ducted a disorderly house at 120 Madison street, the adjoining residence. The beer was stored in an outhouse. The husband carried the key. He directed the negro to deliver the beer to 120 Madison street. There was evidence to the effect that the defendant herself sold beer to John Walt, and this evidence is uncontradicted. There was also certain evidence that the inmates of the house sold intoxicating liquors and turned over the proceeds to the defendant. While the use of the words "or by or through any person connected with her" were not technically correct, we are not disposed to hold that the error was prejudicial, in view of the fact that the evidence that defendant herself sold beer to the witness Walt was uncontradicted. Another ground urged for reversal is that the court erred in not giving the jury the whole law of the case; it being insisted that the jury should have been told in substance that, if they believed from the evidence that the defendant acted jointly with her husband in selling the liquor, or sold the liquor in his presence, the law presumed that she acted in obedience to his command and under his coercion, and they should find her not guilty, unless they believed from the evidence that she acted of her free will and volition. It may be conceded that even at the time of Blackstone it had been the rule of the common law for a thousand years that where a crime with some exceptions, was committed by a married woman conjointly with or in the presence of her husband, prima facie she was not criminally liable, as it was presumed that she acted in obedience to his commands or under his coercion. 13 R. C. L. p. 1238. It may also be conceded that the rule has been applied to all classes of misdemeanors, and even within recent years to the illegal sale of intoxicating liquors. Mulvey v. State, 43 Ala. 316, 94 Am. Dec. 684; State v. Cleaves, 59 Me. 298, 8 Am. Rep. 422; 4 Bl. Com. 28. While it is said that the reason for the rule is not quite clear, it is evident that it must have had its foundation in the peculiar relation which existed between husband and wife in the earlier days. At common law the husband had almost absolute control over the person of his wife; she was in a condition of complete dependence; could not contract in her own name; was bound to obey; she had no will and her legal existence was merged into that of her husband, so that they were termed and regarded as one in law, "the husband being that one." 13 R. C. L. p. 983; Elliott v. Waring, 5 T. B. Mon. 338, 17 Am. Dec. 69; MacKinley v. McGregor, 3 Whart. (Pa.) 369, 31 Am. Dec. 552. But these conditions have changed. Even at an early day courts of equity disregarded the fiction that husband and wife were one, and treated them as separate and distinct persons where it was necessary to protect the rights of the wife. Elliott v. Waring, supra; Winebrinner v. Weisiger, 3 T. B. Mon. 32. Indeed, the early rule that the husband might chastise his wife in moderation was never recognized or enforced in this state. Richardson v. Lawhon, 4 Ky. Law Rep. 998. By the act of March 15. 1894, now sections 2127 and 2128, Kentucky Statutes, the rights and liabilities of husband and wife are materially changed. Under that act, the husband has no estate or interest in his wife's property, but the wife holds and owns all of her estate to separate and exclusive use, and free from the debts, liabilities, or control of her hus band. By virtue of that act the wife may make contracts, sue and be sued, collect her rents, and may sell and dispose of her personal property. In the case of Lane v. Bryant, 100 Ky. 138, 37 S. W. 584, 18 Ky. Law Rep. 658, 36 L. R. A 709, this court declined to follow the common. law rule that a husband was liable for slandercus words spoken by his wife, on the ground that the rule had been changed by the above statute, the court saying: "The rule is a harsh one at best, and with the progress of civilization, and the changes by wise, modern legislation of the relation between husband and wife as to the right of property and personal control by the husband, it would seem absurd in this enlightened age to regard the wife as a mere machine, made to labor and to talk as the husband directs, and to make him liable on that ground for her torts when not committed by his direction or procurement." After calling attention to the provisions of the act of March 15, 1894, the court added: "While it may be and is the marital duty of both to aid each other in the support and maintenance of each and of their children, the control and use of the wife's property by her is independent of the husband, not subject to his control, and the familiar doctrine that the legal existence of the wife is merged in that of the husband no longer exists, and as on this rule is based the common-law liability of the husband for the wife's torts, and even for her debts contracted before marriarge, the reason for enforcing this doctrine is gone, and past adjudications on the subject will not be followed. The unity of person has been destroyed, and to say that it still exists, with the constant legislation of this state endeavoring to secure the wife in her person and property, and at last by the act of March, 1894, making the wife equal of the husband in the control and use of property, would be opposed to the plain legisla tive intent, and result in enforcing a doctrine that has neither wisdom nor justice in it." In the more recent case of Turner v. Heav rin, 182 Ky. 65, 206 S. W. 23, the court, while recognizing the common-law rule that a wife could not sue for criminal conversation with her husband, held that the rule had been changed by the act of 1894, and that a wife now had the right to bring such an action. It will thus be seen that the one-person idea of the marriage relation as expounded by the common-law authorities, can no longer be made the touchstone of a married woman's rights or capacities. Nagle v. Tieperman, 74 Kan. 32, 85 Pac. 941, 88 Pac. 969, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 674, 10 Ann. Cas. 977. Being secure in her person and property, and her separate identity having been established, it is clear that the means through which a husband exercised control and dominion over the person and property of his wife no longer exist. Having sought and obtained these new rights and privileges, which have placed her upon a plane of equality with her husband, she must accept the corresponding obligations and responsibilities which those rights and privileges entail, and can no longer take shelter under the supposed dominion of her husband. This is the view taken by the Supreme Court of Tennessee in the case of Morton v. State, 141 Tenn. 357, 209 S. W. 644, 4 A. L. R. 264, where it was held that the supposed duress of a woman by reason of marriage, which relieves her of liability for crimes com mitted in the presence of her husband, depends upon her disability by virtue of the marriage. and is destroyed by statutes emancipating her from such disability. We therefore conclude that there is no longer a presumption that a married woman who commits a crime conjointly with or in the presence of her husband acts under his coercion. It follows that the court's failure to instruct the jury to that ef fect was not error. Judgment affirmed. NOTE-Coverture as Defense in Criminal Acts. In many of the States it has been held, as under the rule of common law, that if a husband is present when a crime is committed by his wife presumably she acts under his coercion, but this presumption, in this country at least, is remittable. Thus in Com. v. Adams, 186 Mass. 101, 71 N. E. 78, Loring, J., said it was recited that in that state "When a married woman is indicted for a crime and it is contended in defense that she ought to be acquitted because she acted under the coercion of her husband, the question of fact to be determined is whether she really and in truth acted under such coercion or whether she acted of her own free will and independently of any coercion or control by him." And much earlier than this it was held in Uhl v. Com., 6 Grat. (Va.) 706, that an instruction to the jury, leaving it to them to say whether the wife was coerced or acted under her own free will, was right. In People v. Ryland, 97 N. Y. 126, it was left to the jury to say whether a wife was guilty or not of forgery, where there was no direct evidence that she acted under the influence of her husband or that he compelled her in any way to participate in the crime. In State v. Houston, 29 S. C. 108, 6 S. E. 943, it was said that as matter of law a wife could not be deemed guilty where after being coerced in giving assistance, she became the more active of the two in consummating the offense, as the influence of former coercion might still be the reason for her activity. But the rule seems a little different where the crime charged involves conspiracy and the common law rule that husband and wife, being one person in the law, they cannot be joined as conspirators. Several states have held that general emancipation under married women acts do not abrogate this rule. Thus in People v. Miller, 82 Cal. 107, 22 Pac. 934, on an appeal by the husband, his sole contention was that no prosecution for conspiracy could be maintained against husband and wife and the Court said: "That such was the rule of common law, we cannot doubt, and we find nothing in the code or statutes of this state to indicate an intention by the legislature to change it." In State v. Clark, 9 Houst. 536, the Court charged the jury that: "A husband and wife may together commit a crime as well as either one alone they may combine together and commit a murder; if they are both engaged in this transaction, though the law regards them as one they are alike guilty," but then the Court goes on to say: "It is true that, if those two alone were concerned in the commission of an offense of this kind, then you could not convict, because it takes two to make a conspiracy-they being one in law; but it would be sufficient if there were other persons joined in it, though they were not known; then they might be convicted." This appears to us to be excessive refining. In Merrill v. Marshall, 113 Ill., App. 447, the action was for slander in charging that plaintiff "and her husband formed a conspiracy to cheat and defraud" a certain company, and therefore it was ruled that there was no imputation for which an action was maintainable, because the common law so far as applicable and of a general nature is the law of this state, and this has not been modified. At all events, it looks like enforcing a technical rule quite strictly to apply it in such a case. Whether the enabling acts and other statutes make inapplicable such a rule as we have been discussing, is a thing as to which we grow more dubious every day. But it is difficult to say we have advanced or are advancing to the point, where man and wife will stand in every way the same as regards the family relation. Not yet does it seem to be recognized that the man is displaced as the head of the family, nor do we think it will be the case, when not only as to property rights they are equal, but also as to general political rights. Where woman is declared to be a feme sole for certain purposes, the rule of construction is that of strictness and nothing to aid it is implied. The reasons we have cited still give us a glimpse of the old rule, as they impliedly admit that coercion by a husband might be less injurious than by a stranger. C. CORRESPONDENCE. RIGHT OF WOMEN TO SERVE AS JURORS. Sheboygan, Wis., March 20, 1920. Central Law Journal, St. Louis, Mo. Gentlemen: It is with great interest that I read the article in your issue of March 19th, having reference to the rights of women to be drawn for jury service and agree with all that is said. What, however, has not been touched is the fact that the jury to which all constitutions refer in the provisions for right of trial by jury has been decided to be the common law jury known at the time of the adoption of the United States Constitution, which is a jury of twelve men and whose verdict must be unanimous. It seems to me that no constitutional amendment giving the right to vote to women unless further amendments were adopted changing the constitution as to what kind of a jury such constitutions refer to could give the right to a Court to draw women for jury serv ice, anymore than any law could be constitutionally enacted to reduce the number of men on a jury or to provide for a verdict other than unanimous. American Digest, Annotated. Key Number Series, Volume 7A. Continuing the Century Digest and the first and second Decennial Digests. A Digest of all current decisions of all the American Courts, as reported in the National Reporter System, the Official Reports, and elsewhere, from January 1, 1919, to May 31, 1919; and digested in the Monthly Advance Sheets for February, 1919, to and including June, 1919 (Nos. 341-345). Prepared and edited by the Editorial Staff of the American Digest System. St. Paul. West Publishing Company. 1920. Review will follow. American Law of Charter Parties and Ocean Bills of Lading. By Wharton Poor, of the New York Bar. Albany, N. Y. Matthew Bender & Company. 1920. Price, $5.50. Review will fol low. HUMOR OF THE LAW. Joe Fountain of Bootjack, Mich., was willing to plead guilty in court to the charge of mak ing liquor, having a private still in his home. Prosecuting Attorney Lucas told the court that he tried to get a promise of reformation from Joe, a promise at least that he would refrain from drinking for the remainder of his life. "Not me," was Joe's answer. "It might go wet again." As Joe's infraction included only making a little spirit for his own use, he was released on payment of the costs.-Daily Mining Gazette. Some eons ago, in my youth's early hey-dey Succeed." "That man," I observed, "is a sevenfold wonder, He's learned all the tricks and the kinks in the game. A person so wise couldn't know how to blunder; By now he must be on the top peak of fame." But I found later on that the gifted old bloke Had died in the workhouse, disheartened and broke. Men thought that McCoyne was a whale, The people were startled to see That a dumb little dame in the chorus girl game Was named as his sole legatee! As long as a man is alive He can cling to the bubble called fame, His great reputation will thrive And people will honor his name. But nine out of every ten Their robes of distinction will shed, For folks find them out when their wills get about, A month or two after they're dead. When Jones was a king of finance His countrymen reverenced Jones; They thought that there wasn't a chance That he ever would pull any bones. But when they discovered his will His dollars were left-every oneTo a red-headed peach who began every speech "I'll say so," "I seen" or "I done." -Post-Dispatch. 1. Bankruptcy-Appeal and Error.-A decree of adjudication is a final decree, and, if unappealed from, is binding, not only on the bankrupt, but upon the petitioning creditors and all other creditors who became parties to the proceeding and interested in the estate, which is res in the hands of the Court.-In re Malkan, U. S. C. C. A., 261 Fed. 894. 2.- Constitutional Law.-Congress can constitutionally enact that a discharge in bankruptcy shall bar debts due to creditors residing out of the country, so far as future proceedings within the country are concerned.-Morency v. Landry, N. H., 108 Atl. 855. 3. Preference.-Where real estate was conveyed to a partnership, on its organization, by one of the partners, with the knowledge of his partner that he had previously given a mortgage thereon, the fact that through his failure to record his own deed the mortgage did not become eligible to registry, so as to become a lien, until within four months prior to the firm's bankruptcy, when it was recorded, in the absence of evidence that the firm was then in 5. Implied Warranty.-Where the books of a bank are shown to a prospective purchaser of bank stock, and nothing is said with reference to the correctness of the books, there is an implied warranty that the books are correct, but where there is an express refusal on the part of the seller to warrant the correctness of the books, there is no implied warranty.-Luten v. Earles, Wash., 187 Pac. 349. 6.- -Misapplication.-The issuing by an officer of a national bank, without consideration. of certificates of deposit which are afterward paid by the bank, constitutes a misapplication of its moneys. funds, and credits, within Rev. St. § 5209 (Comp. St. § 9772).-Matters v. U. S., U. S. C. C. A., 261 Fed. 826. 7. Bills and Notes-Acceptance.-Payment by bank of a check drawn on it includes acceptance. -National Bank of Commerce of Seattle v. Seattle Nat. Bank, Wash., 187 Pac. 342. 8.Drawee.-The drawer of a check undertakes that the drawee will be found at the place that he is described to be, and that the sum specified will there be paid to the holder when the check is presented, and he is bound to pay at the place named.-Raphael v. People's Bank of Benicia, Cal., 187 Pac. 53. 9. Postdated Check.-A postdated check may be transferred before the day it bears date with like effect as if transferred on the day of its date.-American Nat. Bank V. Wheeler, Cal., 187 Pac. 128. 10. Cancellation of Instruments-Inadequacy. -Where the inadequacy of consideration for an instrument affecting real estate is accompanied by other inequitable incidents and shows bad faith, such as concealment, misrepresentation, and undue advantage on part of the one obtaining the benefit, or the ignorance, weakness of mind, incapacity, pecuniary necessities, and the like on the part of the other, such circumstances, together with the inadequacy, will much more readily induce a Court to grant relief, defensive or affirmative.-Brink v. Canfield, Okla., 187 Pac. 223. 11. Carriers of Goods-Bill of Lading.-Person discounting draft attached to bill of lading requires special property in shipment.-Frontier Nat. Bank of Eastport v. Salinger, Ind., 126 N. E. 40. 12. Carriers of Passengers-Derailment.-A common carrier is responsible for defects in a rail causing derailment injuring a passenger which, even though not discoverable after the rail came into its possession, could have been discovered by the most careful and thorough examination during manufacture.-Morgan Southern Pacific Co., Cal., 187 Pac. 74. V. 13. Commerce-Telegram.-Where there was continuous transmission of a telegraph message from a place in Mississippi to a place in Texas, the message was interstate commerce.-Mackey Telegraph & Cable Co. v. Martin, Tex., 218 S. W. 133. 14. Compromise and Settlement-Amicable Adjustment-It is the policy of the law to encurage rather than discourage amicable adjustments of controversies, and while it frowns upon imposition | and fraud in the procurement thereof and will protect the victimized therefrom, it will not relieve from merely improvident settlements.Kessler v. Leinss, Wis., 176 N. W. 236. 15. Contracts Implication.-A duty may be imposed upon a party to a contract by necessary implication, and, when such implication is not external to the contract but gathered from it, it is as much a part of the contract as if set forth in express words.-Ambrosini v. N. Pelaggie & Co., Vt., 108 Atl. 916. 16.- -Intent.-Where a contract is ambiguous, the true intention of the parties, if it can be ascertained therefrom, prevails over verbal inaccuracies, inapt expressions, and the dry words of the stipulation.--Prowant v. Sealy, Okla., 187 Pac. 235. 17.- -Option.-Where, in a contract supported by a sufficient consideration, an option is given to one of the parties, the option is valid and enforceable, though there is no independent or specific consideration therefor.-Blaffer & Farish v. Gulf Pipe Line Co., Tex., 218 S. W. 89. 18. -Quantum Meruit.-Plaintiff suing on a special contract for compensation as a shorthand reporter, having set up such a contract and offered evidence thereof, could obtain no relief on a quantum meruit.-Reitler v. Olson, Colo., 187 Pac. 313. 19. Corporations — Apparent Authority. The president of an oil-producing company, with authority to superintend drilling operations upon certain property, did not have apparent authority to enter into brokerage contract on behalf of the corporation, engaging brokers to sell such property. Caddy Oil Co. v. Sommer, Ky., 218 S. W. 288. 20.- -Change of Name.-A change of corporate name does not make a new corporation, but only gives the corporation a new name.-W. T. Rawleigh Medical Co. v. Bunning, Neb., 176 N. W. 85. 21.- -Misuse of Franchise.-Misuse of a corporate franchise constitutes abuse of powers, justifying the application of Comp. Laws 1913, § 8004, for the annulment of corporate franchises for abuse of power, whenever the acts of misuse involve injury to the public, although the same acts may be a violation of a penal statute, as Pen. Code, c. 65.-State v. GambleRobinson Fruit Co., N. D., 176 N. W. 103. 22.- -Personal Act.-Authority of the president of a corporation to draw checks in the name of the corporation for his individual benefit cannot be presumed.-McCullam v. Mermod, Jaccard & King Jewelry Co., Mo., 218 S. W. 345. 23. Ratification.-Ratification by corporation of unauthorized contract made the contract that of the corporation from its inception.Union Oil Co. of California v. Pacific Surety Co., Cal., 187 Pac. 14. 24.- -Ultra Vires.-An "ultra vires" act is an act beyond the powers of the corporation.Houston v. Utah Lake Land, Water & Power Co., Utah, 187 Pac. 174. 25. Covenants-Building Restrictions.-That property subject to restrictive covenants has become more desirable or valuable for business than for residence purposes will not necessarily defat equitable relief, where the restriction, notwithstanding the change of conditions, is still of substantial advantage to the dominant property. -Strong v. Shalto, Cal., 187 Pac. 159. 26.- -Restriction Scheme.-Restrictive covenants inserted in deeds as part of a building scheme and expressly made binding on every lot in the tract for the benefit of every owner run with the land for the benefit of other lots in the tract.-Miles v. Hollingsworth, Cal., 187 Pac. 167. 27. Criminal Law-Bribery.-An attempt by defendant to bribe an adverse witness was evidence of guilt and might be so considered by the jury.-State v. Ettenburg, Minn., 176 N. W. 171. 28. Intrapping.-A person intrapped into the commission of a wrongful act, without any original criminal design upon his part and without any attempt to carry out a criminal purpose of his own conception, does not thereby become guilty of crime.-State v. Mantis, Idaho, 187 Pac. 268. 29. Withdrawal of Plea.-After sentence, courts may, in their discretion, permit pleas of guilty to be withdrawn, or refuse to allow such withdrawal, and, except where there has been an abuse of such discretion, the Supreme Court will not interfere.-Sandlovich v. State, Neb., 176 N. W. 81. 30. Damages-Mental Anguish.-Mental anguish of plaintiff farmer, injured in the middle of the harvest season, when defendant's automobile collided with his buggy, is one of the consequential results of the injury, which need not be specially pleaded under rule as to pleading special damages.-Freiburg v. Israel, Cal., 187 Pac. 130. 31.- -Minimizing.-The rule that an injured person must exercise reasonable precaution to keep down the damages does not require him to submit to an operation.-Gibbs v. Almstrom, Minn., 176 N. W. 173. 32. Dedication--Purpose of.-When land is taken or dedicated for use as a highway the taking or dedication should be presumed to be not merely for purposes and usages known and in vogue at the time, but also for all public purposes, present and prospective, known or unknown, consistent with the character of such highway, and not detrimental to abutting realty. Dakota Central Telephone Co. v. Spink County Power Co., S. D., 176 N. W. 143. 33. Divorce Acquiescence.--Where a husband whose wife had deserted him in 1912 filed and served upon her in 1913 a libel for divorce charging cruelty, he thereby acquiesced in the desertion, and cannot subsequently, on libel filed in 1918, secure divorce as for a three-year utter desertion under Public Laws 1885, c. 212, in the absence of a showing of restoration of continuity of desertion broken by such acquiescence.-Moody v. Moody, Me., 108 Atl. 849. 34.Alimony.-Alimony on decree for limited divorce need not be in gross.-Goldberg v. Goldberg, Ind., 126 N. E. 36. 35. -Desertion.-Desertion by one consort of the other can only be justified by showing such conduct on the part of the deserted party as would entitle the other to a divorce a mensa, and nothing short of this will justify a willful desertion or a continuance of it.-Towson v. Towson, Va., 102 S. E. 48. 36.- -Paramount Right.-The interest of a child of divorced parents is paramount to any right of his father to his custody.-Ladd v. Ladd, Iowa, 176 N. W. 211. 37. Public Interest.-Marriage is a relation in which the public is deeply interested, and it is subject to proper regulation and control by the state, and cannot be dissolved as an ordinary contract at the desire of the parties.Bounds v. Bounds, Md., 108 Atl. 870. 38. Easements-Private Way.-Open, continuous, and notorious use by an owner of land of a private way over another's adjoining tract, known, acquiesced in, and unprotested by the latter, is presumptively adverse to him, and enjoyed under a bona fide claim of right.-Roberts v. Ward, W. Va., 102 S. E. 96. 39. Eminent Domain-Incidental Inconvenience. The mere incidental inconvenience to an abutting property owner from the construction of a railroad along a public highway, or a consequential injury or a remote injury such as that suffered by the community in general, is not an element of damages for the jury in a |