set on foot by a proclamation only, without force to carry it into effect."

See also Colombian Controversy, 6 Moore's International Law Digest, pp. 995 et seq.

We do not think that it was the purpose of the executive order under which the government at Manila was instituted and maintained at the time of this importation to direct the collection of the duties at ports not in the occupation of the United States, and certainly not at one actually in the possession of a de facto government, as is shown in this case.

We think the Court of Claims was in error in holding the duties collectible at Manila under the circumstances related.

Its judgment will therefore be reversed and the case remanded to the Court of Claims with instructions to enter judgment for the claimant.

Reversed.

NOTE. The most important discussions of the law governing military occupation are Fleming v. Page (1850), 9 Howard, 603; Cross v. Harrison (1854), 16 Ib. 164; Leitensdorfer v. Webb (1858), 20 Ib. 176; New Orleans v. Steamship Co. (1875), 20 Wallace, 387; Coleman v. Tennessee (1879), 97 U. S. 509; Ferrand, Des Réquisitions en Matière de Droit International Public; Pillet, Les Lois Actuelles de la Guerre; Oppenheim, "The Legal Relations Between an Occupying Power and the Inhabitants," Law Quarterly Review, XXXIII, 363; Spaight, War Rights on Land; Birkhimer, Military Government and Martial Law; Cobbett, Cases and Opinions, II, 108; Magoon, Reports, 11-36, 225-228, 261-455; Bonfils (Fauchille), sec. 1155; Hyde, II, 361, and Moore, Digest, I, 45, VII, 257. The methods employed by the Germans during their occupation of Belgium and Northern France are described in Garner, vol. II.

In determining upon the measures and methods of government to be adopted in the occupied territory, the occupant is limited only by the restraints of his own municipal law and by the laws and usages of war, Little v. Barreme (1804), 2 Cranch, 168; Mitchell v. Harmony (1852), 13 Howard, 115; United States v. Diekelman (1876), 92 U. S. 520; Dow v. Johnson (1880), 100 U. S. 158; Gates v. Goodloe (1880), 101 U. S. 612. He may enforce the existing local law or substitute a new system of his own making, United States v. Reiter (1865), 27 Fed. Cases, No. 16146. The system of military government does not necessarily cease with the termination of war, Cross v. Harrison (1854), 16 Howard, 164. Contra, Ex parte Ortiz (1900), 100 Fed. 955. Allegiance to the conqueror during a temporary military occupation merely suspends the former allegiance. It does not make the inhabitants aliens de facto, Shanks v. Dupont (1830), 3 Peters, 242; United States v. Huckabee (1873), 16 Wallace, 414.

The terms martial law and military law are frequently used synonymously. This is erroneous. Military law applies only to persons in the military and naval forces and applies to them in both peace and war. Martial law as an instrument of domestic government pre

supposes a state of public danger or grave disorder necessitating the substitution of summary military methods for the more deliberate methods of the civil law. In contemplation of international law, however, martial law is that body of law which is imposed upon an occupied district by the will of the military occupant. It may be, and in great part it usually is, the law which prevailed in the dis trict prior to its subjugation, but during the occupation it derives its authority from the will of the occupant. See Ex parte Milligan (1866), 4 Wallace, 2; Marais v. Attorney General of Natal (1902), L. R. [1902] A. C. 109; Johnson v. Jones (1867), 44 Ill. 142, 153; Grove v. Mott (1884), 46 N. J. Law, 328, 331; Sir Frederick Pollock, "What is Martial Law," Law Quarterly Review, XVIII, 152.

Motion to set aside an order for substituted service of a writ of summons in an action for breach of promise of marriage, and to stay all proceedings therein, on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction over the defendant, who was described in the writ as "The Sultan of the State and Territory of Johore, otherwise known as Albert Baker."

LORD ESHER, M. R. For the purposes of my judgment I must assume that the Sultan of Johore came to this country and took the name of Albert Baker, and that the plaintiff believed that his name was Albert Baker, and I will go so far as to assume for the present purpose that he deceived her by pretending to be Albert Baker, and then promised to marry her, and that he broke his promise. Whether these matters could be proved, if the case went further, is entirely another matter; but at the present stage of the case I will assume them to be true. At length, when he is sued, he alleges that he is a sovereign prince, and that no action can be maintained against him in the municipal Courts of this country for anything which he has done.

The first point taken was that it was not sufficiently shewn that the defendant was an independent sovereign power. There was a letter written on behalf of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, on paper bearing the stamp of the Colonial Office, and which clearly came from the Secretary of State for the Colonies in his official character. He is in colonial matters the adviser of the Queen, and I think the letter has the same effect for the

present purposes as a communication from the Queen. It was argued that the judge ought not to have been satisfied with that letter, but to have informed himself from historical and other sources as to the status of the Sultan of Johore. It was said that Sir Robert Phillimore did so in the case of The Charkieh, Law Rep. 4 A. & E. 59. I knów he did; but I am of opinion that he ought not to have done so; that, when once there is the authoritative certificate of the Queen through her minister of state as to the status of another sovereign, that in the Courts of this country is decisive. Therefore this letter is conclusive that the defendant is an independent sovereign. For this purpose all sovereigns are equal. The independent sovereign of the smallest state stands on the same footing as the monarch of the greatest. It being established that the defendant is in that position, can he be sued in the Courts of this country? It is not contended that he could, unless by coming into this country, and living there under a false name, and I will assume for the present purpose-by so deceiving the plaintiff, he has lost his privilege as an independent sovereign and made himself subject to the jurisdiction. In the case of The Parlement Belge, 5 P. D. 197, the whole subject was carefully considered. As I have pointed out, great judges in the House of Lords and the Queen's Bench had in previous cases declined to decide this point, but I think that this Court was there called upon to decide the point, and did decide it. I said, in giving the judgment of the Court in that case, after citing passages from various authorities, and a minute examination of the cases on the subject (see p. 214 of the report), "The principle to be deduced from all these cases is that, as a consequence of the absolute independence of every sovereign authority, and of the international comity which induces every sovereign state to respect the independence and dignity of every other sovereign state, each and every one declines to exercise by means of its Courts any of its territorial jurisdiction over the person of any sovereign or ambassador of any other state, or over the public property of any state which is destined to public use, or over the property of any ambassador, though such sovereign, ambassador, or property be within its territory, and therefore, but for the common agreement, subject to its jurisdiction." It appears to me that, by the authority of this Court, the rule was thus laid down absolutely and without any qualification. We had not then to deal with the question of a foreign sovereign submitting to the jurisdiction; every

body knows and understands that a foreign sovereign may do that. But the question is, How? What is the time at which he can be said to elect whether he will submit to the jurisdiction? Obviously, as it appears to me, it is when the Court is about or is being asked to exercise jurisdiction over him, and not any previous time. Although up to that time he has perfectly concealed the fact that he is a sovereign, and has acted as a private individual, yet it is only when the time comes that the Court is asked to exercise jurisdiction over him that he can elect whether he will submit to the jurisdiction. If it is then shewn that he is an independent sovereign, and does not submit to the jurisdiction, the Court has no jurisdiction over him. It follows from this that there can be no inquiry by the Court into his conduct prior to that date. The only question is whether, when the matter comes before the Court, and it is shewn that the defendant is an independent sovereign, he then elects to submit to the jurisdiction. If he does not the Court has no jurisdiction. It appears to me that this is the result of the principles laid down in The Parlement Belge, 5 P. D. 197. Therefore, I think the Court has no jurisdiction to enter into any inquiry into the matters alleged by the plaintiff, the defendant being an independent sovereign, and not submitting himself to the jurisdiction. For these reasons the appeal must be dismissed.

[LOPES, L. J. and KAY, L. J. delivered concurring opinions.]

COMPAGNIE

SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC v. LA
FRANCO-BELGE DU CHEMIN DE FER DU NORD.

CHANCERY DIVISION OF THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE OF ENGLAND. 1897. Law Reports [1898] 1 Ch. 190.

[In 1882 the defendant corporation was formed in Belgium for the purpose of acquiring and working a railway concession in the South African Republic. A difference of opinion having arisen between the Republic and the company as to the control of certain of the company's funds on deposit in England, the South African Republic instituted an action in answer to which the defendants set up a counterclaim by which it claimed payment of £208,800 on account of alleged breaches of the terms of