they stand for, that the names heard almost as readily excite certain ideas, as if the objects themselves, which are apt to produce them, did actually affect the senses. Which is manifestly so in all obvious sensible qualities; and in all substances that frequently and familiarly occur to us.

VII. Words often used without signification.

Secondly, That though the proper and immediate signification of words are ideas in the mind of the speaker, yet because by familiar use from our cradles we come to learn certain articulate sounds very perfectly, and have them readily on our tongues, and always at hand in our memories, but yet are not always careful to examine, or settle their signification perfectly; it often happens that men, even when they would apply themselves to an attentive consideration, do set their thoughts more on words than things. Nay, because words are many of them learned before the ideas are known for which they stand; therefore some, not only children, but men speak several words, no otherwise than parrots do, only because they have learned them, and have been accustomed to those sounds.

But so far as words are of use and signification, so far is there a constant connexion between the sound and idea, and a designation that the one stands for the other; without which application of them, they are nothing but so much insignificant noise.

VIII. Their signification perfectly arbitrary.

Words by long and familiar use, as has been said, come to excite in men certain ideas so constantly and readily, that they are apt to suppose a natural connexion between them. But that they signify only men's peculiar ideas, and that by a perfectly arbitrary imposition, is evident, in that they often fail to excite in others (even that use the same language) the same ideas we take them to be signs of: and

every man has so inviolable a liberty to make words stand for what ideas he pleases, that no one hath the power to make others have the same ideas in their minds that he has, when they use the same words that he does. And therefore the great Augustus himself, in the possession of that power which ruled the world, acknowledged he could not make a new Latin word which was as much as to say, that he could not arbitrarily appoint what idea any sound should be a sign of, in the mouths and common language of his subjects.

It is true, common use by a tacit consent appropriates certain sounds to certain ideas in all languages, which so far limits the signification of that sound, that unless a man applies it to the same idea, he does not speak properly; and let me add, that unless a man's words excite the same ideas in the hearer, which he makes them stand for in speaking, he does not speak intelligibly.

But whatever be the consequence of any man's using of words differently, either from their general meaning, or the particular sense of the person to whom he addresses them, this is certain, their signification in his use of them, is limited to his ideas, and they can be signs of nothing else.

CHAPTER XVII.

OF PARTICLES.

I. Particles connect parts, or whole sentences together.

BESIDE words which are names of ideas in the mind, there are a great many others that are made use of to signify the connexion that the mind gives to ideas, or propositions, one with another.

The mind in communicating its thoughts to others, does not only need signs of the ideas it has then before it, but others also, to show or intimate some particular action of its own, at that time, relating to those ideas.

This it does several ways; as is, and is not, are the general marks of the mind, affirming or denying. But besides affirmation or negation, without which there is in words no truth or falsehood, the mind does, in declaring its sentiments to others, connect not only the parts of propositions, but whole sentences one to another, with their several relations and dependencies, to make a coherent discourse.

II. In them consists the clearness and beauty of a good style.

The words whereby it signifies what connexion it gives to the several affirmations and negations, that it unites in one continued reasoning or narration, are generally called Particles, and it is in the right use of these that more particularly consists the clearness and beauty of a good style.

To think well, it is not enough that a man has ideas clear and distinct in his thoughts, nor that he observes the agreement or disagreement of some of them but he must think in train, and observe the dependance of his thoughts and reasonings upon one another. And to express well such methodical and rational thoughts, he must have words to show what connexion, restriction, distinction, opposition, emphasis, &c. he gives to each respective part of his discourse. To mistake in any of these, is to puzzle, instead of informing his hearer; and therefore it is that those words which are not truly by themselves the names of any ideas, are of such constant and indispensable use in language, and do much contribute to men's well expressing themselves.

III.

Neither is it enough, for the explaining of these words, to render them, as is usual in Dictionaries, by words of another tongue which come nearest to their signification, for what is meant by them is commonly as hard to be understood in one as another language. They are all marks of some action, or intimation of the mind; and therefore to understand them rightly, the several views, postures, stands, turns, limitations and exceptions, and several other thoughts of the mind, for which we have either none, or very deficient names, are diligently to be studied. Of these there is a great variety, much exceeding the number of particles that most languages have to express them by ; and therefore it is not to be wondered that most of these particles have divers, and sometimes almost opposite significations.

IV. Instance in But.

But is a particle, none more familiar in our language; and he that says it is a discretive conjunction, and that it answers sed in Latin, or mais in French, thinks he has sufficiently explained it. But it seems to intimate several relations the mind gives to the several propositions or parts of them, which it joins by this monosyllable.

First, "But to say no more :" here it intimates a stop of the mind in the course it was going, before it came quite to the end of it.

Secondly, "I saw but two plants :" here it shows, that the mind limits the sense to what is expressed, with a negation of all other.

Thirdly, "You pray; but it is not that God would bring you to the true religion,"

Fourthly, But that he would confirm you in your

own."

The first of these buts, intimates a supposition in the mind of something otherwise than it should be; the latter shows that the mind makes a direct opposition between that, and what goes before it.

Fifthly, "All animals have sense; but a dog is an animal" here it signifies little more, but that the latter proposition is joined to the former, as the minor of a syllogism.

CHAPTER XVIII.

ENDS OF LANGUAGE.

I. To convey ideas.

THE ends of language in our discourse with others are chiefly these three first, to make known one man's thoughts or ideas to another secondly, to do it with as much ease and quickness as possible; and, thirdly, thereby to convey the knowledge of things: language is either abused or deficient when it fails of any of these three.

First, Words fail in the first of these ends, and lay not open one man's ideas to another's view: 1. When men have names in their mouths without any determinate ideas in their minds, whereof they are the signs;

Or, 2. When they apply the common received names of any language to ideas, to which the common use of that language does not apply them: or, 3. When they apply them very unsteadily, making them stand now for one, and by and by for another idea.