a republic, an empire, a kingdom, a republic, an empire and again a republic, but throughout these changes it continues to be France, and it is bound by any engagements made in its behalf by any of the governmental agents which have been authorized from time to time to act for it. Perhaps the most striking example of a personality which has survived radical changes in both territory and government is the kingdom of Italy. By a series of annexations culminating in 1870, the kingdom of Sardinia, comprising the island of that name and the northwest corner of the Italian peninsula, succeeded in uniting with itself all the other states in Italy, which it organized into the kingdom of Italy with its seat at Rome. Although its territory was vastly increased, its name changed, a new government created and its capital established at a point outside of the original state, yet the kingdom of Italy regards itself as the same political entity as the kingdom of Sardinia and acknowledges itself bound by the treaties made by Sardinia. This however seems a somewhat forced identification, and some jurists of distinction, e. g. Holzendorff and Hall, think that the kingdom of Italy should be regarded as a new creation. The case is certainly much more extreme than that presented by the territorial growth of the United States and the governmental changes in France.

The continuing personality of the state regardless of changes in its territory or form of government is important chiefly in connection with the contracts of the state. When a government is established as the recognized government of a state, it may assert any right which accrued to the state under any preceding government whether de facto or de jure, State of Yucatan v. Argumedo (1915), 92 N. Y. Misc. 547. Territorial or governmental changes do not release it from its contracts or treaty obligations unless they make those obligations impossible of fulfillment or create a situation which could not have been in contemplation when they were entered into, Republic of Peru v. Dreyfus (1888), L. R. 38 Ch. D. 348. Likewise the substitution of one form of government for another does not affect the duty of the state as to its debts. When Brazil was changed from an empire to a republic in 1889, the new government immediately announced that the obligations contracted by the imperial government would not be questioned. In Agency of American Car & Foundry Co., Limited, v. American Can Co. (1919), 258 Fed. 363, 369, the question at issue being the power of an agent of the Kerensky Government to make an effective settlement of a contract entered into by the government of the Czar, the court said:

The principle of law is well established that the rights and liabilities of a state are not affected by a change in the form or the personnel of a government, no matter how that change may be effected. The obligations of a state, the debts due to and from it, are not affected by any transformation in the internal organization of its government.

If, however, the debts have been contracted with reference to a specific portion of its territory, the loss of that territory may in some

cases affect the obligation which was contracted on the assumption of its continued possession and enjoyment. As to such cases it is difficult to lay down general rules. Each must be judged on its own facts.

As to how far the acts of a de facto government are binding upon its successor, see Republic of Peru v. Dreyfus (1888), L. R. 38 Chancery Division, 348; United States v. Prioleau (1865), 35 L. J. Chan. Rep. N. S. 7; United States v. McRae (1869), L. R. 8 Eq. 69; United States v. Home Insurance Co. (1875), 22 Wallace, 99; Williams v. Bruffy (1877), 96 U. S. 176; Coffee v. Groover (1887), 123 U. S. 1; Baldy v. Hunter (1898), 171 U. S. 388; MacLeod v. United States (1913), 229 U. S. 416.

The preservation of the identity of the state's personality throughout changes in territory or government should be clearly distinguished from the question of state succession or the transmission of rights and obligations as concomitant with a transfer of jurisdiction. For further discussion of the principal of the continuity of state life, see Rivier, I, 62; Cobbett, Cases and Opinions, I, 78; Moore, Digest, I, 248.

CHAPTER IV.

STATE SUCCESSION.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. PRIOLEAU.

COURT OF CHANCERY OF ENGLAND. 1865.

35 Law Journal, Chancery, N. S. 7.

[The government of the Confederate States owned certain cotton which it consigned to the defendant Prioleau and others, at Liverpool, authorizing them to sell it, and recoup themselves for certain charges out of the proceeds. Upon the downfall of the Confederacy the United States filed a bill praying to have the cotton, then in Liverpool, delivered up to it, and for an injunction and a receiver. The defendants proved a lien upon the cotton for £20,000.]

WOOD, V. C.-There are one or two points which, I think, are tolerably clear in this case. The first point is with reference to the right of the United States of America, at this moment, to the cotton, subject to the agreement. I treat it first in that way. It has scarcely been disputed on the present argument, and could hardly be disputed at any further stage of the inquiry, that the right is clear and distinct, because the cotton in question is the admitted result of funds raised by a de facto government, exercising authority in what were called the Confederate States of America; that is to say, several of those States which, in union, formerly constituted the United States, and which now, in fact, constitute them; and that de facto government, exercising its powers over a considerable number of States (more than one would be quite enough), raises moneybe it by voluntary contribution, or be it by taxation, is not of much importance. The defendant Prioleau, in cross-examination, admits that they exercised considerable power of taxation; and with those means, and claiming to exercise that authority, they obtained from several of the States of America funds, by

which they purchased this cotton for the use of the de facto government. That being so, and that de facto government being displaced, I apprehend it is quite clear that the United States of America (that is to say, the government which has been successful in displacing the de facto government, and whose authority was usurped or displaced, or whatever term you may choose to apply to it), the authority being restored, stand, in reference to this cotton, in the position of those who have acquired, on behalf of the citizens of the United States, a public property; because otherwise, as has been well said, there would be no body who could sue in respect of, or deal with property that has been raised, not by contribution of any one sovereign state (which might raise a question, owing to the peculiar constitution of the Union, if it had been raised in Virginia or Texas, or in any given State), but the cotton is the product of levies, voluntary or otherwise, on the members of the several States which have united themselves into the Confederate States of America, and which are now under the control of the present plaintiffs, and are represented, for all purposes, by the present plaintiffs. That being so, the right of the present plaintiffs to this cotton, subject to this agreement is, I think, clear, because the agreement is an agreement purporting to be made on behalf of the then de facto existing government, and not of any other persons. That case of The King of the Two Sicilies [1 Sim. N. S. 301] and the case of The King of Spain, [1 Dow. & Cl. 169], and other cases of the same kind, which it is not necessary to go through, show that whenever a government de facto has obtained the possession of property, as a government, and for the purposes of the government de facto, the government which displaces it succeeds to all the rights of the former government, and, among other things, succeeds to the property they have so acquired.

Now I come to the second head of the question, and I confess at this moment, as at present advised I do not feel

much doubt on the subject, namely, the question whether or not, taking this property, they must or must not take it subject to the agreement. It appears to me, at present, they must take it subject to the agreement. It is an agreement entered into by a de facto government, treating with persons who have a perfect right to deal with them. I apprehend if they had been American subjects they might do so. One of them, Prioleau, is not an American subject (at least I have no evidence that he is);

he is a naturalized British subject; he would have a perfect right to deal with a de facto government; and it cannot be com pared with any one of those cases Mr. Gifford put, of persons taking the property of another with knowledge of the rights of that other. That is a species of argument that cannot be applied to international cases of this description, and for a very good reason; if so, there would be no possibility during the existence of a government de facto of any person dealing with that government in any part of the world. The Courts of every country recognize a government de facto to this extent, for the purpose of saying-you are established de facto, if you are carrying on the course of government, if you are allowed by those whom you affect to govern to levy taxes on them, and they pay those taxes, and contribution is made accordingly, or you are acquiring property, and are at war, having the rights of belligerents, not being treated as mere rebels by persons who say they are the authorized government of the country. Other nations can have nothing to do with that matter. They say we are bound to protect our subjects who treat with the existing government; and we must give to those subjects, in our country, every right which the government de facto can give to them, and must not allow the succeeding government to assert any right as against the contracts which have been entered into by the government de facto; but, as expressed by Lord Cranworth in the case referred to, they must succeed in every respect to the property as they find it, and subject to all the conditions and liabilities to which it is subject and by which they are bound. Otherwise, I do not see any answer to Mr. James' illustration, and I do not see why there should not have been a bill filed to have the Alabama delivered up; because on the theory of the present plaintiffs, it was their property just as much as their cotton is now. If the case had been this (and it is the only case I can consider as making any difference, but that difference would be fatal to the plaintiffs' case in another point of view): if they had been a set of marauders, a set of robbers (as was said to be the case in the kingdom of Naples, truly or untruly), devastating the country, and acquiring property in that way, and then affecting to deal with your subjects in England, it would not be the United States, but the individuals who had been robbed and suffered, who could come as plaintiffs. That would be fatal to the claim of the United States as plaintiffs. The United States could only come to