and 26,000 more prisoners were taken by the victors. General Brussiloff sent a telegram to his Emperor recording the triumph. On June 6 the advanced guards entered Luck, and the following day the town was occupied in force, and the Russians passed through rapidly and continued their march westward. Luck, it will be remembered, was captured by the Austrians in September, 1915. Dubno was also recaptured from the enemy. In four days the Russians advanced no less than 30 miles along the great main road to Vladimir Volynsk and were then not much over that distance from the town.

On June 8 a further batch of prisoners, not less than 20,000 men, was captured, but at this point assistance arrived from the German Army of the north. The German Staff quickly realised the peril of their allies, and reinforcements were found by withdrawing men from Von Hindenburg's and Prince Leopold of Bavaria's armies on the north of the Pripet Marshes. The German troops were rushed southwards to Kovel and then along the Rovno Railway as far as the River Styr, where the great battle was fought. The arrival of the German troops effectively rallied the fleeing Austrians.

Thus the advance against the left wing of the AustroHungarian Army was checked. The Austrian centre, which was situated about Brody and was commanded by the Bavarian general, Count von Bothmer, had successfully held its ground from the beginning. On the Austrian right wing, however,

there was a veritable debacle. General Brussiloff's troops, here commanded by General Letchitsky, broke all the Austrian defences on the Dniester, and on June 9 and 10 nearly 20,000 prisoners were captured in this region alone. The Austrians fled, and within a few days the Russian guns were once more bombarding Czernovitz. Between the Dniester and the Pruth there was no halt, and hordes of cavalry pursued and harried the defeated enemy.

Immense quantities of booty of all sorts fell into the hands of the Russians. Barbed-wire, rifle-ammunition, hand-grenades, coal, and supplies of all kinds were captured. For the most part, however, the Austrians succeeded in saving their guns, the number of cannons taken not being large, judged by modern standards. Thus during the first week of the offensive, June 4-10 inclusive, the total number of prisoners recorded was 107,000, but the Austrians only lost 125 guns in this period, a number which is disproportionately small, and suggests that the commanders intentionally sacrificed their infantry rather than their armament. The fighting was very severe in Galicia, as well as in Bukovina and Volhynia, but here, as already stated, the Russian progress was much less marked. On June 10, however, the Russians captured the important town of Buezacz, which is situated on the banks of the Styrpa.

During the second week of the offensive, June 11-17, the Russians continued to pour through the two great breaches in the Austrian line, but in the Austrian centre Count von Bothmer stood firm in front of Brody. The Russians threw their troops in masses against this general's army, but they were repulsed with heavy losses. The Russians reached a point within 25 miles of Kovel, but here, on the banks of the Stokhod, their advance was definitely stopped. The southern advance had far greater success. For several days the Austrians-or rather, the Hungarians, for the troops at this point were mostly Magyarsdefended the outskirts of Czernovitz with desperation, but on June 17 the Tsar's troops forced the passage of the Pruth and once more entered the capital of Bukovina. This was the third time since the beginning of the war that the Russians had captured Czernovitz. During the second week of this "battle" the Russians took 60,000 prisoners and captured 50 more guns.

The Austro-Hungarian retreat from Czernovitz was very rapid. During the last few days the passage of the Pruth was contested by a rearguard only, and these troops fought with such success that the main army, under the command of General von Pflanzer, was able to escape from the city without further losses in prisoners or guns. The Austrians did not attempt to make another stand until they reached the eastern slopes of the Carpathians. Thus the Russians advanced by forced marches for about 40 miles south of Czernovitz, and in a few days the Muscovites had once more occupied almost the whole of Bukovina. Reaching the barrier of the Carpathians, the Russian

flood was diverted, and began to sweep westwards parallel with the mountain ranges. General Letchitsky's next objective was the important town and railway junction of Kolomea, which lies some 50 miles west of Czernovitz, on the main railway line to Lemberg. The Russians hoped that by this movement they would not only gain territory, but would be able to outflank von Bothmer on his right wing, and thus compel that stubborn general to fall back on Lemberg. This advance in the south continued to progress, but it should be observed that it never had the strategic importance of the furious assault aimed at Kovel. It was eastwards of Kovel that the chief danger to the Austrians lay, and it was there that they received the greatest assistance from their powerful allies. Large reinforcements were sent to von Linsingen, who was in command on the Stokhod, and during the third week, June 18-24, that famous general not only held his own, but actually recovered a small portion of the territory that had been lost to the Russians.

Meanwhile, the Russians were not idle further north. A great offensive was launched against the German lines north of the Pripet, and the Russians charged the German lines in dense masses. One of the most determined assaults took place in the neighbourhood of Baranoviche, and the Russians also took the offensive still further north, where the veteran general, Kuropatkin, was in command. These attacks failed, and their main result was to cause the Russians the very heavy casualties which are inseparable from an offensive, especially an unsuccessful offensive, under modern conditions.

The effects of von Linsingen's reinforcements in the north and the valorous stand by the Austro-Hungarian rearguard in front of Czernovitz in the south are apparent in the small number of prisoners taken by the Russians in the third week, as compared with the many thousands captured in the first two weeks. In the third week of the offensive the Russians captured only 12,000 prisoners, and very few guns. It should be stated here that the Austro-Hungarian General Staff gave out that the Russian statements regarding the number of prisoners captured (which we have accepted as accurate in the ANNUAL REGISTER) were gross exaggerations, and claimed that the number of soldiers thus lost was much smaller. Having regard to the magnitude of the operations, there is, however, no intrinsic improbability in the Russian claims, but rather the reverse, and there is therefore no good reason for doubting the official figures published in Petrograd.

The course of the battle during the fourth week of the offensive (the last week in June) was similar to that of the third. Brussiloff advanced rapidly on his left wing but failed to gain any ground on his right. The right wing of Brussiloff's great army was commanded by General Kaledin, whose duty it was, as already stated, to take Kovel. In the fourth week, however, Kaledin was reduced to the defensive by von Linsingen. The

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latter hammered on the right side of the huge Russian salient, in the neighbourhood of Sokul, on the Styr, and although he in his turn only succeeded in gaining about 4 miles of ground, and never came near to retaking Luck, he was able before the end of June definitely to defeat Kaledin's assault upon Kovel.

In the south the Russians, after capturing the whole of Bukovina, marched west into Galicia, and so rapid was General Letchitsky's advance that he arrived within artillery range of Kolomea on June 26. At this point the Austrians had rallied, and they attempted to defend the town. But General Letchitsky once again proved his superiority. The new Austrian lines were severely bombarded, and after three days' desperate fighting the enemy's defences again cracked and the Russian infantry poured through the gap. Nearly 11,000 prisoners were captured in front of Kolomea, and on the last day of June General Letchitsky entered that town.

At this point the centre of interest shifted once more to the Western Theatre, and during July and August the strategic changes in the East were of a much less important character. Yet General Brussiloff's moves retained their paramount interest. The error of judgment made by the Austro-German command in weakening their lines south of the Pripet in order to obtain the troops necessary for the expedition into Venetia influenced the whole course of the summer's campaign to the detriment of the Central Powers. It was from that one mistake that all the successes of the Entente flowed. General Brussiloff's army from the Pripet to Rumania numbered in all 1,500,000 men. During June that General captured approximately 210,000 men from the Austro-German forces opposing him, and also took about 230 guns. The total Austro-Hungarian and German casualties on this front are not known exactly, but the number killed and wounded during June cannot have been much under 150,000. The total of the Austro-Hungarian forces originally opposed to Brussiloff at the beginning of his offensive was about 750,000 men, so that the odds were roughly 2 to 1, and about half the enemy's army on this front was put out of action in this one month, an achievement of which the Russian Staff might justly feel proud. The Austro-German forces captured very few prisoners during this period, the only appreciable number being about 11,000 men taken by von Linsingen when he drove in Kaledin's front near Sokul. The Russian casualties south of the Pripet were undoubtedly less than half as numerous as those of their enemies.

Thus was a heavy blow struck at the Austro-German position in the East. The reverse side of the picture is to be found in the fighting in the northern sphere of operations, the lines from Riga to the Pripet. There also the Russians attempted to make an advance on a large scale, but there they completely failed. In this region the Russian casualties were much heavier than those of the Germans, who were acting strictly on the de