perpetuity, and received from the Governor General of Porto Rico a patent which was confirmed in 1881 by a patent from the King of Spain. Porto Rico having been ceded to the United States, the American Military Governor on April 30, 1900, issued a decree abolishing the office of procurador. This decree was ratified by Congress. Sanchez then filed a complaint in the Court of Claims for the purpose of recovering from the United States the value of the office on the ground that its abolition deprived him of property contrary to article 7 of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain which provided that the cession should not "in any respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds." The complaint was held bad on demurrer and the claimant appealed.]

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court. We do not think that the present claim is covered by the Treaty. The words in the Treaty "property of private individuals," evidently referred to ordinary, private property, of present, ascertainable value and capable of being transferred between man and man.

When the United States, in the progress of the war with Spain, took firm, military possession of Porto Rico, and the sovereignty of Spain over that Island and its inhabitants and their property was displaced, the United States, the new Sovereign, found that some persons claimed to have purchased, to hold in perpetuity, and to be entitled, without regard to the public will, to discharge the duties of certain offices or positions which were not strictly private positions in which the public had no interest. They were offices of a quasi-public nature, in that the incumbents were officers of court, and in a material sense connected with the administration of justice in tribunals created by government for the benefit of the public. It is inconceivable that the United States, when it agreed in the Treaty not to impair the property or rights of private individuals, intended to recognize, or to feel itself bound to recognize, the salability of such positions in perpetuity, or to so restrict its sovereign authority that it could not, consistently with the Treaty, abolish a system. that was entirely foreign to the conceptions of the American people, and inconsistent with the spirit of our institutions.

If, originally, the claimant lawfully purchased, in perpetuity, the office of Solicitor (Procurador) and held it when

Porto Rico was acquired by the United States, he acquired and held it subject, necessarily, to the power of the United States to abolish it whenever it conceived that the public interest demanded that to be done. It is clear that the claimant is not entitled to be compensated for his office by the United States because of its exercise of an authority unquestionably possessed by it as the lawful sovereign of the Island and its inhabitants. The abolition of the office was not, we think, in violation of any provision of the Constitution, nor did it infringe any right of property which the claimant could assert as against the United States. . The judgment of the Court of Claims must be affirmed. It is so ordered.

NOTE. The rule that private property rights are not affected by a mere transfer of jurisdiction is operative without any treaty stipulation to that effect, Leitensdorfer v. Webb (1858), 20 Howard, 176; United States v. Mereno (1863), 1 Wallace, 400. A state which would violate such an elemental rule of justice would probably not feel bound by a treaty. No construction of a treaty which would impair those private property rights of its inhabitants recognized by the laws and usages of nations should be adopted further than its words require, Strother v. Lucas (1838) 12 Peters, 410.

While the rights of private property in ceded territory are not af fected by the cession, the new sovereign may require the existence and extent of such rights to be proved in a prescribed manner, De la Croix v. Chamberlain (1827), 12 Wheaton, 599, 601; United States v. Clarke (1834), 8 Peters, 436; Chouteau v. Eckhart (1844), 2 Howard, 344, 374; Glenn v. United States (1852), 13 Howard, 250; Tameling v. U. S. Freehold Co. (1877), 93 U. S. 644, 661; Botiller v. Dominguez (1889), 130 U. S. 238; Astiazaran v. Santa Rita Land and Mining Co. (1893), 148 U. S. 80; Ainsa v. New Mexico and Arizona Ry. (1899), 175 U. S. 76; Florida v. Furman (1901), 180 U. S. 402; Barker v. Harvey (1901), 181 U. S. 481.

The question of the recognition by the receiving state of the private property rights of the inhabitants of ceded territory arises with great frequency in connection with grants which individuals claim to have been made to them by the ceding state. It is obvious that a sovereign can cede nothing with which he has already parted, Mitchell v. United States (1835), 9 Peters, 711, 733. The validity of a grant does not depend upon a strict compliance with every legal for mality, United States v. Auguisola (1863), 1 Wallace, 352. If a grant is derived in regular form, a court will not inquire into its voidability for equitable considerations, Jones v. McMasters (1857), 20 Howard, 8. As to the treatment of inchoate grants, see Soulard v. United States (1830), 4 Peters, 511; Delassus v. United States (1835), 9 Peters, 117. As to conditional grants see United States v. Arrendondo (1832), 6 Peters 691; Cessna v. United States (1898), 169 U. S. 165. As to indefinite grants see O'Hara v. United States (1841), 15 Peters,

274; United States v. Miranda (1842), 16 Peters, 153; Dent v. Em. meger (1872), 14 Wallace, 308. As to void grants see Harcourt v. Gaillard (1827), 12 Wheaton, 523; Coffee v. Groover (1887), 123 U. S. 1; More v. Steinbach (1888), 127 U. S. 70. As to forfeited grants, see United States v. Repentigny (1866), 5 Wallace, 211. As to conflicting grants under former sovereigns, see Doe v. Esclava (1849), 9 Howard, 421.

The statement made in Cessna v. United States (1898), 169 U. S. 165, 186, that "it is the duty of a nation receiving a cession of territory to respect all rights of property as those rights were recognized by the nation making the cession," appears to be too broad, and in fact has not been followed by the Supreme Court in later cases. In 1728 the government of Spain had sold at public auction the office of high sheriff of Havana which was declared to be perpetual and hereditary and which carried with it a lucrative monopoly. Upon the American occupation of Cuba, the Military Governor, General Brooke, abolished the office and he was sustained by the Secretary of War, Mr. Root. When the claimant brought an action against the Military Governor, the Supreme Court decided against him and said, "We agree with the opinion of the Secretary of War, that the plaintiff had no property that survived the extinction of the sovereignty of Spain," O'Reilly de Camara v. Brooke (1908), 209 U. S. 45. In the case of Alvarez Y. Sanchez v. United States (1910), 216 U. S. 167, the court explicitly rejects the argument that since the office in question was regarded as property under Spanish law, it should be so regarded by the United States. Although the nations are in agreement as to most forms of property, certain exceptions are obvious. If Russia, while the institution of serfdom still existed, had ceded territory to Turkey, property rights in the serfs in the ceded territory would probably not have been disturbed, but if a similar cession had been made to Sweden, it is not to be supposed that such property rights would have survived. If a monopoly for the sale of liquor had been granted in one of the French West Indies, . which monopoly had been declared to be perpetual and subject to inheritance and sale, the transfer of the island to the United States would nevertheless ipso facto extinguish the monopoly. In other words, the recognition of rights of property in ceded territory depends partly upon the nature of the property and the public policy of the receiving state.

For discussion of the effect on private rights of a transfer of jurisdiction see Bordwell, "Purchasable Offices in Ceded Territory", Am. Jour. Int. Law, III, 119 (an able adverse comment on Alvarez Y. Sanchez v. United States (1910), 216 U. S. 167); Sayre, "Change of Sovereignty and Private Ownership of Land," Am Jour. Int. Law, XII, 475 (an excellent treatment); Magoon, Reports, 177, 194, 305, 351, 374, 541, 650; Hyde, I, 235; Moore, Digest, I, 414.

Williams, Cases in Equity during the Time of Lord Chancellor Talbot,

281.

Barbuit had a commission, as agent of commerce from the King of Prussia in Great Britain, in the year 1717, which was accepted here by the Lords Justices when the King was abroad. After the late King's demise his commission was not renewed until 1735 and then it was, and allowed in a proper manner; but with the recital of the powers given him in the commission, and allowing him as such. These commissions were directed generally to all the persons whom the same should concern and not to the King: and his business described in the commissions was, to do and execute what his Prussian Majesty should think fit to order with regard to his subjects trading in Great Britain; to present letters, memorials, and instruments concerning trade, to such persons, and at such places, as should be convenient, and to receive resolutions thereon; and thereby his Prussian Majesty required all persons to receive writings from his hands, and give him aid and assistance. Barbuit lived here near twenty years, and exercised the trade of a tallow-chandler, and claimed the privilege of an ambassador or foreign minister, to be free from arrests. After hearing counsel on this point,

LORD CHANCELLOR [TALBOT. The first part of the opinion is quoted in In re Republic of Bolivia Exploration Syndicate Limited, [1914] 1 Ch. 139, ante, 221].

The question is, whether the defendant is such a person as 7 Anne, cap. 10, describes, which is only declaratory of the antient universal jus gentium; the words of the statute are ambassadors or other public Ministers, and the exception of

persons trading relates only to their servants; the parliament never imagining that the ministers themselves would trade. I do not think the words ambassadors, or other public ministers, are synonymous. I think that the word ambassadors in the act of parliament, was intended to signify ministers sent upon extraordinary occasions, which are commonly called ambassadors extraordinary; and public ministers in the act take in all others. who constantly reside here; and both are intitled to these privileges. The question is, whether the defendant is within the latter words? It has been objected that he is not a public minister, because he brings no credentials to the King. Now although it be true that this is the most common form, yet it would be carrying it too far to say, that these credentials are absolutely necessary; because all nations have not the same forms of appointment. It has been said, that to make him a public minister he must be imployed about state affairs. In which case, if state affairs are used in opposition to commerce, it is wrong: but if only to signify the business between nation and nation the proposition is right: for, trade is a matter of state, and of a public nature, and consequently a proper subject for the imployment of an ambassador. In treaties of commerce those imployed are as much public ministers as any others; and the reason for their protection holds as strong: and it is of no weight with me that the defendant was not to concern himself about other matters of state, if he was authorized as a public minister to transact matters of trade. It is not necessary that a minister's commission should be general to intitle him to protection; but it is enough that he is to transact any one particular thing in that capacity, as every ambassador extraordinary is; or to remove some particular difficulties, which might otherwise occasion war. But what creates my difficulty is, that I do not think he is intrusted to transact affairs between the two crowns: the commission is, to assist his Prussian Majesty's subjects here in their commerce; and so is the allowance. Now this gives him no authority to intermeddle with the affairs of the King: which makes his employment to be in the nature of a consul. And although he is called only an agent of commerce, I do not think the name alters the case. Indeed there are some circumstances that put him below a consul; for, he wants the power of judicature, which is commonly given to consuls. Also their commission is usually directed to the prince of the country; which is not the present case: but at most he is only a con