For

an act is no objection, provided only it is sufficient to give notice of the general subject of the proposed legislation and of the interests likely to be affected. The title was never intended to be an index of the law." 148 But though the title and the law may both refer to the same general subject-matter, yet if the title uses a term which describes a totally different branch of the subject from that dealt with in the body of the act, or an entirely differ ent method of dealing with it, the act is void for this reason. example, to entitle an act "to regulate the traffic in intoxicating liquors," and then, in the body of the act, entirely to prohibit such traffic, is not complying with the constitutional requirement.114 But the title may be broader than the act without avoiding it; and it is no valid objection if the title makes reference to matters which would be inconsistent with its general scope, provided no such inconsistent matters are found in the statute itself.145

The addition of the word "etc." or the sign "&c." to the title of an act does not enlarge its scope, or bring within the title matters not more specifically described therein; under the constitutional provision in question, these letters have no meaning.14 And the clause, "and for other purposes," when used in the title of an act, following a specific statement of the purposes of the act, is without any legal meaning, and does not enlarge the title so as to make it embrace anything not specifically expressed.147

But the courts, in dealing with a question of this kind, will not be solicitous to overthrow the statute. On the contrary, they will give the legislature the benefit of every doubt, and will endeavor to so read the title and the act as to make the one adequate to express the subject of the other. "It has always been held that these statutory titles, in regard to their construction, are to be liberally treated, so as to validate the law to which they appertain, if such course be reasonably practicable. In such a connection, hyper

148 Johnson v. Harrison, 47 Minn. 575, 50 N. W. 923. 144 In re Hauck, 70 Mich. 396, 38 N. W. 269.

145 Powers v. McKenzie, 90 Tenn. 167, 16 S. W. 559.

146 State v. Hackett, 5 La. Ann. 91.

147 Board of Commissioners of Pitkin County v. Aspen Mining & Smelting Co., 3 Colo. App. 223, 32 Pac. 717.

criticism is utterly out of place, the only requirement being that the title of the statute shall express its object in a general way, so as to be intelligible to the ordinary reader." 148

A statute perfect in itself may repeal another law or part of a law by implication, although such repeal is not expressed in the title of the repealing statute.149 For example, where an act is entitled "An act to restore uniformity in taxation," the repeal of certain special laws which interfere with uniformity of taxation is germane to the subject and may properly be embraced in such act.150

Even where two or more subjects are embraced in the act or expressed in the title, it does not always follow that the statute will be void in toto. Where the act is broader than its title, the portion in excess of the title will be declared void, if this can be done without destroying the rest of the enactment; as, where the title of the act relates to "all citizens" and the body of the act to "all persons." In such a case, in order to entitle a party to the benefit of the act, it must be alleged and proved that he is a citizen. 181 If the act embraces distinct subjects which are not expressed in the title, and also subjects which are expressed in the title, it is void as to the former, but not necessarily void as to the latter. It is then subject to the rule that an act unconstitutional in part will not be declared void in toto if the valid portions "are separable from the void provisions and capable of enforcement independently of such void provisions, unless it shall appear that all of the provisions of the act are so dependent on each other, operating together for the same purpose, or are otherwise so connected together in meaning, that it cannot be presumed that the legislature would have passed the one without the other provision.” 152 And where the title embraces two objects, and the act embraces two

148 In re Haynes, 54 N. J. Law, 6, 22 Atl. 923; Johnson v. Harrison, 47 Minn. 575, 50 N. W. 923; Allegheny County Home's Case, 77 Pa. St. 77. 149 Union Trust Co. v. Trumbull, 137 Ill. 146, 27 N. E. 24.

150 Burke v. Monroe Co., 77 Ill. 610.

181 Messenger v. State, 25 Neb. 674, 41 N. W. 638.

152 Donnersberger v. Prendergast, 128 Ill. 229, 21 N. E. 1; People v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. 553.

subjects, so that it is impossible to tell which object was intended by the legislature, the courts are not at liberty to select one object and sustain the law as to that alone; the whole act must fall.153

158 Skinner v. Wilhelm, 63 Mich. 568, 30 N. W. 311; City of San Antonio v. Gould, 84 Tex. 49.

DEFINITION AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.

149. There is in every sovereignty an inherent and plenary power to make all such laws as may be necessary and proper to preserve the public security, order, health, morality, and justice. This power is called the "police power." It is a fundamental power and essential to government, and is based upon the law of overruling necessity.

Definition.

In its most general sense, "police" is the function of that branch of the administrative machinery of government which is charged with the preservation of public order and tranquillity, the promotion of the public safety, health, and morals, and the prevention, detection, and punishment of crimes. And the police power is the power vested in a state to establish laws and ordinances for the regulation and enforcement of its police, as just defined. It has been remarked by the supreme court of the United States that while many attempts have been made to define the police power, the endeavor has never met with entire success. "It is always easier to determine whether a particular case comes within the general scope of the power than to give an abstract definition of the power itself which will be in all respects accurate."1

1 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814, 818. "The police power of a state is co-extensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed 'the law of

Nature and Origin of Power.

It cannot be doubted that the origin of this power must be sought in the very purpose and framework of organized society. It is fundamental and essential to government. It is a necessary and inherent attribute of sovereignty. It antedates all laws, and may be described as the assumption on which constitutions rest. For the state (whether we regard it as an association of individuals or as a moral organism) must have the right of self-protection and the right to preserve its own existence in safety and prosperity, else it could neither fulfill the law of its being nor discharge its duties to the individual. And to this end, it is necessarily invested with power to enact such measures as are adapted to secure its own authority and peace, and to preserve its constituent members in safety, health, and morality. Theories of the state, according as they tend to enlarge or restrict the legitimate sphere of its functions and activities, will create theories as to the proper limitations of the police power. But its existence, in a measure proportioned to the rights and duties it is to guard, is implied in the recognition of the state as a factor in law and civilization. "It is a power," as has been well said, "essential to self-preservation, and exists, necessarily, in every organized community. It is, indeed, the law of nature, and is possessed by man in his individual capacity." For these reasons it appears that the nature and authority of the police power are best described by the maxim "salus populi suprema lex," while the principle, "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas," furnishes, in most cases, a convenient rule for its application.

Police Power Distinguished from Eminent Domain.

There is a broad distinction between the taking of private property for a public use, under the power of eminent domain, and the incidental injury or inconvenience, or damage or deterioration, which may result to property or business on account of the exertion of

overruling necessity.' It is that inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort and welfare of society." Lake View v. Rose Hill Cemetery, 70 Ill. 191. "The police power of a state extends to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property within the state." Thorpe v. Rutland & B. R. Co., 27 Vt. 140.

• License Cases, 5 How. 588. See Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378.