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the two nations will be, as it shall be my desire to make them, perpetual.
Later in the season, Mr. Lincoln was invited to revisit his home in Springfield, on the occasion of a mass meeting of the people of Illinois, who were unconditionally for the Union, to be held at that place. The letter addressed by him, in reply. to the chairman of the Committee of Invitation, an esteemed personal friend, was published at the time, and received with satisfaction by the loyal people of the country. The subject of Emancipation is again treated therein, after discussing the possible terms of peace, and the issue brought directly home to the minds of the people, with pointed force and sunlike learness. The letter is in these words :
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON,
August 26, 1863. MY DEAR SIR: Your letter inviting me to attend a mass meeting of unconditional Union men, to be held at the capital of Illinois on the 3d day of September, has been received. It would be very agreeable to me thus to meet my old friends at my own home; but I can not just now be absent from this city 30 long as a visit there would require.
The meeting is to be of all those who maintain unconditional devotion to the Union; and I am sure that my old political friends will thank me for tendering, as I do, the nation's gratitude to those other noble men whom no partisan malice or partisan hope can make false to the nation's life. There are those who are dissatisfied with me. To such I would say: You desire peace, and you blame me that we do not have it But how can we attain it? There are but three conceivable ways : First, to suppress the rebellion by force of arms. This I am trying to do. Are you for it? If you are, so far we are agreed. If you are not for it, a second way is to give up the Union. I am against this. If you are, you should say so, plainly. If you are not for force, nor yet for dissolution, there only remains some imaginable compromise.
I do not believe that any compromise embracing the maintenance of the Union is now possible. All that I learn leads to a directly opposite belief. The strength of the rebellion is its military—its army. That army dominates all the country and all the people within its range. Any offer of any terms mado by any man or men within that range in opposition to that
arny, is simply nothing for the present, because such man or men have no power whatever to enforce their side of a compromise, if one were made with them. To illustrate : Suppose refugees from the South and peace men of the North get together in convention, and frame and proclair a compromise embracing the restoration of the Union. In what way can that compromise be used to keep Gen. Lee's army out of Pennsylvania ? Gen. Meade's army can keep Lee's army out of Pennsylvania, and I think can ultimately drive it out of existence. But no paper compromise to which the controllers of Gen. Lee’s army are not agreed, can at all affect that army. In an effort at such compromise we would waste time, which the enemy would improve to our disadvantage, and that would be all
. A compromise, to be effective, must be made either with those who control the Rebel army, or with the people, first liberated from the domination of that army by the success of our army. Now, allow me to assure you that no word or intimation from the Rebel army, or from any of the men controlling it, in relation to any peace compromise, has ever come to my knowledge or belief. All charges and intimations to the contrary are deceptive and groundless. And I promise you that if any such proposition shall hereafter come, it shall not be rejected and kept secret from you. I freely acknowledge myself to be the servant of the people, according to the bond of service, the United States Constitution; and that, as such, I am responsible to them.
But, to be plain. You are dissatisfied with me about the negro. Quite likely there is a difference of opinion between you and myself upon that subject. I certainly wish that all men could be free, while you, I suppose, do not. Yet I have neither adopted nor proposed any measure which is not consistent with even your view, provided you are for the Union. I suggested compensated emancipation, to which you replied that you wished not to be taxed to buy negroes.
But I have not asked you to be taxed to buy negroes, except in such way as to save you from greater taxation, to save the Union exclusively by other means.
You dislike the Emancipation Proclamation, and perhaps would have it retracted. You say it is unconstitutional. I think differently. I think that the Constitution invests its Commander-in-chief with the law of war in the time of war. The most that can be said, if so much, is, that the slaves are property. Is there, has there ever been, any question that by the law of war, property, both of enemies and friends, may be taken when needed? And is it not needed whenever taking it helps us or hurts the enemy? Armies, the world over, destroy
enemies' property when they can not use it; and even destroy their own to keep it from the enemy. Civilized belligerents do all in their power to help themselves or hurt the enemy, except a few things regarded as barbarous or cruel. Among the exceptions are the massacre of vanquished foes and noncombatants, male and female. But the proclamation, as law, is valid or is not valid. If it is not valid, it needs no retraction. If it is valid, it can not be retracted, any more than the dead can be brought to life. Some of you profess to think that its retraction would operate favorably for the Union. Why better after the retraction than before the issue? There was more than a year and a half of trial to suppress the rebellion before the proclamation was issued, the last one hundred days of which passed under an explicit notice, that it was coming unless averted by those in revolt returning to their allegiance. The war has certainly progressed as favorably for us since the issue of the proclamation as before. I know as fully as one can know the opinions of others, that some of the commanders of our armies in the field, who have given us our most important victories, believe the emancipation policy and the aid of colored troops constitute the heaviest blows yet dealt to the rebellion, and that at least one of those important successes could not have been achieved when it was but for the aid of black soldiers. Among the commanders holding these views are some who have never had any affinity with what is called abolitionism, or with “republican party politics," but who hold them purely as military opinions. I submit their opinions as being entitled to some weight against the objections often urged that emancipation and arming the blacks are unwise as military measures, and were not adopted as such in good faith.
You say that you will not fight to free negroes. Some of them seem to be willing to fight for you—but no matter. Fight you, then, exclusively to save the Union. I issued the proclamation on purpose to aid you in saving the Union. Whenever you shall have conquered all resistance to the Union, if I shall urge you to continue fighting, it will be an apt time then for you to declare that you will not fight to free negroes. I thought that, in your struggle for the Union, to whatever extent the negroes should cease helping the enemy, to that extent it weakened the enemy in his resistance to you. Do you think differently? I thought that whatever negroes can be got to do as soldiers, leaves just so much less for white soldiers to do in saving the Union. Does it appear otherwise to you? But nogroes, like other people, act upon motives. Why should they do any thing for us if we will do nothing for them? If they stake their lives for us, they must be prompted by the strongest motivo, even the promise of freedom. And the promise, being made, must be kept.
The signs look better. The Father of Waters again goes unvexed to the sea. Thanks to the great North-west for it. Nor yet wholly to them. Three hundred miles up they met New England, Empire, Keystone, and Jersey, hewing their way right and left. The sunny South, too, in more colors than one, also lent a hand. On the spot their part of the history was jotted down in black and white. The job was a great National one, and let none be banned who bore an honorable part in it; and, while those who have cleared the great river may well be proud, even that is not all. It is hard to say that any thing has been more bravely and better done than at Antietam, Murfreesboro, Gettysburg, and on many fields of less zote. Nor must Uncle Sam's web-feet be forgotten. At all the waters' margins they have been present: not only on the deep sea, the broad bay and the rapid river, but also up the narrow, muddy bayou; and wherever the ground was a little damp, they have been and made their tracks. Thanks to all. For the great Republic-for the principles by which it lives and keeps alive-for man's vast future-thanks to all. Peace does not appear so far distant as it did. I hope it will como soon, and come to stay: and so come as to be worth the keeping in all future time. It will then have been proved that among freemen there can be no successful appeal from the ballot to the bullet, and that they who take such appeal are sure to lose their case and pay the cost. And then there will be some black men who can remember that, with silent tongue, and clenched teeth, and steady eye, and well poised bayonet, they have helped mankind on to this great consummation; while I fear that there will be some white men unable to forget that, with malignant heart and deceitful speech, they have striven to hinder it.
Still, let us not be over-sanguine of a speedy final triumph. Let us be quite sober. Let us diligently apply the means, never doubting that a just God, in His own good time, will give us the rightful result.
Yours, very truly, A. LINCOLN. JAMES C. CONKLING, Esq.
Mr. Lincoln, whose gratitude to the gallant soldiers who bave rallied at the call of their country, and whose proud satisfaction in their heroic conduct on so many battle-fields, have been constantly manifested, was unwilling to decline the invitation to be present on the solemn occasion of consecrating
He left 28,178 small arms on the field. His entire loss during this invasion, including numerous desertions, must have approached, if it did not equal, 40,000 men. Meade's total losses, in killed, wounded and missing, numbered 23,186.
The operations before Charleston and other points, attended with less success than was for a time promised, were not without favorable results.
Another disaster to the Rebel cause, and one of the greatest magnitude, followed the advance of Gen. Rosecrans on Chattanooga, and of Gen. Burnside upon Knoxville, in the latter part of August. With no very severe fighting, Burnside occupied Knoxville on the 1st of September, and Cumberland Gap on the 9th. Rosecrans, after the unfavorable battle of Chickamauga, took possession of Chattanooga, on the 21st of September. East Tennessee was thus completely in our possession, and a line of communication of the greatest importance to the enemy was finally severed. On the 19th of October, Gen. Grant, by the President's order, assumed command of the united armies of the Tennessee, the Cumberland, and the Ohio. The subsequent victories of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, on the 24th and 25th of November, and the decisive defeat of Longstreet in his bold attempt to recover Knoxville, made this great acquisition entirely secure. The way was thus prepared for assuming the offensive, by an advance into the heart of Georgia.
The rebellion seemed now to have been brought to the verge of final overthrow.