swinging it he brought it in contact with the defendant's trolley wire, which ran beneath the structure. The side of the bridge was protected by a parapet eighteen inches wide. Four feet 7 inches below the top of the parapet the trolley wire was strung. The plaintiff was shocked and burned when the wires came together. He had a verdict at Trial Term, which has been affirmed at the Appellate Division by a divided court.

We think the verdict cannot stand. The defendant in using an overhead trolley was in the lawful exercise of its franchise. Negligence, therefore, cannot be imputed to it becaused it used that system and not another. Dumphy v. Montreal, etc., Co., 1907 A. C. 454. There was, of course, a duty to adopt all reasonable precautions to minimize the resulting perils. We think there is no evidence that this duty was ignored. The trolley wire was so placed that no one standing on the bridge or even bending over the parapet could reach it. Only some extraordinary casualty, not fairly within the area of ordinary prevision, could make it a thing of danger. Reasonable care in the use of a destructive agency imports a high degree of vigilance. Nelson v. Branford L. & W. Co., 75 Conn. 548, 551, 54 Atl. 303; Braun v. Buffalo Gen. El. Co., 200 N. Y. 484, 94 N. E. 206, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1,089, 140 Am. St. Rep. 645, 21 Ann. Cas. 370. But no vigilance, however alert, unless fortified by the gift of prophecy, could have predicted the point upon the route where such an accident would occur. It might with equal reason have been expected anywhere else. At any point upon the route a mischievous or thoughtless boy might touch the wire with a metal pole, or fling another wire across it. Green v. W. P. Co., 246 Pa. 340, 92 Atl. 341, L. R. A. 1915C 151. If unable to reach it from the walk, he might stand upon a wagon or climb upon a tree. No special danger at this bridge warned the defendant that there was need of special measures of precaution. No like accident had occurred before. No custom had been disregarded We think that ordinary precaution did not involve forethought of this extraordinary peril. It has been so ruled in like circumstances by courts in other jurisdictions. Green v. W. P. Co., supra; Vannatta v. Lancaster Co., 164 Wis. 344, 159 N. W. 940; Parker v. Charlotte R. R. Co., 169 N. C. 68, 85 S. E. 33; Kempf v. S. R. Co., 82 Wash. 263, 144 Pac. 77, L. R. A. 1915C 405; Sheffield Co. v. Morton, 161 Ala. 153, 49 So. 772. Nothing to the contrary was held in Braun v. Buffalo Gen. El. Co., 200 N. Y. 484, 94 N. E. 206, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1,089, 140 Am. St. Rep. 645, 21 Ann. Cas.

370, or Wittleder v. Citizens Electric Ill. Co., 47 App. Div. 410, 62 N. Y. Supp. 297. In those cases the accidents were well within the range of prudent foresight. Braun v. Buffalo Gen. El. Co., supra, 200 N. Y. at page 494, 94 N. E. 206, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1,089, 140 Am. St. Rep. 645, 21 Ann. Cas. 370. That was also the basis of the ruling in Nelson v. Branford Lighting & Water Co., 75 Conn. 548, 551, 54 Atl. 303. There is, we may add, a distinction not to be ignored between electric light and trolley wires. The distinction is that the former may be insulated. Chance of harm, though remote, may betoken negligence, if needless. Facility of protection may impose a duty to protect. With trolley wires the case is different. Insulation is impossible. Guards here and there are of little value. To avert the possibility of this accident and others like it at one point or another on the route, the defendant must have abandoned the overhead system and put the wires underground. Neither its power nor its duty to make the change is shown. To hold it liable upon the facts exhibited in this record would be to charge it as an insurer.

The judgment should be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event. HISCOCK, C. J., and CHASE, COLLIN, HOGAN, CRANE and ANDREWS, JJ., concur. Judgment reversed, etc.

NOTE-Extraordinary Peril to Children from Dangerous Agency.-Let it be conceded, that, in the case of a dangerous agency like electricity extraordinary precautions should be taken to guard against injury therefrom, yet in so far as injury to a third party is concerned on the premises of one maintaining it, must precaution be taken against all possible injury?

Take the instant case and was vigilance required of such an extreme quality as to bring within compass of foresight such an occurrence as happened? There seems to have been no claim that the trolley wire was closer to the bridge than it should have been, or that wherever placed it would interfere with any use of as happened? There seems to have been the "short cut beween streets." There was evidently no thought that it operated as a lure to children. Indeed, it does not appear that as a lure it operated at all.

The case of Green v. W. P. Co., 246 Pa. 340, 92 Atl. 341, L. R. A. 1915C, 151, is a very instructive case on the line of duty to guard against every possibility of injury. The injury in that case arose from a wire two other boys had found in the street and thrown it over a trolley wire. The latter told the first boy he could have the wire. He went to the place, took hold of the wire and was burned. The court said: "To have held defendant responsible for the injury on the ground that it should have anticipated such consequence *** would be to substitute for injury within reasonable anticipation any possible injury which might result." Then alluding to the duty of

the company to observe "the highest care practicable to avoid injury" to a third person, it says it was "under no obligation to so safeguard its lines that by no possibility can injury result therefrom."

In Harris v. Ry. & Light Co., 152 Wis. 627, 140 N. W. 288, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1058, the accident arose from a bucket insecurely fastened on a light tower falling and injuring a by-stander on a public street. The court held to liability, but it was said among other things that a device could have been used, even though the bucket was insecurely fastened, which would have insured safety for others, and there was attractiveness to children in the lifting and lowering of the bucket.

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In Meyer v. U. L. H. & P. Co., 151 Ky. 332, 151 S. W. 941, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 136, an electric company left high tension wires improperly insulated near the ground, but inside a walled churchyard. A boy in attempting to recover his ball from the yard at a place where the wall was so high as not easily to be scaled, stumbled against the wire. The boy from an adjoining playground, but the company did not know of the habit in going to the churchyard. This case is much stronger than the instant or the Green case, but the court, going into an extensive review of the cases held there was no liability. The court said: "The cases announcing a contrary doctrine do it upon the idea that the dangerous instrument is attractive and inviting to children, and that the owner thereof, for these reasons, might have reason to anticipate that children would congregate about the place where the thing is located and receive injuries. That rule cannot be applied in the case at bar, as there was nothing attractive about the place where the boy was injured. He went there for the purpose only of securing his ball. The inclosure was simply a small yard by the side of the church building and was inclosed and without any doors, gates or other openings to permit ingress." It seems to us that a ball from an adjoining playground might more surely be anticipated to fall within the inclosure than might have been foreseen the result in either the instant or the Green cases, yet Kentucky sustained instruction for defendant and the case was affirmed.

In Graves v. Water Power Co., 44 Wash. 675, • 87 Pac. 956, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 452, a boy who had climbed up a bridge pier there came in contact with an electric wire. He climbed there to look a for a pigeon's nest. The court in denying recovery, said: "The things that constituted the attraction, which, it is claimed, drew him to this place, were features connected with the river. The bridge and the pigeons were matters for the existence of which appellant was not responsible." This case reasons out the matter quite closely against recovery by the boy.

But another case from Kentucky, seems more apposite. Mayfield W. & L. Co. v. Webb, 129 Ky. 395, 111 S. W. 712, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 179, 130 Am. St. Rep. 469. In this case a little boy was killed by coming in contact with an electric wire on poles 18 feet above the ground. He reached this wire by climbing up the guy wires and the pole. The court thought the company could not be held to have anticipated a child would take such pains to reach a wire that happened to be uninsulated.

In Brown v. Panola L. & P. Co., 137 Ga. 352. 73 S. E. 580, an uninsulated electric wire passed

over a sweet gum tree, which children visited for the gum. A boy, 13 years of age, climbed this tree, notwithstanding he had been warned of the dangerous character of the wires. The practice of visiting the tree was unknown to the company. No liability. To have held otherwise would put an electric company to an extraordinary vigilance, it seems to us.

In Wetherby v. Twin State G. & E. Co.,

Vt. -, 75 Atl. 8, 25 L. R. A. (N. S:) 1220, the court by way of summary, says: "The courts cannot make electric companies insurers of the safety of children, more than of others, nor require of such companies, in the circumstances of their business, a degree of care, prudence and foresight beyond that which is given to careful and prudent men to have and exercise in such or like circumstances."

It is hard to restrain children or to anticipate any and every kind of danger to which they may subject themselves, but when an injury occurs, which can only be anticipated as extraordinary and which in the usual case of property, and especially of a property devoted to public use, then the right to carry on business ought not to be hedged about or made to expend unusual sums of money to provide against the occurrence of injury. In these days of regulation of public utilities by commissions, its approval of the manner of its use ought to carry some presumption C. of the sufficiency of that manner.

HUMOR OF THE LAW.

Even romantic marriages have their drawbacks, as revealed in a story told by H. M. Acker, a North Dakota power in politics. He relates that a man named Green suddenly confronted an acquaintance whom he had not seen for many years and who informed him he had been married ten years.

"Took place in church, I suppose, with bridesmaids, flowers, etc.?"

"No," replied the acquaintance, "it was an elopement."

"Did the girl's father follow you?" "Yes, and he has been with us ever since."

One Sunday evening the pastor of a rural church in New Jersey, Gov. James F. Fielder of that state related, selected Hades as the text for his discourse. As he expounded and applied the subject an absent-minded man in the congregation, toying with a well-filled match safe in his pocket, ignited the contents. The sulphur fumes reached a pious woman in the seat just ahead.

"It is wonderful, Mary," she whispered to her companion, "simply wonderful! I have heard Brother White preach many a sermon, but none so realistic as this."

1.

16, 34, 39 ..3, 23 .13

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Posses

Adverse Possession-Continuous sion. The continuity of possession of land by owner's grandchildren, claiming under an alleged contract between their father and owner, was broken by the eviction, by owner, of the grandchild in possession, where it was from one to three years before one of the grandchildren again located on the land.-Creech v. Creech, Ky., 216 S. W. 127.

2. Dedication of Way.-Where a toll road was constructed under authority of statute, and the right to take tolls was granted to a private or semiprivate corporation, the road, when established, became a public road, and, when a dedication of the right-of-way was accepted, the rights of the public therein became fixed, and no title to any part thereof could be acquired by adverse possession.-Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Lowman, Va., 101 S. E. 326.

3.

Bankruptcy-Discharge. Discharge will not be denied bankrupt druggist, under Bankruptcy Act, § 14b (3), being Comp. St., § 9598, on the ground he "obtained property on credit upon a materially false statement in writing, made by him" to representative of wholesale drug company "for the purpose of obtaining credit" from such company, where the written statement of assets and liabilities prepared by the bankrupt for such representative, although failing to show bankrupt's indebtedness to members of his family, did not on its face purport

to include all his indebtedness or to state that no other indebtedness was subsisting.-In re Rammage, U. S. D. C., 260 Fed. 893.

4. Banks and Banking-Depositor.-Where one accidentally or by mistake sends checks or money for deposit to a bank with which he had never opened an account, and there is no agreement between him and bank creating relation of depositor and banker, and bank fails to pay his checks thereon, he has no action against bank for damages, as to create such relationship the minds of the parties must meet, and without this the bank is not bound to honor checks signed by the person making such a deposit.-Rimes & Stubbs v. National Bank of Savannah, Ga., 101 S. E. 315.

5. Forgery.-A bank, having paid a check with a forged indorsement, cannot charge the amount against its depositor, unless it shows a right to do so on the doctrine of estoppel or because of some negligence chargeable to the depositor.-Pannonia Building & Loan Ass'n v. West Side Trust Co. of Newark, N. J., 108 Atl. 240.

6. Bills and Notes-Attorney Fee.-Indorsee, suing indorser on note providing for payment of "attorney's fee" "in case suit is brought," could not recover attorney's fee and costs of prior unsuccessful suit against maker, since note confines recovery to a "suit," meaning one suit, and to an "attorney's fee."-Highleyman v. McDowell Motor Car Co., Mo., 216 S. W. 52.

7. Consideration.-One promissory note is a good and sufficient consideration for another given in exchange therefor.-American Nat. Bank v. Patterson, La., 83 So. 218.

8.- -Holder in Due Course.-Under Rev. Laws 1910, § 4109, relating to negotiable instruments, the burden is on holder of an instrument negotiated by any person whose title was defective to show that holder or party under whom he claims acquired title as holder in due course.McKone v. McConkey, Okla., 185 Pac. 520. 9. Boundaries Adjoining Landowners. Where adjoining landowners were both ignorant as to the true boundary, and each had an equal opportunity to ascertain the facts, but failed to do so, one of them was not estopped to deny that a fence was the true boundary line by reason of the other making improvements on the subsequently disputed strip. Carstensen V. Brown, Wyo., 185 Pac. 567.

10. Brokers-Burden of Proof.-Where land was not sold to purchaser procured by brokers' principal, but was sold to third party and by third party to procured purchaser, brokers cannot recover commission without showing that brokers' principal, after having actually sold land to procured purchasers, fraudulently conveyed it to third party as a mere blind to deprive brokers of their commission.-Lorton v. Trail, Mo., 216 S. W. 54.

while alighting by reason of her three-inch heel catching on the edge of the steps as that she slipped because of smooth condition of the steps, verdict in her favor cannot be sustained.-Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. Co. v. Wisdom, Tex., 216 S. W. 241.

13. Chattle Mortgages Permissive Possession. Possession of a mortgaged mare by the mortgagor was permissive and not a matter of right.-Mason v. Sault, Vt., 108 Atl. 267.

14.

Commerce-Burden on.-An ordinance requiring all vehicles, including street passenger cars, on entering a public square in the city's commercial district to turn to the right and pass around the square, does not impose a burden on interstate commerce, even if some of the street cars entering the square are engaged in such commerce.-City of Easton v. Miller, Pa., 108 Atl. 262.

15. -Local Transaction.-A transaction between a foreign corporation and a dealer in the state, whereby the corporation undertook to carry on for the dealer's benefit what was designated as a "trade campaign," the amount of compensation to be received by the corporation being dependent on the amount of increase in the dealer's sale, constituted the doing of business within the state, and not interstate com→ merce, although the sale of certain articles of merchandise, as premiums, was an incident.Dean v. Caldwell, Ark., 216 S. W. 31.

Work.-A contractor

17. Contracts-Extra claiming extras must show, not only that he' performed the services, furnished material, and did work outside of and in addition to the specifications agreed upon, but that such additions and alterations necessitated an expense in excess of the contract price.-Leeper-Curd Lumber Co. v. Barbuzza, Tex., 216 S. W. 216.

18. Severability.-A promise made upon several conditions, one of which is unlawful, no matter whether the illegality be at common law or by statute, is void.-Hanes v. Hanes, Tex., 216 S. W. 272.

19. Corporations-Dissolution.-A de facto dissolution of a corporation will excuse creditor from exhausting legal remedies and recovering a judgment at law against the corporation before maintaining suit upon the equitable liability of stockholder; a de jure dissolution being unnecessary.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Nield, Ky., 216 S. W. 62.

20.--Indictment.-A corporation is liable to indictment or other criminal process.-Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. City of Charlottesville, Va., 101 S. E. 357.

21. Laches.-A bona fide purchaser of corporate stock, void because an over-issue, must not unreasonably delay bringing of an action against the corporation or its officers for relief on account of loss, or his laches will bar his right of recovery.-Leffing well v. Evans, Ky., 216 S. W. 58.

22.- -Promoter. The promoter of a corporation to be formed stands in a fiduciary relation toward it, and to the subscribers to its stock.Cator V. Commonwealth Bonding & Casualty Ins. Co., Tex., 216 S. W. 140.

23. -Specific Interest.-A corporation can be guilty of a specific intent involving an evil pur

pose to do a wrongful act, as to violate the Espionage Act.-U. S. v. American Socialist Soc., U. S. D. C., 260 Fed. 885.

24. Subscription to Stock.-Where plaintiff, after having subscribed for corporate stock on installments, gave a further subscription to defendant's agent, paying the price of the stock, but defendant refused to issue the stock, such failure of defendant warranted plaintiff in refusing to pay installments on her earlier subscriptions, and excused her from provisions of the contract that payments made should be forfeited in case of default.-Texas Co-operative Inv. Co. v. Clark, Tex., 216 S. W. 220.

25. Covenants-Quantity in Deed.-Where the contract or the deed is for a specified tract of land, and there is no waranty in the deed as to acreage, the vendee cannot recover on the mere recital of the number of acres or any shortage in the acreage, in the absence of allegation and proof of fraud, and misrepresentation, unless there is a failure of title to part of the land, in which case he recovers damages on the warranty of title.-Henofer v. Realty Loan & Guaranty Co., N. C., 101 S. E. 265.

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27. Accomplice.-The mere agreement to commit a crime would not constitute one an accomplice, unless the crime was subsequently committed in pursuance to the conspiracy or agreement.-Cone v. State, Tex., 216 S. W. 190. 28. Circumstantial Evidence.-Where cumstantial evidence is relied on to prove the guilt of defendant, he may introduce evidence tending to show that another having motive to commit the offense was in such proximity_that he might have been the author.-Kelley v. State, Tex., 216 S. W. 188.

29. Interest of Witness. In a homicide case, court did not err in instructing jury to consider the interest or lack of interest that any witness might have in the outcome of the trial in arriving at weight to be given his testimony. -State v. Elby, La., 83 So. 227.

31.

Deeds-Limitation of Estate.-Whenever grantor means to limit an estate to the heirs of the life tenant, an estate of inheritance will vest in the tenant for life; but the intention to convey an estate which would vest in the grantee's heirs must be manifest.-Hutton & Bourbonnais Co. v. Horton, N. C., 101 S. E. 279.

23.-Specific Intent.-A corporation can be nance between the general and particular descriptions in a deed, the latter will prevail.Tucker v. Angelina County Lumber Co., Tex., 216 S. W. 149.

The

33. Descent and Distribution-Heir. laws of descent and distribution govern only what the persons owns at his death, and cannot touch what he has disposed of during his life, so that a person has heirs only as to property which he holds at his death, and not as conveyed away during his lifetime.-Runge v. Freshman, Tex.. 216 S. W. 254.

34. Purchase by Administrator.The purchase of property from a distributee immediately after distribution by the former administrator of the estate will be closely scrutinized by a court of equity and be set aside at the instance of the seller unless the utmost fairness and good faith in the transaction are shown.-Wilson v. Day, U. S. C. C. A., 260 Fed. 788.

35. Divorce Foreign Decree.-After a foreign decree for a wife for total divorce and alimony, her prayer in Georgia sent for permanent alimony was properly abandoned, since after she obtains a decree of total divorce the marital relation no longer exists, and she cannot thereafter maintain an action for alimony.-Brown v. Brown, Ga., 101 S. E. 315.

36. Insanity.-An act which if performed by a normal person would be ground for divorce

affords no justification for dissolving the marriage bond if committed by an insane person.Hartwell v. Hartwell, Mass., 125 N. E. 208.

37. Dower-Partnership.-Where four brothers entered into written agreements to devote their time to the insurance business as a common enterprise, each having the right to withdraw funds, as needed, without an accounting, such withdrawals to represent the entire interest of the member, and that upon the death of any member the property held by the association was to become that of the survivors, the association held to be one of partnership, and not of joint tenancy, so that on the death of a partner, his share was subject to his widow's dower rights.-Fleming v. Fleming, Ia., 174 N. W. 946. 38. Electricity-Reasonable Rates. - Private contracts as to rates to be charged for furnishing electric power must yield to the public welfare, and the state may fix a just and reasonable rate without regard to that reserved in the contract.-Edison Storage Battery Co. v. Board of Public Utility Com'rs, N. J., 108 Atl. 247.

A

39. Embezzlement-Felonious Intent. felonious intent is an essential ingredient of the crime of embezzlement by a bailee.-Lindgren v. U. S., U. S. C. C. A., 260 Fed. 772.

40. Equity-Clean Hands.-In a landlord's suit to remove a cloud upon title to land in the form of a lease, breached and abandoned by the tenant, a holding that plaintiffs did not come into equity with clean hands because of a showing that they had sold the land through defendant tenant as agent was improper, where no estoppel was pleaded.-Shaw v. Corbett, Ore., 185 Pac. 585.

41.- -Common Interest.-Class suits may be maintained in equity; class suits being those in which one or more in a numerous class, having a common interest in the subject-matter, sue in behalf of themselves and all others of the class. City of Dallas v. Armour & Co., Tex., 216 S. W. 222.

42. Executors and Administrators - Homestead. Under the Constitution, creditors of deceased husband have no right to subject homestead to payment of debts until homestead rights of widow and minor children have ceased.Turner's Heirs v. Turner, Ark., 216 S. W. 44.

43. Personal Liability.-An attorney employed by an administrator of an estate to render services for it has no claim against the estate, though his services may have inured to its benefit, but must look for compensation to the administrator who employed him.-Gilleylen v. Hallman, Ark., 216 S. W. 15.

44. Primary Administration. An intestate's beneficial interest in a royalty agreement with a foreign mining corporation, pledged to secure his debt to a New Jersey corporation doing business in New York, the place of primary administration, where the claim secured might be enforced, held to constitute assets in New Jersey for the purpose auxiliary administration.-Wall v. American Smelting & Refining Co., N. Y., 108 Atl. 235.

45. Fixtures Removal. Notwithstanding fixtures placed by the tenant might have become a part of the realty and belonged to the landlord on expiration of the original lease, the landlord could by subsequent lease waive the right thereto (Civ. Code, § 3513) and grant the tenant a right to remove the fixtures during a new term, and, if he did so, the tenant's removal of them would be legal.-McComish v. Kaufman, Cal., 185 Pac. 476.

A

46. Fraud-Actionable Representation. representation as to value of property is often a representation of fact and actionable, if false, especially where the purchaser to whom the representation is made is so situated as to have no means of investigation, and therefore relies on the statements of value made by the vendor or his agent.-Bonnarjee v. Pike, Cal., 185 Pac. 479.

47. Frauds, Statute of-Debt of Another.Partner's promise to pay other partner's share, as well as his own, of partnership debts, being a promise to pay debts for which he himself was personally liable, was not within statute of frauds, relating to promises to pay debt or default of another, and was enforceable, though not in writing.-Davis v. Abell, Ky., 216 S. W. 104.

48.-Original Promise.-If a promise is made by one in his own name to pay for services to

be rendered another, it is an original and not a collateral promise, and is not within the statute of frauds (Rev. St. 1908, § 2666; Mills' Ann. St. 1912, § 3065).-Spelts v. Anderson, Colo., 185 Pac. 468.

49. Parol Evidence.-Parol evidence is admissible to apply the description of a lease in order to show that there are lands of the particular description, but is inadmissible to supply or add to the description to make it comply with the statute of frauds.-Neal v. Harris, Ark., 216 S. W. 6.

50. Fraudulent Conveyances-Levy.-A judgment creditor has the right to levy on and sell land that he claims to have been conveyed in fraud of his debt.-Ely v. Hertshorn, N. J., 108 Atl. 221.

51. Homicide Deadly Weapon.-A shotgun at such long range as to make it apparent that death or serious bodily injury could not result from its use would not be legally a deadly weapon. Medford v. State, Tex., 216 S. W. 175. 52. Indemnity-Damages.-Where buyer in agreement to buy a going manufacturing business contracted to fill all unfilled orders on the books if not canceled or placed at a higher price, and to indemnify seller against liability thereon, the damage which the seller might recover was fixed by the measure of seller's liability in damages to customers whose accepted orders had not been filled because of buyer's default.North v. Joseph W. North & Son., N. J., 108 Atl. 244.

53. Insurance-Accidental Injury. "Accident" and "accidental," as used in policies coVering accidental death or injury by accident or accidental means, are presumed to be employed in their ordinary and popular sense as meaning happening by chance, unexpectedly taking place, not according to the usual course of things, an event occurring without the foresight or expectation of the person acted upon or affected by it.-Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Meldrim, Ga., 101 S. E. 305.

54.

-Check in Payment.-Under a resolution of a fire insurance company agreeing to accept a missing assessment check in payment if received in a reasonable time, the time from March 13, 1918, to March 4, 1918, when the resolution was rescinded, because the check had not been received, was a reasonable time.-Shuman v. Main, Beaver & Black Creek Mut'l Fire Insurance Co., Pa., 108 Atl. 265.

55. Inventory of Stock.-That insured in preparing an inventory of stock omitted old, unsalable stock, held not to avoid the fire policy, which required the taking of an inventory.Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Biggs, Tex., 216 S. W. 274.

56.Payment by Note.-Insured's note, in the usual form of a negotiable collateral security note, making stock of goods covered by policy collateral for payment of note, did not invalidate policy under provision making it void if the interest of insured in goods be other than unconditional and sole ownership;" the execution of such note not depriving insured of the unconditional and sole ownership of the property, even though note should be construed as creating a chattel mortgage.-Lavenstein Bros. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., Va., 101 S. E. 331.

57.Waiver.-Where applicant for a life insurance policy makes no statement as to age, or imperfectly and completely states it, insurer, by issuing a policy, waives the information and is bound, notwithstanding that the age, if given, would have caused a refusal of insurance.Royal Neighbors of America v. Sims, Tex., 216 S. W. 240.

58. Judicial Sales-Collateral Attack.-Where, in suit to settle estate, it was adjudged that certain land be sold to satisfy creditors, the presumption that master did his duty and carried out judgment by selling the land and paying proceeds to creditors, held warranted on collateral attack.-Potter v. Webb, Ky., 216 S. W. 66.

59. Judgment-Collateral Attack.-Attack on judgment is collateral where plaintiff in ejectment replies that judgment relied on by defendants as link in title was void for want of jurisdiction.-Crider v. Sutherland, Ky., 216 S. W. 57. 60.- Default.-The taking of ex parte proof after default upon which to base a judgment does not make the judgment other than one by