to the public printer of the territory, within this court under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, which it was held it could not, and the court said: "It seems to us, that the control of these territorial governments properly appertains to that branch of the government which creates and can change or modify them to meet its views of public policy, viz: the Congress of the United States. That control certainly has not been vested in this court, either in mode or in substance, by the 25th section of the Judiciary Act. It has been argued in this case, that as Congress, in creating the territorial governments of Wisconsin and Iowa, reserved to themselves the power of disapproving and thereby annulling the acts of those governments, and bad, in the exercise of that power, stricken out several of the provisions of the charter of the bank of Dubuque, enacted by the legislature of Wisconsin, as The acts of the legislative assembly of the territory of New Mexico at its twenty-sixthsenting to the residue; that therefore the charsession, which convened at the capitol at the city of Santa Fé on Monday, the 18th day of February, 1884, and adjourned on Thursday, the 3d day of April, 1884, were duly certified to by the secretary of the territory as having been compared with the enrolled originals and original translations thereof, respectively, on file in his office, and that the same were true and correct copies thereof, and published by authority. Among these acts as so published appear "An act authorizing the building of a peni tentiary in the territory of New Mexico and regulating its management," approved March 14, 1884; and an act entitled An act to amend an act authorizing the building of a penitentiary and regulating its management, approved March 14, 1884," approved March 26, 1884; and "An act to provide for the erection of capitol building in the city of Santa Fé," approved March 29, 1884. Laws of New Mexico, chap. 58-60. The legislative journals for that year, to which reference will hereafter be made, show that each of these acts was signed by the president of the council and the speaker of the house, and its approval by the governor reported to the house in which the act originated in each instance. ter of this bank should be regarded as an Act of Congress, rather than of the territorial government; and consequently the decision of the state court, in favor of the repealing law of Iowa, must be held to be one in which was drawn in question and overruled the validity of a statute of or an authority exercised under the United States, and as a decision also against a right, title, or privilege set up under a statute of the United States. The fallacy of this argument is easily detected. Congress, in creating the territorial governments, and in conferring upon them powers of general legislation, did not, from obvious principles of policy and necessity, ordain a suspension of all acts proceeding from those powers, until expressly sanctioned by themselves, whilst for considerations equally strong they reserved the power of disapproving or annulling such acts of territorial legislation as might be deemed detrimental." *In Chavez v. Luna (N.M.)Jan. 23, 1889, [662 the supreme court of New Mexico held, upon a bill of complaint setting up in substance the same matters as alleged here, that where the constitution of a state prescribed the mode to be observed by the legislature in passing bills, there was no doubt whatever about the power of a court to inquire into the question as to The question in this case is whether the ter- whether the constitution had been violated or ritorial courts should have gone behind the not, but that rule of law did not apply to the enrolled bills whose passage was thus duly state of facts presented in that case, in which attested, and which were duly approved, the only question was one of the organization placed in the proper depository, and duly cer- of the body; and People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. tified to and published, and held them void 481, was cited to the point that courts cannot upon the ground that certain members of the entertain a bill to review the action of a legisquorum of one of the two bodies by which lature in the manner of its organization, or the they were passed were seated without having election or qualification of its members. Recertificates of election. And this notwith-ferring to section 7 of the Organic Act of the standing the fact that "all the laws passed by territory, the court declined to decide whether the general assembly and governor were, as in the general terms therein used, conferring must be assumed, duly submitted to Congress legislative power upon the legislative assembly 661]*and that body did not see fit to disapprove of New Mexico, it was intended to confer the any of them under the power reserved by sec- usual and ordinarily incidental power to deter tion seven of the Organic Act, a power which mine finally the election, qualification, and rehad been exercised affirmatively in some in-turn of the members, but concluded that as by stances. 16 Stat. at L. 44, chap. 21; 16 Stat. at L. 278, chap. 270; 20 Stat. at L. 280, chap. 41. that section all laws passed by the legislative assembly and governor had to be submitted to Congress, and, if disapproved, were null and void and of no effect, it must be presumed that these acts were so submitted, and; there being nothing to show that they were disapproved, that they had received the passive assent of the Congress, and had been in that way ap proved, and that, therefore, there was nothing upon which to ground the jurisdiction of the court over the subject sought to be reviewed. In the present case the decree below was affirmed on the authority of Chavez v. Luna, and the dissent was placed upon the ground that mere non-action by Congress was not to be taken as an approval of the acts of the legislature so as to preclude judicial investigation. We need not consider this difference of opinion further than to say that the fact that resort to Congress was open to those who objected to the legality of the acts passed by this leg slative assembly is not without sig. nificance in inquiring into the jurisdiction of the courts in the premises. In Fieldv. Clark, 143 U S. 649 [36:294], it was 663] *held by this court, upon great consider ation, that the signing by the speaker of the House of Representatives and by the President of the Senate in open session of an en olled bill is an official attestation of such bill as one that has passed Congress; and that when the bill thus attested receives the approval of the President and is deposited in the Department of State according to law, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress is complete and unimpeachable. That conclusion was reached in view of the clauses of the Constitution of the United States bearing upon the subject, and would seem to be decisive of this case. It is true that the courts of many of the states under constitutional or statutory provisions of a peculiar character, which, expressly or by necessary implication, required or authorized the court to go behind the enrolled Act, when the question was whether the Act, when authen ticated and deposited in the proper office, was duly passed by the legislature, have announced a different conclusion. These cases are given in the notes to Field v. Clark, and some of them are referred to and considered in the opinion in that case. But as the Organic Act of New Mexico, taken with the Revised Statutes, conforms quite closely to the provisions of the Federal Constitution, the rule laid down in Field v. Clark governs the case before us. Perhaps, however it would be proper to extend our examination somewhat further. The question whether a seeming act of a legislature has become a law in accordance with the fundamental law is a judicial one to be tested by the courts and judges, and not a question of fact to be tried by a jury South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 260, 267 [24:154,157]; Post v. Kendall County Supr8.105 U. S.667 [26:1204]. In the first case Gardner v. Barney, 73 U. S. 6 Wall. 499 [18: 890] was cited with approval, in which the court laid down the proposition: "That whenever a question arises in a court of law the existence of a statute, or of the time when a statute took effect, or of the precise terms of a statute, the judges who are called upon to decide it have a right to resort to any source of information which in its nature is capable of 664] conveying to the judicial mind a clear and satisfactory answer to such question; always seeking first for that which in its nature is most appropriate, unless the positive law has enacted a different rule." And see Duncan v. McCall, 139 U. S. 449 [35:219]: Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202, 216 [34:691,697]; Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 [36:294]. The bill alleged that the counsel consisted of twelve members, seven constituting a quorum. By the Organic Act it was provided that the council shall consist of thirteen members. 9 Stat. at L. 448, chap. 49, § 5. The Act of June 19, 1878 (20 Stat. at L. 193, chap. 329) limited the number to twelve and directed the legisla tive assembly to divide the territory into representative and council districts. An Act of June 27, 1879 (21 Stat. at L. 35, chap. 40) referred to the Act of June 19, 1878, and to "the twelve members of the council." In the sessions of 1880 and 1882 there appear to have been thirteen members of the council. N. M. Acts, 1880, 11: Acts, 1882, 7. By an Act of December 21, 1881, the election held for members of the legislature on the second day of November, 1880, was declared to be valid and all the acts of the legislature, the members of which were chosen at that election, were vali. dated, and the legislature directed to apportion the representative and council districts, but it was provided that if they failed to do so the apportionment should be made in accordance with an Act referring to the legislatures of Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming, approved June 3, 1880. 21 Stat. at L. 154, chap. 119; 22 Stat. at L. 1, chap. 3. By an Act of February 14, 1884, it was provided "that the members elected to the territorial legislature of New Mexico in November, anno Domini, eighteen hundred and eighty-two, and all vacancies legally filled since that time, if any, are hereby declared to be the legal members of the legislature hereby authorized, subject to all valid contests." And the legislature was directed to convene on the third Monday of February, 1884. 23 Stat. at L. 3, chap. 6. But whether composed of twelve or thirteen members, there can be no doubt that seven constitute a quorum authorized to do business. It was the duty of the secretary of the territory, under section 1921, to administer the oath of office to the members elect *of the two [665 houses, and there is nothing in this bill to exclude the presumption that he did so, and if so, it is difficult to see why persons so sworn in did not thereby become entitled in the first instance to take their seats, or why the council thus organized was not at least a council de facto. The charges in the bill relate to three out of eight members, but as to one of these, Mr. Catron, the bill states that while he did not originally have a certificate of election from the board of county commissioners, which was ex officio the canvassing board, he did have a certificate issued by that board, under the order of the district court, in respect of which adjudication no further question appears to have been made. Neither as to him nor the two other members (Mr. McComas and Mr. Montoya) whose title to their seats is questioned, was it alleged that they were not elected to the council, but the averment as to the latter is that the election returns of the election held in November, 1882, showed and still show that two other persons received a majority of the votes cast in Bernalillo county at the election of members of the council for that county and that the two sitting members did not receive a majority of the votes so cast and were not duly elected members of said council. Reference is made in the bill to the journals of the council and house of the legislative as sembly of New Mexico for its twenty-sixth | B. Catron be declared entitled prima facie to session, and we have examined them as pub- the seat from Santa Fé county, subject to the lished by authority. That of the council, after right of contest, which motion was carried by stating that the legislative council assembled unanimous vote. The name of Mr. Catron February 18, 1884, in conformity with the Act was then called by the secretary and he apof Congress (23 Stat. at L. 3) recites that the peared, signed the oath and was sworn in. A secretary of the territory being present, "pro- similar motion was made as to Messrs. McCoceeded to call the names of the councilmen mas and Montoya, which being adopted by elected from the different counties, respective- unanimous vote, their names were called by ly, for the purpose of swearing them in as the secretary and they appeared, signed the such. The following gentlemen answered and oath, and were sworn in as members from were duly sworn, and signed the official reg Bernalillo. Mr. José Armijo y Vigil was then ister, to wit." Then follow the names of eight elected president of the council and sworn in persons, including those whose title to seats is by the secretary, and "the latter then retired.' questioned in this proceeding. The record We understand the object of this preface to be shows that the election of officers thereupon to explain that the three persons, in respect of ensued, who being duly sworn in by the secre- whom it was claimed that they were improptary, that officer retired. A committee was erly admitted to seats to the council, did not then appointed to wait upon the governor and take their seats in virtue of the vote of the five 666]inform him that the *council was duly or- members, whose right to act as members of ganized and ready to receive any communication the council was not disputed, but that the vote which he might be pleased to make them, of those five was simply taken by the secrewhich committee having retired in the dis- tary as advisory, he himself determining upon charge of the duty assigned them, after a short his own responsibility who were entitled to be absence returned, and reported that they had sworn in. So far as the record proper is condone so and that the governor "recognized cerned, irrespective of this prefatory matter, this body as legally organized, and would be nothing appears upon the journals to show ready to deliver his message to both houses in that this was otherwise. joint session on the next day." But this record The journal of the house discloses similar of the proceedings of February 18, 1884, is proceedings as to certain members from Bernpreceded by a prefatory statement headed alillo county. It further appears therefrom "organization." This states that the secretary that two bodies had organized, each claiming of the territory appeared at the council cham-to be the territorial council, one presided over ber at noon "for the purpose of swearing in the members of the council (all as a question of fact being present); he was met with a degree of confusion, which, being long continued," the secretary retired and proceeded to the house, where organization was effected. Subsequently, and on the same day, the secretary of the territory called the members of the council to order and made some remarks, stating among other things "the seats of members from Bernalillo county are disputed." It ap-gally be organized until first being sworn in pears from the judgment of the district court presented, it has passed upon the question involved in the case of county officers elected at the same election that the members of the leg islature were, from that county; and decided adversely to those elected upon the face of the returns, and that a large number of fraudulent votes were cast. And it appearing that the application of the same facts would change the result as to members claiming to have been elected upon the same ticket, and it likewise appearing that the question of fraud in said election has become one of public notoriety, and it also appearing that the seat of the member from Santa Fé county is involved in a similar contest, it therefore seems to me proper and just that at this time, the members only who are not involved in the contest should be sworn. Whereupon five members signed the oath and were sworn in. The secretary thereupon further remarked: "In view of the situation it seems to me just. in the absence of law to the contrary, that the members sworn in and not involved in contest should express their judgment as to who of the contestants are prima facie entitled to be sworn in. For this 6671 purpose, and this *purpose alone, I will consider a motion to be submitted without debate." A motion was then made that Thomas by J. F. Chavez and the other by J. Armijo y Vigil, and each had sent a communication to that effect to the house. The house thereupon appointed a committee to ascertain which of the two councils was legally organized, a majority of which reported that, according to the law of the United States, the secretary of the territory was "the only authorized person to administer the oath to the members of either body of the legislature; that no body can le by said officer;" "that the body represented and presided over by Hon. José Armijo y Vigil have been duly sworn in by the secretary of the territory and recognized by *the [668 governor of the territory, as the regularly organized and legal legislative council;" and recommended that the house recognize such council accordingly. The majority report was adopted, the sitting members from Bernalillo county voting in the affirmative, but there being a majority without them. On the other hand, among the joint resolutions passed and approved at the session of the legislative assembly in question and to be found in the laws for 1884 as published, is one approved April 3, 1884, reciting that whereas the chairman of the committee on territories of the United States Senate had advised the governor of the purpose of the committe "to investigate the questions at issue in connection with the memorial of J. Francisco Chavez and others, referred to said committee," and having requested certain record evidence bearing upon the issues aforesaid, it was resolved that the secretary be authorized and directed to turn over for the use of that committee "all poll books of the said precincts of the counties of Bernalillo and Santa Fé, of the election held on the 7th day of November, 1882, and all other record evidence concerning and touching said | and to compel the clerk of the territorial house election in said counties now in his possession." to bring his minutes and journals into court to Laws N. M. 1884, 241. The memorial thus be there corrected, came under review, and this referred to will be found in the Congressional court said: "It is not one of the functions of a Record for the first session of the Forty-eighth *court to make up the records of the pro-[670 Congress, p. 1549, where it appears that a me- ceedings of legislative bodies. Nor can it be remorial signed by Mr. Chavez and six others, quired, in a case not involving the private interholding, as they state, the proper legal evidences est of parties, to determine whether particular of election to the twenty-sixth legislative as- bodies assuming to exercise legislative functions sembly of New Mexico, was presented to the constitute a lawful legislative assembly. Such a Senate of the United States on March 3, 1884, question might indeed arise in a suit depending and was referred to the committee on territo- upon an enactment passed by such an assembly. And it might be that, in a case of that character, and under some circumstances, the court would be compelled to decide whether such an enactment was passed by a legislature having legal authority to enact laws. How far in the decision of such a question the judiciary would be concluded by the record of the proceedings of those bodies, deposited by the person whose duty it was to keep it with the officer designated by law as its custodian, are questions we have no occasion at this time to consider." ries. This memorial refers to the provisions of the territorial laws that "each branch of the legislative assembly shall decide and determine the election and qualifications of their own members under the rules and restrictions that may be respectively adopted by each branch for that purpose." That if a contested election be pending, the person holding the certificate of election shall take possession and discharge the duties of the office until the contest shall be be decided." N. M. Comp. Laws 1865, chap. Without undertaking to consider under what 63, §§ 35, 50. And that the board of county circumstances which of two legislative bodies commissioners shall act as boards of canvassers may be judicially determined to be the lawful 669] of the elections within their respective and true body, or when or how the lawful orcounties; "and shall immediately issue a certi-ganization of a legislative body may be judificate of election, under their hands, to the person that may have received the highest number of votes for any office." N. M. Laws 1876, chap. 1, §14, ¶ 9. The proceedings of February 18, 1884, are then related at length, and it is insisted that the conduct of the secretary was unlawful, arbitrary and in defiance of right, justice, and the plain provisions of the law. We are not advised as to what became of the investigation based on the memorial and referred to in the joint resolution, but it would appear that Congress took no action whatever in the premises, although its attention was thus called to the condition of affairs. cially drawn in question, we are of opinion that the allegations of this bill made no such case for interposition as would have justified the courts in going behind the enrolled bills as deposited with the secretary of the territory and declaring them invalid because some of the members of the council were seated without certificates of election. We may add that by an act passed by the legislative assembly in question, approved April 3, 1884 (N. M. Laws 1884, chap. 66) a compilation of the laws of the territory was provided for; which compilation was duly made and published by authority (N. M. Comp. Laws 1884); that an official index to It is undisputed, therefore, that the council these compiled laws was adopted; the compiled which participated in the enactment of these laws amended in many particulars; and other laws was recognized by the governor and the acts of 1884 amended or repealed, by the sucsecretary of the territory and by the house, nor ceeding, the 27th legislative assembly (N. M. is there any suggestion in the bill of the exist-Laws 1886, 1887, chap. 49, and passim); and ence of any other council than the one thus recognized; and the courts of the territory have adjudged that these acts were duly enacted. In the meantime, it must be presumed that bonds have been issued to provide funds for the trection of a penitentiary and a capitol, and hat these public works have gone forward. Considerations of public policy and necessity for the protection of the public and individuals an act was also passed for the issue of bonds whose interests may be affected thereby forbid ELIAB W. METCALF, Piff. in Err., [671 this mode of attacking the validity of acts of officers de facto, if this council were no more than that, whatever defects there may be in the legality of their appointment or election. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S. 441 [30: 185]. Under these circumstances we think it clear that the judgment of the supreme court of the territory must be affirmed. In Clough v. Curtis, 134 U. S. 361, 371 [33: 945, 949], petitions for mandamus to compel the secretary of the territory of Idaho to record certain proceedings as part of the proceedings of a session of the legislature of the territory, 153 U. S. U. S., Book 38. as construed by its highest court. are rules of decision in the courts of the United States. 2. Actions upon foreign judgments must be brought within the period prescribed by the local law, the lex fori, or the suit will be barred. 8. The ten year bar of the statutes of limitation of action on a judgment recovered in the U. S. Circuit Court for the' District of Wisconsin; the twenty years limitation of such statutes applies to such judgment. 1858, of Wisconsin, constitutes no defense to an years after the judgment or decree was rendered." *The Revised Statutes of 1858, chap. [672 138, contain the following provisions: "Sec. 1. Civil actions can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this chapter, except when in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by statute." "Sec. 14. The periods prescribed in section one of this chapter, for the commencement [No. 18.] of actions other than for the recovery of real Reargued April 18, property, shall be as follows: 1894. Decided May 14, 1894. Argued Dec. 8, 9, 1892. "Sec. 15. Within twenty years: 1. An action upon a judgment or decree of any court of record of this state. 2. An action upon a sealed instrument, when the cause of action accrues within this state. "Sec. 16. Within ten years: 1. An action upon a judgment or decree of any court of record of any state or territory within the United States, or of any court of the United States. 2. An action upon a sealed instrument, when the cause of action accrued with N ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Wisconsin, to review a judgment in favor of defendant, the City of Watertown, in an action brought in 1883, by Eliab W. Metcalf, plaintiff, as assignee of a judgment for $10, 207.86, recovered in 1866, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Wisconsin, upon said judgment; in which action the de-out this state. fense was that the cause of action did not arise within ten years before the action was brought and that the action was therefore barred by the statute of limitations of Wisconsin. versed, and cause remanded with direction to enter judgment for plaintiff. See same case, 128 U. S. 586 (32: 543.) In the Revised Statutes of 1878, § 4220, 4221, the language of the provisions as to actions on judgments is modified, so as to Reinclude in the limitation of twenty years an action upon a judgment or decree of any court of record of this state, or of the United States, sitting within this state;" and to confine the limitation of ten years to "an action upon a judgment or decree of any court of record of any other state or territory of the United States, or of any court of the United son of a saving clause in § 4984, the case at bar is not governed by these statues, but by the statutes of 1858. Messrs. Chas. E. Monroe and Geo. A. Jenks for plaintiff in error, on the first argu ment. Statement by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller: This was an action brought June 29, 1883, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Wisconsin, by a citi-States, sitting without this state." By reazen of Ohio, the assignee of certain persons who were assignees in different proportions of a judgment for the sum of $10,207.86, recovered April 9, 1866, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Wisconsin, by a citizen of Tennessee against a municipal corporation of Wisconsin. The petition having been amended (in accordance with the opinion delivered by this court when the case was before it at a former term, and reported in 128 U. S. 586 [32: 543]) by showing that this plaintiff's assignors were citizens of other states than Wisconsin, the defendant answered that the cause of action did not arise within ten years before this action was brought, and that the action was therefore barred by the statute of limitations It will be perceived that the questions arisof Wisconsin. The case having been subing upon the *record in this case relate [673 mitted to the circuit court for trial without jury, that court, on August 2, 1889, so held, and, having filed findings of fact and conclusions of law, rendered judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff sued out this writ of error. The Revised Statutes of Wisconsin of 1849, chap. 127, § 41, applied one limitation to all judgments of courts of record within the United States, as follows: "Every judgment and decree in any court of record of the United States, or of any state or territory of the United States, shall be presumed to be paid and satisfied at the expiration of twenty to Thomas v. Brockenbrough, 6: 287, and to Prevost v. Gratz, 5: 311. As to effect of state decisions and laws, in regard to statute of limitations, upon United States courts, see note to Elmendorf v. Taylor, 6: 289. Messrs. George W. Bird and Daniel Hall for defendant, on the first argument. Messrs. Charles E. Monroe and Geo. A. Jenks for plaintiff in error, on reargument. Messrs. Geo. W. Bird and Daniel Hall for defendant in error, on reargument. Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the court: to the meaning, applicability, and validity of the first paragraph of section 16 of the Revised Statutes of Wisconsin of 1858, which, taken in connection with sections 1 and 14, barred "an action upon a judgment or decree of any court of record of any state or territory within the United States, or of any court of the United States," in ten years. The contention of the plaintiff is that, under a proper construction of the paragraph, judgment or decrees of the courts of the United States sitting within the state of Wisconsin are not included therein, and that if this were not so, it would be so far unconstitutional. De That neither time nor statute of limitations runs against the state, see note to Gibson v. Chouteau, 20: 534 |