to all the partiality and undue preferences which they were framed to prevent; it being easy to foresee how bproperty would be sent abroad with that unjust view immediately previous to and in contemplation of bankruptcy.woltyridond Is In this point the rules in the United States of America differ from our rules..Judge Story brings forward in his work upon the Conflict of Laws the arguments in favour of both systems. As our short sketch of the subject is confined to the English law, we only notice the principle on which the American courts refused to notice the title of foreign assignees; namely, that the assignment is in truthban assignment by virtue of san local law, and has an authority co-extensive only with the laws itself. In a very recent instance the rule prevailing in England was enforced in favour of French assignees or syndics. It is mentioned by Judge Story. In Alivön v. Furnival," he says, it was held, that, if by the law of the foreign country, the assignees or syndics of a foreign bankrupt may sue there, the same right to sue in England will be allowed by the comity of nations; and that if there are three yassignees or syndics appointed under the foreign law, and two may by that law sue without joining the third, the same right to sue will be acknowledged and enforced by the same comity in England. Upon that occasion Mr. Baron Parke, bin delivering the opinion of the Court, said, "This is a peculiar -right of action breated by the law of the country, and we think bit may by the comity of nations be enforced in this, as much esas the right of foreign assignees or curators, or foreign corpo-trations, sappointed or created ginba different way from that 量 f which the law of this country requires."gais esitub Isno> sbouWelare tempted to add the summary of the English law, Biwhich is very ably drawn by Mr. Justice Story in the following words 416 The following propositions, he says, "ate firmly established first, that an assignment under the bankrupt law of a foreign country passes all the personal property of the bankrupt locally situate, and debts, owing in England; secondly, that an attachment of such property by an English 14 Story, Conflict of Laws, § 406. viq nos) 2 Alivon v. Furnival, I Cr. M. & R. 296. v nadome kep eno) gull 23 Story, Conflict of Laws, § 420, (2). vod 4 Conflict of Laws, p. 409. ́ 1 creditor after such bankruptcy, with or without notice to him, is invalid to overreach the assignment; thirdly, that in Eng -land the same doctrine holds under assignments by her own bankrupt laws as to personal property and debts of the bankrupt in foreign countries; fourthly, that upon principle all attachments made by foreign creditors, after such assignment in a foreign country, ought to be held invalid sixthly, that Jatualbevents a British creditor will not be permitted to hold the property acquired by a judgment under any attachment made in a foreign country after such assignment; and seventhly, that a foreign creditor, not subjected to British laws, will be permitted to retain any such property acquired under any such -judgment, if the local laws (however incorrectly upon principle) confer on him an absolute title."ow bilgul ai galisz .1 The relation of husband and wife is one which, viewed as a omatter of personal law, is so universally the subject of courtesy, has to be a matter almost juris gentium. It depends upon the odex locibusEven if the marriage is contracted under eircumstances which amount to a fraud upon the law of England, as bwheres parties domiciled in England go to Scotland merely with a view to the facilities of the Scotch law in making the icontract, the law of England treats the relation as completely established. In the same way a marriage between a girl of neleven years and a boy of nine years old, fraudulently effected A by the boy's father in France, was held valid in England _because it was held valid in France. So it has been established -oin the Ecclesiastical Courts, that wherever a marriage takes Jplace, if it is valid according to the lex loci contractûs, personal duties arising out of it shall be enforced. Generally speaking, the legal mode according to that law is the mode which it is expedient to adopt. Al marriage at Antwerp, valid according to English law, but invalid according to Dutch daw, has been helds invalid. However, in some instances marriage to trong In very odd is 29220g yahoo agiotot & to wol ; botul Doeld. Birthwhistle v. Varuili, 9 Bl. 717 CV. & Fib. 1935; Dalrymple v. ९ · 1- Dalrymple, 2/Hag. Cons, 58.1 to Jusumbosits as tedi ̧ylbuoɔɔ2 2 Roach v. Garvan, 1 Ves. sen. 160. 3 Crompton v. Bearcroft, Bull, N. P. 113; see 7 Cl. & Fin. 921. 10 4 Sinclair v. Sinclair, Hag, Cons. Kent v. Burgess, 11 Sim. 376; Middleton v. Janverin, 2 Hag. Cons. 437; Butler v. Freeman, Amb. 303.00 q zzed to tɔudo 3 abroad according to English rites is valid. For instance, during the English military occupation of a Dutch colony1 a marriage between an English officer and an English lady was held valid. In the English factories at Lisbon, Leghorn, Oporto, Cadiz, at Smyrna, and Aleppo, in the houses of our ambassadors in all foreign countries, marriages take place according to English law, and are held valid.1 "It is true," says Lord Stowell," that English decisions have established this rule, that a foreign marriage, valid according to the law of the place where celebrated, is good everywhere else, but they have not e converso established that marriages of British subjects, not good according to the general law of the place where celebrated, are universally and under all possible circumstances to be regarded as invalid in England. It is therefore certainly to be advised that the safest course is always to be married according to the law of the country, for then no question can be stirred; but if this cannot be done on account of legal or religious difficulties, the law of this country does not say that its subjects shall not marry abroad." There is however in our law books a very celebrated case, which suggests an exception to this general rule as to the admission of the foreign law upon this subject. Suppose a party born and married in England to go and reside in Scotland, and there to obtain a divorce. That was the case of Mr. Solley. Suppose that such a person contracted a second marriage, not in England, as Mr. Solley did, but in Scotland. It is clear that in Scotland such second marriage would be good-but, although Lord Brougham seems to assume that it would be held good in England, and has founded upon that assumption a tissue of conclusions, with a view to shew the necessary absurdities and inconsistencies of our law, we cannot help thinking that such second marriage would not be in any way recognized in England, and that the absurdities suggested by his lordship flowed not from our law, but from his mistaken assumption of what our law is. Our law does not recognize the husband divorced by Scotch law as a single man. It seems to be a necessary consequence 1 Reading v. Smith, 2 Hag. Cons, 385. 2 Ibid. 390. 4 Warrender v. Warrender, 9 Bli. 128. that it will not admit his Scotch marriage after his Scotch divorce. A general rule to recognize Scotch marriages will not imply the recognition of Scotch marriages between incompetent parties. Mr. Solley was in the position of an incompetent party. He was a married man, according to English law, in spite of Scotch proceedings, by which his marriage was in Scotland a nullity. Lord Brougham appears to have supposed that a nation which recognizes a foreign marriage must of necessity recognize a foreign divorce. It is a natural opinion for him to entertain, as he makes no distinction between the comity of nations and rights asserted ex debito justitiæ. In regarding foreign contracts and dissolutions of contracts, he seems not to bear in mind that some of them are agreeable, some offensive to English feelings and opinions. Had he acknowledged the rule, of which jurists generally approve, that the admission of foreign law is always a matter of comity,/// he would have seen at once that in this as in every other instance, it must depend upon the moral and religious opinions of individual nations. Indeed a nation might not impossibly entertain an opinion, to which Lord Brougham's proposition would altogether prevent it from giving effect: for instance, a nation might regard marriage as absolutely indissoluble. We may observe, by the way, that as few people can bear the expense of a private act of parliament, married couples are in England indissoluble in respect of the great bulk of the community. If a foreign divorce must of necessity be held valid in a nation which condemns divorces altogether; how can such a nation give effect to this important principle of domestic life? How can it carry out this rule of religion and morality? A subject need but cross the frontier and he may immediately avail himself of a foreign jurisdiction as a ready means of shaking off the trammels, which, by the law of his domicile, are indissoluble. The truth is, that foreign marriages are respected, because their validity is matter of agreement in all the countries of Christendom. Whether under any circumstances a marriage ought to be dissoluble, and, if so, what is the nature of those circumstances, are questions upon which Christendom is much divided. The consequence is, that marriages are, but divorces are not, parts of the juris gentium. ''We must next view the law as a mixed law!We must consider how a foreign marriage affects rights to property, real and po personal. As to personalty, the rule we take to be, that it shall be regulated by the law of the country in which the contract is When Aubade. Where marriages have taken place dona tie on Sites under a foreign domicile, equities and other claims founded upon the peculiarities of English law have not been allowed to no di noid bus elins gilt lls ba▲ 9temitigal es doma prevail.1 re Eng The same rule does not apply to realty. Lord Brougham's mind has been very fertile in suggesting difficulties and abmay arise out of the English law in this spect. But our barons of old, have stood firm, and legitimatio per subsequens matrimonium has been refused, so far as it may affect land in England. ́ ́ Lord Chief Justice Tindal, in delivering his opinion upon Doe d. Birthwhistle v. Vardills to the House of Lords, uses the following expressions, tion bus foton "We hold it to be a tule or maxim of the law of England, with respect to the descent With respect to the descent of land in I land from father to son, that the son must be born after actual marriage between his father and mother; that this is a rule of purmeto aropa i re juris positivi, as are all the laws which regulate succession to real property, this particular rule having been framed for the direct purpose of excluding in the descent of land in England the application of the rule of the civil and canon law, by which the subsequent marriage between the father and mother was held to make the son born before marriage legitimate; and that this rule of descent, being a rule of positive law annexed to the land itself, cannot be allowed to be broken in upon or disturbed by the law of the country where the claimant was born, and which may be allowed to govern his personal status as to legitimacy, upon the supposed ground of the comity of nations.' 2 His lordship explained the Statute of Merton in these words:"That statute or provision of Merton runs thus, viz., 'To the king's writ of bastardy, whether any one being born before matrimony may inherit in like manner as he that 1 Anstruther v. Adair, 2 M. & K. 513; Sawyer v. Shute, 1 Anst. R. 63. 2 Doe d. Birthwhistle v. Vardill, 9 Bli. 73. 37 Cl. & Fin. 925. 4 Ibid. 929. |