In the case of Elliott v. Swartwout (35 U. S. (10 Pet.) 137), in holding that "worsted" was not woolen goods under the act of 1832, the court said: Laws imposing duties on importations of goods are intended for practical use and application by men engaged in commerce; and hence it has become a settled rule in the interpretation of statutes of this description to construe the language adopted by the legislature, and particularly in the denomination of articles, according to the commercial understanding of the terms used. This rule is fully recognized and established by this court, in the case of Two Hundred Chests of Tea, reported in 9 Wheat. 438. The court there say, the object of the duty laws is to raise revenue, and for this purpose, to class substances according to the general usage and known denominations of trade. Whether a particular article was designated by one name or another, in the country of its origin, or whether it were a simple or mixed substance was of no importance in the view of the legislature. It applied its attention to the description of articles as they derived their appellations in our own markets, in our domestic as well as our foreign traffic; and it would have been as dangerous as useless to attempt any other classification than that derived from the actual business of human life. It being admitted in this instance that worsted is a distinct article, well known in commerce under that denomination, we must understand Congress as using the term in that commercial sense and as contradistinguished from wool, and woolen goods, and other well-known denominations of goods (p. 150). This rule seems not only to be well settled, but to be well grounded in principle. To whom should Congress address its tariff acts? To the populace on the street, who have nothing to do with the subject matter of the legislation? Or, should they be directed to those from whom the Congress expects obedience, and to its officers upon whom its administrative duties fall? In the question at bar whom will we consult as to the meaning of the term "commonly known as clothing wool"? It has been suggested here that the inquirer should go out into the street and at random ask any English-speaking individual the meaning of the phrase "commonly known as clothing wool." It is urged that this would elicit the answer, "Wool from which clothing is made." It probably would elicit the answer, "I know nothing about the woolen business." But, if perchance, one familiar with growing, selling, importing, exporting, buying, grading, sorting, manufacturing, or handling wool in any way was asked the question, in our judgment he would say, "Wool, commonly known as clothing wool,' is a wool of short fiber used in the woolen process, and is usually a carding wool." And if he were asked, "What is 'combing wool'?" he would reply that "it was distinguished from clothing wool chiefly on account of its long staple, which permitted it for the most part to be combed." Should interpreters of the act, in seeking to properly classify a product, and in order to find out the definition of the words used, seek those who know nothing about the different classes of the article? Surely this would be to impute to Congress an absurd intention. Who is it that "commonly" knows clothing wool? The Government's position implies that there is a great class of citizens who are not engaged in the wool trade in any way, and who are not students of the wool question, and who have never consulted the dictionaries, encyclopedias, etc., but who have knowledge on the subject of clothing wool which we need in determining the intent of Congress. The class of people the Government has in mind may know what wool is, but probably have never heard of "clothing wool." Would it not be absurd to declare that Congress intended that the interpreters of the act, in trying to determine its meaning, should go to those who had never heard of the term rather than to those to whom the act was directed, or to those familiar with the use of the term wherever and whenever it is used? We can, therefore, see no additional meaning given to the words "clothing wool" by the use of the words "commonly known as," and in arriving at the conclusion we have considered the fact that it has not been shown in this case that there is any difference or any distinction between what is "commercially" known and what is "commonly" known. Indeed, we can see no difference in the meaning or application of the phrases "commonly known" and "usually known." Paragraph 362 of the act of 1909 is as follows: 362. Class two, that is to say, Leicester, Cotswold, Lincolnshire, Down combing wools, Canada long wools, or other like combing wools of English blood, and usually known by the terms herein used, and also hair of the camel, Angora goat, alpaca, and other like animals. The corresponding provisions in the acts of 1897, 1890, 1883, and 1867, contained the same phrase, and as far as we know no court or administrative official has held that the phrase "usually known" changed the meaning from that understood by those familiar with the terms used in woolen commerce and trade. There are cases where the imported article may have a definite commercial designation and yet be commonly known by another name. If in that instance Congress uses the words "commonly known as" in describing the article by a name other than the commercial term, then in construing its meaning, the courts universally hold Congress to have excluded the commercial designation.— Cadwalader v. Zeh (151 U. S. 171); Roosevelt v. Maxwell (20 Fed. Cas. 1155). But this is not a case where the commercial designation is relied upon by the importer; a commercial designation is not before us. But even if it were, there seems to be but one understanding as to the meaning of "clothing wool." In the case of Tiffany v. United States (131 Fed. 398), certain silver handbags or purses were held excluded from paragraph 434, act of 1897, which provided that "articles commonly known as jewelry," etc. Upon the testimony of commercial witnesses, the court said: The uncontradicted testimony of witnesses from various branches of trade, including dealers in jewelry, fancy goods, silverware, and of salesmen in department stores, shows that these articles are not commonly known as jewelry, and are not manufactured in jewelry factories, or sold as articles of jewelry. It seems that this case stands on all fours with the case at bar. There the commercial definition of jewelry as taken from those familiar with the business was held to be the same as was "commonly known." In Swan v. Arthur (103 U. S. 597), the court said: While tariff acts are generally to be construed according to the commercial understanding of the terms employed, language will be presumed to have the same meaning in commerce that it has in ordinary use, unless the contrary is shown. There is certainly no showing in this case that the term "clothing wool" has a common or ordinary use different from its use among commercial men. It is urged with much force by the Government that Congress intended in the emergency to levy duty on all wools except carpet wools, and that this court should declare the combing wool in controversy in this case clothing wool within the broad meaning of the act. It is urged that the court is privileged to take into consideration the conditions of commerce and trade on the date of the passage of the statute, the necessity for a protective tariff to be levied on combing wool which was seeking admission into our home market already filled with the home-produced product; that the report of the Tariff Commission before the framers of the law, the statements of members while in committee, and the debates of members of Congress while on the floor should be permitted to override the plain wording of the act in determining the legislative intent. The reasons and arguments set out by the Government in their very forceful brief and oral argument are quite impressive in that direction. After thoroughly considering the history of the legislation, the commercial and trade conditions at the time of its enactment, and the committee's report on the bill, as well as other related documents, we are impressed with the fact that Congress may have thought that there was a necessity for levying a duty upon combing wool, and even, we dare to say, some Members of Congress may have felt that section 18 included combing wool. Some of them no doubt did not think that the terms used included combing wool. Some Members may have supported the legislation believing it covered all wool not expressly exempted, while others no doubt supported it because, according to their interpretation of the term, it did not include certain wools. To hold that Congress in its completed enactment, by the use of the words "commonly known as clothing wool" meant to include "combing wool" is to do violence to every rule and canon of construction known to tariff jurisprudence. The courts in construing tariff laws have almost uniformly held that it is the judicial function to construe the language as found in the statute, giving 72052-257-VOL 12- -6 the words used their ordinary meaning, and where the language is plain, that the legislative intent can not be declared to be other than what the ordinary meaning of those words will import in the absence of evidence establishing a commercial meaning different from the ordinary meaning.-Ringk & Co. v. United States (10 Ct. Cust. Appls. 107; T. D. 38372); Merck v. United States (151 Fed. 14). In the latter case, the court said: The courts can only ascertain the legislative intention by the language used, and it is not their duty by a distorted construction to attempt to cover an article which may have been omitted even by inadvertence (p. 15). No matter how great the emergency may be for a different construction, or what this court may think of the wisdom of Congress in failing to say "all wool," or to say "clothing wool and combing wool," or "Classes I and II," it would be a far-reaching and dangerous precedent to hold that the author of the bill did not know what he was saying when he introduced the bill, and that the committee did not know what they were reporting when they reported the bill, and that Congress did not know what it was making dutiable when it was enacting the legislation, and that the Executive did not know the meaning of the words in the act when he approved it. In United States v. Marsching (1 Ct. Cust. Appls. 216; T. D. 31257), the court said: While it is true that every provision of law must be read in the light of all the other provisions of that law, and while it is true that the meaning of Congress, particularly in tariff legislation, must be ascertained in the light of conditions of commerce, and that in this light the language used by Congress must be interpreted, or even in some cases supplied, we do not think that in a case like this where the essential words supporting the construction contended for have been expressly omitted by Congress the courts can by any rule or method of construction read back into the act such words. The fact that some inconsistency may be wrought by this holding, or that some inequalities of duties may be levied, or that some disturbance may be had in the remaining or other provisions, is not a sufficient warrant for the court to read back into the statute language expressly omitted therefrom by Congress. In the opinion of the court the language of the act is plain and unambiguous. The rule is well settled that in the presence of such a provision the court should abstain from interfering with the will of Congress as expressed. * * * The Supreme Court of the United States in Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger (157 U. S. 1, at p. 37) said, restating an earlier opinion set out in Scott v. Reid (35 U. S. (10 Pet.) 524): * * Where the language of the act is explicit, there is great danger in departing from the words used, to give an effect to the law which may be supposed to have been designed by the legislature. It is not for the court to say, where the language of the statute is clear, that it shall be so construed as to embrace cases, because no good reason can be assigned why they were excluded from its provisions. In United States v. Fisher (6 U. S. (2 Cr.) 358, 385), Chief Justice Marshall said that where the meaning of the legislature was plain "it must be obeyed." In United States v. Shing Shun & Co. (173 Fed. 844), the court said: Where the language employed in an act is clear and certain, they [the court] have nothing to do with the reasonableness or justice of the results flowing from according it its natural, usual, and obvious meaning, nor with any supposed policy actuating its framers (p. 847). The rule is very definitely laid down in Coles v. Collector (100 Fed. 442) as follows: To undertake a departure from the language used would in fact be an unjustifiable assumption by the court of legislative power. It is the duty of the court, where the language is free from doubt or uncertainty, to confine itself to the words of the legislative body that enacted the law, without adding thereto or subtracting anything therefrom. Now, in the case at bar, having in mind all the evidence and all the definitions in all the books, authorities, and reports, and having before us the use of the terms by Congress in past legislation, is the meaning of the words "clothing wool," or of the phrase "commonly known as clothing wool" free from doubt or uncertainty? Is the definition well settled and free from ambiguity? If these questions are answered in the affirmative, this court has but one duty, and that is to "confine itself to the words of the legislative body." Since the earliest days of the Republic's legislative life it has been confronted with the problem of levying duty upon wool. Congress has used many different words and phrases with many different meanings in its legislation on that question, and the past acts of Congress show that it possessed scientific and accurate knowledge on the subject. Its woolen schedules have been prepared in the language of, and for the understanding of, those who had acquired special knowledge of the subject matter. Can this court properly hold that in the preparation and passage of the emergency act it departed from all of its previous understanding of the definitions and application of terms, and intended that a different rule of interpretation should be applied to this special piece of legislation? It might be well for a fuller understanding of the legislative history to set out extracts from the various tariff acts of the past: May 19, 1828.-First. On wool unmanufactured, four cents a pound; * * * * sheep's wool, unmanufactured, of the value of twenty and hair of the alpaca, the goat, and other like animals March 2, 1861.-Sec. 12. First. On all wool unmanufactured, and all hair of the alpaca, goat, and other like animals, unmanufactured * * Provided, That any * * wool of the sheep, or hair of the alpaca, the goat, and other like animals * Sec. 23. Wool, unmanufactured, and all hair of the goat, alpaca, and other like |