most eminent judges of Nebraska. It is a simple and effective method, and is just this ---overrule all such motions and require the party to plead instanter. Give him his little "exception" if he wants it, as it will not be error that will reverse the case, anyhow. It is a somewhat laughable sight to see a defendant after his demurrer to the petition is overruled, solemnly take an "exception," and then take time in which to answer, yet that is done daily in our courts, apparently in ignorance that answering over purges the ruling of reversible error. And let me add that it isn't necessary for a nisi prius judge to give a party a long a long enough time in which to amend his petition or answer, as will admit of his going to Europe and back again, before he does it. It is a common thing for such judges to give the defendant, after his demurrer is overruled, "thirty days in which to answer, and the plaintiff 10 days thereafter in which to reply." Such a practice is absolutely indefensible. 2. Let us consider now the third great cause of delay, viz: Numerical excess of judges of courts of last resort to hear a cause or to pronounce a decision. No more than three (3) or at most four (4) judges of a Supreme Court should be required to pronounce the final judgment of the Court. The smaller the number, the greater the sense of responsibility, and the greater the probability of close investigation and mature deliberation. Multiplying the number of judges divides the sense of judicial responsibility, and lessens the probability of concentrated attention to the cause. Three (3) trained, paid judicial servants of the state is all that any man ought to be entitled to have listen to his private differences and pronounce judgment upon them. Moreover, to increase that number by no means adds to the wisdom of the decision, for, with additional ability you also get additional lack of ¦ ability. If a lawyer cannot convince a majority of three judges of the justice of his cause, what will it avail him to attempt to convince a majority of seven judges? If three cannot solve the problem, it is certain that seven cannot. Experience has shown that a mere increase in the number of Judges of the Supreme Court will not result in any appreciable gain in the decision of causes. Here are some of the facts: In the year 1895, when the Supreme Court of Nebraska consisted of but three members, Judges Maxwell, Post and Norval, and there were no commissioners—just three (3) opinion-writing men--the Supreme Court of Nebraska decided 374 cases. In 1907, when there were three (3) Supreme Court Judges and six (6) Supreme Court Comissioners--nine (9) opinion-writing men-the Supreme Court of Nebraska decided but 367 cases- less. In other words, nine (9) men decided less cases in 1907, than three men did in 1895. Again: In 1907, the people of Nebraska increased the number of Supreme Court Judges from three (3) to seven (7), in the hope that the additional number would result in the Court catching up with its work, and, in addition, raised the salaries of the judges. The people were willing to do this, as they are still willing to do any reasonable thing to expedite the business of the courts. What has been the result? In the year 1908, the seven (7) judges of the Supreme Court of Nebraska decided 393 cases; in the year 1910, 376 cases; and in the year 1911, 367 cases. From this it will be seen that there has been no appreciable increase in the number of cases decided, notwithstanding the increase in the numof judges. WHY? From the simple reasons hereinbefore stated, and that an increase in the number of judges does not result in an increase in the number of decisions. The evidence establishes that. What, then, is to be done? Obviously, to divide the Supreme Court into departments. It is not so much from a lack of Supreme Court Judges that we suffer but from a lack of Supreme Courts. Whatever the number of judges, they should be required by law to sit in divisions. If any further evidence than that of the State of Nebraska, let us look at the experience of other states. Colorado-Has a Supreme Court of seven judges, and a Court of Appeals of five judges. Supreme Court sits in departments, of two judges and the Chief Justice each. Time required to litigate a given case is from two to four years. Some years ago, Colorado had a Court of Appeals, but abolished it. About one year ago, this Court was re-instated, but under an arrangement by which it is only an addition to the Supreme Court there, for the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction either. by appeal or writ of error, and can decide no cause unless it is sent to it by the Supreme Court. They say that since the establishment of this Court of Appeals under the arrangement above noted, things are catching up a little bit. The Supreme Court turned over about 300 cases to the Court of Appeals for decision. Colorado is not a very good state to prove either side of any contention, for there are peculiar local conditions there that enter into the matter largely. One lawyer writes me that the Supreme Court does not work hard enough and takes too many vacations. California-Has a Supreme Court of seven judges and three District Courts of Appeal of three (3) judges each, but the time required to reach the end of litigation in California is as long or longer than it is in Nebraska. The Supreme Court does not sit in divisions. The causes of delay assigned are the usual ones of trial judges not frowning upon dilatory tactics, and the time of the Supreme Court being occupied in deciding whether defeated litigant in one of its Courts of Appeals has a still a right of appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislature has tried several expedients for absolutely limiting the jurisdiction of the intermediate the intermediate appellate courts, so as to shut off appeal from them to the Supreme Court, but, I am told, with out success. Indiana-Has a Supreme Court of five (5) judges and a Court of Appeals of five (5) judges, but the time required to reach the end of litigation is from 2 to 4 years. Neither Court sits in divisions. Kansas-Has a Supreme Court of seven (7) judges, which sits in divisions. It has no Court of Appeals. Length of time required to reach final judgment is 1 year to 18 months-in rare cases 2 years. They have the "Rules Session" system in operation there. Michigan-Has a Supreme Court of eight (8) judges which sits in divisions of five judges each, the unanimous decision of whom is final. If there is disagreement or doubt, the case is re-argued before the entire bench. The Supreme Court is not behind at all—and a case is reached there within six months after it is filed. Some delay occurs in the trial courts for the usual causes. But the total length of time necessarily employed in reaching the final end of a lawsuit in Michigan is about one year. There are no intermediate Appellate Courts in Michigan. Minnesota-Has a Supreme Court consisting of five (5) judges and has no Court of Appeals. There is no constitutional requirement for this Court to sit in divisions. Length of time required for litigation in Minnesota is nine months to one year. But there is, I am told, a judicial sentiment in that state against frivolous procedure that is effective. Missouri-Has a Supreme Court of seven (7) judges which sits in divisions, and is aided by four commissioners. Div. No. 1 has four judges and two commisioners. Div. 2 has three (3) judges and two commissioners. Missouri also has three. (3) Courts of Appeal of three (3) judges each. One of these Courts sits at St. Louis, one at Springfield, and one at Kansas City. Complaint is made that there is a diversity of opinion between some of the Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court. Anyhow. it takes as long to reach final judgment as in Nebraska. The chief difficulty with Missouri is that she hasn't enough Supreme Court Judges as compared with her population, which is nearly three time that of Nebraska, while the number of her Supreme Court Judges is the same. Texas-Has a Supreme Court consisting of six (6) judges-three (3) of which constitute their Court of Criminal Appeals and three their Court of Civil Appeals. It. also, has eight Courts of Appeal of three (3) members each, the jurisdiction of which is supposed to be final on all questions of fact. But Texas suffers from worse delav than in many other states, though it is said that their Courts of Appeal are about up with their work. I have the proceedings oI the bar association of that state for several years back, and they are filled with lamentations about the interminable delays of litigation. As nearly as I can learn, the states considered, having the greatest expedition in litigation are Washington, Minnesota, Michigan, Wisconsin and Kansas, in the order named. In none of them are there any intermediate appellate courts. In three of them, the Court sits in divisions. There is a movement on foot in a number of states for the creation of intermediate Courts of Appeal. This tendency should be opposed for the reason that in every state west of the Ohio river, where they have such courts, the delay is as great or greater than it is in this state. That statement is susceptible of proof. Then it must be apparent that, the time of Supreme Courts would be taken up very largely in deciding whether a defeated litigant in the Court of Appeals had still a right to be heard in the Supreme Court. To decide this, the Supreme Court would consume as much time as it would require to decide the case in the first instance. And, in the one or two states where the jurisdiction of such courts is so strictly limited as to exclude this possibility, the intermediate appellate courts are, in effect, mere additions to the Supreme Court. Then, too, the establishment of such courts would further comWashington-Supreme Court of nine plicate the situation, and give one more op(9) members required to sit in two depart-portunity to prolong the struggle. What ments of four (4) judges each the chief justice sitting with each department. Three judges are necessary to pronounce a decision. The Constitution of Washington provides that the number of Supreme Court judges may be increased, every four years, by the legislature, if necessity require; and the Constitution further provides that the judges shall always sit in departments. Time of litigation 6 to 9 months. No delay. Wisconsin-Has a Supreme Court of seven judges, who divide the cases among themselves. This Court is not very much behind with its work, and decision may be had within about 6 months from the time the case is filed. There is no Court of Appeals. Time of litigation about one year. we want is something to end it. I say again There ought also to be a demand for the Court. The objection of counsel or his motion sufficiently discloses his contention, and the ruling of the Court plainly shows the decision. An "exception" is only equivalent to saying to the trial judge-"You're dead wrong, and I'll show you in the Supreme Court." Besides being useless, the necessity of taking an exception as a prerequisite to review may result in great injustice, for it is easy to conceive of a situation where the Supreme Court might say to an appellant-"Yes, this evidence should not have been admitted, and its admission probably was prejudicial to you, but you didn't except to its admission at the trial." In vain, the lawyer might reply that he objected to it and called it to the attention of the trial court. His failure to go through the mummery of taking an "exception" would "put him out of business." It is an altogether useless and even dangerous superfluity, and should be done away with as soon as the legislature can get to it. I should prefer to bring this article to a close without even referring to the last cause of delay in litigation, viz:-"Procrastination, indifference and laziness of judges and lawyers." My readers would feel better and my recommendations would be more acceptable. The letters I receive from lawyers in other states are filled with such replies as these, to my question "What is the cause of delay in your state?" Thus-"Too much indulgence granted to counsel for bringing a case to trial." "Granting continuances for trivial causes." "Too few terms of courts." "Disposition of judges and lawyers to let things go as they are." "Holding dilatory pleas under advisement," etc., etc., etc. As far as the Supreme Court of Nebraska is concerned, I do not profess to know whether it could render more decisions each year than it does, in its present unwieldly form. I have but one word to say about this Court in this regard. It is this: In 1886, when the Supreme Court of Tennessee had been behind with its work since the civil war, and it is said that legislative expedients had failed, and the wrath of the people took the form of an imperative demand that the docket be cleared by the Supreme Court itself, and candidates for the Supreme Bench were pledged to do it, the Supreme Court of Tennessee decided 1822 cases in the first year, 1472 cases the next year, and 1162 the next, and the docket was cleared. You will find this reported in 24 Am. Law Review, at page 283, under the caption-"How the Supreme Court of Tennessee Cleared Its Docket. District judges and lawyers are too indifferent to the value of time and the offense of wasting it. I think that much of this results from the excessive time allowed by the statute in which to do things in the course of litigation. We are all the slaves of precedent, and the time set in the statute is followed in other things by the courts of analogy. The times fixed by the statute were largely influenced originally by the means of communication in vogue 50 or 75 years ago, in the days of the sailing vessel, pony express and the ox team. Those days are out of joint with the present. The vast commercial business of the country is transacted without loss according to the methods of today, while we, not only in the substantive law of the land, but in the time within which acts must be done continue to be ruled by the dead. The wail of every man wearily waiting for his due, the efficiency of the judicial system, the good of the state, the standing and honor of our profession, and our own interests all summon us, loudly and imperatively, to the duty of abolishing this deplorable, disgusting and disgraceful delay in the administration of justice. The duty is urgent and immediate. Some of us have grown gray thinking that "something ought to be done," and, perhaps, speculating, more or less idly, what it should be, but it has resulted in nothing tangible. The evil continues unabated. Let us as lawyers attack the problem without further delay or discussion. "Lose this day loitering, 'twill be the same old story "Tomorrow, and the next more dilatory; "Each indecision brings its own delays, "And days are lost lamenting o'er lost days. "Are you in earnest? Seize this very minute, "What you can do, or think you can, begin it "Boldness has genius, power and magic in it. "Only engage and then the mind grows heated; "Begin it, and the work will be completed. W. M. CAIN, Fremont, Nebr. HUSBAND AND WIFE-ADVERSE POSSESSION. HANCOCK v. DAVIS et al. Supreme Court of North Carolina. March 3, 1920. 102 S. E. 269. During the continuance of the family relation, neither a husband nor a wife can acquire title by adverse possession as against the other of land of which they are in joint occupancy. BROWN, J. The evidence shows that John E. Henry entered into possession of the lot in controversy prior to 1870, having no paper title thereto. He remained in possession up to his death in 1912. This action was commenced in 1917. The lot was listed for taxes by John E. Henry in 1870 and sold for taxes on January 7, 1871, and bid off in the name of W. R. Henry, infant son of John E. Henry, and brother of defendant Mary Davis, who was John E. Henry's daughter. W. R. Henry was born in 1866, and died in 1873, according to the evidence. No deed was made to W. R. Henry at the time of sale, but the then sheriff, John D. Davis, gave a receipt for the taxes in name of W. R. Henry. On April 18, 1891, John D. Davis, not then being sheriff, executed a tax deed to W. R. Henry for the lot. The plaintiff offered in evidence a deed to Agnes Henry, dated October 30, 1891, purporting to be signed by W. R. Henry for the lot and probated upon the oath of John E. Henry. On October 21, 1913, Agnes Henry executed a deed for the lot to plaintiff, Hancock. Agnes Henry was the third wife of John E. Henry, and was married in 1887. The defendant Mary Davis is the child of John E. Henry by a prior marriage, and so far as the record discloses is his only heir at law. Plaintiff offered mortgage from John E. Henry and Agnes Henry to S. P. Hancock, March 17, 1906, recorded in Book 5, page 303, which said mortgage has been canceled and fully satisfied of record, as appears from the face of the same. The defendants objected to the introduction of this mortgage on the grounds that it was not material and was prejudicial; objection overruled, and defendants excepted. As the mortgage was duly canceled, we fail to see its bearing on this controversy. We are of opinion that his honor erred in refusing the motion to nonsuit, as in any view of the evidence, plaintiff failed to make out title to the lot. John E. Henry was in possession of the lot from prior to 1870 to his death. Assuming that he had acquired title by possession, no one except defendants have shown a title from him. Mary Davis was his only heir at law, and after her father's death held the property subject to what dower right the widow may have had. The widow held no conveyance from John E. Henry. The deed signed by W. R. Henry conveyed no title, for he died in 1873, some years before Davis executed the deed. If Agnes Henry had anything, she had only a paper writing which might be color of title. Assuming that it was, it never ripened into a good title by adverse possession. John E. Henry lived on the lot up to date of his death in 1912, and died without either devising or conveying the property to his wife Agnes. She did not hold adversely after she received the deed purporting to be executed by W. R. Henry. She resided with her husband on the lot, and was there as his wife, and could not hold adversely to him. This subject is discussed in the recent case of Kornegay v. Price, 100 S. E. 883, where it is said: "It seems to be well settled that, owing to the unity of husband and wife, adverse possession cannot exist between them so long as the coverture continues. But, where the marital relations have been terminated by divorce or abandonment, it seems that one may acquire title from the other by adverse possession. 1 A. & E. Ency. p. 820, § 11. In First National Bank |