armies; the iron-clad navy will rest idly in our ports; taxes will immediately decrease, and new States will be coming into the confederacy, bringing rich contributions to the relief and comfort of mankind. What European state will not be profited by this change? Is there no one that will have the magnanimity to perceive that it ought to be accepted? SIR: It will be proper for you to inform Mr. Thouvenel that I have communicated the substance of his explanations given to you on the subject of Mexican complications to Mr. Romero, excluding, however, all that part of the explanations which was stated to you by Mr. Thouvenel to be confidential. A copy of my communication to Mr. Romero is annexed. The frankness and distinctness which we have maintained throughout with all parties on this grave subject have seemed to require this proceeding. I am, sir, your obedient servant, WILLIAM L. DAYTON, Esq., &c., &c, &c. WILLIAM H. SEWARD. No. 147.] Mr. Dayton to Mr. Seward. PARIS, May 16, 1862. SIR: Your several despatches from No. 138 to No. 146, both inclusive, have been received. Despatch No. 138, received on the 7th instant, gives a summary of our military position for the purpose of enabling me to satisfy Mr. Thouvenel that the government of France should assume as a fact the certain failure of the insurrection, and that its commercial interests demand a withdrawal of the concession of belligerent rights to the insurrectionists. I am waiting in daily expectation of hearing what Mr. Adams has done in England upon this question. Without this knowledge I do not feel that it would be wise or prudent to urge the point further at the present moment. My despatch of March 29 (No. 131) gives you the substance of a conversation with Mr. Thouvenel upon this point, which is subsequent in date to that with the Emperor, to which your despatch refers. The question of the propriety of revoking this concession of belligerent rights has been presented to this government so distinctly and earnestly that I am quite sure the answer of Mr. Thovenel, given in that despatch, was upon full advisement. Without a still further change for the better in the condition of things at home, or some encouraging information from Mr. Adams, I hesitate to urge the point further at present. It might be considered as savoring of importunity, or, at all events, as wanting in that diplomatic forbearance which this government would have a right to expect. This remark applies only to my further and immediate action upon this question; not at all to your despatch. At the time that despatch was written you were yet ignorant of my last conversation with Mr. Thouvenel. The misfortune is that, acting upon previous instructions, I have, in this respect, anticipated your wishes. But the course of events has already greatly added to the strength of our position. Each day adds a new argument to the strength of our claim upon these governments for a revocation of that unwise concession. If, in addition to the taking of New Orleans, our armies at Yorktown and Corinth should be successful, there would scarcely remain a plausible excuse with which to evade our demand. It can hardly be that so good a government as that of France will long continue a wrong which commenced in a wholly mistaken view of the policy and power of the United States. But in the present condition of things-our armies yet facing each other in the field, and the denouement daily expected-the French government will probably wait the result. I shall avail myself of the contents of your despatch at an early day, and hope, in the meantime, that coming events may even add to its force. I am, sir, your obedient servant, His Excellency WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State, &c, &c., &c. WILLIAM L. DAYTON. P. S. Since writing the above I have received a communication from Mr. Adams, which informs me that the British government had "no intention to vary the policy" adopted heretofore; and he states, further, that after having read your late despatch upon this question, "the answer was that the great ports were not yet in our possession, and the issue appeared yet uncertain." Under these circumstances I shall wait the development of a few days more at least before addressing myself again upon this point to the French government. D. Mr. Dayton to Mr. Seward. 1 No. 149.] In my prior despatches I have informed you fully of my suggestions to the government here as respects the propriety of withdrawing the concession of belligerent rights granted to the south, and of my purpose to wait the development of a few days before mooting the question further. Your despatch No. 149, subsequently received, and an unexpected interview with Mr. Thouvenel, under favorable circumstances, induced me to suggest it again. I had a long conference with him on the 21st instant, and am fully satisfied that his previous answer given me on this question was upon advise. ment. Immediately upon my entering his office, he said he had just received news from the United States. That the day preceding the secretary of their legation at Washington had arrived here, and they had a long talk about our affairs. He referred to our late successes, and the present position of our armies. He said he had never doubted the superior strength of the north, nor of its ability to overcome the south; but the question was, how were we to govern them afterwards? That under our form of government the assent of the people seemed to be essential. Putting his finger upon a map, and pointing to the central parts of the southern cotton States, he said, that when beaten they would retire there; that it was a vast country, and consequently very difficult to foresee the future. I then recalled to him my former suggestion as to a withdrawal of the concession of belligerent rights as an act of justice to us, a friendly power, and a certain means of hastening the forthcoming of cotton to France. I pointed out to him on the large map received from your department the mode in which the insurrec tionists were hemmed in without a port or outlet to the sea, with their cities taken, New Orleans and the Mississippi river in our possession, their feeble fleet in those waters destroyed, and with no ships or commerce anywhere. He said these things were true, and the concession of belligerent rights was therefore a nullity-mere waste paper; that it had been granted origially because it was supposed there would be an external as well as an internal war between the parties, and it would therefore be an essential to the commerce of France; that the concession was for a purpose external, not internal; but he repeated substantially what he had said on a prior occasion, that it would not be a handsome thing in a great government at once, upon the south being worsted, to withdraw a concession which had been made to them in their day of supposed strength; that, aside from all political reasons, he felt that such a proceeding would not be exactly worthy of France; or, in common parlance, if I understood him aright, the thing would not look well. Besides, he said again, they could do nothing upon this subject without England. That they had acted together, and although there had been no treaty to that effect, yet France considered herself bound by this understanding. The answers to these suggestions seemed very obvious, and I, of course, used them. I told him that so far from this concession being regarded as of no importance by the insurrectionists, their resolutions. to destroy their cotton, and not to plant another crop, were predicated altogether upon the hope that, in that event, necessity would yet drive these governments into alliance with them; that so long as this concession stood it was a hand extended, encouraging them to hope for more; that its prompt withdrawal at this time would end the rebellion at once. I further stated that this concession of belligerent rights was made in derogation of the sovereign powers of a friendly state, and under a mistaken view of facts, and it was but just to us that, upon the true state of the case appearing, it should be promptly withdrawn; that the acknowledgment by a foreign power of another flag within our sovereignty and jurisdiction was (aside from any practical effects) a matter which, of necessity, touched the pride and wounded the sensibilities of our people; that we first appealed to France to set this matter right, because we believed that France had wished us well. As respects England, with whom he said France must act, I told him that we could scarcely hope, in view of facts stated in your recent despatches, that she would be willing to retrace her steps; that whatever might be the strictly official conduct of that government, we could scarcely forbear to see that it wilfully closed its eyes to matters which were constantly being carried on in its ports. He said, in reply, he did not think we could justly charge anything of this kind upon France or her public men. Mr. Thouvenel made no other answer to my remarks as to contraband goods going from here to the south than as heretofore stated. When, however, I told him of the subscriptions of £40,000 and £50,000 in Liverpool, and read to him a portion of your despatch No. 146, in which it is stated that you have notice that five steamers have been purchased, fitted, armed, and supplied with material of war in England to prosecute a naval war against us, which could be looked upon as nothing less than a piratical invasion of our country, he seemed, I thought, somewhat incredulous. He said it was very strange, and that nothing of that kind, as I understood him, could be justified. I submitted to him whether it would not be well for France, under the circumstances, to signalize her aversion to the designs of such conspirators. He said he would speak to Lord Cowley on the subject. I have thus given you the substance of another conference upon these matters. I do not think these general conversations amount to much, except as showing the general drift of mind and purpose of the government. They are too loose in their nature to be otherwise regarded. Inasmuch as I had learned that Mr. Adams, in the exercise of the discretion which was left to him, had submitted your recent long despatch giving a summary of our military position, in connexion with the map which accompanied it, to the British government, I have done the same here. With you, I feel the great importance of a withdrawal by these pow ers of this concession of belligerent rights; but, as I have written you from the beginning, I am confident that it will not be done in France except in concert with England. This will remain true so long as the present cordial relations between these powers shall continue to exist. As you have access at Washington to the representatives of both, and may bring them into conference at your pleasure, cannot you obtain some suggestions from them favorable to such course of action? With aid from Mr. Mercier and Lord Lyons something may be done. Without such aid I fear it is not at present possible to accomplish anything in that direction. I am, sir, your very obedient servant, His Excellency WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c. WM. L. DAYTON. Mr. Dayton to Mr. Seward. No. 151.] PARIS, May 26, 1862. SIR: I beg to enclose you the translation of a brief extract from a recent article in the Constitutionnel. You are aware that this paper, if not semiofficial, is often used to convey to the public mind of France the views of leading men in the government. That portion, particularly, of this article, which is in brackets, expresses very clearly views and opinions which I am quite sure are held by more than one of the present ministers, and I think by the Emperor. It seems impossible to make them understand that the interior of the southern country is penetrable by its navigable rivers, and upon and near which is the bulk of its population; that an army there surrounded, as they would be, and cut off from supplies, could not exist; and if it could, that the disposition and habits of the people would not lead them to a long stay in large numbers in the sparsely settled and remote districts of the interior. It is this wide space which constantly staggers the faith of the statesmen of France in our ability to govern the insurgents even if we conquer their armies in the field. This objection, as I have told Mr. Thouvenel, was one about which our own statesmen had no doubt, and it seemed to me eminently a question for home consideration. I have no doubt, however, that the supposed uncertainty of the future, arising from the above cause, has its influence, and. weighty influence, in determining these governments not now to disturb belligerent rights. Will you permit me, in this connexion, to suggest, that it seems to me quite important that your attempt to obtain from England and France a withdrawal of this concession to the insurgents, should not become public except in the event of assured success. A knowledge of the denial of the application would very much encourage the rebels in their hopes. As the matter now stands I do not see that this concession affords serious pretext to the leaders of the rebellion to encourage their followers to look for more; especially after the tone of Mr. Yancey's address to the south. Mr. Thouvenel informs me that the consuls of France, in southern ports, report to him that great dissatisfaction exists there with the conduct of this government; so great, indeed, that they have threatened to confiscate the property of Frenchmen and send them out of the country. These governments having stopped short of direct intervention or recognition, have so much disappointed the hopes of the rebels that they are rather disposed to ignore the value of that which has, in fact, been done for them. Respectfully, your obedient servant, The Constitutionnel devotes its first three columns to a consideration of the actual state of Affairs in America. The article, which is in very prominent type, is signed M. Paulin Limayrac. It does not deny that the capture of New Orleans is a great victory for the north, but adds: ["What does this victory prove? Does it prove that the conquest of the south by force of arms is henceforth possible? Does it change the nature of things? Does it cancel distances? And, in the hearts of men determined to make a desperate resistance, will it engender submission to the victor? Cast a glance upon the map of that immense country, and then tell us whether, after as before the capture of New Orleans, the north, advancing deep into the south, will not meet with the same insurmountable obstacles that England had to encounter at the time of the war of independence-distances, climate, impossibility of procuring provisions, and an energetic people defending their homes? Such is, in fact, now the actual state of the question. The south defends its firesides. The most skilful paradoxes will not succeed in changing opinion upon this point, and the truth conveyed in the recent words of Mr. Gladstone: The north is fighting for supremacy; the south is fighting for its independence.' "Nearly the whole of the Atlantic coast, the Gulf of Mexico, and the banks of the Mississippi are in the power of the federals.] Yet, considering everything, the confederation of the south has rather progressed than fallen off since the 4th of March, 1861, if we estimate only the power of the States in square miles. It is scarcely enclosed within its limits, and has under its flag the greater portion of the States which were neutral on the accession of Mr. Lincoln. Moreover, the army commanded by General Beauregard, far from being dispersed or weakened, is increasing, gaining strength, and preparing for proximate eventualities, according to plans which certainly exist, although they have not transpired. Thus the dénouement by war is further off than ever, and those who advise the north to fight to the last without mercy or consideration, those who urge it to establish its sway on sanguinary ruins and devastation, are not aware of the sad future they would prepare for the whole of America if their counsels were followed. We entertain other sentiments and other ideas. We never wished to see one of the belligerents crush the other. Inspired by that wise and gen |