gasoline. The launch was flying the American flag, but one of Huerta's officers seized the entire party and carried them off to jail amid the hoots and jeers of the crowd. Rear Admiral Mayo demanded the release of the sailors and an apology for the insult in the shape of a formal salute to our flag. Huerta disavowed the act of his officer, released the men, but refused to salute the flag. Eleven warships and three cruisers of the Atlantic fleet were ordered to Tampico. On April 20, President Wilson came before Congress, asking permission to use force against Huerta "to maintain the dignity and authority of the United States." The vote was 337 to 37. On the same day our forces were ordered to occupy Vera Cruz on the Gulf of Mexico. Admiral Fletcher landed a detachment of marines and seized the customs house, while the battleships Utah and Florida shelled the arsenal from the harbor. Seventeen American lives were lost before Fletcher had control of the seaport.

709. Carranza and Villa. To avert war between Mexico and the United States, the greater republics of South America now offered their mediation. Representatives from Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (the "A B C powers") met the delegates of Huerta and the United States at Niagara Falls, Canada, in May, and urged Huerta to resign. He departed from Mexico on the German cruiser Dresden in July, and in September President Wilson withdrew our forces from Vera Cruz and returned to his policy of "watchful waiting," declaring that it was none of our business how Mexico settled her own troubles. But anarchy continued in Mexico while Carranza slowly fought his way to power against the bandit Villa. Carranza made himself master of the capital in July, 1915, and as his fortunes improved, his antagonist Villa grew more desperate. Finally, on March 10, 1916, Villa's ruffians crossed our border with cries of "Death to Americans!" and raided the town of Columbus, New Mexico, killing seven soldiers and twelve civilians, and wounding a score of others. We were obliged to send a punitive force into Mexico (with Carranza's permission) in pursuit of Villa. But the clever bandit eluded our soldiers, and before long Carranza, charging us with designs on his power, demanded our withdrawal. The troops came back from their wild-goose chase over the hot plains of northern Mexico without Villa and with little glory. Carranza's power grew slowly but steadily in the distracted land, until he was able to

summon a constitutional convention and get himself elected the first president of the Mexican Republic under the new constitution for a term of four years (March, 1917).

President Wilson asked nothing more than to be allowed to go on with the program of social and industrial reform which he outlined in his speech to Congress in December, 1914. But the World War was already under way in Europe, which, in spite of our declaration of strict neutrality, was affecting our commerce, arousing our sympathies and protests, and absorbing our attention to the exclusion of all other interests. It almost monopolized the labors of our government during the remainder of Wilson's first term of office, and at the opening of his second term drew us into its angry vortex (April 6, 1917).

REFERENCES

The Spanish War and the Philippines: J. H. LATANÉ, America as a World Power (American Nation Series), chaps. i-x; A. C. COOLIDGE, The United States as a World Power, chaps. v-viii; J. W. FOSTER, American Diplomacy in the Orient, chap. xiii; J. G. SCHURMAN, Philippine Affairs; D. C. WORCESTER, The Philippines, Past and Present; E. E. SPARKS, The Expansion of the American People, chap. xxxvi; C. R. FISH, The Path of Empire (Chronicles, Vol. XLVI), chaps. ii-v; J. D. LONG, The New American Navy, chaps. v-xii; H. T. PECK, Twenty Years of the Republic, chaps. xii-xiv; A. B. Hart, American History told by Contemporaries, Vol. IV, Nos. 180–196; The Obvious Orient, chaps. xxiv-xxvi; E. B. ANDREWS, The United States in our Own Time, chaps. xxvii, xxviii; James BRYCE, The American Commonwealth (enlarged edition of 1911), Vol. II, chap. xcvii; Histories of the Spanish War by H. C. Lodge, R. A. ALGER, and HENRY WATTERSON.

The Roosevelt Policies: THEODORE ROOSEVELT, Autobiography; LATANÉ, chaps. xii-xvi; PECK, chap. xv; COOLIDGE, chaps. xv-xix; J. W. FOSTER, A Century of American Diplomacy, chap. xii; E. L. BOGART, Economic History of the United States, chap. xxx; H. C. LODGE (ed.), Addresses and Presidential Messages of Theodore Roosevelt, 1902–1904; GIFFORD PINCHOT, The Fight for Conservation; FRANCIS CURTIS, The Republican Party, chaps xvi-xviii; F. W. HOLLS, The Peace Conference at The Hague, chaps. i, ii, viii; W. F. JOHNSON, Four Centuries of the Panama Canal, chaps. viii-xii; JOHN MITCHELL, Organized Labor, chaps. xvii, xviii; biographies of Roosevelt by J. A. RIIS, WM. D. LEWIS, WM. R. THAYER, CHAS. G. WASHBURN, and LAWRENCE ABBOTT.

The Return of the Democrats: F. A. OGG, National Progress (American Nation Series), chaps. i-xvi; E. D. DURAND, The Trust Problem; IDA M. TARBELL, The Tariff in our Times; W. H. TAFT, Presidential Addresses and State Papers (New York, 1910); W. WILSON, Presidential Addresses and State Papers (New York, 1917), The New Freedom; R. M. LA FOLLETTE, Autobiography; F. W. TAUSSIG, The Tariff Act of 1913 (Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. XXVIII, 1–30); H. P. WILLIS, The Federal Reserve; C. W. BARRON,

The Mexican Problem; E. R. JOHNSON, The Panama Canal and Commerce; H. CROLY, The Promise of American Life and Progressive Democracy; biographies of Wilson by H. J. FORD, WM. B. HALE, and H. W. HARRIS (an Englishman).

TOPICS FOR SPECIAL REPORTS

I. The Hague Peace Conference of 1899: HOLLS, pp. 1-35, 365-372; LATANÉ, pp. 242–254; A. D. WHITE, Autobiography, Vol. II, pp. 250–354; J. W. FOSTER, Arbitration and the Hague Court.

2. Anti-Imperialism: COOLIDGE, pp. 148–171; PECK, pp. 610-612; Andrews, pp. 853-858; G. F. HOAR, Autobiography of Seventy Years, Vol. II, pp. 304329; EDWARD ATKINSON, The Cost of War and Warfare from 1898 to 1904; MOORFIELD STOREY, What shall we do with our Dependencies?

3. The Convention of the Progressive Party at Chicago: E. STANWOOD, History of the Presidency, Vol. II, pp. 288-298; Review of Reviews, Vol. XLVI, pp. 310 ff.; W. R. THAYER, Theodore Roosevelt, pp. 350-375; W. D. LEWIS, Life of Theodore Roosevelt, pp. 370-380.

4. Were we Unjust to Colombia? ROOSEVELT, The Panama Blackmail Treaty (Metropolitan Magazine, Vol. XLI, p. 8); THAYER, John Hay and the Panama Republic (Harper's Magazine, Vol. CXXXI, 167-175); ABBott, Impressions of Theodore Roosevelt, pp. 137-141; CHAMBERLAIN, A Chapter of National Dishonor (North American Review, Vol. CXCV, pp. 145-174).

5. Oregon's Experiments in Direct Democracy: J. D. BARNETT, Operation of the Initiative, Referendum, and Recall in Oregon, pp. 189-218; DICKEY, The Presidential Primary in Oregon (Political Science Quarterly, Vol. XXXI, pp. 81-104); HAYNES, People's Rule in Oregon (Political Science Quarterly, Vol. XXVI, pp. 32-62).

CHAPTER XX

AMERICA AND THE WORLD WAR

NEUTRALITY

710. The Origin of the War. On the 28th of June, 1914, the heir to the Austrian throne was assassinated in the Bosnian capital of Serajevo by a Serbian youth named Princip. Holding the antiTeutonic propaganda of Serbian revolutionary societies responsible for the murder, Austria, backed by her powerful ally Germany, started to punish Serbia by invading her territory and bombarding her capital. The Czar of Russia mobilized his troops on the Austrian border to protect his fellow Slavs in the Balkans and check the German "push to the east" (Drang nach Osten). France was Russia's ally, and Great Britain was on the friendliest terms (Entente) with France. When, therefore, Germany ordered Russia to demobilize within twelve hours, it looked as though all the great powers of Europe would be drawn into the Austro-Serbian quarrel over the assassination of a prince. In vain did the foreign ministers in the great capitals of Europe labor to avert the terrible catastrophe of a general war, in the last week of July, 1914. In vain did they plead for time, for the submission of the dispute to the Hague Tribunal or to the arbitration of the four great powers of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. Germany had for years been nourishing the belief that England, France, and Russia were hemming her in with an iron ring of jealous hatred, to crush her industrial and commercial expansion. She had prepared the most mighty military engine the world has ever seen and determined now to strike before she was struck. Self-defense was her plea, but to the majority of the nations her action looked like a deliberate piece of aggression to win "a place in the sun" for her colonial ambitions and to impose her "Kultur" on Europe by force of arms. Her first military move, the ruthless invasion of Belgium, whose neutrality Prussia had guaranteed

with the other great powers in the Treaty of 1839, provoked a storm of protest on both sides of the Atlantic.1

711. The Submarine Peril. The United States government declared its strict neutrality, but the people of the United States were not neutral. Their sympathies were overwhelmingly on the side of the Entente Allies (Great Britain, France, Russia, Belgium, Serbia) against the Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary). The pressure of public opinion naturally affected our policy. When, for example, Great Britain, mistress of the seas, blockaded the coasts of Germany by mines sown in the North Sea, arbitrarily extended the list of contraband goods, seized our vessels and cargoes, the protests from Washington were so friendly that the German government accused us of being virtually England's ally. When Germany, on the other hand, resorted to the submarine and drew a "war zone around the British Isles in order to starve them into submission, we insisted on maintaining the freedom of the high seas. Germany's offense against neutral rights was incomparably more serious than England's, because whereas England seized property only, Germany destroyed lives. The submarine is a frail instrument of defense, being easily rammed by a powerful ship or destroyed by a single shot from a moderate-sized gun. Hence it will not expose itself to destruction by observing the rules of visit and search. It has no way of placing in safety the crew and passengers of a ship carrying contraband, before destroying ship and cargo. It strikes quickly, sending its torpedo on its swift and secret mission of death. It has been called the stiletto of the seas. The British seizures of ships and cargoes violated the rules of international law, but the German destruction of neutral and noncombatant lives outraged the dictates of humanity. For the former there could be redress and indemnity after the war; for the latter there was no reparation.

712. The Lusitania torpedoed. It was inevitable that American lives should be lost if Germany persisted in submarine warfare,

'1 Von Bethmann-Hollweg, the German Chancellor, confessed in a speech to the Reichstag that the invasion of Belgium was contrary to the dictates of international law" and promised to make reparation for the wrong when the German "military object" was obtained. "Necessity knows no law" was his plea. The "necessity" in this case was the rapid march on Paris by the most favorable route. He found the Treaty of 1839 only "a scrap of paper "