SAME-PREAMBLE.

45. A statute will not be declared unconstitutional on account of a statement of the reasons for enacting it, or anything else, found in the preamble, when the objection does not appear in the body of the act.59

The preamble to a statute is an introductory clause which sets forth the reasons which have led to the enactment, by reciting the state of affairs intended to be changed, the evils designed to be remedied, the advantages sought to be procured or promoted by the new law, or the doubts as to the prior state of the law which it is meant to remove. It is thus an exposition of the motives of the legislature, and in some sense a key to the meaning of the terms which they have employed to express their avowed intention. But it is not an essential part of the statute, and is by no means found universally in modern laws. Hence if the body of the act is free from constitutional objections, it will not be adjudged invalid by reason of anything found in the preamble.

SAME-EFFECT OF DECISION.

46. A decision against the constitutionality of a statute, rendered by a competent court in a proper case, makes the statute entirely null and inoperative so long as the decision stands.

40

"An unconstitutional act is not a law. It confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office. It is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed." " And if the statute is adjudged unconstitutional in part, that part which is rejected will be a nullity. But in view of the fact that courts sometimes overrule their decisions on constitutional questions, it is necessary to observe that while a statute, once adjudged invalid by the court of last resort, will continue inoperative as long as that decision is maintained, yet a later decision,

* Lothrop v. Stedman, 42 Conn. 583; Sutherland v. De Leon, 1 Tex. 250. 40 Norton v. Shelby Co., 118 U. S. 425, 6 Sup. Ct. 1121.

41

sustaining the validity of the statute, will give it vitality from the time of its enactment, and thereafter it is to be treated as having been constitutional from the beginning. Notwithstanding some difference of opinion, the better authorities hold that a repealing clause in an unconstitutional statute (repealing all laws and parts of laws in conflict with it or inconsistent with it) is equally invalid with the rest of the statute, and therefore leaves the former laws untouched.*

CONSTRUCTION OF CONSTITUTIONS-METHOD.

47. A constitution is not to be interpreted on narrow or technical principles, but liberally and on broad general lines, in order that it may accomplish the objects of its establishment and carry out the great principles of government.

A constitution "is intended for the benefit of the people, and must receive a liberal construction. A constitution is not to receive a technical construction, like a common-law instrument or a statute. It is to be interpreted so as to carry out the great principles of government, not to defeat them." 48 Constitutions, it is said in another case, "declare the organic law of a state; they deal with larger topics and are couched in broader phrase than legislative acts or private muniments. They do not undertake to define with minute precision in the manner of the latter, and hence their just interpretation is not always to be reached by the application of similar methods." "A constitution of government does not, and cannot, from its nature, depend in any great degree upon mere verbal criticism, or upon the import of single words. Such criticism may not be wholly without use; it may sometimes illustrate or unfold the appropriate sense; but unless it stands well with the context and the

41 Pierce v. Pierce, 46 Ind. 86. But an act of the legislature which was unconstitutional at the time of its enactment will not obtain validity by a subsequent change in the constitution, authorizing such legislation. Comstock Mill & Min. Co. v. Allen, 21 Nev. 325, 31 Pac. 434.

42 Campau v. City of Detroit, 14 Mich. 276; Tims v. State, 26 Ala. 165. 43 Morrison v. Bachert, 112 Pa. St. 322, 5 Atl. 739.

44 Houseman v. Com., 100 Pa. St. 222.

subject-matter, it must yield to the latter. While, then, we may well resort to the meaning of single words to assist our inquiries, we should never forget that it is an instrument of government we are to construe, and that must be the truest exposition which best har monizes with its design, its objects, and its general structure." "

SAME-INTENT TO BE SOUGHT.

48. It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of constitutions that the instrument must be so construed as to give effect to the intention of the people, who adopted it.

49. This intention is to be sought in the constitution itself, and the apparent meaning of the words employed is to be taken as expressing it, except in cases where that assumption would lead to absurdity, ambiguity, or contradiction.

Where the meaning shown on the face of the words is definite and intelligible, the courts are not at liberty to look for another meaning, even though it would seem more probable or natural, but they must assume that the constitution means just what it says. "Whether we are considering an agreement between parties, a statute, or a constitution, with a view to its interpretation, the thing we are to seek is the thought which it expresses. To ascertain this, the first resort in all cases is to the natural signification of the words employed, in the order and grammatical arrangement in which the framers of the instrument have placed them. If, thus regarded, the words embody a definite meaning, which involves no absurdity and no contradiction between different parts of the same writing, then that meaning apparent upon the face of the instrument is the one which alone we are at liberty to say was intended to be conveyed. In such a case, there is no room for construction. That which the words declare is the meaning of the instrument, and neither courts nor legislatures have the right to add to, or take away from, that meaning." 46 But if the words of the constitution,

481 Story, Const. § 455.

40 Newell v. People, 7 N. Y. 9, 97; City of Beardstown v. City of Virginia, 76

thus taken, are devoid of meaning, or lead to an absurd conclusion, or are contradictory of other parts of the constitution, then it cannot be presumed that their prima facie import expresses the real intention. And in that case, the courts are to employ the process of construction to arrive at the real intention, by taking the words. in such a sense as will give them a definite and sensible meaning, or reconcile them with the rest of the instrument. And this sense is to be determined by comparing the particular clause with other parts of the constitution, by considering the various meanings, vernacular or technical, which the words are capable of bearing, and by studying the facts of contemporary history and the purpose sought to be accomplished, and the benefit to be secured, or the evil to be remedied, by the provision in question.“ Subsidiary Rules of Constitutional Construction."

1. The construction of a constitutional provision is to be uniform.“ 2. In case of ambiguity, the whole constitution is to be examined, in order to determine the meaning of any part, and the construction is to be such as to give effect to the entire instrument, and not to raise any conflict between its parts which can be avoided."

3. A constitution should be construed with reference to, but not overruled by, the doctrines of the common law and the legislation previously existing in the state."1

4. A constitutional provision should not be construed with a retrospective operation, unless that is the unmistakable intention of the words used or the obvious design of the authors."

IIL 34, 40; City of Springfield v. Edwards, 84 Ill. 626; People v. May, 9 Colo. 80, 10 Pac. 641; 1 Story, Const. § 401; Hills v. City of Chicago, 60 Ill. 86.

47 People v. Potter, 47 N. Y. 375; Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107 (Gil. 81). 48 These rules are here summarized from Black, Interp. Laws, 13-34, where the reader will find a full discussion of them.

"The policy of one age may ill suit the wishes or the policy of another. The constitution is not to be subject to such fluctuations. It is to have a fixed, uniform, permanent construction. It should be, so far at least as human infirmity will allow, not dependent upon the passions or parties of particular times, but the same yesterday, to-day and forever." 1 Story, Const. § 427. so Manly v. State, 7 Md. 133.

51 Costigin v. Bond, 65 Md. 122, 3 Atl. 285.

52 See Town of Cherry Creek v. Becker, 123 N. Y. 161, 25 N. E. 369; Farns

5. The provisions of a constitution are almost invariably mandatory; it is only in extremely plain cases, or under the pressure of necessity that they can be construed as merely directory."

6. Whatever is necessary to render effective any provision of a constitution, whether the same be a prohibition, or a restriction, or the grant of a power, must be deemed implied and intended in the provision itself."4

7. Where the constitution grants a power in general terms, the grant includes all such particular and auxiliary powers as may be necessary to make it effectual. Where the means for the exercise of a granted power are specified, all other means are understood to be excluded. Where the means are not specified, any means may be resorted to which are fairly and properly adapted to accomplish the object of the grant of power, if they do not unnecessarily interfere with existing interests or vested rights.""

8. The words employed in a constitution are to be taken in their natural and popular sense, unless they are technical legal terms, in which case they are to be taken in their technical signification."

9. The preamble to a constitution and the titles of its several articles or sections may furnish some evidence of its meaning and intention, but arguments drawn therefrom are entitled to very little weight."

10. It is not permissible to disobey, or to construe into nothingness, a provision of the constitution merely because it may appear to work injustice, or to lead to harsh or obnoxious consequences or invidious and unmerited discriminations, and still less weight should be attached to the argument from mere inconvenience."

worth v. Railroad Co., 83 Me. 440, 22 Atl. 373. But compare In re Gibson, 21 N. Y. 9.

53 Varney v. Justice, 86 Ky. 596, 6 S. W. 457; People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 177.

54 Endl. Interp. St. § 535; 1 Story, Const. § 430.

Field v. People, 2 Scam. (Ill.) 79.

5 Greencastle Tp. v. Black, 5 Ind. 557; The Huntress, Daveis, 82, Fed. Cas. No. 6,914; People v. Fancher, 50 N. Y. 288.

57 Houseman v. Com., 100 Pa. St. 222.

* Greencastle Tp. v. Black, 5 Ind. 557; Weill v. Kenfield, 54 Cal. 111; County of Wayne v. City of Detroit, 17 Mich. 390; Oakley v. Aspinwall, 8 N. Y. 547, 568; People v. May, 9 Colo. 80, 10 Pac. 641.