As now written, the statutes apparently permit any type of assistance to be requested from an agency. Should the request for assistance from the CIA be restricted in any way to guard against unwarranted agency involvement in law enforcement activities? Mr. CARLUCCI. I shouldn't think so, Mr. Fauntroy. The Director of CIA, the Director of Central Intelligence, has the statutory responsibility under the 1947 Act to protect sources and methods. He therefore should be in a position to pass judgment on how the information should be used; but I don't see how you could frame a statute that would say what kinds of information should be provided and what kinds should not. I think it would be very difficult to craft.

Mr. FAUNTROY. You indicated that the CIA has been effective in preventing political assassinations. I wonder if you would care to comment on any recommendations you could offer to make the CIA more effective in that area?

Mr. CARLUCCI. Well, I think, Congressman, the tone of my prepared statement pretty much covers it, and I say "tone" because I would emphasize that our ability to protect the people who give us information is absolutely fundamental, and no one, particularly in this kind of an area, is going to put their life on the line if they think the information is not secure.

So the main thing we can do, really, is to create a general awareness of the real importance of this problem.

Mr. FAUNTROY. Would you have any recommendations on how the Secret Service might more effectively protect the President or the State Department might more effectively protect those in their charge?

Mr. CARLUCCI. I would regard that as outside my competence, Mr. Fauntroy. Suffice it to say that we have a very good working relationship with both of those organizations and I know of no problems that would need to be resolved.

Mr. FAUNTROY. Returning to the exchange of information, what role would the National Foreign Intelligence Board play in coordinating intelligence information in the event of an assassination? Mr. CARLUCCI. The National Foreign Intelligence Board would be one vehicle that might be used to coordinate the tasking of the different agencies.

There are other vehicles. As the intelligence community is now organized, the Director of Central Intelligence has the authority to level tasking on the different intelligence agencies, so the process that I would see would be that he would make the decision as to what information needed to be collected. Those instructions would go out through the entire community. They would then come back to the agencies, who would evaluate them, and the National Foreign Intelligence Board might meet as a group to give their overall assessment and pass on the information before it was turned over to the NSC for passage to the President.

They serve more as an evaluative body than as a tasking organization.

Mr. FAUNTROY. I take it from your previous response to an earlier question you do have pretty clear lines of communications in terms of individuals who communicate among the agencies? Mr. CARLUCCI. I would say they are very clear; yes, sir.

Mr. FAUNTROY. What if any intra- or interagency procedures has the CIA adopted to share information with the FBI in the event of assassination? I ask this question with the following situation in mind. During the ongoing investigation the CIA may come across a piece of information which means nothing in particular to the people running the assassination investigation but the same information was shown to an expert in the organized-crime area, or an expert in the Communist activities area, and its real significance became apparent.

With this in mind, how will the CIA see to it that information gets to the people within the Bureau who can properly evaluate it? Mr. CARLUCCI. Under terms of the Executive order, Executive Order 12036, we have a responsibility to cooperate with the FBI in the counterintelligence function. I think much of the information that you were talking about would fall into the counterintelligence area, and much of the information that you I think are referring to would fall under the category of counterintelligence.

There is no specific agreement other than that of the responsibilities to organizations delineated in 12036. I would be glad to submit Executive Order 12036 for the record because I think it may cover some of the questions you are getting at.

Mr. FAUNTROY. Mr. Chairman, I respectfully request that that be made a part of the record at this point. I would hope that the next member will pick up on this subject, as my time has expired. Chairman STOKES. Without objection, it is so ordered.

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of

the United States of America including the National Security Act of 1947, as

amended, and as President of the United States of America, in order to provide

for the organization and control of United States foreign intelligence activities, it

is hereby ordered as follows:

THE PRESIDENT

SECTION 1

DIRECTION, DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES WITH RESPECT TO THE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE EFFORT⚫

1-1. National Security Council

1-101. Purpose. The National Security Council (NSC) was established by the National Security Act of 1947 to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security. The NSC shall act as the highest Executive Branch entity that provides review of, guidance for, and direction to the conduct of all national foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities.

1-102. Committees. The NSC Policy Review Committee and Special Coordination Committee; in accordance with procedures established by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, shall assist in carrying out the NSC's responsibilities in the foreign intelligence field.

1-2. NSC Policy Review Committee.

1-201. Membership. The NSC Policy Review Committee (PRC), when carrying out responsibilities assigned in this Order, shall be chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence and composed of the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or their designees, and other senior officials, as appropriate. 1-202. Duties. The PRC shall:

(a) Establish requirements and priorities for national foreign intelligence; (b) Review the National Foreign Intelligence Program and budget proposals and report to the President as to whether the resource allocations for intelligence capabilities are responsive to the intelligence requirements of the members of the NSC.

(c) Conduct periodic reviews of national foreign intelligence products, evaluate the quality of the intelligence product, develop policy guidance to ensure quality intelligence and to meet changing intelligence requirements; and (d) Submit an annual report on its activities to the NSC.

1-203. Appeals. Recommendations of the PRC on intelligence matters may be appealed to the President or the NSC by any member of PRC.

1-3. NSC Special Coordination Committee.

1-301. Membership. The NSC Special Coordination Committee (SCC) is chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and its membership includes the statutory members of the NSC and other senior officials, as appropriate.

1-302. Special Activities. The SCC shall consider and submit to the President a policy recommendation, including all dissents, on each special activity. When meeting for this purpose, the members of the SCC shall include the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

1-303. Sensitive Foreign Intelligence Collection Operations. Under standards established by the President, proposals for sensitive foreign intelligence collection operations shall be reported to the Chairman by the Director of Central Intelligence for appropriate review and approval. When meeting for the purpose of reviewing proposals for sensitive foreign intelligence collection operations,

•Certain technical terms are defined in Section 4-2.

FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL. 43, NO. 18—THURSDAY, JANUARY 26, 1978

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