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1. Bankruptcy-Secured Debt.-The lien on all property of judgment debtor in the county, which Code Civ. Proc. Cal. § 674, provides that filing of transcript of judgment gives, is enough to make the judgment creditor a "secured creditor," within Bankruptcy Act.-Oilfields Syndicate v. American Improvement Co., U. S. C. C. A., 260 Fed. 905.

2. Bills and Notes-Burden of Proof.-Where there was evidence to show that notes sued on were obtained by fraud, plaintiff, a subsequent holder, has the burden of proving that it was a bona fide holder for value.-Mechanics' Saving Bank v. Feeney, N. H., 108 Atl. 295.

3. Consideration. The postponement of the obligation on a note to a future date is a new consideration moving to the maker and operates as a present consideration for execution of a new note by him.-Katz v. Judd, Wash., 185 Pac. 613.

4. Innocent Holder. If the transaction in which a note originated were tainted with illegality in that it involved the holding of a lottery by the maker of the note to dispose of the property for which he gave it to the payee, the fact would not prevent recovery on the note by an innocent holder for value.-Whitman V. Fournier, Mass., 125 N. E. 303.

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8.

Burglary-Occupancy.-It is not necessary that there should be someone actually living in the house in order to constitute "occupancy." -Carneal v. State, Texas, 216 S. W. 626.

9. Chattel Mortgages—Shifting Stock. Where a chattel mortgage is given upon a shifting stock of merchandise, the mortgage should identify the chattels with such particularity that they can be determined without difficulty and uncertainty.-Miller v. Scarbrough, Wash., 185 Pac. 625.

10. Waiver of Lien. An attachment of mortgaged chattels, in a suit to enforce the mortgage debt, is a waiver of the lien.-M. Steinert & Sons Co. v. Reed, Me., 108 Atl. 334.

11. Contracts-Impossibility of Performance. -A contract, valid in its inception, may become voidable or impossible of performance by the failure of a subsequent contingency; but, if the contingency is one which may happen, the parties are bound by their contract until it can be determined it cannot be enforced.-Nannizzi v. Caprile, Cal., 185 Pac. 673.

12. Modification of Parol.-A written agreement may be modified by a subsequent parol contract, notwithstanding the general rule embodied in L. O. L. § 713.-Propst v. William Hanley Co., Ore., 185 Pac. 766.

13. Ratification.-There can be no ratification of a contract, where the one who has the power of ratification is ignorant of the facts, and in such case the doctrine of constructive knowledge has no application.-Berkshire v. Holcker, Mo., 216 S. W. 556.

14. Rescission.-Rescission of an executed contract for fraud will not be denied because plaintiff cannot place defendant in statu quo, if equity can still be done between the parties. -Spencer v. Deems, Cal., 185 Pac. 671.

15. Restraint of Trade.-A contract not to re-engage in a certain business is enforceable, providing the restraint of trade involved is reasonable and not so extensive as to affect the public interest.-Keen v. Ross, Ky., 216 S. W. 605.

16. Corporations-Joint and Several Liability. -If a stockholder was defrauded in the sale of stock to him by the president of the company acting as its selling agent for commission, the president and the company were both jointly and severally liable to him.-Denis v. Nu-way Puncture Cure Co., Wis., 175 N. W. 95.

17. Repurchase of Stock-Where defendant seller of corporate stock unqualifiedly re

fused to repurchase it pursuant to an alleged agreement, plaintiff buyer was not required to tender the stock certificate before bringing suit. -Vrba v. Krall, Iowa, 175 N. W. 4.

18. Criminal Law-Accomplice.-The testimony of an accomplice is legal testimony, and a conviction may be founded upon it alone and sustained; but such evidence is open to grave suspicion, and should be acted on with the utmost caution.-People v. Pattin, Ill., 125 N. E. 248.

19. Irresistible Impulse.-The doctrine that a criminal act may be excused or mitigated upon the notion of an irresistible impulse to commit it, where the offender had the mental capacity to appreciate his legal and moral duty In respect to it, has no place in the law.-State v. Carrigan, N. J., 108 Atl. 315.

20. Part of Conversation.-Generally, when a part of a conversation is called out by one party, the other party has the right to all of such conversation.-People v. Baker, Ill., 125 N. E. 263.

21. Voluntary Intoxication.—Mental unsoundness, produced by voluntary intoxication, even where it is so pronounced as to exhibit entire prostration of the faculties of defendant, is no defense against a criminal charge of atrocious assault and battery.-State v. Marriner, N. J., 108 Atl. 306.

22.

Customs and Usages-Implied Reference to. Where defendant claimed that a contract of reinsurance was affected by custom, the custom must be clearly established, or shown to have been reasonable, definite, and uniform, before it will be presumed that the parties referred to it in making the contract.-American Guaranty Co. v. American Fidelity Co., U. S. C. C. A., 260 Fed. 897.

23. Death-Eye Witnesses.-One killed in an accident occurring in the absence of witnesses is presumed to have exercised reasonable care for his own safety.-Stukas v. Warfield, Pratt, Howell Co., Iowa, 175 N. W. 81.

24. Dedication-Plats.-Deed referring to a plan of platted lots and streets conveyed by one of the delineated streets carried to the public an incipient dedication of the streets.-Harris v. City of South Portland, Me., 108 Atl. 326.

25. Deeds-Repugnancy.-When a deed contains a general description, followed by a particular description of the premises granted, the latter will control the former.-John L. Roper Lumber Co. v. Hinton, U. S. D. C., 260 Fed. 996. 26. Repugnancy.-If there is a repugnancy between the granting clause of a deed and the habendum, the former will control the latter so as not to defeat the grant.-Jackson v. Lady, Ark., 216 S. W. 505.

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27. Fraud-Misrepresentation.-The resentation to a vendee by the agent of the vendor, or by the vendor himself, of the cost to the vendor of land, made to induc the vendee to purchase, is a misrepresentation of a material fact, which, if relied upon by the vendee, to his damage, constitutes actionable fraud.-Wine v. U. S., U. S. C. C. A., 260 Fed. 911.

28. Fraudulent Conveyances-Fraud in Law. -A debtor's transfer of property to his wife without consideration, thereby placing all of his

property subject to be taken by creditors beyond their reach, amounts to a fraud in law; the intent of the wife in accepting the transfer being immaterial.-Lowell-Woodward Hardware Co.

v. Davis, Kansas, 185 Pac. 732.

29. Voluntary.-Conveyances without consideration and to protect the property, made by a judgment debtor to his wife, before creation of debt and rendition of judgment, and, after judgment, by the debtor and his wife to the debtor's brother, who reconveyed to the debtor as trustee for his daughter, were fraudulent and void, under Ky. St. § 1906, as to the debtor's creditors, past, present, and prospective.-Ball v. Brown-Ross Shoe Co., Ky., 216 S. W. 612. to Freehold.—A

30.

Fixtures-Annexation chattel does not become a fixture unless physically or constructively annexed to the freehold. -Hanson v. Voss, Minn., 175 N. W. 113.

31. Eminent Domain-Additional Burden.Where, by the construction of its telegraph line on a railroad right of way, defendant imposed an additional burden on the fee, the owner of the fee, which was subject to the easement of the railroad, is entitled to compensation for the additional burden.-Query v. Postal TelegraphCable Co., N. C., 101 S. E. 390.

32. Petition for Condemnation.-Petition filed by a city to condemn land, alleging that it is to be used to widen a certain street, which, when widened, will be used as a public street, and that it is necessary therefor, sufficiently alleges the public character of the use and the necessity therefor.-City of Huntington v. Frederick Holding Co., W. Va., 101 S. E. 461.

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34.

Guaranty-Presumption.-In every doubtful case, the presumption is against a continuing guaranty.-National Surety Co. v. Campbell, Wash., 185 Pac. 602.

35. Release of Guarantor.-A guarantor of payment of a note is not released by mere failure to protest or give notice of nonpayment of the same. Citizens' State Bank of Mt. Vernon v. Hendrix, Iowa, 175 N. W. 17.

36. Highways-Equal Rights in.—An automobile driver and motorcyclist have equal rights to lawfully use public highways, and each may assume the other will exercise ordinary care, and not carelessly expose to danger or negligently injure the other.-Lemmon v. Broadwater, Del., 108 Atl. 273.

37. Homestead-Conveyance of.-A homestead of a husband and wife cannot be conveyed except by a written instrument jointly executed by both.-Robison v. Robison, Iowa, 175 N. W.

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attempting to escape, maliciously kills or fatally wounds the officer, the homicide is murder.— State v. Weisengoff, W. Va., 101 S. E. 450.

40. Husband and Wife-Agency.-The relation of agency between husband and wife is governed by the same rules which apply to other agencies.-Milhollin v. Milhollin, Ind., 125 N. E. 217.

41. Community Property.-Separate property, acquired in a state where community property is unknown, does not become community property, but remains separate property when transported into a community property state.-Bosma v. Harder, Ore., 185 Pac. 741.

42. Entireties.-When a husband and wife take an estate by the entirety they hold, not as separate individuals and by moieties, but as one person, each holding the whole of it, and on the death of either the entire estate belongs to the survivor.-Lomax v. Cramer, Mo., 216 S. W. 575.

43. Separate Maintenance.-The wife may maintain an action for separate maintenance and support without asking for divorce.-Shipley v. Shipley, Iowa, 175 N. W. 51.

44. Indians Spoliation. As the United States, as guardian of the Indians, has the duty to protect them from spoliation, and therefore right to prevent them being illegally deprived by excessive taxation of the rights conferred by Act June 28, 1906, as to distribution of lands of the Osage Indians, officers of the United States can invoke relief for the accomplishment of that purpose.-U. S. v. Board of Com'rs of Osage County, Okla., U. S. S. C., 40 S. E. 100. 45. Injunction-Multiplicity of Suits.-Equity will grant an injunction to prevent a multiplicity of suits; the question of whether, in a particular case, equity will assume jurisdiction, depending, if case is not covered by a controlling precedent, upon the merits of the particular case, the real and substantial convenience of all parties, the adequacy of the legal remedy, the situations of the parties, the points to be contested, and the result to follow as to whether the interests of any of the parties will be unreasonably overlooked or obstructed.-Houston Heights Water & Light Ass'n v. Gerlach, Texas, 216 S. W. 634.

46. Trade Secrets.-The law recognizes a property right in trade secrets and confidences, and a court of equity, when its jurisdiction is properly invoked, may enjoin one in whom a confidence has been reposed from divulging them to third persons or from himself taking advantage of them to owner's injury, and obligation not to divulge exists in case of an employe, in the absence of contrary stipulation.Morrison v. Woodbury, Kan., 185 Pac. 735.

47. Insurance Constitution and By-Laws.The laws of a benefit association are binding upon all its members, and all are conclusively presumed to know them.-Miller v. Supreme Tent of Knights of Maccabees of the World, Wash., 185 Pac. 593.

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nor preclude a party from availing himself of them.-Seastrand v. D. A. Foley & Co., Minn., 175 N. W. 117.

50.-Default.-A judgment by default, or by consent, or one rendered in action in which usury was not in fact pleaded or put in issue as a defense, does not bar the judgment debtor from thereafter setting up the defense of usury against the judgment, when it is sought to be enforced in a court of equity.-Ruckdeschall v. Seibel, Va., 101 S. E. 425.

51. Reopening.-The court has jurisdiction to reopen a judgment during the term in which rendered and hear further testimony.-Kretchmer v. Kretchmer, Iowa, 175 N. W. 8.

52. Larceny-False Pretenses.-The distinction between larceny and false pretenses is that in larceny the owner of a thing has no intention to part with his property to the person taking it, although he may intend to part with possession, while in false pretenses the owner does intend to part with the property, but it is obtained from him by fraud.-People v. Shwartz, Cal., 185 Pac. 686.

53.

-Hope of Gain.-In prosecution for the larceny of a steer, proof that defendant gave away the beef after he had killed the steer was sufficient evidence of casus lucri, even if that were an essential element of crime of larceny in Florida.-Adams v. State, Fla., 83 So. 271.

54. Ownership.-Owner of a farm, on which corn stolen was raised by a tenant on shares, had such ownership in the corn, although undivided, as would support an indictment for larceny of the corn.-State v. Taylor, Del., 108 Atl. 280.

55. Libel and Slander-Printed Defamation. -Printed defamation is more potent than spoken, because more permanent.-Stanley v. Prince, Me., 108 Atl. 328.

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56. Limitation of Actions - Discovery Fraud. An action for fraudulently misrepresenting the value of land sold is not barred if brought within three years, after plaintiff's discovery of the fraud, provided he acted prudently.-Morrison v. Hartley, N. C., 101 S. E. 375.

57. Tolling Statute.-When the statute of limitations starts to run during the lifetime of an ancestor, it does not stop as against an heir, even though the heir is under disability at the death of the former, and at the time of descent cast.-White v. Scott, N. C., 101 S. E. 369.

58. Marriage Illicit Cohabitation.-Cohabitation, illicit in its inception, will be presumed to continue so.-Illinois Steel Co. v. Iudustrial Commission, Ill., 125 N. E. 252.

59. Slaves.-Where a negress was married while a slave, but continued to live with her husband after emancipation, the marriage became legal.-Wiley v. Stewart, La., 83 So. 260.

60. Master and Servant-Dependency.-That a deceased minor servant gave his wages to his father, in aid of him and his children, constituted the father an actual "dependent" within the Workmen's Compensation Act.-Colucci v. Edison Portland Cement Co., N. J., 108 Atl. 313.

61. Earning Capacity. The Workmen's Compensation Act does not give compensation for loss of a member, but for the loss of earning capacity actually caused by the loss of the limb. Centlivre Beverage Co. v. Ross, Ind., 125 N. E. 220.

62.- -Principal's Direction.-If the danger of carrying a tie to top of a steep and slippery embankment with insufficient help was not such as to threaten immediate injury, and the servant by reason of his foreman's order was led to believe that he could carry his part by the use of care, and he proceeded to do the work with the exercise of care, he is not barred from recovering.-Tull v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., Mo., 216 S. W. 572.

63. Scope of Employment.-A master is responsible for the torts of his servant only when they are committed within the scope of the employment.-Figone v. Guisti, Cal., 185 Pac. 694. 64. Wrongful Discharge.-One employed to render personal service to another for a specific term is entitled to recover damages for the breach of his contract if he is discharged, without sufficient cause, before the expiration of

the term.-Davis v. Laurel River Lumber Co., W. Va., 101 S. E. 447.

65. Wrongful Discharge.-A corporation's buyer and manager, employed by contract under seal at a salary of $100 per week, terminable on six months' notice, and wrongfully discharged without notice, could not maintain actions of debt to recover weekly instalments of salary for the six months' period for which his contract entitled him to notice; the damages being unliquidated, as capable of reduction by whatever might have been earned in other employments. Ögden-Howard Co. v. Brand, Del., 108 Atl. 277.

66. Malicious Prosecution-Bad Character.In an action for malicious prosecution, proof of the general bad character of the plaintiff is admissible on the measure of damages, where damages for mortification and disgrace are sought; but the reputation sought to be shown must be bad in the same respect in which his reputation was, or otherwise would have been injured by the malicious prosecution.-Boyers v. Lindhorst, Mo., 216 S. W. 536.

67. Burden of Proof. To maintain an action for malicious prosecution, one must show that the prosecution has ended in his favor. McLaughlin v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., N. J., 108 Atl. 309.

68. Mechanics' Liens-Subcontractor.-A subcontractor on a building which has perfected its lien for work, labor, and material furnished, tractor's assignment to a bank of funds or the greater part before the date of the conpayments due, has a prior and superior right to payment from such funds over that of the bank. -Neil & Co. v. Sedlachek, Wis., 175 N. W. 89 69. Mines and Minerals-Partnership.-A partnership to secure a block of oil and gas leases, and to drill a test well to develop field and enable partnership to dispose of the leases, in pursuance of which one test well was drilled, producing but small amount of gas, held a general and not a mining partnership.-Snider v. Davidson, Kan., 185 Pac. 724.

70. Mortgages-Deed Absolute.-A deed absolute upon its face may be shown by parol evidence to have been intended as a mortgage, without alleging fraud, accident, or mistake.Sutton v. Hardison, Ky., 216 S. W. 609.

71. Rents.-Where mortgage does not expressly pledge rents, etc., of mortgaged premises as further security, the rents accrued prior to appointment of a receiver in a foreclosure proceeding on application of second mortgagee belong to mortgagor or the owner of the fee.Stewart v. Fairchild-Baldwin Co., N. J., 108 Atl. 301.

72. Municipal Corporations - Governmental Power. Though neither counties nor the state nor its governmental agencies can be sued in tort, one whose personal porperty has been wrongfully taken, damaged, or converted to the county's use may waive the tort and sue upon an implied contract to pay for such property.Nelson County v. Coleman, Va., 101 S. E. 413. 73. Negligence-Performance of Duty.—Any liability for negligence must rest upon the existence of a duty, which must arise out of a relation between the parties, and a negligent failure to perform the duty.-Mercer v. Meinel, Ill., 125 N. E. 288.

74. Patents Description of Elements. Where the language of a claim includes elements described in general terms, the court may look to the specification for the purpose of construing the language and ascertaining its meaning. I. T. S. Rubber Co. v. Panther Rubber Mfg. Co., U. S. C. C. A., 260 Fed. 934.

75.-Novelty.-The Bone patent, No. 705,732, for a retaining wall of reinforced concrete, with a heel such that the weight of the earth thereon tends to keep the wall erect, held, under Rev. St. § 4868, in view of prior patents and description of the device in foreign printed publications, to contain no patentable novelty, except, perhaps, in its special form, and in that respect not infringed.-Bone v. Commissioners of Marion County, U. S. S. C., 40 Sup. Ct. 96.

76. Utility. That a patented process for manufacturing steel was used, and that a large manufacturer, through its officers, having the fullest knowledge of the science and art and having at their command the best experts, paid

a large sum for infringement and right to use, is strong evidence of utility.-Chruchward International Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., U. S. C. C. A., 260 Fed. 962.

77. Principal and Agent-Scope of Agency.— An act which an agent is not expressly authorized to do may bind his principal if it is necessary to enable him to effectuate the purpose for which the agency is established.-Davison v. Parks, N. H., 108 Atl. 288.

78. Principal and Surety-Release of Surety. -Where money is used by the owner to liquidate demands for which if unliquidated he would be liable, the contractor's surety is not released on its bond, even though the stipulated percentage of amounts due are not withheld by the owner as security.-Harvey v. George, Mich., 175 N. W. 140.

79. Railroads -Contributory Negligence.-A motorman's act in driving an electric car through a dense fog at such a speed that he could not stop within the range of his vision, with knowledge that freight cars of another company might be on the track, held to constitute contributory negligence precluding recovery for damages to the car by a collision.— North Coast Power Co. v. Cowlitz, C. & C. Ry., Wash., 185 Pac. 615.

80. Trespasser.-A railroad owes no duty to a trespasser on its track, except not to wilfully or wantonly injure him after discovering his presence there.-Hubbard v. Southern Ry. Co., Miss., 83 So. 247.

81. Reformation of Instruments-Conformity to Oral Agreement.-The basic principle upon which reformation of a written instrument is allowed is that the writing does not express the prior oral agreement upon which it is founded.-Heard v. Nancolas, Iowa, 175 N. W.

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82. Robbery-Force and Intimidation.-"Robbery" is the felonious and violent taking of money, goods, or other valuable things from the possession of another by force or intimidation, and is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary not less than one and not more than fourteen years.-People v. Jones, Ill., 125 N. E. 256.

83. delivery of personal property at the place agreed on or designated by the buyer is a completed delivery. Fiske v. H. E. Dunbar & Co., Me., 108 Atl. 324.

Sales-Delivery.-Generally,

84. Misrepresentation.-If representations inducing a sale were material and false, and the maker knew or should have known that they were false, or made them recklessly without knowledge, and the injured party relied on them as true without present means of knowledge of their falsity, and suffered damage, he was defrauded in the legal sense.-Denis v. Nu-Way Puncture Cure Co., Wis., 175 N. W. 95.

85. Offer and Acceptance.-For a contract of purchase to become effective when entered into by mail, the offer to sell must be accepted by buyer unequivocally, unconditionally, and without any variance.-Dunn v. Freeman, Ga., 101 S. E. 393.

86. Street Railroads-One-Man Car.-An orIdinance requiring every street car to be operated by a conductor and motorman, subject to penalty for violation, is presumed a lawful exercise of the police powers for public safety, and, notwithstanding a contested claim of safety of a one-man car, cannot be held unconstitutional, in the absence of a shownig of a clear case of arbitrary conduct on the part of the local authorities. Sullivan v. City of Shreveport, U. S. S. C., 40 Sup. Ct. 102. 87. Wills Attestation. Where attesting witnesses signed after attorney who had drawn will had stated in testator's presence and hearing that testator wished them to attest will, and after testator had himself signed will, there was a publicaion of will, there having been, in effect, a declaration by testator that it was his last will.-Lohmann v. Lohmann, Mo., 216 S. W. 518.

88.-Laches.-An attack on the validity of a will disposing of testator's entire estate comes too late when made nearly 13 years after his death.-Gerke v. Citizens' State Bank of Spencerville, Ind., 125 N. E. 238.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., FEBRUARY 27, 1920

RIGHT OF PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY TO
BE RELEASED FROM SERVICE CON-
TRACTS, NOTWITHSTANDING SPE-
CIFIC GRANT BY LEGISLATURE TO
MAKE THEM AND LACK OF MUTU-
ALITY.

The United States Supreme Court recently held that, under the laws of Ohio, ordinances of the City of Columbus granting to a street railway a franchise for the term of twenty-five years, providing that the railway shall charge a certain rate for fares and grant universal transfers, must be complied with by the railway, notwithstanding increased operating expenses, because the State Legislature vested in the City of Columbus the right to make an irrevocable contract with such railway. Columbus Ry., P. & L. Co. v. City of Columbus, 249 U. S. 399, 39 Sup. Ct. 349.

exercise such police power, but has authority to use it again and again, as often as the public interests require."

Neither in the City of Columbus case nor in Cleveland v. Cleveland City Ry. Co., 194 U. S. 517, cited by the Columbus case. was allusion made to successive legislative bodies, but the rulings of Ohio State Courts were followed in declaring that the power to make irrevocable contracts fixing rates had been unmistakably vested in cities of that state regarding, at least, street railways as public utilities.

It is also pointed out by the Illinois Court, in the Quincy case, supra, that in the City of Columbus case: "The Federal Supreme Court specifically stated that there was no showing that the contract had become im possible of performance, nor were facts. established in the record proving that, taking the whole term of the franchise together, the contract would necessarily be unprofitable or unremunerative to the public utility corporation, while in this case i. is conceded the record shows that the railway company must charge and collect fares in excess of those prescribed in said ordinance in order to meet operating expenses."

Lately the Supreme Court of Illinois held, that there was no inability under the contract clause of the federal Constitution, against a public utility having the right to have its rates readjusted so as to furnish adequate compensation, notwithstanding at term contract with a city of that state. State Pub. U. Comm. v. City of Quincy, performance, nor that there is a lack of

125 N. E. 374.

These two cases may not be in necessary conflict, because the Supreme Court proceeded upon the theory that it was by express power given to the Ohio city that there was a surrender by the state of its sovereignty over the subject. In the Illinois Court it was said there was no such surrender, under Illinois law.

But the Illinois Supreme Court went further and said: "It has long been a principle of constitutional law that in matters relating to the police power, each successive legislature is of equal authority, and a legislative body cannot part with its right to

While it seems to us that the distinction drawn by the Illinois Court does not meet what is said by U. S. Supreme Court, because this does not show impossibility of

proper remuneration under the ordinance "taking the whole term of the franchise together," yet we undertake to say that the Illinois Court was right and U. S. Supreme Court was in error.

It is said in Collier on Public Service Companies, § 117, that in Munn v. Illinois. 94 U. S. 113, it had been declared that "power to regulate is not a power to destroy," and this regulation must "stop on the hither side of the unnecessary and uncompensated taking or destruction of any private property" devoted to public use (Reagan v. F. L. & T. Co., 154 U. S. 1. c. 399), and what such a "company is entitled.

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