I hold that the danger was one to which this Court can have regard and a rescue from which this Court can reward. It is not the same as, but it is analogous to, a rescue from pirates or mutineers, which this Court has always recognized as the subject of salvage.

In a few instances courts have intimated that in the absence of recognition by the political department of the government, the question of the independence of a state is open to proof, Consul of Spain V. The Conception (1819), 6 Federal Cases, 359; Yrisarri v. Clement (1825), 2 C. & P. 223; (1826), 3 Bing. 432. Questions of international status however are usually treated as political rather than judicial questions, and the courts will follow the decisions of the political departments of the government. In Rose v. Himely (1808), 4 Cranch, 240, 272, in considering the status of San Domingo, then in revolt against France, Chief Justice Marshall said:

It has been argued that the colony, having declared itself a sovereign state, and having thus far maintained its sovereignty by arms, must be considered and treated by other nations, as sovereign in fact, and as being entitled to maintain the same intercourse with the world that is maintained by other belligerent nations. In support of this argument, the doctrines of Vattel have been particularly referred to. But the language of that writer is obviously addressed to sovereigns, not to courts. It is for governments to decide, whether they will consider St. Domingo as an independent nation, and until such decision shall be made, or France shall relinquish her claim, courts of justice must consider the ancient state of things as remaining unaltered, and the sovereign power of France over that colony as still subsisting.

See also City of Berne v. Bank of England (1804), 9 Ves. 347; The Pelican (1809), Edwards, App. D.; Jones v. Garcia Del Rio (1823), Tur. & Rus. 297; Taylor v. Barclay (1828), 2 Sim. 213; Thompson v. Barclay (1828), 6 L. J. (O. S.) Ch. 93; S. C. (1831), 9 L. J. (O. S.) Ch. 215; The Ionian Ships (1855), 2 Spinks, 212; Republic of Peru v. Dreyfus (1888), L. R. 38 Ch. D. 348; Mighell v. Sultan of Johore [1894], 1 Q. B. 149; Foster v. Globe Venture Syndicate [1900], 1 Ch. 84; Aksionairnoye Obschestro A. M. Luther v. James Sagor & Co. (1920), L. R. [1921] 1 K. B. 456; Gelston v. Hoyt (1818), 3 Wheaton, 246; United States v. Palmer (1818), 3 Ib. 610; The Divina Pastora (1819), 4 Ib. 52; The Santissima Trinidad (1822), 7 Ib. 283; Kennett V. Chambers (1852), 14 Howard, 38; United States v. Baker (1861), 24 Federal Cases, 962; The Three Friends (1897), 166 U. S. 1; Underhill v. Hernandez (1897), 168 U. S. 250; Oetjen v. Central Leather Co. (1918), 246 U. S. 297; Molina v. Comision Reguladora del Mercado de Henequen (1918), 92 N. J. Law, 38.

It is generally believed that to allow a government to sue in the courts of a country which has not recognized it would set the courts of that country in opposition to its political departments. It is therefore well-settled that such a government shall not be allowed access

to the courts as a plaintiff, Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Gov. ernment v. Cibrario (1921), 191 N. Y. Supp. 543; The Rogdai (1920), 278 Fed. 294; The Penza (1921), 277 Fed. 91; but the same reasons do not apply if an unrecognized government appears as a defendant. If the courts adjudicate claims asserted against it they do not thereby embarrass the action of the political departments nor impair their freedom in passing upon the question of recognition. Such a suit has therefore been allowed, Wulfsohn v. Russian Soviet Government (1922), 66 N. Y. L. J. 1711, discussed in Harvard Law Review, XXXV, 768.

The League of Nations.-The League of Nations is a new organization whose status in international law is as yet undetermined. Throughout the Great War many men in many countries were giving thought to plans for the settlement of international controversies and the prevention of war. Projects for international organization, in the elaboration of which Leon Bourgeois, former Prime Minister of France, Lord Robert Cecil, former Minister of Blockade of Great Britain, General Louis Botha, former Minister of Defence of the Union of South Africa, and Woodrow Wilson, then President of the United States, had taken the leading part, were laid before the Peace Conference, and owing chiefly to the insistence of President Wilson that the Conference should provide some machinery for international administration and adjustment of differences in time of peace, the Covenant of the League of Nations was adopted and incorporated in the Treaty of Peace with Germany, and has been accepted by more than fifty countries. Germany has applied for admission to the League and the only other non-member states are Russia, Turkey, Egypt, Ecuador, Mexico and the United States. The objects of the League are stated in the preamble to the Covenant (Part I of the Treaty of Versailles) in the following words:

THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,

In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve
international peace and security

by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war,
by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations
between nations,

by the firm establishment of the understandings of interna-
tional law as the actual rule of conduct among Govern-
ments, and

by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for
all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples
with one another,

Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations.

The seat of the League is at Geneva, Switzerland. Its government is vested in a Council and an Assembly. These two bodies, in accordance with the terms of the Covenant, have established the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague. As to the Permanent Court see Hudson, "The Permanent Court of International Justice," Harvard Law Review, XXXV, 245. The statute establishing the Court forms an appendix to this article. The Treaty of Versailles

also created an International Labor Office as part of the organisation of the League of Nations.

On the League of Nations see Temperley, History of the Peace Conference of Paris; Sir Geoffrey Butler, Handbook to the League of Nations, with an introduction by Lord Robert Cecil; Duggan, The League of Nations: the Principle and the Practice; Erzberger, The League of Nations; Lord Grey of Falloden, The League of Nations; Haskins and Lord, Some Problems of the Peace Conference; House, What Happened at Paris; Lawrence, The Society of Nations: Its Past, Present and Possible Future; Oppenheim, The League of Nations and its Problems; Sir George Paish, The Nations and the League; Lord Eustace Percy, The Responsibilities of the League; Pillet, De l'Idee d'une Societe des Nations; Sir Frederick Pollock, The League of Nations.

SECTION 2. PROTECTORATES.

THE KING v. THE EARL OF CREWE.

THE COURT OF APPEAL OF ENGLAND. 1910.
Law Reports [1910] 2 K. B. 576.

[By treaties with the native tribes, Bechuanaland was placed under the jurisdiction of the British Crown, and in 1885, by an Order in Council, was erected into a protectorate. By another Order in Council in 1891, the British High Commissioner for South Africa was empowered to provide for the peace and good order of all persons under the jurisdiction of the Crown in South Africa. A controversy having arisen in one of the tribes as to who was its rightful chief, the High Commissioner, under authority of the Order in Council of 1891, directed that Sekgome, one of the claimants who was then outside the tribal limits, should be detained in custody lest his return to the tribe should provoke bloodshed. Sekgome then endeavored to obtain his release by a writ of habeas corpus directed to the Earl of Crewe, Secretary of State for the Colonies. The writ was denied on the ground that application had not been made to the right court and that the Earl of Crewe did not have the custody of the prisoner. On appeal this decision was affirmed. Only so much of one of the opinions is given as relates to the nature of protectorates.]

a member of a native African tribe, dwelling in a region which has for some years become officially entitled "The Batawana Native Reserve," near Lake Ngami, within the Bechuanaland Protectorate. Now the features of Protectorates differ greatly, and of this a comparison of the British Protectorates of native principalities in India, the British Protectorate of the Ionian Islands between 1815 and 1864, the Protectorate of the Federated Malay States, and the Bechuanaland Protectorate The one common

affords ample illustration.

element in Protectorates is the prohibition of all foreign relations except those permitted by the protecting State. Within a Protectorate, the degree and the extent of the exercise by the protecting State of those sovereign powers which Sir Henry Maine has described (International Law, p. 58) as a bundle or collection of powers which may be separated one from another, may and in practice do vary considerably. In this Bechuanaland Protectorate every branch of such government as existsadministrative, executive, and judicial has been created and is maintained by Great Britain. What the idea of a Protectorate excludes, and the idea of annexation on the other hand would include, is that absolute ownership which was signified by the word "dominiom" in Roman law, and which, though perhaps not quite satisfactorily, is described as territorial sovereignty. The protected country remains in regard to the protecting State a foreign country; and, this being so, the inhabitants of a Protectorate, whether native born or immigrant settlers, do not by virtue of the relationship between the protecting and the protected State become citizens of the protecting State. As Dr. Lushington said in regard to the inhabitants of the Ionian States, then under a British Protectorate, in his judgment in The Ionian Ships (1855), 2 Ecc. & Adm. 212, 226, "allegiance in the proper sense of the term undoubtedly they do not owe; because allegiance exists only between the Sovereign and his subjects, properly so called, which they are not." A limited obedience the dwellers within a Protectorate do owe, as a sort of equivalent for protection; and in the present case the Orders in Council relating to the Bechuanaland Protectorate and the " proclamations of the High Commissioner made thereunder imply the duty of obedience on the part of Sekgome and other persons within the area of the Protectorate to a practically unlimited extent.

Appeal dismissed.

STATHAM v. STATHAM AND HIS HIGHNESS THE GAEKWAR OF BARODA.

PROBATE, DIVORCE AND ADMIRALTY DIVISION OF THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE OF ENGLAND. 1911.

Law Reports [1912] P. 92.

These were two applications arising out of a husband's divorce petition.

The second was a summons by the co-respondent asking that he should be dismissed from the suit on the ground that he was an independent ruling prince.

BARGRAVE DEANE J. In this case Mr. George Wellington Statham has filed a petition praying the Court to dissolve his marriage on the ground of the adultery of his wife, Beatrix Alice Statham, with his Highness Maharaja Gaekwar Sir Saraji Rao III of Baroda, who has been added as a co-respondent in the suit under s. 28 of the Divorce Act, 1857.

The first question which I have to determine is raised by summons on behalf of the co-respondent, in which the Court is asked to dismiss him from the suit on the ground that he is a reigning sovereign and by the rules of international law is not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Court. .

There is no doubt that an independent reigning sovereign cannot by the rules of international law be made against his will a party to proceedings in our Courts. He may choose to sue, and if so a counter-claim may be raised against him as plaintiff, but he cannot be made a defendant.

What then is the status of the Gaekwar of Baroda?

So far as I have been able to ascertain by my researches the princes of Baroda date their importance from the Mahralta Confederacy, which in the eighteenth century was a powerful body of confederated ruling chiefs in India. During the last thirty-two years of the eighteenth century the house of Baroda fell a prey to family feuds, and in 1800 the succession fell to a prince feeble in mind. Internal troubles arising, British troops were sent in defense of the hereditary ruler against all claimants, and in 1802 a treaty was signed by which the independence of the reigning prince of all except the British Crown was assured, but which, on the other hand, secured his dependence on the British Crown. Several weak but troublesome princes succeeded in succession to the throne of Baroda, and in 1874