ing action taken in America. I replied in the negative, as from any official sources. But I had seen in the newspapers some reference to a contemplated appointment under the same commission. His. lordship said he should be glad to have me mention the subject to you. I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams. No. 314.] * * [Extracts.] DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, August 2, 1862. * * * SIR: It is indeed manifest in the tone of the speeches, as well as in the general tenor of popular discussions, that neither the responsible ministers, nor the House of Commons, nor the active portion of the people of Great Britain. sympathize with this government, and hope, or even wish for its success in suppressing the insurrection; and that, on the contrary, the whole British. nation, speaking practically, desire and expect the dismemberment of the republic. I cannot deny that these sentiments must insensibly influence the administration, and give its policy a hostile direction. But these senti ments are, after all, in a great measure speculations; and they may very well exist, and yet the government, and certainly the people of Great Britain, may be entirely unprepared by any responsible action to attempt to precipitate a change here whose consequences may be momentous, even to themselves. I well recollect that with what seemed to us far better motives, Great Britain recently wished and expected the separation of Hungary and of Venice from Austria; and yet the government passively looked on, and saw the revolutions designed to effect those ends languish and perish. It is a proverb that the earth is full of good but unexecuted intentions. Happily for human society, the proportion of evil intentions unfulfilled is equally great. Indeed, we can hardly be surprised at the disposition and the tendencies upon which I am dwelling, unless we shall persist, after so much opposing evidence, in our early error of conceding to Great Britain a degree of magnanimity which she herself does not even affect to claim, and which, perhaps, has never yet been exhibited by any nation. We cannot forget that we are a younger branch of the British family; that we have not been especially reverential of the senior branch, and have even been ambitious to surpass it in wealth, power, and influence among the nations. To these facts it is to be added that, in the very heat of competition, we have broken, have abandoned the course, and have divided ourselves into suicidal factions. The success of the insurgents would make it sure that the race could never be resumed, while the triumph of the government would probably reanimate the national ambition once more. At this moment we have encountered an unexpected reverse, which encourages our eager enemies, wherever they may be, to hope for our signal and complete overthrow. Did ever any nation, at once so presumptuous, yet so unwise, and so apparently unfortunate, secure the absolute forbearance of a rival it had boldly challenged? Certainly not, and therefore I reckon not upon any sentimental forbearance of the British government. The American people understand, as well as their government does, that none is to be expected or even de sired. Still the disfavor of Great Britain is inherently illiberal; and happily the unwarrantable and too unreserved exhibition of it naturally rouses the American people to a sense of their danger, and tends to recall them from unworthy domestic strife to the necessity of regaining the national prestige they have so unwisely lost. Allowing now British prejudice and passion their full effect, the government of Great Britain must, nevertheless, be expected to act with a due regard to the safety, honor, and welfare of the British empire. Great Britain is at peace with the whole United States, and practically with the whole world. Manufactures and commerce do, indeed, suffer derangement and abatement in consequence of our civil war. This war, however, like every other, must come to an end in some way, and at some not distant time, if she continue to stand aloof; and when that end shall have come, whatever its nature may be, she will enjoy, at least, all the benefits that she could in any event obtain by intervention to compel a peace. Is it probable that her intervention would mitigate the war, or alleviate the embarrassment she is suffering from it? The question seems to involve a preliminary one, namely: what is to be the character of her intervention? Is it to be merely a moral one, or an act of recognition, with a declaration of neutrality, but not respecting our blockade, and not refraining and restraining her subjects from violating it? Shall we not, in that case, be justified in withdrawing the relaxation of the blockade we have already made, and in closing the ports we have opened to her commerce? If we should do this, would her recognition of the insurgents shorten the war, or would it alleviate the embarrassment she suffers from it? But it may be answered that she would not consent to surrender these concessions, and would resort to force to save them. Then Great Britain would violate belligerent rights allowed us by the law of nations, and would become an ally of our domestic enemies; and then she would be at war with us while, at least, some other commercial state would be maintaining towards us relations of neutrality and peace. Would Great Britain profit by a war with us? Certainly neither nation could profit by the war while it should be in actual operation. But it is said she might divide and conquer us. What would she gain by that? Would the whole or any part of the United States accept her sovereignty and submit to her authority? The United States, under their present organization and Constitution, must always be a peaceful nation, practically friendly to Great Britain, as well as to all foreign states, and so they must always be conservative of the peace of nations. Let this organization be struck down by any foreign combinations, what guarantee could Great Britain then have of influence or favor, or even commercial advantage to be derived from this country? Even if this nation, after having lost its liberties and its independence, should remain practically passive, who is to restrain the ambitions of European states for influence and dominion on this side of the Atlantic; and how long, under the agitation of such ambitions, could Europe expect to remain in peace with itself? But what warrant have the British government for expecting to conquer the United States, and to subjugate and desolate them, or to dictate to them terms of peace. A war urged against us by Great Britain could not fail to reunite our people. Every sacrifice that their independence could require would be cheerfully and instantly made, and every force and every resource which has hitherto been held in reserve in a civil war, because the necessity for immediately using it has not been felt, would be brought into requisition. I shall not willingly believe that Great Britain deliberately desires such a war, as I am sure that every honorable and generous effort will be made by the United States to avoid it. In the second place, I observe that apprehensions of a change of attitude by Great Britain are built in some degree upon the supposed probability that very serious reverses to the national cause may occur. None such, however, have yet occurred. We cannot and do not pretend to reckon upon the chances of a single battle or a single campaign. Such chances are, perhaps, happily beyond human control and even human foresight. But the general course of the war and its ultimate results are subjects of calculation, on a survey of forces and circumstances with the aid of experience. We cheerfully leave the study of the probabilities of this war, in this way, to all statesmen and governments whom it may concern, declaring for ourselves that while we apprehend no immediate danger to the present military condition, the most serious reverses which can happen will not produce one moment's hesitation on the part of the government or the people of the United States in the purpose of maintaining the Union, or sensibly shake their confidence in a triumphant conclusion of the war. I shall not here add to the explanation which I have made on other occasions of our means and resources for meeting a final trial of the national strength and the national virtue. Rather than do this, I willingly turn away from the spectacle of servile war and war abroad-of military devastation on land, and of a carnival of public and private cupidity on the seas, which has been presented to me-to set down with calmness some reflections calculated to avert an issue so unnecessary and so fatal, which you may possibly find suitable occasion for suggesting to the rulers of Great Britain. For what was this great continent, brought up, as it were, from the depths of what before had been known as "the dark and stormy ocean?" Did the European states which found and occupied it, almost without effort, then understand its real destiny and purposes? Have they ever yet fully understood and accepted them? Has anything but disappointment upon disappointment, and disaster upon disaster, resulted from their misapprehensions? After near four hundred years of such disappointments and disasters is the way of Providence in regard to America still so mysterious that it cannot be understood and confessed. Columbus, it was said, had given a new world to the kingdoms of Castile and Leon. What has become of the sovereignty of Spain in America? Richelieu occupied and fortified a large portion of the continent, extending from the Gulf of Mexico to the Straits of Belleisle. Does France yet retain that important appendage to the crown of her sovereign? Great Britain acquired a dominion here surpassing, by an hundred fold in length and breadth, the native realm. Has not a large portion of it been already formally resigned? To whom have these vast dominions with those founded by the Portuguese, the Dutch, and the Swedes, been resigned but to American nations, the growth of European colonists, and exiles who have come hither bringing with them the arts, the civilization, and the virtues of Europe? Has not the change been beneficial to society on this continent? Has it not been more beneficial even to Europe itself than continued European domination, if it had been possible, could have been? The American nations which have grown up here are free and self-governing. They have made themselves so from inherent vigor and in obedience to an absolute necessity. Is it possible for European states to plunge them again into a colonial state and hold them there? Would it be desirable for them and for Europe, if it were possible? The balance of power among the nations of Europe is maintained not without numerous strong armies and frequent conflicts, while the sphere of political ambition there is bounded by the ocean which surrounds that continent. Would it be possible to maintain it at all if this vast continent, with all its populations, their resources, and their forces, should once again be brought within that sphere. If we, who rightfully dwell on this continent, with all the inducements to peace, harmony, and good order which so fortunate a position creates, cannot remain at peace among ourselves, even when free from foreign interference, does Europe expect that we will be reduced and kept in the harmony which her interests require when the jealousies and ambitions of all Europe are engrafted upon the stock of our native dissensions? Again: Spain undertook to plant and establish here a system of Indian slavery, with what success I need not answer. Portugal, Spain, and Great Britain, with more labor, wealth, and consummate skill, undertook to establish African slavery. It has perished from the whole continent except Brazil and the United States. Now, when the social system of the United States is convulsed with the agony of slavery here, is it desirable that slavery should be revived and perpetuated, and the republic perish for refusing it unbounded expansion and duration? Is it wise for Europe to attempt to rescue slavery? Is it possible, if the attempt shall be made? On the contrary of all these suppositions, is it not manifest that these American nations were called into existence to be the home of freemen; that the states of Europe have been trusted by Providence with their tutelage, but that tutelage and all its responsibilities and powers are necessarily withdrawn to the relief and benefit of the parties and of mankind when these parties become able to choose their own system of government and to make and administer their own laws? If they err in this choice, or in the conduct of their affairs, it will be found wise to leave them, like all other states, the privilege and responsibility of detecting and correcting the error by which they are, of course, the principal sufferers. I am, sir, your obedient servant, CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, Esq., &c., &c., &c. WILLIAM H. SEWARD. You will receive herewith a correspondence which has taken place between Major General Butler and Mr. Johnson, which is the fruit of the suggestions informally made to that officer and General Shepley, by the President's direction, through the commission which was sent to New Orleans on the opening of trade there. It may be well to communicate this correspondence to Earl Russell, and say that the policy of General Butler is approved. I learn from Mr. Stuart that Earl Russell complained to him that the mission of Mr. seemed to his lordship an evasion of the suggestion he had made to me in regard to a declaration that cotton bought by neutrals should not be confiscated. This is unjust on the part of Earl Russell. Mr. -'s mission was directed, and he was on his way before the earl's suggestion was received. It may be well to set this matter right also, but you will not make the explanation in any spirit of complaint. I send you a note from General Halleck, showing how cotton is coming through Columbus. On the whole, I believe that the cotton trade will now revive quite as rapidly as has been at any time anticipated. It will, I think, be well to communicate the matters contained in this despatch verbally and informally, but you may give copies of General Butler's and General Halleck's correspondence. I am, sir, your obedient servant, SIR: I have received your despatch (No. 187) of the 17th ultimo, and its accompaniments, relative to the repairing of the Tuscarora at Southampton, and to the gunboat, supposed to be intended for the insurgents, which is under construction at Liverpool. Your proceedings in these matters are entirely approved. I am, sir, your obedient servant, CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, Esq., &c., &c., &c. WILLIAM H. SEWARD. Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward. No. 203] LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, SIR: In my despatch (No. 199) of the 30th of July I brought down the narrative of the proceedings in the case of the gunboat No. 290 to the morning of the 29th. Later in the day I sent another telegram to Captain Craven, giving further intelligence from Liverpool, urging his departure from Southampton, also that he should let me know his next movements, and cautioning him about the line of British jurisdiction. To this message the captain immediately replied, announcing his departure at 8 o'clock, and his intention to touch at Queenstown for further information. On the 30th of July I wrote to Captain Craven, by mail to Queenstown, giving fuller details, received at half-past eleven o'clock from Mr. Dudley, touching the movements of the gunboat off Point Lynas on that day. Early on the morning of the 31st I sent a telegram to Captain Craven, at Queenstown, apprising him that 290 was said to be still off Point Lynas. At about 10 o'clock m. of that evening I received a telegram from Captain Craven, dated at Queenstown, announcing his reception of my despatch and his intention to await further instructions. This was answered by me early the next morning in the following words, by telegram: p. "At latest, yesterday, she was off Point Lynas; you must catch her if you can, and, if necessary, follow her across the Atlantic." On the same day I received by mail a note from Captain Craven, dated the 31st, announcing the receipt of my despatches and his decision to go to Point Lynas at noon on the 1st instant. Captain Craven seems to have sailed up St. George's channel. This last movement must have been made in forgetfulness of my caution about British jurisdiction, for, even had he found No. 290 in that region, I had, in previous conversations with him, explained the reason why I should not consider it good policy to attempt her capture near the coast. In point of fact, this proceeding put an end to every chance of his success. |