But little attention has apparently been given by the Spanish Government to the source of wealth in Cuba's 9,000,000 acres of natural pasture lands. Spain's political economy never has consisted so much in a direct land tax as in a tax upon industries and commerce, consequently the ranchman, or landed proprietor, may be the owner of extensive pastures over which roam countless heads of cattle, and yet his wealth not be considered by the Government until he negotiates his stock in the market. During the occupation of Pinar del Rio by the insurgents under Maceo, in the present insurrection, it was a strange oversight on the part of the authorities that in attempting to starve the rebels out of that province they did not take into consideration the fact that many heads of cattle roamed over the plains and the forest-covered hills and valleys were alive with hogs, which furnished the insurgent invaders with an abundance of food. The pasture lands north of Trinidad are so well adapted to the raising of horses that it was formerly a common phrase to say that even the beggars of Trinidad rode horsback. Yet one may search the Government records and find no mention of this source of wealth. In the vicinity of Sancti Spiritus, extending eastward to the province of Santiago, are extensive prairies which furnish grazing for great herds of cattle. Some of them are without natural water supply, but they have been provided with enormous wells at intervals. These sometimes reach a depth of 300 feet, and the water is drawn by a noria, a device employed by the Moors when they occupied Spain. This consists of a large wooden wheel made to revolve by animal power, over which passes an endless belt, to which buckets are fastened. The cattle ranges extend far across that part of Cuba termed Camaguey to Santiago province, which is mountainous and covered with dense forests. As an illustration of the internal wealth of Cuba may be cited a typical peasant's home and surroundings, visited in the interior of the island during the present insurrection. The family consisted of a mother and her numerous offspring and her invalid husband. She was de pendent almost entirely upon the labor of her only grown son for subsistence, which was obtained from the land, scarcely more than an acre of which was under cultivation. Her possession consisted of 12 caballerias of land, and it supplied her with all the necessities of life except clothing and salt. Her products as enumerated at the time consisted of coffee, sugar, molasses, beans, rice, honey, wax, sweet potatoes, yams, yuccas, bananas, corn, poultry, pigs, a cow or two, several horses, and tobacco. In cases of emergency salt, or a fair substitute, could be obtained from the royal palm by a' peculiar process of boiling, and the only reason for not raising her own cotton and making her own cloth, as was done by the aborigines, is that with the Cuban, cotton spinning and weaving is a lost art. Everything about the place had a slovenly and abandoned look. The children were either entirely naked or clothed in tattered garments, but what they lacked in clothing they made up in dirt. The bodies were literally covered with it, and the mother herself was not much neater in appearance. A huge wooden mortar, merely a section of a hollowed log, served as a mill in which to clean rice, grind coffee, thrash beans, etc. Cowhides were in use for drying coffee and beans and for making lariats. Receptacles made of the stem of the royal palm served for holding almost anything, from the morning's milk to the boiled dinner, and sections of the wild bamboo served in lieu of buckets to bring water from the river. Even the cups and saucers and spoons were furnished by a neighboring tree, whose gourdlike fruit was easily prepared in various shapes for this purpose. The pots were almost the only things seen in use that were not a product of the immediate vicinity. Even the large mill for the grinding of cane was constructed of timbers obtained in the neighboring woods. Cuba produces a great variety of fruits and honeys. Oranges, pineapples, and bananas grow to perfection, almost without any attention, and their varieties are not surpassed by those growing in any other part of the world. There are many other delicious fruits which have not yet found their way into the Northern markets and are not known in the United States. The native woods of the island have been exploited to some extent. It is said that the 17,000,000 acres of forest lands furnish 40 varieties of fine cabinet woods, among them mahogany and cedar. The mineral resources are imperfectly known. Valuable iron mines have been discovered and worked profitably, the ore being exceedingly rich and of a superior quality. Mines have been worked by two American companies, the ore being loaded directly from the mines into vessels and taken to the United States, where the metal is used in the manufacture of Bessemer steel. Large deposits of manganese ore have also been discovered, the ore yielding in some instances 58 per cent. of metal of a superior quality. About 12 miles from Santiago there is a range of mountains known as the Sierra del Cobre, in which are large deposits of copper. One mine was worked by an English company with great profit for many years, but other deposits remain untouched. Bituminous-coal deposits in extensive layers have been reported. Finances.-Until 1868 the finances of the island were exceedingly prosperous. For many years there was an excess of revenue over expenditure. From 1850 to 1860 the Cuban treasury was in such a prosperous state that with only a tax of 2 per cent. on the produce of rural property and of 4 per cent. on the rentals of urban real estate, a small tax on the sale of realty, the stamp tax, and the custom dues, its surplus never fell below $3,000,000, while it rose in some years to $5,000,000. This favorable state of affairs ceased after 1860. Filibustering attempts previous to 1868 and the rebellion of 1868-78 caused a large increase in the estimates for the army and the navy, which previously had been slight. The revenues in consequence of the revolt were much reduced, while the expenses rose to huge proportions. Extraordinary taxes were levied, but they proved insufficient. Loans were obtained, first from the Banco Español of Havana and subsequently from other banks. Treasury notes and bank notes guaranteed by the treasury were issued. The treasury issued bonds guaranteed by the customs dues, and a floating debt for the liquidation of previous expenditures was formed. All these debts were consolidated by the issues of bonds guaranteed by the Cuban treasury to the amount of $124,000,000 in 1886 and to the amount of $44,500,000 in 1870. The revenue for the fiscal year 1893-'94 was $20,492,764, and the expenditure $26,230,176. The military expenditure was $8,541,200, and the naval expenditure $1,097,385; the cost of the civil administration, $3,663,909. In 1895 the expenses of the war added $122,500,000 to the debt, not counting $10,000,000 of arrears of salaries and unpaid obligations. In 1896 the war expenses were $10,000,000 or more every month. The Goverment in 1895 and 1896, owing to the civil war, could collect no taxes, and the customs receipts at Havana fell off to one quarter the normal amount. The destruction of sugar estates and tobacco fields took from the laboring class their principal means of support, and deprived the Government of its main sources of revenue for years to come. The sugar crop, which was 1,050,000 tons in 1894, was estimated at less than 200,000 tons in 1896, and the tobacco crop at 50,000 bales instead of the normal amount of 450.000 bales. The total exports were valued at $60,000,000 in 1895, but in 1896 they were not expected to exceed $15,000,000. The Government estimates of expenditure for 1896-97 were $92,000,000, and of revenue $30,000,000. The increase of revenue over that even of 1894 was expected to come from a higher tax on imports, although the whole produce of the country would hardly pay for the foreign breadstuffs needed to feed the starving population huddled in the cities. When merchants and bankers exported all their gold to Spain and the United States and thousands gave up business and returned to Spain, the Spanish Government authorized the Bank of Spain in Havana to emit $12,000,000 of notes for the payment of current obligations in Cuba, to be guaranteed by a reserve of $3,000,000 in silver coin deposited by the Government and redeemed in gold. When the merchants refused to take the new currency except at a discount the Captain General issued a decree ordering all persons to accept the bills on a par with gold, and endeavored to enforce it against the retailers until they began to close their shops; against the wholesalers until they emigrated; against the Stock Exchange and against the bankers, including the Bank of Spain, which refused to accept them in payment for gold drafts on Spain, until the banks closed their exchange departments. The Insurrection.-The Governor General is the highest official representative of the National Government in the island, having as vice-royal patron all the powers inherent in the patronship of the Indies. His power is almost absolute at the best of times, and his rule is that of a military commander. The laws of Spain are liberal, and they do not tend to deprive the native Cubans of any of the privileges enjoyed by her subjects born in the peninsula, but the administration of these laws has always been bad. The Cubans themselves are a peace-loving, gentle race, but the despotic rule of many military chiefs, from the Captain General down, has given them for generations ample ground for complaint. A few years ago a young man, educated in Spain, but a Cuban by birth, took upon his own shoulders the task of liberating his countrymen. From a student in Seville and a graduate at Madrid he became a political convict at Havana, and at length, finding refuge in the United States, began his work, which has resulted in the present insurrection. Finding no support among the wealthier classes, he addressed himself to the humbler ones. By his power of oratory he readily won the attention of the latter, and knowing how many failures had been due to the lack of proper organization, he strove to organize. With unceasing activity he sought to bring together all the Cubans residing in the United States, Mexico, Central America, and Colombia, for the purpose of accumulating funds and carrying on a well-directed propaganda for the independence of Cuba. The work soon began to bear fruit. Cuban artisans joined in making weekly contributions to a general fund, newspapers were published, and an active preparation was carried on by the Cuban emigrants, inspired and effectively conducted by José Marti, the father of the present insurrection. In the island secret organizations were formed and members were pledged for the cause, with the special object of knowing the leaders and their followers who could be depended upon to support the movement when the time should arrive for it. When Marti thought the time had arrived he issued an order fixing the date of Feb. 24, 1895, for the uprising. In response, several leaders and their few followers took the field in Cuba, but they remained inactive and undecided. The country people refused to join them, and, except in Santiago province, they were soon dispersed by Spanish troops, and those who were not captured surrendered a few days later. For the first few months the success of Marti's plans appeared doubtful, but with the landing of Antonio and José Maceo, followed by that of Gomez and Marti, the aspect of the uprising changed, and Spain, conscious that the rebellion was assuming a serious phase, sent her most famous general, Martinez Campos, with re enforcements to quell the uprisings. He debarked on April 16, 1895, at Guantanamo, and took immediate command of military affairs in the island. His plan was to put down the revolt by fair fighting and judicious enterprise. He had the confidence of the Cuban people, and the leaders in the revolt looked upon him as a just man and a fair fighter. His proposition was to find employment for laborers by the building of roads and public works, and to conciliate the people rather than oppress them; but neither his soldiers nor his officers were educated up to his standard, much less the Spanish people, and with the insurgents in the field and the conservative element opposed to him he soon found things going decidedly wrong. Maceo and Gomez.-Although the country people of Cuba were not much better prepared to fight against tyranny and oppression upon the landing of Maceo and Gomez than they had been upon the capture of Cardenas by Lopez, in 1850, the present leaders had concentrated years of labor and ambition in their plans. If the people would not fight for their liberty, the leaders well knew that they would not oppose the movement, while a certain class could be depended upon to do some fighting; hence the general plan of winning a people's independence without the actual force of arms was conceived. Antonio Maceo was known to be a brave fighter, with the cause of Cuba's freedom at heart; but he was a mulatto, and the Cuban leaders, who were white, knew that his color would give rise to the belief that the insurrection was a negro revolt. Therefore Marti had visited Gomez at his home in Santo Domingo, and had induced him to embark for Cuba, offering him the command of the rebel army. Maceo, with several of the former insurgent leaders, sailed from Costa Rica and landed near Baracoa. They were immediately attacked by Spanish soldiers. Making their escape, they were attacked again, and driven from place to place, hiding in caves till only Maceo and two or three others of the little expedition of the original 23 were left to find their way to the leaders, who were already forming bands in the mountains of Santiago. With scarcely better success, Marti and Gomez made their way to the interior with 5 companions, where they joined Maceo and the other rebel chiefs. Here they reviewed their situation, and while Maceo, Quintin Bandera, Rabi, and others determined to Scour the country for recruits, Gomez was directed to march into Camaguey, the principal theater of his operations during the last insurrection. Marti, after seeing the Dominican chief well on his way, was to return to the sea in order to embark for the United States and there continue his work as revolutionary agent; but he lost his life in a skirmish at the Mouth of Two Rivers. Gomez, referring to his situation, wrote: "From that moment my position became considerably worse. I was without health, without troops, and without arms." Nevertheless he determined to proceed, "sick not only in body, but in soul as well." To increase his despair, he was informed that "the people of Camaguey wanted no war," and to this effect they had formed a junta with the object of coming to meet him and manifesting the decision of the people of the province and obliging him to re-embark, even offering him the means to do so. One morning at daybreak the members of his escort refused to continue their march, on the pretext that they had only agreed to carry on the insurrection in the east, where they belonged, and ought not to be taken from their own province. "It cost me trouble," says Gomez, "to reduce them to obedience." Continuing his own account, "three days later a traitor presented himself to the enemy and informed him VOL. XXXVII-17 A of my situation, and again my escort insisted in their proposition not to follow me. In vain their own officer in command interposed his authority; the soldiers refused to obey. Then, indignant, I rebuked them severely, calling them disloyal and bad companions. Return to the east,' said I to them; I alone will go to Camaguey.' Even more indignant than myself, Gen. Borrero addressed them energetically, in a manner which I had never before witnessed, for he was of a violent temper. Among other things that I remember hearing him say was: You are bad Cubans and worse soldiers. You are disgracing yourselves. Gen. Gomez is a foreigner, who has come to help us in this holy war, and you wish to abandon him, sick and persecuted by the enemy. Oh, if that is the way you do, then the whole world can say with reason that you are cowards.' The words of Borrero impressed themselves on the souls of those men, and they agreed to continue, but not without two or three of their number deserting in the night of that same day." Gomez confessed that, in spite of his confidence in his friends of Camaguey, there were moments when he could not but feel "troubled with the most terrible doubts." But his hopes were revived upon hearing that Gen. Campos had "urged that his march be stopped at all hazards." for, if he entered Camaguey, Spain might consider her cause lost. Gen. Borrero gave this news to their followers, saying that they were saved, for if Gen. Campos laid such importance upon Gomez's entrance into the territory, it must be for a reason favorable to the revolution. On June 5 the Dominican leader and his small force of Orientales crossed the Jobabo river, and later joined the venerable Cisneros, Lope Recio, Dr. Agramonte, and other instigators of the movement. While Gomez with such indomitable courage was surmounting the difficulties before him, the Maceos, Rabi, Bandera, Tamayo, and others, mostly colored, were recruiting men and ambushing the Spanish troops in the east. Their ambushes were mostly successful, and each encounter renewed their hopes. On July 12 they gave battle to the columns under command of Santocildes and Campos respectively, on their way to Bayamo. Gen. Santocildes was killed, leaving Campos to take command of the shattered columns and get them into Bayamo. This was looked upon as a victory by the insurgents, who now prepared to carry the insurrection farther west. On Nov. 1 they concentrated in the estate Mala Noche, near Holguin, and there formed the army of invasion, with Antonio Maceo chief in command and José Miro chief of staff. This force was mostly negroes, and, according to Miro's report, consisted of 1,700 men. On Nov. 3 they took up their march westward to enter Camaguey, and there join the general in chief, Maximo Gomez. The Dominican, in his account, says that from the very moment that he joined the men who were to form the provisional government, there began a series of triumphs obtained by force of arms, and the revolution gained consistency and strength. His escort of Orientales, chiefly blacks, was re-enforced in Camaguey by white Cubans from the towns, many of them sons of former revolutionists. With this force Gomez successfully attacked the Spaniards at Altagracia, ambushed a Spanish guerrilla, and took El Mulatto and San Geronimo. With the booty captured he loaded the men who had been induced with such difficulty to follow him from the east, and sent them back to their homes. From his new recruits he selected a hundred men disposed to follow him wherever he might direct, and, naming them as his escort, he crossed into the province of Sancti Spiritus. The Trocha.-During the former insurrection a Spanish engineer conceived the idea of separating that part of the island where the Spanish were in active operation from that part of it where there was no insurrection. For this purpose he proposed the construction of a line between Jucaro, on the south coast, and Moron, on the Junco river, near the north coast. By this line it was proposed to confine the insurrection to the east, where it had begun, and thus prevent its spreading. This line was termed a trocha, which simply signifies a way or path across a country without regard to its topography or other roads, such as is often cut through a forest to designate the limits of a territory or to mark a boundary. The military authorities entered upon the establishment of the line at once, and immediately began a series of movements with the object of bewildering and tiring the enemy without risking any real engagements. The success of these movements was crowned by the treasonable surrender of the Spanish garrison at Pelayo, with 50 rifles and 23,000 cartridges. For this act the Spanish authorities sentenced Capt. Feijoo, the commanding officer, to life imprisonment in chains. On the morning of Nov. 29 Antonio Maceo, with a part of his force, simulated an attack upon the trocha near Ciego de Avila, and as the Spaniards concentrated to give battle at this point, the insurgents marched around an unprotected part of the line, and, without losing a man or firing a shot, joined hands that same day with Maximo Gomez and his followers. 46 A STREET SCENE IN VILLA CLARA. such stress was laid upon its construction by the Spaniards that it came to be considered as impregnable as the great wall of China. But when numerous rebel chiefs had crossed it and recrossed it, and the old warrior chief Maximo Gomez had crossed it in company with his wife and servants, the military authorities began to wake up to the worthlessness of their trocha. So badly were the plans of the originator carried out that upon his visiting the line he is reported to have exclaimed, This is neither a trocha nor a military line, but a badly staked way which serves for nothing." Although it was condemned by both Capts.-Gen. Valmaceda and Campos, when the latter returned to the island in 1895 and found that the insurgents, counting upon greater elements than he had supposed, had entered Camaguey, he hastily distrib. uted nearly 50,000 soldiers along the old line between Jucaro and Moron, hoping to keep them from entering the province of Santa Clara. Forts were rapidly constructed, and trees and undergrowth cleared away for 200 yards each side of the railroad track which ran along the line; and thus came into existence for a second time the old trocha as a military line. The Invasion.-Scarcely did Campos get his boundary line into effective shape before Gomez with his retinue of Camaguey recruits crossed it into the jurisdiction of Sancti Spiritus, where he In the meantime Gens. Roloff and Sanchez had successfully landed a large expedition of arms, men, and ammunition in the vicinity of Tunas, Sancti Spiritus, and these, joining Maceo and Gomez, constituted then the entire army disposed to invade that part of Cuba, garrisoned by overwhelming odds. According to Miro, Maceo's chief of staff, this entire force numbered scarcely 2,600 men, including servants without arms, soldiers, and officers, which in the eyes of the leaders at that time seems to have been a formidable force. The plan was then adopted to carry the war into the western province at once by dividing this army into small bands. These bands were then to march forward by separate routes, and at every opportunity they were to make a pretense of giving battle to the enemy. By presenting a small skirmish line, they hoped to hold in check any Spanish column which might attack them, while the pack train, with the bulk of the force. could make their retreat, and then by a retrograde movement advance farther into the provinces where there had been no successful insurrection. By continuing such movements as these the insurgents were to avoid any serious encounter with the enemy; but in certain localities farther west they were to concentrate, that the Spaniards, unprepared for them in that locality, might be surprised and routed. Scarcely had the plan been determined upon, when, on the morning of Dec. 2. firing was heard upon the out-gagement. Maceo thence continued his rapid march post of the camp. The insurgents were imme- along the southern borders of Matanzas and Havana diately prepared to move in accordance with these provinces to the town of Guira de Melina, which he plans. The forces with their impedimenta were took, and thence northward toward Havana. hurried through a narrow defile in the forest, while Throughout these movements of the insurgents Maceo with 80 infantry and a few horsemen ad- their numbers were constantly being increased by vanced to check the enemy. The Spaniards, sup- negro field hands and Cuban youth, mostly from posing that they had now met the insurgent army, the neighboring towns, who, encouraged by the prepared to give battle by forming their companies success of the movements, hesitated no longer to in compact lines and directing their fire in volleys take the field. The banditti, who had always at the few dodging insurgents, whose plan they claimed to have been carrying on a war against supposed was to lead them into ambush. This Spain, in most cases hastened to join the insurgents, gave the main body of the insurgents ample time to and their leaders were given a rank as well as all make their retreat. After sustaining the fire of the others who presented themselves with any number Spaniards for an hour, losing but 1 man killed and of recruits. Those bandits who did not proclaim 6 wounded. Maceo ordered his men to run, he be- for the rebellion and many free lances who deemed ing the last to leave the field. When the Spaniards, the opportunity had come to reap a harvest of plunseeing their enemy flee, advanced with their flanque- der on their own account were shortly wiped out by ros cautiously thrown out, they found that the the insurgent chiefs, who hanged them wherever rebel army had disappeared. The next day found the captured. Gomez did not participate in so much insurgents on their march to the west, sustaining of the fighting as did Maceo, but, attended by his various skirmishes with the Spanish columns, whose escort, he planned continually to confuse the Spanofficers, in absolute ignorance of the enemy's tac- iards with his circuitous movements, and with a ties, reported battles with formidable numbers of policy at times conciliatory, and at other times desinsurgents. potic, he sought to claim the services of the peasants, who he well knew would not fight. He issued various decrees prohibiting the grinding of cane, the running of trains, and the supplying of the Spanish troops with provisions. By the hanging of an occasional unfortunate, he hoped to make these decrees effective, and by setting fire to the cane fields and destroying the railroads, he sought to create a reign of terror that would materially strengthen his cause. At Iguara, on Dec. 3, the insurgents sustained a combat with the troops under Segura, with a loss of 5 killed and 32 wounded. They then continued their march through the southern part of the province, sustaining various encounters with the troops. Entering the jurisdiction of Cienfuegos on the 15th, they met the Spaniards at Mal Tempo. and there ensued the most decisive action of the insurrection. The fight began in the morning at 8 o'clock, and the hastily formed squares of the Spanish raw recruits were repeatedly broken by the charges of the insurgents, who report having killed 210 of the enemy with the machete. The troops were undoubtedly put to flight, leaving in the hands of the rebels various trophies of their defeat. While the insurgents were dividing their booty they were warned of the approach of another column, which they immediately proceeded to attack under command of Maceo, and after half an hour's fight the Spaniards retired. About the same time Gomez, who was in another direction, stumbled upon another column, which he also fought with success; thus the insurgents had three victories in a single day. Continuing their advance the following day, they surprised and cut up a Spanish guerrilla near Santa Isabel de Lajas. Campos now endeavored to check their rapid movements by concentrating 8,000 soldiers to prevent their passing the valley of Cienfuegos; but by the usual skillful evasions of the rebel leaders a conflict was avoided until the opportune moment. when an inferior force could be surprised. By a series of forced marches they left Campos in their rear at Colon with 7,000 troops, and dashed across Matanzas province. By means of the railroads the Captain General moved his troops ahead again to check them, but by a series of zigzag movements Maceo was able to avoid the concentrated Spanish forces, while Gomez with 500 horsemen made a dash somewhere else. At Coliseo the insurgents under Maceo burned the town, and with a skirmish line of 200 horsemen held in check 2,500 Spanish infantry under Campos. They then made a retrograde movement to Las Villas, and again entered the jurisdiction of Cienfuegos after five days of continual marching. But without waiting for the Spaniards, who supposed the insurgents to be retreating, to determine upon any definite plans, they advanced again into Matanzas along the south coast, sustaining a serious encounter at Calimets with veteran troops, in which they lost 10 killed and 27 wounded-thus far their most serious en On Jan. 7, 1896, he united with Maceo near Punta Brava, a dozen miles from Havana, and Miro reports that the concentrated force numbered 11,700 men. Here it was decided that Gomez should keep up his tactics of moving about with his escort, while the bulk of the force should return and distribute itself over Matanzas. Maceo, with 4.000 men, including his original Orientales, should continue into the westernmost province of Pinar del Rio. This plan was immediately put into execution. The Spanish military authorities were unprepared for any such movement, and while a column under the command of Gen. Garcia Navarro was sent in pursuit of Maceo, others were sent after Gomez. Maceo's advance into Pinar del Rio was eminently successful. So rapidly did he move that Garcia Navarro's column could not get up to him, while the surprised garrisons in front of him surrendered to his surging horde, which was continually being increased by the Cubans, who looked upon the multitude as already having won Cuba's freedom. Maceo's rapid movement continued along the north coast to the very last towns of Guane and Mantua, where his raids became more like a triumphal procession, the people rising en masse to welcome him. From Mantua he swept southward to the vicinity of the city of Pinar del Rio, and thence he continued his march along the southern highway back toward Havana. At Paso Real he was taken by surprise by the of column Gen. Luque, and thence ensued the famous but indecisive battle of Paso Real. While the Spaniards remained in possession of the city Maceo marched away, and with colors flying entered the city of San Cristobal, where he was received with demonstrations of joy even by those people who did not favor his cause. He then proceeded to attack Candelaria, which city had shown no disposition to receive him; but as he failed to force its surrender, and the pursuing columns came to its relief, he took to flight. Gen. Sabas Marin had hastily formed another trocha across the narrow part of the island between Mariel and Majana, to prevent Maceo's forces joining |