The suspension of such governmental functions as are obviously incompatible with the new political relations thus brought about may be presumed. But no such implication may be reasonably indulged beyond that result.

Such a conclusion is in harmony with the settled principles of public law as declared by this and other courts and expounded by the text books upon the laws of war and international law. Taylor, International Public Law, Sec. 578.

That there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of the inhabitants of the ceded region is obvious. That all laws theretofore in force which are in conflict with the political character, constitution or institutions of the substituted sovereign lose their force, is also plain. Alvarez v. United States, 216 U. S. 167. But it is equally settled in the same public law that that great body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights continues in force until abrogated or changed by the new ruler. In Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U. S. 524, 546, it was said:

"It is a general rule of public law, recognized and acted upon by the United States, that whenever political jurisdiction and legislative power over any territory are transferred from one nation or sovereign to another, the municipal laws of the country, that is, laws which are intended for the protection of private rights, continue in force until abrogated or changed by the new government or sovereign. By the cession public property passes from one government to the other, but private property remains as before, and with it those municipal laws which are designed to secure its peaceful use and enjoyment. As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances, and regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions and constitution of the new government are at once displaced. Thus, upon a cession of political jurisdiction and legislative power-and the latter is involved in the former-to the United States, the laws of the country in support of an established religion, or abridging the freedom of the press, or authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and the like, would at once cease to be of obligatory force without any declaration to that effect; and the laws of the country on other subjects would necessarily be superseded by existing laws of the new government upon the same matters. But with respect to other laws affecting the possession, use and transfer of property, and designed to secure good order and peace in the community, and promote its health and prosperity,

which are strictly of a municipal character, the rule is general, that a change of government leaves them in force until, by direct action of the new government, they are altered or repealed. .

That the United States might, by virtue of its situation under a treaty ceding full title, have utterly extinguished every municipality which it found in existence in the Philippine Islands may be conceded. That it did so in view of the practice of nations to the contrary is not to be presumed and can only be established by cogent evidence.

NOTE. See also: Townsend v. Greeley (1867), 5 Wallace, 326; Merryman v. Bourne (1870), 9 Ib. 592; More v. Steinbach (1888), 127 U. S. 70; Los Angeles Farming and Milling Co. v. Los Angeles (1910), 217 U. S. 217, and the cases there cited.

In practice and quite apart from any legal theory, the effect of the transfer of jurisdiction from one country to another depends much upon the size of the population of the district in question. If small it is not likely to be able to preserve its identity, but will be absorbed by the annexing state and will take the latter's system of law. The old system will continue in force however until the new one is established. The transfer of jurisdiction may also be followed by such a volume of immigration from the territory of the new sov. ereign as to alter entirely the character of the original population, and lead to the introduction of a new legal system. A change of this sort occurred in Utah after its transfer from Mexico to the United States, First National Bank v. Kinner (1873), (1 Utah, 100. If the newly acquired lands are entirely without a civilized population, it is the Anglo-American doctrine that British or American citizens occupying such districts take their own law with them, or as expressed by Chief Justice Holt in Blankard v. Galdy (1693), 2 Salkeld, 411, "In case of an uninhabited country newly found out by English subjects, all laws in force in England are in force there."

For the status of the common law in Massachusetts see the opinion of Chief Justice Shaw in Commonwealth v. Chapman (1847), 13 Metcalf (Mass.), 68, and for its introduction into Oklahoma see McKennon v. Winn (1893), 1 Ok. 327. For the conflict between the Dutch and the English law after the cession of New York to the English, see Mortimer v. New York Elevated Railroad Co. (1889), 6 N. Y. Supp. 898.

Upon the transfer of jurisdiction the new sovereign succeeds to all the rights of his predecessor, but he takes subject to the limitations of his own constitution. The ceding government cannot increase the powers of another government by purporting to convey to it powers which it cannot constitutionally exercise, New Orleans v. United States (1836), 10 Peters, 662; Pollard v. Hagan (1845), 3 Howard, 212. Any provision of the local law which is repugnant to the law of the new sovereignty may be nullified by the transfer of

jurisdiction. Hence on the cession of Minorca to Great Britain, it was held that torture, which was authorized by the old law, could not be inflicted by the British governor, Fabrigas v. Mostyn (1773), 20 State Trials, 181. The transfer may create a situation which necessarily renders certain laws inoperative. Thus on the cession of Texas to the United States, the incompetency of an American citizen to hold land in Texas because of alienage ceased to exist, Osterman v. Baldwin (1868), 6 Wallace, 116. The laws of the ceding state regulating the disposition of the public domain or the discharge of governmental functions in the ceded territory depart with the authority from which they emanated, Harcourt v. Gailliard (1827), 12 Wheaton, 523; United States v. Vallejo (1862), 1 Black, 541; More v. Steinbach (1888), 127 U. S. 70; Ely's Administrator v. United States (1898), 171 U. S. 220.

The transfer of jurisdiction does not in itself alter the local laws which are in force in the ceded territory except in so far as they are in conflict with the laws or institutions of the new sovereign, Campbell v. Hall (1774), Cowper, 204; Picton's Case (1804-1812), 30 State Trials, 226, 944; Strother v. Lucas (1838), 12 Peters, 410; Leitensdorfer v. Webb (1858), 20 Howard, 176; Barnett v. Barnett (1897), 9 New Mexico, 205, 211. On the whole subject see Magoon, Reports, 351; Hyde, I, 201; Moore, Digest, I, 304-311, 332-334.

SECTION 2. EFFECT ON PRIVATE PROPERTY.

THE UNITED STATES, Appellants, v. JUAN PERCHEMAN,

Appellee.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. 1833.

7 Peters, 51.

Appeal from the superior court for the eastern district of Florida.

On the 17th of September, 1830, Juan Percheman filed in the clerk's office of the superior court for the eastern district of Florida, a petition, setting forth his claim to a tract of land containing two thousand acres, within the district of East Florida. The petitioner stated that he derived his title to the said tract of land under a grant made to him on the 12th day of December, 1815, by governor Estrada, then Spanish governor of East Florida, and whilst East Florida belonged to The court adjudged "that the

Spain.

Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the court. .

Florida was a colony of Spain, the acquisition of which by the United States was extremely desirable. It was ceded by a treaty concluded between the two powers at Washington, on the 22d day of February, 1819.

The second article contains the cession, and enumerates its objects. The eighth contains stipulations respecting the titles to lands in the ceded territory.

It may not be unworthy of remark, that it is very unusual, even in cases of conquest, for the conqueror to do more than to displace the sovereign and assume dominion over the country. The modern usage of nations, which has become law, would be violated; that sense of justice and of right which is acknowledged and felt by the whole civilized world would be outraged, if private property should be generally confiscated, and private rights annulled. The people change their allegiance; their relation to their ancient sovereign is dissolved; but their relations to each other, and their rights of property, remain undisturbed. If this be the modern rule even in cases of conquest, who can doubt its application to the case of an amicable cession of territory? Had Florida changed its sovereign by an act containing no stipulation respecting the property of individuals, the right of property in all those who became subjects or citizens of the new government would have been unaffected by the change. It would have remained the same as under the ancient sovereign. The language of the second article conforms to this general principle. "His catholic majesty cedes to the United States in full property and sovereignty, all the territories which belong to him situated to the eastward of the Mississippi, by the name of East and West Florida.' A cession of territory is never understood to be a cession of the property belonging to its inhabitants. The king cedes that only which belonged to him. Lands he had previously granted were not his to cede. Neither party could so understand the cession. Neither party could consider itself as attempting a wrong to individuals, condemned by the practice of the whole civilized world. The cession of a territory by its name from one sovereign to another, conveying the compound idea of surrendering at the same time 23 the lands and the people who inhabit them, would be necessarily

understood to pass the sovereignty only, and not to interfere with private property. If this could be doubted, the doubt would be removed by the particular enumeration which follows. "The adjacent islands dependent on said provinces, all public lots and squares, vacant land, public edifices, fortifications, barracks and other buildings which are not private property, archives and documents which relate directly to the property and sovereignty of the said provinces, are included in this article."

This state of things ought to be kept in view when we construe the eighth article of the treaty, and the acts which have been passed by congress for the ascertainment and adjustment of titles acquired under the Spanish government. That article in the English part of it is in these words: "All the grants of land made before the 24th of January, 1818, by his catholic majesty, or by his lawful authorities, in the said territories ceded by his majesty to the United States, shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of the lands, to the same extent that the said grants would be valid if the territories had remained under the dominion of his catholic majesty."

This article is apparently introduced on the part of Spain, and must be intended to stipulate expressly for that security to private property which the laws and usages of nations would, without express stipulation, have conferred. . . Without it, the titles of individuals would remain as valid under the new government as they were under the old; and those titles, so far at least as they were consummate, might be asserted in the courts of the United States, independently of this article. The decree is affirmed.

ALVAREZ Y SANCHEZ v. UNITED STATES.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. 1910.
216 U. S. 167.

Appeal from the Court of Claims.

[In 1878 the claimant Sanchez purchased for a valuable consideration the office known as "Numbered Procurador [Solicitor] of the Courts of First Instance of the capital of Porto Rico" in