fusion exerted himself with the utmost gallantry and energy to restore order.' Indeed, that any of his force escaped at all is probably due to his calm courage. He showed that, if owing to a long career of desk work he was an unskilful general, he was, at all events, a fighting officer of whom the British army may be proud.

that an order was sent to him to return, but | distinguished officer to his conduct in this for some unknown reason he failed to do so, conflict. While admitting that he had and other two guns and some cavalry were committed serious mistakes in strategy, it despatched to his support. The general had was added, 'on the other hand, he never no opportunity of reconnoitring the ground, lost his head for a moment, and in the or ascertaining the extent of the deep tor-moment of the greatest danger and conrent-bed in front and on our right which concealed and sheltered the enemy; but he admitted that Lieutenant Maclaine's impetuosity in commencing the action sooner than was intended compelled him to open fire at once with the remaining guns. The details of the conflict cannot be ascertained with anything approaching to certainty. If the most daring courage could have made up for unskilful strategy, General Burrows 'would have won a Victoria Cross twenty times.' But under the attacks of the overwhelming numbers of the enemy the native troops became unsteady, and their line at length 'curled up like a wave.' The 66th British Foot displayed the most desperate valour in resisting the attacks of the surging masses of swordsmen, cavalry, and musketeers who pressed upon them from all sides, and they suffered severely in the conflict; but at length the few wearied remnants were swept to the rear in a surging mob of Sepoys and Afghans. The general, in order to save his infantry from annihilation, was compelled to give the order for retreat, which speedily became a flight. During the rest of the day, and all through the night till the morning of the following day, the fugitives continued to stream towards Candahar. The Afghans hovered in the rear and made frequent attacks, but failed to disperse our men, who, though worn out with thirst and hunger and fatigue, made a gallant resistance whenever an onset was made. Their rear was protected by the artillery, which kept up its military formation even to the walls of Candahar, and the limbers served as ambulances for the wounded. Altogether in the battle and the retreat nearly half the force perished.

It is only an act of justice to General Burrows to quote the testimony borne by a

General Burrows undoubtedly committed a series of tactical errors of a grave nature, but the blame of this rash and unfortunate enterprise is not altogether due to him, but must be largely shared by General Primrose, who commanded in Candahar, and the Indian Government. The former was responsible for despatching General Burrows with only some 2600 men and twelve guns to hold in check an army of at least 12,000 men with thirty guns, and leaving him with no support nearer than 43 miles. He certainly ought to have sent to the assistance of Burrows at least the two regiments of native infantry which had arrived from the frontier in time for the battle of Maiwand. If he did not think fit to strengthen the brigade, he should have recalled it. Want of forethought and false economy on the part of the Indian Government had so had so denuded denuded General Phayre, who was stationed at Quetta, of transport, that he could not push up any large force to Candahar.

Had ordinary foresight and prudence been displayed, General Phayre would have been able to have reached Candahar by August 15. But both the Government and General Primrose seemed to have failed to appreciate the position of affairs. Fortunately the enemy had suffered too much and were too weary with the efforts of the day to continue the pursuit very far; but bands of their cavalry hung for some miles on the rear of our forces, and when day

at Candahar. A sortie, which was very injudiciously made by General Primrose, terminated in the loss of more than onefifth of the troops employed, including the able and gallant Brigadier-general Brooke. But in a short time the enemy, who never really pressed the siege, practically raised it on hearing that a relieving force under General Roberts was approaching.

broke the villagers along the road poured |lery had been splendidly served at Maiout in great and ever-increasing numbers to wand, and the practice was equally good harass and cut down the fugitives. But for the assistance given by General Brooke with a small party of soldiers who came out of Candahar to their assistance, probably few of the defeated troops would have forced their way through the crowds of assailants who sought to block the road to that city. Two of the Horse Artillery guns were captured, along with their brave leader, Lieutenant Maclaine, and five of the smoothbores presented to the Wali were abandoned in the retreat. The behaviour of all the troops engaged in this unfortunate affair seems to have been good up to two o'clock, when the native infantry regiments were swept away by the rush of overwhelming numbers of Ghazees and horsemen. The native cavalry, however, behaved badly, and refused to charge the enemy at a critical moment of the battle. One proof of their demoralization is that not a single native officer was killed. Altogether the British loss, in killed and missing, amounted to about 1000 men out of the 2600 of whom the force consisted.

When the news of the disaster at Maiwand reached Cabul it was resolved that General Roberts should march to the relief of Candahar at the head of a picked body of the troops stationed at the capital, and that the forces not required for this purpose should at once withdraw from the country before the tidings of our defeat should rouse the tribesmen against us. Accordingly, two days after General Roberts had started for Candahar, General Stewart commenced his march to India with the less efficient troops, the sick, the swarms of camp followers, the Hindoo traders, and all the Afghans who thought it unsafe to remain after the British force had quitted the country. Not a shot was fired against them as they withdrew, they suffered no molestation during their homeward march, and with scarcely any of the illness and suffering which had been anticipated they regained their long-wishedfor cantonments in India. Mr. Griffin said, in his address at the last durbar, that he hoped the recollections which the Afghans would have of us would not be wholly unfriendly, and certainly the inhabitants of Cabul, to which our armies had gone on a mission of vengeance, had reason to remember us with some gratitude, for, to say nothing of the lavish expenditure by which they had been enriched, and of the medical skill and medicines by which the sick had been benefited, our troops left the city fortified as it had never been fortified before.

Such was the consternation caused by this defeat that General Primrose, who commanded at Candahar, precipitately abandoned the encampment and withdrew into the city-a step which was strongly condemned by Sir F. Haines, the Commander-in-chief. The victorious Afghans were said to have bought their victory so dearly that they hesitated to advance from Khushk-i-Nakhud. One portion of them wished to march on Candahar, another insisted on returning. Disputes ran so high, that from words they came to blows. In the end, however, they resolved to attack Candahar, and they set themselves at the same time to stir up the tribes along the route to Quetta. During the first week of August Ayoob's main body appeared before the city, and batteries were erected Meanwhile General Roberts was on his and villages and posts occupied on every march to the relief of Candahar. The road side, save the north. On the 8th they from Candahar,' says a distinguished officer, began firing upon Candahar. Their artil-passed through a hostile country, in which

not only opposition but also scarcity of evidently intended making a stand. On supplies was to be anticipated. A single the 31st of August the relieving force route was available, and an army marching reached Candahar, 318 miles from Cabul, from Cabul was in this position-that it which they had traversed in twenty-three would quit a base which was being simul- days, including two halts of one day each. taneously evacuated and move on a be- The discipline of the troops during this leaguered fortress. It would therefore be great march was no less remarkable than completely in the air. Such an operation their spirit and endurance, and though was in complete violation of all the prin- straggling soldiers and some camp followers ciples of strategy, and nothing but not were in several instances murdered by the merely success, but rapid success, without Afghans, who hung upon the rear of the a single check, could justify it. A more column, no act of retaliation was committed. audacious march was therefore never un- Supplies were paid for, and private property dertaken. That it was completely-nay, was everywhere respected. brilliantly successful reflects great credit on General Roberts, but does not absolve the Government from the responsibility which it incurred by having rendered the step necessary.'

Considerable anxiety was felt respecting the position of General Roberts, as from the time he left the Logar Valley none of the messages sent by him, till he arrived at Khelat-i-Ghilzye, reached the British authorities elsewhere. The General had under his command 2562 European soldiers, 7157 Natives, and 273 British officers. He was weak in artillery, having with him only eighteen mountain guns. The baggage was reduced to the smallest possible compass, but the army was encumbered with 8000 camp followers. The march commenced on the 9th of August; the first 98 miles were traversed in seven days, and on the 15th the forces reached Ghuznee. The soldiers were put to great trouble and toil in consequence of the desertion of the drivers belonging to the transport service, but they were not attacked or harassed during their march by the hostile tribes. On the 23rd the column reached Khelat-i-Ghilzye, hav- | ing marched from Ghuznee, a distance of 134 miles, in eight days. Taking the garrison with him, General Roberts pursued his onward march, and on the 26th he learned that Ayoob Khan had on the 23rd abandoned the investment of Candahar, and had taken up a position north-west of the city, in the Argandab Valley, where he

General Roberts was instructed by the Government to seek out and defeat Ayoob Khan, and he lost no time in performing the duty intrusted to him. Reinforced by the garrison of Candahar, under General Primrose, consisting of 4500 soldiers, a battery of 40-pounders, a battery of field artillery, and four guns of horse artillery, he marched out to attack the enemy, who were strongly intrenched at the village of Pir Paimal, on a spur of a range of hills to the west of Candahar, and occupied in great force several villages in front of their position. They did not seem inclined to wait the attack of our men, but prepared to assume the offensive with great steadiness and resolution. The British troops, in forcing their way through lanes and inclosures surrounded by high walls, which had been loopholed, encountered a most stubborn resistance, and lost a large number both of officers and men. After severe fighting the village of Pir Paimal was carried soon after noon, and the Afghans retired to an intrenched camp to the south of the Babi Wali Pass, which leads to the Argandab Valley. They held this strong position for some time with great determination, but they were at length driven from it at the point of the bayonet, and fled in great disorder, pursued for 15 miles and cut up by the British cavalry. Ayoob's camp, which stood at Mazra, a mile beyond, was found completely deserted, and thirty-two pieces of artillery,

CHAPTER XVII.

South African disturbances-History of Cape Colony-Position of the Boers-Their slaves and treatment of the Hottentots -Abolition of Slavery-Collisions between the Boers and the Kafirs-Decision of Lord Glenelg and the House of Commons respecting the case of the Kafirs-Exodus of the Boers to the Orange territory-Natal Colony-Another Kafir War-Annexation of Kafirland, Basutoland, and the Orange River Free State-A third Kafir War-The Orange River State declared independent-Atrocities committed by the Boers-Hostilities between the Basutos and the Orange River State-Appeal of that State to Britain for help-Renewed hostilities with the Basuto chief MosheshHis entreaty for protection-His tribe made British subjects-Discovery of the Diamond Fields-Dispute about the sovereignty of the country-Its settlement-Supply of firearms to the natives-Its consequences-Constitutional Government granted to Cape Colony-Failure of the experiment-Another Kafir War-Lord Carnarvon's proposal of confederation-Quarrel between the Boers and the Zulus-Cetewayo-Defeat of the Boers by Sekokuni-Annexation of the Transvaal-Sir Bartle Frere's policy-His ultimatum to Cetewayo-Defeat of the British troops at IsandulaRorke's Drift and Ekowe held against the Zulus-Death of the ex-Imperial Prince of France-Defeat and capture of Cetewayo-Terms granted to the Zulus by Sir Garnet Wolseley-Cetewayo's visit to England-His restorationOpposition to it-Its result.

WHILE war was still raging in Afghanistan | other territories in exchange for her South serious disturbances broke out in South African possessions, and the Dutch at the Africa, which led to hostilities both with Cape became British subjects. the native tribes and the Dutch Boers, and terminated in a most unsatisfactory result. The peninsula of Table Mountain was occupied by the Dutch East India Company in 1652, and they gradually extended their authority as far as the Great Fish River on the east of Grahamstown. The Dutch settlers proved bad neighbours to the native races, and at the close of last century, in addition to 26,000 slavesdescendants of Malays or of imported negroes-they had reduced the Hottentots to a state of serfdom. The conquest of Holland by Napoleon created a sudden danger that the Cape might be seized by the French, and at the request of the Stadtholder the British Government took temporary possession of it in his name in 1795. At the Peace of Amiens the colony was restored to Holland, but in 1806 the danger recurred, and Sir David Baird was despatched to recover possession. The Hollanders in Cape Town had become infected with the French revolutionary notions, and made a vigorous resistance to the British troops, but were defeated, and the colony became again provisionally a British possession. The occupation was intended to be only temporary, but at the Treaty of Paris in 1815 Holland agreed to accept

For the first quarter of a century after the transference of the colony to Britain. matters proceeded pretty smoothly between the new Government and the Boers. They retained their laws, their religion, and their language, and they were permitted to govern their slaves and Hottentot serfs in their own way. In 1828, however, the law of settlement, which confined the Hottentots to special locations and obliged them to work for their livelihood, was repealed, and they were left free to go where they pleased. This step gave great dissatisfaction to the Boers, and in the long-run proved the reverse of advantageous to the Hottentots, who have now almost entirely disappeared. Then followed the abolition of slavery in the colony. The slavery of the Cape was mainly patriarchal, and differed widely from the system prevalent in the West Indies and the United States. It still was slavery, and its abolition was just and expedient, but this was carried out in a manner that excited a sense of indignant resentment among the Boers. They claimed £3,000,000 as the value of their slaves, but the indemnity was cut down to £1,200,000, and by a piece of perverse official mismanagement the money was made payable only at the Bank of