very sound one, that the Crown themselves capture or seize
a vessel, and the persons whose property is seized must come
in the course of proceedings prepared to give grounds why
their property is not confiscable. It is enough for the Crown
to say, "We regard this vessel or this cargo as prize and we
seize it as prize, and we issue a writ against you in which we tell
you that we are going to ask the Court for its condemnation."
Thereupon the other parties must file their claim, and it is
for them to show that the seizure and capture by the Crown
were not rightfully made.

Prize courts are courts of international law,-"that is," in the words of Sir Samuel Evans, "the law which is generally understood and acknowledged to be the existing law applicable between nations by the general body of enlightened legal opinion," The Odessa (1914), L. R. [1915] P. 52. Hence when a neutral claimant declared that the statutes of his country forbade his presenting the evidence which the court required, Lord Parker of Waddington, in The Consul Corfitzon (1917), L. R. [1917] A. C. 550, replied:

Their Lordships are clearly of opinion that a Court of Prize cannot properly be deterred from making what it conceives to be the appropriate order because a neutral claimant would, if he obeyed the order, be guilty of a breach of his own municipal law. The substantive law administered by the Court is international law, which cannot be affected by the municipal legislation of any one State, and its practice and procedure are governed by the municipal law of the State from which it derives its jurisdiction, and cannot be modified by the municipal legislation of any other State.

If however a country enacts legislation which conflicts with the established rules of international law, such legislation is binding upon its prize courts, The Eir (France, 1916), Journal Officiel, August 17, 1916; The Prins Hendrick (Germany 1917), Entscheidungen, 321. The determination of questions of prize belongs exclusively to the country of the captor, L'Invincible (1816), 1 Wheaton, 238. The prize court of an ally has no jurisdiction, Glass v. Sloop Betsey (1794), 3 Dallas, 6, but a prize court in the territory of an ally may condemn, The Christopher (1799), 2 C. Robinson, 209. A belligerent may not set up a prize court in a neutral country, Wheelwright v. De Peyster (1806), 1 Johnson (N. Y.) 471, 481. There are exceptional cases in which a prize court sitting in a belligerent state has condemned a prize lying in a neutral port, The Henrick and Maria (1799), 4 C. Robinson, 43; Hudson v. Guestier (1808), 4 Cranch, 293; The Polka (1854), Spinks, 57; but in the opinion which he delivered in the last case the eminent judge Dr. Lushington said that "this case is decided upon its own peculiar circumstances, and is not to be considered as a precedent for the condemnation of a prize while lying in a neutral port." To ask a neutral to allow its ports to be used as places of deposit for captured vessels which cannot be taken to

a port of the captor is to ask it to abandon its neutrality. The docIt was trine of the cases cited above is now generally condemned. embodied in article 23 of Convention XIII, adopted at The Hague in 1907, but this article was rejected by Great Britain, Japan, Siam and the United States.

A prize court not only has exclusive jurisdiction of all questions of prize or no prize but also of all the incidents which depend for their determination on the question of prize or no prize. Hence an action for false imprisonment based on the detention of a passenger on a vessel whch it was alleged had been wrongfully captured could not be heard by a common law court, for the question of the validity of the capture could only be determined by a prize court, Le Caux v. Eden (1781), 2 Douglas, 594. So when a voyage was interrupted by capture and was continued to a different port determined by the captors, a claim for freight could only be heard by a prize court, since the right to the freight contracted for at the beginning of the voyage was lost by the interruption of the voyage and the only freight recoverable would be that which the prize court might award, The Corsican Prince (1915), L. R. [1916] P. 195; The St. Helena (1916), L. R. [1916] 2 A. C. 625. But when goods have been effectively released to a claimant, no question involving the jus belli remains for determination and the jurisdiction of the prize court comes to an end, Egyptian Bonded Warehouses Co. Ltd. v. Yeyasu Goshi Kaisha For further discussion of the in(1921), L. R. [1922] 1 A. C. 111. cidental jurisdiction of prize courts see The Anna Christiana (1778), Hay and Marriott, 161; Smart v. Wolf (1789), 3 T. R. 323; The Copenhagen (1799), 1 C. Robinson, 289; The Race Horse (1800), 3 Ib. 101; The Diana (1803), 5 Ib. 60; Faith v. Pearson (1815), 4 Campbell, 357; The Antonia Johanna (1816), 1 Wheaton, 159; The Nassau (1866), 4 Wallace, 634.

That can The capture of a vessel or cargo does not transfer title. be effected only by a decree of a prize court of competent jurisdiction, The Nassau (1867), 4 Wallace, 634; Oakes v. United States (1899), 174 U. S. 778, 789; The Brig Fair Columbian (1913), 49 Ct. Cl. 133. Pending condemnation or restitution the captured property or its proceeds are held by the captor in trust for those who may finally be proved to be entitled to it, The Nassau (1867), 4 Wallace, 634, but a decree of condemnation relates back to the time of capture, Goss v. Withers (1758), 2 Burrow, 683; Stevens v. Bagwell (1808), 15 Ves. Jr. 139. As seizure is merely the assertion of a right to capture, it is the captor's duty to take his prize before a prize court as soon as possible. Unnecessary delay may result in a decree of demurrage by way of damages, The Corier Maritimo (1799), 1 C. Robinson, 287; The Peacock (1802), 4 Ib. 185; Slocum v. Mayberry (1817), 2 Wheaton, A delay of 1; The Nuestra Senora de Regla (1882), 108 U. S. 92. one month was held to be unreasonable in The St. Juan Baptista (1803), 5 C. Robinson, 33. A claimant also may lose his rights by undue delay, The Susanna (1805), 6 Ib. 48. While it is the duty of a captor to take in his prize for adjudication, he may under imperative circumstances sell it and submit the proceeds to the prize court, Jecker

v. Montgomery (1852), 13 Howard, 498, 516. In The Erymanthos, Cargo Ex, (Malta, 1915), the court held that if enemy property consigned to a British, allied, or neutral subject under a contract by which title had passed to the buyer be captured before payment, payment is to be made to the Crown, on the theory that the goods when restored are put in their original condition as to the seller's lien, and the seller being an enemy, his rights pass to the Crown. Jour. Soc. Comp. Leg., XVI, (N. S.) 70.

In extreme cases enemy vessels captured as prize may be destroyed, The Felicity (1819), 2 Dodson, 381, but if the vessel proves not to have been an enemy vessel, the captors must pay the full value of the property destroyed even though if brought before a prize court it would have been confiscated, The Actaeon (1815), 2 Dodson, 48. But recent regulations as to destruction of prizes issued by various governments do not distinguish between enemy and neutral vessels. See Wilson, Handbook, 306; Int. Law Topics, 1905, 62; Int. Law Situations, 1907, 74; Ib., 1911, 51; Atherley-Jones, 528; Barclay, Problems, 99; Lawrence, War and Neutrality in the Far East, 250; Garner, {ch. xv; Smith and Sibley, International Law, ch. xii. Whenever a captor brings goods to the port of actual destination according to the intent of the contracting parties he is entitled to the freight because he has complied with the terms of the contract, but in any other case he is entitled to no freight at all, even though the vessel has performed a large part of its voyage. In The Vrow Henrica (1803), 4 C. Robinson, 343, Lord Stowell said, "Freight is, in all ordinary cases, a lien which is to take the place of all others. The captor takes cum onere." See also The Der Mohr (1800), 3 C. Robinson, 129, (1802), 4 Ib. 315; The Fortuna (1802), 4 Ib. 278; The Vrow Anna Catherina (1806), 6 Ib. 269; The Antonia Johanna (1816), 1 Wheaton, 159; Hooper, Adm. v. United States (1887), 22 Ct. Cl. 408; The Roland (1915), 1 Br. & Col. P. C. 188. The title to all property captured vests in the state of the captor, The Manila Prize Cases (1903), 188 U. S. 254, and hence at any time prior to condemnation the state may order the property released to its former owner, The Elsebe (1804), 5 C. Robinson, 155; The St. Ivan (1811), Edwards, 376. But such release does not prevent the captor from proceeding to adjudication, The Mercurius (1798), 1 C. Robinson, 80. The sentence of condemnation by a prize court having jurisdiction completely extinguishes the title of the original proprietor and transfers title to the state or sovereign of the captor, The Brig Fair Columbian (1913), 49 Ct. Cl. 133. Since the judgment of a prize court is a proceeding in rem it is conclusive as to all matters decided and within its jurisdiction, and is a protection to all persons who derive their claims from the captor, Hudson v. Guestier (1810), 6 Cranch, 281; Cushing v. Laird (1882), 107 U. S. 69, but a decree may be made the basis of a diplomatic protest, Cushing v. United States (1886), 22 Ct. CL 1, 42. See the classic argument of William Pinckney in Moore, Int. Arb., III, 3180. The following decisions in prize made by the United States Supreme Court during the Civil War were modified or reversed by the British-American Claims Commission appointed under the

Treaty of Washington (the reference in parentheses is to Moore, Int. Arb.): The Hiawatha, 2.Black, 635 (IV, 3902); The Circassian, 2 Wallace, 135 (IV, 3911); The Springbok, 5 Wallace, 1 (IV, 3928); Sir William Peel,5 Wallace, 517 (IV, 3935); The Volant, 5 Wallace, 179 (IV, 3950); The Science, 5 Wallace, 178 (IV, 3950). For further discussion of prize courts and prize law, see Earl of Halsbury, Laws of England, "Prize Law and Jurisdiction," XXIII, 275; Allin, "English and German Prize Courts and Prize Laws," Minnesota Law Review, II, 22; Huberich and King, "Development of German Prize Law," Columbia Law Review, XVIII, 503; Sir Erle Richards, "The British Prize Courts and the War," British Year Book of International Law, 1920-21, 11; Roscoe, "Prize Court Procedure," Ib. 1921-22, 90; Baty, "Prize Droits," Law Quarterly Review, XXXII, 38; Viscount Tiverton, Principles and Practice of Prize Law; J. A. Hall, The Law of Naval Warfare, ch. xi; Pyke, The Law of Contraband of War, 214; Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, XL, 372; Cobbett, Cases and Opinions, II, 188; Bonfils (Fauchille), sec. 1422; Hyde, II, 786; Moore, Digest, VII, ch.

XXV.

CHAPTER XVI.

UNNEUTRAL SERVICE.

THE IMMANUEL.

HIGH COURT OF ADMIRALTY OF ENGLAND. 1799.
2 C. Robinson, 186.

This was the case of an asserted Hamburgh ship, taken 14th August 1799 on a voyage from Hamburg to St. Domingo, having in her voyage touched at Bordeaux, where she sold part of the goods brought from Hamburg, and took a quantity of iron stores and other articles for St. Domingo. A question was

first raised as to the property of the ship and cargo; and 2dly, supposing it to be neutral property, Whether a trade from the mother country of France to St. Domingo, a French colony, was not an illegal trade, and such as would render the property of neutrals engaged in it liable to be considered as the property of enemies, and subject to confiscation?

SIR WM. SCOTT [LORD STOWELL] .

Upon the mere question of property, as it respects all the goods as well as the ship, I see no reason to entertain a legal doubt. Considering them as neutral property, I shall proceed to the principal question in the case, viz. Whether neutral property engaged in a direct traffic between the enemy and his colonies, is to be considered by this Court as liable to confiscation? And first with respect to the goods.

Upon the breaking out of a war, it is the right of neutrals to carry on their accustomed trade, with an exception of the particular cases of a trade to blockaded places, or in contraband articles (in both which cases their property is liable to be condemned), and of their ships being liable to visitation and search; in which case however they are entitled to freight and expences. I do not mean to say that in the accidents of a war the property of neutrals may not be variously entangled and