SAME-PRESUMPTION OF LEGALITY.

39. Every presumption is in favor of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature.

Legislators, as well as judges, are bound to obey and support the constitution, and it is to be understood that they have weighed the constitutional validity of every act they pass. Hence the presumption is always in favor of the constitutionality of a statute; every reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the statute, not against it; and the courts will not adjudge it invalid unless its violation of the constitution is, in their judgment, clear, complete, and unmistakable.20

SAME-REFERENCE TO JOURNALS OF LEGISLATURE.

40. The journals of the legislature may be resorted to for the purpose of determining whether the act was passed in due form; but no evidence will be received to contradict the journals.

A statute may be unconstitutional for lack of compliance with the forms prescribed by the constitution in the process of its enactment. If it is shown to the court that the legislature has neglected or violated its duty in any of these particulars, the act must be pronounced invalid. And for this purpose, the court may go behind the enrolled or printed bill and examine the journals of the two houses. But the act will not be adjudged void unless the journals affirmatively show a lack of compliance with such forms.27

20 Tonnage Tax Cases, 62 Pa. St. 286; Kerrigan v. Force, 68 N. Y. 381; Hartford Bridge Co. v. Union Ferry Co., 29 Conn. 210; Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194; Mayor, etc., of Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376; Stewart v. Supervisors of Polk Co., 30 Iowa, 9.

27 Prescott v. Illinois Canal, 19 Ill. 324; Common Council of Detroit v. Board of Assessors, 91 Mich. 78, 51 N. W. 787. Compare Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa. St. 401. And see infra, p. 296.

SAME-MOTIVES OF LEGISLATURE.

41. The motives of the legislature, in passing a particular measure, cannot be inquired into, nor can it be shown that it was procured by fraud or bribery.

The constitutionality of a statute is a bare question of legislative power, and any inquiry as to the motives operating on the minds of the legislators, in voting for the measure, is entirely incompetent. The validity of a statute does not in the least depend on the considerations which induced the legislature to enact it. Evidence to establish fraud, bribery, or corruption against the members of the legislature, as a ground for setting aside the statute, is not admissible. The courts are not made guardians of the morals of the legis lators, nor are they at liberty to impute to them any improper motives.28 Nor can it be shown that deception or suppression of the truth was practiced upon the legislature to induce the passage of the act. Thus, an inquiry as to whether a land grant was obtained by a railroad company by false representations to the legislature would indirectly interfere with the power of the legislature to enact such laws as it may deem best for the general good. The courts will therefore presume (whatever may be averred to the contrary) that no general statute is ever passed either for want of information upon the part of the legislature or because it was misled by the false representations of interested parties."

SAME-POLICY OF LEGISLATION.

42. A statute cannot be declared void on considerations going merely to its policy or propriety.

The courts have nothing whatever to do with the policy, expedi ency, wisdom, or propriety of acts of the legislature. Such matters

28 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87; Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502; State v. Fagan, 22 La. Ann. 545; Williams v. Nashville, 89 Tenn. 487, 15 S. W. 364; Parker v. State, 132 Ind. 419, 31 N. E. 1114; Lynn v. Polk, 8 Lea (Tenn.) 121; Jewell v. Weed, 18 Minn. 272 (Gil. 247).

29 Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Chicago, P. & S. Ry. Co., 39 Fed. 148. And see Stevenson v. Colgan, 91 Cal. 651, 27 Pac. 1089.

X!

are questions for legislative determination, but do not belong to the judiciary. Consequently, if a given statute does not violate any provision of the constitution, and is within the general scope of legislative power, the courts cannot adjudge it void merely because it appears to them to be impolitic, unjust, improper, absurd, or unreasonable. To do so would not be an exercise of the judicial functions, but an usurpation of legislative powers.3

30

SAME-NATURAL JUSTICE.

43. A statute cannot be declared invalid because it is opposed to the principles of natural justice or the supposed spirit of the constitution.

It has sometimes been held that if a statute, in the judgment of the court, was contrary to the principles of natural justice, or the general spirit of the constitution, or the maxims of republican government, or the principles of right and liberty supposed to lie at the base of all institutions in a free country, it was the duty of the court to pronounce it invalid.31 But the prevailing opinion at the present day is that there is no such power in the courts. The legislature of a state possesses the power to pass any and every law, on any and every subject, which does not amount to an encroachment upon the province of either of the other departments and is not in conflict with the express terms of either the federal or state constitution. Consequently, one who objects to the validity of an act of the legis lature must be able to point out the specific prohibition, requirement, or guaranty which it violates. If this cannot be done, the act is valid. Natural justice, the principles of republican government, and

30 Angle v. Railway Co., 151 U. S. 1, 14 Sup. Ct. 240; Merchants' Union Barb Wire Co. v. Brown, 64 Iowa, 275, 20 N. W. 434; People v. Common Coun cil of Rochester, 50 N. Y. 525; Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532.

81 Citizens' Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655. And see Ham v. McClaws, 1 Bay (8. C.) 93, 98; People v. Board of Salem, 20 Mich. 452. In Welch v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 149, it was said: "The power of the legislature is not unlimited. They cannot entirely disregard the fundamental principles of the social compact. Those principles underlie all legislation, irrespective of constitutional restraints, and if the act in question is a clear violation of them, it is our duty to hold it abortive and void."

the equal rights of men, are supposed to be adequately guarantied, in this country, by the express provisions of the constitutions. If they are not, the constitutions are at fault. But that is no limitation upon the legislative power. And the spirit of the constitution cannot be appealed to except as it is manifested in the letter.82

"We are urged," said a learned judge in a case in Pennsylvania, "to hold that a law, though not prohibited, is void if it violates the spirit of our institutions, or impairs any of those rights which it is the object of a free government to protect, and to declare it unconstitutional if it be wrong and unjust. But we cannot do this. It would be assuming a right to change the constitution, to supply what we might conceive to be its defects, to fill up every casus omissus, and to interpolate into it whatever in our opinion ought to have been put there by its framers. The constitution has given us a list of the things which the legislature may not do. If we extend that list, we alter the instrument, we become ourselves the aggressors, and violate both the letter and spirit of the organic law as grossly as the legislature possibly could. If we can add to the reserved rights of the people, we can take them away; if we can mend, we can mar; if we can remove the landmarks which we find established, we can obliterate them; if we can change the constitution in any particular, there is nothing but our own will to prevent us from demolishing it entirely." "

SAME-PARTIAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITY.

44. Where part of a statute is unconstitutional, but the remainder is valid, the parts will be separated, if possible, and that which is constitutional will be sustained.

It frequently happens that some parts, features, or provisions of a statute are invalid, by reason of repugnancy to the constitu

32 Reeves v. Corning, 51 Fed. 774; Forsythe v. City of Hammond, 68 Fed. 774; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532; Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 509; State v. Wheeler, 25 Conn. 290; Praigg v. Supply Co. (Ind. Sup.) 42 N. E. 750; People v. Richmond, 16 Colo. 274, 26 Pac. 929; Sawyer v. Dooley, 21 Nev. 390, 32 Pac. 437.

** Sharpless v. Mayor, etc., 21 Pa. St. 147.

tion, while the remainder of the act is not open to the same objection. In such cases it is the duty of the court not to pronounce the whole statute unconstitutional, if that can be avoided, but, rejecting the invalid portions, to give effect and operation to the valid portions. The rule is, that if the invalid portions can be separated from the rest, and if, after their excision, there remains a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, capable of being executed, and conforming to the general purpose and intent of the legislature, as shown in the act, it will not be adjudged unconstitutional in toto, but sustained to that extent.84 "The constitutional and the unconstitutional provisions may even be contained in the same section, and yet be perfectly distinct and separable, so that the first may stand, though the last fall." 85 But "when the parts of a statute are so mutually connected and dependent, as conditions, considerations, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that, if all could not be carried into effect, the legis lature would not pass the residue independently, if some parts are unconstitutional and void, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with them." 86 But if the purpose of the statute "is to accomplish a single object only, and some of its provisions are void, the whole must fall, unless sufficient remains to effect the object without the aid of the invalid portion." "" And if the unconstitutional clause cannot be rejected without causing the statute to enact what the legislature never intended, the whole statute must be adjudged invalid."*

84 Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 6 Sup. Ct. 580; Mobile & O. R. Co. v. State, 29 Ala. 573; State v. Exnicios, 33 La. Ann. 253; People v. Kenney, 98 N. Y. 294.

15 Com. v. Hitchings, 5 Gray (Mass.) 482.

se Warren v. Mayor, etc., 2 Gray (Mass.) 84; Slauson v. City of Racine, 13 Wis. 398; W. U. Tel. Co. v. State, 62 Tex. 630; Eckhart v. State, 5 W. Va. 515. 87 People v. Cooper, 83 Ill. 585.

** Spraigue v. Thompson, 118 U. S. 90, 6 Sup. Ct. 988.

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