hostilities, not only in France, but in Den- | sisted for the most part of raw levies who mark and Austria, was a return to a system of warfare which was believed to have been repudiated by the whole of Europe, and was worthy of a savage rather than of a civilized people. The German forces engaged in the siege of Paris, thinned by unceasing conflicts, and to some extent by exposure and disease, had a hard struggle to maintain their lines of investment on the one hand, and to repel the attacks of the provincial armies on the other. But it was impossible for them to abandon the contest on which they had entered, and their leaders were determined to carry it out at whatever cost. Accordingly a new levy of German Landwehr, to the amount of 200,000 men, was required from Germany; and though the people complained bitterly of the frightful sacrifices they were called on to make, they had no resource but to comply with the demand, and the new levies were sent across the Rhine about the middle of December. Meanwhile Paris, the luxurious city, that 'lived deliciously with the great ones of the earth,' where 'gaud and glitter, vanity, frivolity, and vice' seemed the leading characteristics of the inhabitants, showed that there were sterling qualities beneath them which sustained the people under the pressure of an overwhelming crisis. It was a startling surprise that a population so vast, so various, so excitable,' whose lower classes were so turbulent and ferocious, and whose upper classes seemed so thoroughly saturated with frivolity and selfishness, should, under the pressure of adversity, have proved so patriotic and unselfish. But their sacrifices came too late to save the city or the country. The hopes of deliverance cherished by the Parisians depended on the action of the three armies of the north, centre, and west, which were endeavouring to break through the lines of the enemies surrounding the city, and earnestly striving to force their way to its walls. But though their numbers were large, these armies con had never fired a musket before, and were not able to cope with the well-drilled and experienced soldiers of Germany. Immediately before Christmas General Faidherbe fought a battle with Manteuffel, in which both sides claimed the victory, but the French General was soon after defeated by General Goeben. General Chanzy, who commanded one portion of the army of the Loire, had maintained the struggle with singular obstinacy, but his raw levies were defeated in front of Le Mans (11th January, 1871) with a great loss of prisoners. The only considerable French army now remaining in the field was marching north-eastward, under General Bourbaki, in the hope of overwhelming General Werder, who was posted at Vesoul for the purpose of covering the siege of Belfort. It is the opinion of military critics that if Bourbaki's march eastward had been as ably executed as it was skilfully planned, he might have thrown Werder back into the valley of the Rhine, and seized upon the Paris and Strasburg Railway. In that case it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for the Germans to maintain the investment of Paris. But he was an incompetent commander, and his troops were badly equipped and disheartened by a long series of misfortunes. His movements were so dilatory that it took him five days to traverse 20 miles, and though he had 130,000 men under his command, while Werder had only 40,000, after losing 10,000 men during the three days' battle of Belfort, he failed to drive the Germans from their position, and gave orders for a retreat. Considerable numbers of his troops were intercepted and taken prisoners. Finally, forced away from their home communications, no road remained open to them but that into Switzerland, and at the beginning of February the remnant of Bourbaki's army, 80,000 in number, crossed the frontier in a state so deplorable as to recall the retreat from Moscow, and were disarmed by the Swiss militia, while the General himself in despair attempted to commit after some preliminary negotiations, M. suicide. With the exception of the disor- Jules Favre, on the 28th of January, signed ganized bodies of Mobiles, commanded by the capitulation of Paris, including a general Chanzy and Faidherbe, and of two or three suspension of arms, except on the Swiss remaining garrisons, there was no longer a frontier, where at that moment imminent French army in existence, and at all points ruin was threatening the forces of Bourthe vast outer circle which covered the baki, and the siege of Belfort was being siege of Paris remained impenetrable. pressed to a successful conclusion by General Werder. The terms of the capitulation were that the forts were to be occupied by the German troops, who were also to be allowed to enter Paris, and that the arms of the garrison were to be surrendered. But the National Guard, notwithstanding Bismarck's prudent warning, were permitted, at the request of Jules Favre, to retain their arms, for the professed purpose of maintaining order. True to their plundering propensities, the Germans required that Paris should pay a contribution of 200,000,000 francs within a fortnight. The definite conclusion of peace was referred to an Assembly to be immediately convoked at Bordeaux with sovereign powers. Meanwhile the frost, which had set in with tremendous severity, had proved exceedingly trying both to the besiegers and the besieged. The German commanders had hitherto relied on famine to compel the final surrender of the city, but they now resolved that the long-threatened bombardment should no longer be delayed. On the last day of 1870 the besiegers captured Mount Avron, which was done with unexpected ease, owing to the French having been taken by surprise. In the course of the first week in January Forts Nogent, Rosny, and Noisy, on the east side of Paris, were silenced by the German batteries, and a cannonade was commenced against the southern forts. Several sorties were attempted by the French troops but without success, and at length a final effort was made on the 19th of January to break through the line of the besiegers. It was at first successful, and several positions were captured, but in the end the German reserves were brought up, and after heavy loss these positions were regained, and the assailants driven back into the city. Matters were now rapidly approaching a crisis in the city. The death-rate was steadily increasing. The last week of 1870 had given a total of nearly 4000 deaths, and by the end of January, 1871, it had risen to 4465. Sickness and starvation were extending their ravages on all sides; the rations of bread were reduced, and 8000 horses, hitherto spared for the public service, were now slaughtered to furnish food for the people, many of whom were suffering great privations. After the failure of the sortie on the 19th of January, the Provisional Government saw at last that their case was hopeless, and It had been foreseen that as the surrender of Paris would not take place until the inhabitants were in imminent danger of starvation, prompt measures would require to be taken for their relief. Accordingly a large subscription had been collected in London for this purpose, and vast trains, laden with provisions, had, with the consent of the German commanders, been forwarded through their lines, even before the armistice was signed. As soon as intercourse with the outer world was restored, special trains were despatched day by day from London with additional supplies of flour, rice, biscuit, fish, and fuel, and with 7000 head of live stock. The distress had been greatest in the lower section of the middle classes and amongst the tradesmen, whose feeling of independence made them unwilling to claim a share of the public rations, and whose means were insufficient to meet the heavy price of provisions. Gambetta, who had for some months exercised dictatorial power outside the walls of Paris, attempted to repudiate the convention and to continue the war. He declared that no reactionary or cowardly Assembly should be summoned, but one which should be ready for anything rather than assist at the assassination of France,' and he issued a decree which purported to disqualify for a seat in the Assembly all members of the families that had heretofore reigned in France, and any person who had held office under the late Empire. But the Government of the National Defence declared this decree null and void, and on the arrival of some of its members at Bordeaux Gambetta immediately resigned his office. The elections throughout France took place on the 8th of February. The candidates were connected with all the parties in France-Legitimists, Imperialists, Orleanists, and Republicans of every hue. But though Paris and other large towns returned a number of candidates of an advanced Radical type, such as Louis Blanc, Victor Hugo, Gambetta, and Rochefort, the great majority of those elected were of comparatively moderate and Conservative opinions. M. Thiers was returned for twenty out of the eighty-six departments, a decisive proof that he was regarded at this juncture by the great mass of his fellow-countrymen as the statesman who was most likely to extricate France from its overwhelming difficulties. On the 13th of February the Assembly met at Bordeaux and appointed M. Grevy as its president. The Government of Defence then resigned their powers into its hands, and the Assembly unanimously resolved to appoint M. Thiers, as the most eminent of living Frenchmen, the head of the Executive Administration. He immediately selected M. Dufaure, Jules Favre, Jules Simon, and other public men of a similar stamp, to constitute his Ministry; and he had the shrewdness to associate with himself a Council of the Assembly, that it might share the responsibility of a peace which was certain to be unpalatable. The preliminaries of peace were signed at Ver sailles on the 26th of February, on the conditions imposed and inexorably insisted on by the conquerors. The province of Alsace, with the exception of Belfort and its environs and Metz, with the part of Lorraine which lies between that fortress and the former frontier, were ceded to Germany. A pecuniary compensation of five milliards of francs, or £200,000,000, was also extorted, to be paid by instalments ranging over three years. As security for the payment of this enormous sum, the German forces were to occupy, at the expense of France, the greater part of the territory which they had overrun, but the departments were to be successively evacuated in a specified order, as the instalments were paid. As the continuance of the war was simply impossible, the French negotiators had no alternative but to accept these terms, intolerably hard though they certainly were, and the Bordeaux Assembly approved them by a majority of five to one. It had been stipulated by a separate convention that the Germans were to occupy a certain portion of the French capital as a sign and symbol of their triumph, and on the 1st of March 30,000 of their troops marched down the Champs Elysées, and bivouacked in the Place de la Concorde and the gardens of the Tuileries. The Parisian authorities took all possible precautions to prevent a collision between the inhabitants and their conquerors. A cordon of troops was posted round the whole quarter which the latter occupied, and the Germans found there only silence and emptiness. It was a great relief to the authorities on both sides when the invaders were safely beyond the boundaries of the city without any collision or mischief done. The severity of the conditions of peace exacted from France excited strong disapprobation throughout Europe, and especially in Britain. Great popular meetings were held in London and in several provincial towns to express sympathy with the French people under the cruel treatment which they had received at the hands of the Prus at peace, and to place his armies upon a peace establishment. We must, on the contrary, if we take this large cession, consider the operations of war as deferred till France shall find a suitable opportunity of endeavouring to regain what she has lost, and after having wasted our resources in the maintenance of overgrown military establishments in time of peace, we shall find how little useful the cessions we shall have acquired will be against a national effort to regain them.' sians. Special indignation was expressed | mend to his sovereign to consider himself at the forcible severance of Alsace and Lorraine from France, in spite of the protests and entreaties of the entire population of these provinces. The pretexts which Bismarck put forth to justify this violation of the rights of the people were contemptuously scouted by all unprejudiced and candid observers. It was simply absurd to suppose, after what had taken place, that Germany needed any protection against a French invasion, and if, as Bismarck alleged, the possession of Metz and Strasburg afforded peculiar facilities for aggressions on South German territories, that danger could have been completely averted by dismantling these fortresses. But the possession of these provinces had long been coveted by Prussia, and on the downfall of Napoleon in 1815 her leading statesmen addressed a memorial to the Allied Powers at Paris, advocating the policy of seizing Alsace and Lorraine, in order to afford territorial 'securities' against future French aggressions. Great Britain and Russia, however, peremptorily refused to permit this spoliation. The Duke of Wellington, with his usual sagacity, set forth the grounds on which good policy would prevent the Allied Powers from insisting on territorial cessions such as would prolong the war-feeling among the French people. If such demands, he said, were enforced on the sovereign and people of France, 'there is no statesman who would venture to recom VOL. IV. Bismarck, however, instead of following the moderate and judicious policy recommended by Wellington, chose rather to act on the maxim of Machiavelli, to crush those whom you cannot conciliate. Believing, as he said, that France would never forgive her defeat and the injuries inflicted on her in the war with Germany, he resolved to disable her to the utmost extent possible. He speedily discovered, as he was compelled to admit, that this work had only been half done-that France possessed a wonderful power of recovery, which in no long time completely effaced all traces of the ravages of the war; while, on the other hand, Germany has left behind her in France a legacy of hatred and a thirst for revenge, which has compelled her rulers to impose intolerable burdens on their subjects in order to maintain, during peace, armaments and military preparations on the most gigantic scale. 28 CHAPTER XII. The Red Republicans-Their Plots during the Siege-Mismanagement on the part of the Authorities-Murder of Generals Lecomte and Thomas-Lullier and Assi leaders of the Insurrection-Inefficiency of the Government-The Communal Elections-Outbreak of the Communists-Their Central Committee-Failure of Negotiations-Impolitic Conduct of M. Thiers-Commencement of Hostilities-Bombardment of the City-Dissensions among the Communist Leaders— Their Enforcement of Conscription-Capture of the Forts-Entry of the Besiegers into Paris-Burning of the Public Buildings by the Reds-Murder of the Hostages-The Pétroleuses-Conduct of the Communist Leaders-Frightful Slaughter of the Insurgents-Punishment of the Ringleaders-Payment of the German Indemnity-Withdrawal of the Invading Army-The King of Prussia made Emperor of Germany-Effect of the War on the Interests of his Country -Financial Difficulties-The Falk Laws-Bismarck's Social and Economical Policy-Socialism-Dishonourable Treatment of the King of Hanover-Corruption and Prosecution of the Press-Bismarck's Foreign Policy-His Attempt to pick a Quarrel with France-Pressure of the Military System on the Resources of the Country. No sooner had Paris been freed from its | Felix Pyat was justly accused by his associates of having passed his life in stirring up revolutionary fires, and then skulking off to leave his friends to brave the danger and consequences of the conflagration.' Under the leadership of these 'professors of revolution,' repeated abortive plots against the Government were formed, and after the surrender of Metz a serious outbreak took place, accompanied by a demand for the Commune. A mob of 5000 or 6000 National Guards took possession of the Hôtel de Ville and made prisoners of the Government. Through a well managed stratagem, the building was recaptured by Trochu's party without bloodshed. The General now appealed to the citizens in support of his authority, and the result was an overwhelming vote of confidence in his favour. The Communists numbered only 54,000, while 340,000 votes were given for the Government. After this signal defeat the Red Republicans made no further attempt to overturn the Committee of National Defence until the 22nd of January, 1871. On that day an insurrection took place in the streets, and a good many lives were lost. The intimation made on the 28th, that negotiations were being entered into for a capitulation caused prodigious excitement, which was greatly increased next day when the terms were made known. The elections followed, and it was soon discovered that a large proportion of the members of the Assembly were Imperialists and Royalists. |