So an act by the great fire of 1872, was held unconstitutional." authorizing townships, in districts where there had been a failure of the crops, to issue bonds, to supply the destitute with provisions and with grain for seed, was pronounced invalid." And a similar decision was made with reference to an appropriation by the legislature for the benefit of sufferers from disastrous floods in a part of the state." Nor can a municipal corporation raise money by taxation to reimburse its treasurer for a sum paid by him to the corporation to make good an amount of the public money of which he had been robbed." And a legislative appropriation made to an individual in payment of a claim for damages on account of personal injuries sustained by him while in its service, and for which the state is not responsible, either on general principles of law or by reason of any statute, is a "gift" such as the legislature is forbidden to make." So again, it is held that a law providing that persons planting prairie land with forest trees, and cultivating the same for three years, shall receive a bounty therefor, is unconsti tutional." But, on the other hand, the validity of the federal laws granting pensions to the disabled soldiers and sailors of the late war has never been questioned. And it is held that bounties offered for the destruction of wolves and other dangerous wild animals are valid and constitutional." And, in those states where the question was raised, it was held that an appropriation of money from the state treasury, for the purpose of constructing buildings and collecting and maintaining an exhibit of the products and resources of the state at the World's Fair Columbian Exposition of 1893, was for a public purpose, and was lawful and valid. And, in a recent decision of the United States supreme court, congress having offered a bounty upon sugar produced within the United 78 Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454. 74 State v. Osawkee Tp., 14 Kan. 418. 75 Patty v. Colgan, 97 Cal. 251, 31 Pac. 1133. 76 Bristol v. Johnson, 34 Mich. 123. 77 Bourn v. Hart, 93 Cal. 321, 28 Pac. 951. 78 Deal v. Mississippi Co., 107 Mo. 464, 18 S. W. 24. 80 70 Dimmit Co. v. Frazier (Tex. Civ. App.) 27 S. W. 829; In re Bounties, 18 Colo. 273, 32 Pac. 423. 80 Daggett v. Colgan, 92 Cal. 53, 28 Pac. 51; Norman v. Board, 93 Ky. 537, 20 S. W. 901. States, and then repealed the offer, it was held that sugar manufacturers who had in the meantime raised crops, and engaged in the making of sugar in the expectation of receiving the bounty, had a claim which imposed on the United States such an equitable and moral obligation as authorized the appropriation by congress of money for the payment of such bounties. Irrepealable Laws. 81 Every legislative body, unless restricted by the constitution, may modify or abolish the acts of its predecessors. And there is no way in which a legislative act can be made irrepealable, except it assume the form and substance of a contract.82 Nor can one legislature be bound by the acts of another as to the mode in which it shall exercise its constitutional powers." PRIVATE, SPECIAL, AND LOCAL LEGISLATION. 141. In most of the states, the enactment of private, local, or special laws is forbidden by the constitution. In some of the states, this restriction extends only to cases in which general laws could be made applicable. In others, many subjects are enumerated on which private or special legislation is forbidden. In several of the states, the prohibition is directed against the enactment of private or local statutes regulating the internal affairs of towns and counties. Many state constitutions also provide that charters of incorporation shall be granted only in accordance with general laws, and not by special acts of the legislature. In some of the states, a still different form is found, which provides that all laws of a general nature shall be uniform in their operation throughout the state. All these provisions are mandatory, and any laws which are found to be in violation of them will be declared unconstitutional by the courts. The object of provisions of this sort is twofold. On the one hand, they are designed to deter the legislature from usurping judi 81 U. S. v. Realty Co., 163 U. S. 427, 16 Sup. Ct. 1120. 82 Bloomer v. Stolley, 5 McLean, 158, Fed. Cas. No. 1,559. 88 Brightman v. Kirner, 22 Wis. 54. 85 cial functions and invading the peculiar province of the courts. And on the other hand, they are intended to prevent the enactment of laws characterized by favoritism, partiality, or invidious discriminations against persons or localities. A constitutional prohibition is needed to withdraw such power from the legislature. Where there is no constitutional restriction against the passage of private or local laws, they are within the legislative competency and the courts cannot hold them unconstitutional.84 A private statute is one which operates only upon particular persons or private concerns.8 And a law is "local" which, instead of relating to and binding all persons, corporations, or institutions to which it may be applicable, within the whole territorial jurisdiction of the lawmaking power, is limited in its operation to certain districts of such territory or to certain individual persons or corporations.8 The fact that a statute is limited as to the time of its duration does not make it a local or special law, but such an act is termed a temporary one. A local or special statute is one limited in the objects to which it applies; a temporary statute is limited merely in its duration. Necessarily a local or special law may be perpetual, while a general law may be temporary.87 A good illustration of law. of this objectionable character is found in a statute passed in Indiana in 1879, "legalizing the practice of circuit courts in entering judgments on the first day of the term." It was held to be unconstitutional, as being both local and special in its provisions. It was special because it did not apply to all judgments which might have been or might be taken on the first day of the term. And it was local because it did not in terms legalize the judgments of all the circuit courts of the state which had been theretofore taken on the first day of the term, but only of such of those courts as had "adopted rules of practice making the summons in civil causes returnable on the first day of the term." 88 The prohibition against local and special laws is not to be evaded by merely calling the statute a general law. This device has many times been frustrated by the courts. A law which purports by its terms to be made for the whole state, but which then proceeds by 84 Beyman v. Black, 47 Tex. 558. 851 Bl. Comm. 86. * Kerrigan v. Force, 68 N. Y. 381. 87 People v. Wright, 70 Ill. 388. 89 exceptions, reservations, or provisos, to withdraw from its operation all but one or a few persons, or a special class of persons, or all but one or a few cities or counties, is in reality a private or local law and will be so declared by the judicial department. Thus, an act which by its terms can have application to but one county within the state, although purporting to be a general law, applicable to all counties having a certain population, is special legislation." But a law in relation to cities and villages is not necessarily a local or special law because there may be certain cities and villages, organized under special charters, to which it does not apply." But an act relating to the fees of the sheriff of a single county is clearly a local act." In Pennsylvania, it is held that the classification of the cities of the state according to their population (with reference to their form of government and their corporate powers) is a proper and constitutional method, and is not open to objection on the charge of being special legislation.93 But it is also there ruled that an act excluding perpetually from its operation all counties containing more than 150,000 or less than 10,000 inhabitants is a local law; for the perpetual exclusion of certain counties from the operation of a law is not a classification of the counties. In New York, where the constitution prohibits the passage of local or private bills for "laying out or opening roads, highways, or alleys," it is considered that this is not applicable to streets in cities.*5 94 In those states where the constitution prohibits local or special laws only in cases where a general law could be made applicable, there has been some difference of opinion as to what department of the government is to determine whether or not a general law 89 State v. Herrmann, 75 Mo. 340; State v. Mayor, etc., of Jersey City, 45 N. J. Law, 297; Belleville & I. R. Co. v. Gregory, 15 Ill. 20; Coutieri v. Mayor, etc., of New Brunswick, 44 N. J. Law, 58; Woodard v. Brien, 14 Lea (Tenn.) 520; City of Topeka v. Gillett, 32 Kan, 431, 4 Pac. 800. 90 Devine v. Commissioners, 84 Ill. 590. 91 Potwin v. Johnson, 108 Ill. 70; People v. Newburgh & S. Plank-Road Co., 86 N. Y. 1. 2 Gaskin v. Meek, 42 N. Y. 186. 98 Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. St. 338; Com. v. Patton, 88 Pa. St. 258. 94 Morrison v. Bachert, 112 Pa. St. 322, 5 Atl. 739. 95 In re Lexington Avenue, 29 Hun (N. Y.) 303. could have been made applicable to the case in point. The better opinion seems to be that while the legislature must determine this question in the first instance, yet their decision is not final or conclusive, but the courts must also consider and decide upon the applicability of a general law, when the act passed is regularly presented to them for review, and must decide upon its constitutionality according to their opinion of the facts. 98 97 96 In some of the states, as above mentioned, the constitution contains a provision against the enactment of private or special laws "regulating the internal affairs of towns and counties." It is held that this applies equally to cities. It is violated by a law which, while general in form, serves but to give a salary to a single officer of a single county, as also by a statute conferring upon all cities having a population of not less than 25,000 the power of issuing bonds to fund their floating debt." In those states where the legislature is prohibited from creating corporations by special act, or from conferring corporate powers by special law, this provision is understood as applying only to private corporations and not to municipal bodies.100 It does not prohibit the legislature from passing a special act changing the name of an existing corporation and giving it the power to purchase the property and franchises of another existing corporation.101 But an act granting rights to a single corporation in reference to specific property in a certain location is void under this prohibition.102 The other form of prohibition mentioned in the text (that requir ing that all laws of a general nature shall be uniform in their operation) is quite different in its meaning and effects. It does not entirely forbid the enactment of local or special laws. A statute is understood to be general and uniform in its operation when it operates equally upon all persons who are brought within 96 State v. Mayor, etc., of Newark, 40 N. J. Law, 1; People v. Allen, 42 N. Y. 378. Compare Board of Com'rs of St. Louis v. Shields, 62 Mo. 247. 97 State v. Parsons, 40 N. J. Law, 1. * Gibbs v. Morgan, 39 N. J. Eq. 126. State v. City of Trenton, 42 N. J. Law, 486. 100 State v. Mayor, etc., of Newark, 40 N. J. Law, 71. 101 Wallace v. Loomis, 97 U. S. 146. 102 In re Union Ferry Co., 32 Hun (N. Y.) 82. |