With respect to media and private photographic or tape-recorded evidence, the value to an investigation of all media and private photographic or recording results taken at the assassination scene may be considerable.

Under current law, the materials are not voluntarily delivered; they may be obtained by a grand jury subpena or with a search

warrant.

With respect to media-held materials, the Supreme Court ruled recently in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily that these may be obtained with a warrant, even in a place owned or possessed by someone not reasonably suspected of criminal involvement.

The Bureau places a Stanford Daily-type search in a special category. It is not permitted except with my approval and then only in extraordinary circumstances, as presumably would be the case if a President were assassinated.

With respect to financial/communications records, traditionally, the FBI has obtained financial transaction records through a judicial search warrant, grand jury subpena, or by consent of the

holder.

Acquiring records today, however, is more difficult than in the past. This is a result of legislation rather than court decisions. Indeed, decisions have not recognized fourth and fifth amendment rights asserted by owners of documents, that is, customers, held by third parties, such as banks.

This legislation has established requirements concerning the kinds of information which may be obtained and has set up procedures to be complied with before materials can be obtained. Examples include the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and the very recent Right to Financial Privacy Act.

The latter will significantly regulate the FBI's ability to gain access to records in possession of third party financial institutions and curtail the rapid access to such records. The act effectively ends informal access to financial records subject to certain excep

tions.

Under it, an individual has a right both to be notified when the Government is seeking his financial records and to challenge the Government's access to his records. These rights would not apply when documents were sought with a grand jury's subpena. We will monitor this new legislation to determine its impact upon our investigative responsibilities.

In effect, today, should financial, tax, or credit records be sought after a Presidential assassination, the FBI might experience considerably more difficulty acquiring them than it did in the past. Communications records would also be important to an investigation. Although access to these is not currently controlled by statute, we find it increasingly difficult to obtain them informally. The third subject which I propose to discuss is information exchange and assistance from other agencies.

The Presidential assassination statute specifically instructs that the FBI shall investigate violations and that "Assistance may be requested from any Federal, State, or local agency, including the Army, Navy, and Air Force, any statute, rule, or regulation to the contrary notwithstanding." The wording recognizes the statutory

prohibition against the general use of the Army or Navy as a possee comitatus.

Executive Order 12936 provides a vehicle for the FBI to request the Attorney General to ask other intelligence gathering agencies for specific information regarding violations of criminal law. This authority could be used if the President or other political official protected by statute was assassinated.

In the event of a calamitous event, such as a Presidential assassination, the FBI would relay all pertinent information to all official U.S. Government agencies concerned with developments, including the White House, the U.S. Department of State, the Department of Justice, the National Military Command Center, and the U.S. Secret Service.

We are currently conducting a periodic review of a formal agreement between the FBI and Secret Service which defines areas of activity regarding the Secret Service's protective responsibilities and the investigative responsibilities of the FBI and establishes mutual communication and cooperation in ordinary and extraordinary situations.

Through established liaison at Headquarters, the FBI is in regular communication with many agencies of Government in Washington having normal business with us, including all of those mentioned above. Means are available to immediately contact any U.S. agency which might afford assistance or information.

Our field offices maintain regular contact with criminal justice agencies at Federal, State, and local levels within their territories and can promptly contact any who might assist in an investigation. Through legal attachés, FBI agents attached to the U.S. embassies in several foreign countries, liaison is maintained with many friendly foreign policy agencies to resolve mutual problems of international criminality. The cooperative assistance of those foreign police agencies could be solicited for specific investigation outside the jurisdiction of the United States, subject, of course, to any State Department concerns arising from the specific situation.

The specific situation which might arise would govern the degree of assistance and information which might be sought. Within the United States our jurisdiction appears ample. Within legal bounds, the FBI will not hesitate to solicit cooperation, assistance, or information from whatever source may be required.

Mr. Chairman, I have tried to give you an overview of our jurisdiction to investigate political assassinations, of the way we would respond in the most serious of these situations, of the obstacles we might face in proceeding with an investigation, and of the extent of cooperation we might expect from other agencies in conducting such an investigation.

Obviously, there are many areas that I have not touched on, and I would be happy to answer whatever questions you may have about these or about specific issues that have come to mind concerning the materials I have just presented.

Thank you very much.

Chairman STOKES. Thank you very much, Mr. Webster, for the statement you have just given us.

I apologize for the difficulty we are having with our acoustic system here; we have asked someone to come up and check on it, though.

I would like at this time, without objection, to have placed into the record the FBI functional organization chart and have that made a part of the record at this point.

[The information follows:]

Chairman STOKES. The committee will operate under the 5minute rule.

I guess the first question I would have of you, Mr. Webster, is really a question as to whether or not we can really prevent political assassinations to save a President of the United States. In my opening statement I made the comment that President Kennedy had made in Dallas, and I guess my first question to you. is, What role can the FBI play in preventing political assassinations?

Mr. WEBSTER. The primary protective responsibility is, of course, as I am sure the chairman is aware, with the Secret Service. We do attempt and do in fact provide informational assistance to the Secret Service regarding any information that properly comes into our possession that suggests that a plan or a conspiracy is afoot to do injury to public officials and specifically the President.

We have guidelines in place which govern our ability to develop such information. As it comes to us properly, we make a point of getting that information immediately to the Secret Service, and that is probably the most effective means by which we can contribute to the Secret Service's protective and hence preventive responsibilities.

Chairman STOKES. Can you tell us whether the Attorney General's guidelines on domestic security investigations have had an adverse effect on the FBI's ability to prevent political assassinations?

Mr. WEBSTER. Of course, I have to begin and answer that question by saying any restriction to that extent impedes the free exercise of investigative activity. But these are often choices that are made in a free society.

I personally do not feel at the present time that the domestic security guidelines unreasonably impede or interfere with our ability to develop legitimate information. Whenever we have information that an organization or individual is planning an act of force or violence against the United States or instrumentalities of the United States or against civil rights, we have the basis for an investigation.

We do not put in place informants to tell us what every first amendment organization or other political group may be up to and hence we cannot be assured that we will learn of a plan in time to avert it. That is one of the choices, one of the assumed risks that we take in a free society, and I by no means suggest any alteration in that approach.

Chairman STOKES. I guess that sort of brings me to the next question.

Charter legislation is now pending, Mr. Webster, as you know, in both Houses of Congress to authorize and prevent abuses of domestic security investigations or the use of such investigative tools as informants and wiretapping.

I would appreciate having your comment on the best approach to follow in working out these problems; that is, should the Attorney General issue guidelines subject to congressional veto, should the Congress work out specific legislation subject to executive department input?