It should also be ascertained that the fund is standing in the names of the trustees of the settlement in the books of the governor and company of the Bank of England, and inquiry should be made of them whether they have notice of any appointment by E. T., or of any assignment or charge by the vendor of his share. The purchasers should also be satisfied as to the identity of the vendor; and there should be a declaration by some one acquainted with his family, that he and his two brothers are the only surviving children of his father and mother respectively, and that there has not been any deceased child who left issue; and that the father and mother are both dead; and that E. T. did not leave any issue of her first marriage who survived her. Searches should alsobe made whether the vendor has been a bankrupt or insolvent, and for judgments and annuities. After the assignment is executed, notice of it should be immediately given to the trustees of the settlement, and a distringas should be lodged at the Bank against the transfer of the vendor's share of the trust fund. We now copy an agent's charge for some of the searches here recommended. Searching at the Inrolment Office in Chancery, if you Instructions for Distringas to lodge against the transfer of £ Paid for Distringas Drawing Notice to place at the Bank against the transfer of the aforesaid Sum, and Copy... 0 14 4 0 14 4 0 14 4 0 14 4 0 13 4 0 6 10 .... 0 13 4 Attending the Bank Solicitor therewith for his Allocatur Attending the Secretary of the Bank to place Distringas 0 6 8 1 6 8 0 6 8 We may observe, that if a chose in action belonging to a feme covert is purchased, and she dies before it is received, the trustee thereof will require letters of administration to her effects to be obtained before it is paid, so that the expense of obtaining such administration should be provided for on making the purchase. We think, however, that if a man or a feme sole assigns a chose in action for a valuable consideration, and dies before it is received, the trustee may safely pay it to the assignee, without requiring the concurrence of the legal personal representative of the assignor. 2. On Bequests to Charities. If our readers will refer to our first volume they will find an article on this subject, in which the cases and principles of the law are fully investigated. We regret that the caution which we then gave has not been so generally observed as could have been wished; for many cases have occurred of late in which charities have lost the full benefit of bequests made to them. Some years ago the objection that charitable legacies without special words are only entitled to a proportionable part of the pure personalty, was seldom insisted. upon the expense of separating and arranging the funds in the master's office being frequently considerable. Besides, we may allow something to the conscience of residuary legatees, who are willing that the intention of their testators should be fully carried out, notwithstanding there might be a deficiency in matter of form. But the case is now different, and questions of this kind are much more frequently agitated. Several cases have been before the Master of the Rolls, and, among others, we may notice The Philanthropic Society v. Kemp. In that case, Ann Sammon by her will gave legacies to certain individuals, amounting in the whole to about 40007., and she also gave legacies to charities amounting together to about 13007. The assets of the testatrix consisted of about 12007. in pure personalty, and 54007. in personalty connected with real estate: altogether 66007. The will directed that the charitable, legacies should be paid out of the ready money and proceeds of funded property, personal chattels and effects, 14 Beavan, 581. and not from the proceeds of her leasehold or real estates; and the testatrix charged her leasehold estates, in addition to her other personal estate, with the payment of her debts and other legacies. The Master of the Rolls observed, "The leaseholds being given in addition to,' and not in exoneration of,' the other personal estate, we have the whole personal estate subject to the debts, &c. and all the other legacies. The necessary consequence is, that when you come to apply the assets in payment, you must have pro ratâ payments out of different sorts of personal estate; you pay the debts, funeral expenses and legacies out of the common fund, and yet it is desired that the charity legacies should be first paid out of the pure personalty. Here, as in every case, the testatrix intended all the legacies to be paid, but it must be done according to the principle of law; and if this were a matter altogether independent of authority, I own I should have thought that good reasons might have been found for marshalling assets. I cannot help very strongly thinking so; but considering the authorities which have prevailed, the language which has been laid down on this subject, and the necessity of having pro ratâ payments in cases where charity legacies are concerned, I think that something more than is to be found in this will is wanting, to entitle the charity legacy to be paid in full out of the pure personalty. The wordsi this will seem to be insufficient to enable her intention to be carried into effect in the state of her assets. The intention was perfectly lawful, and might have been effected in a different way, if there had been words introduced into this will expressly throwing the other burdens upon the other portion of the estate." Hence it was held, that the charity legacies failed as to so much of the pure personalty as was required for a pro ratâ payment of the debts and other legacies. The will, it will be observed, provided for one case, namely, that the charity legacies should not be paid out of leaseholds, &c. but it failed in not giving such legacies a priority with respect to the pure personalty. So, in the case of Sturge v. Dimsdale,1 also before the Master of the Rolls, where a testatrix created by her will a 17 Jurist, 543. mixed fund, arising from real and personal estates, and thereout gave several legacies, and, among others, certain legacies to charities; and directed that none of the legacies bequeathed to charities should be paid out of monies to arise by the sale of her real estates, but should be paid out of such part of her personal estate only as should be legally applicable thereto; the Master of the Rolls thought that this direction alone was not sufficient to exempt the pure personal estate from its liability to contribute to the payment of debts and general legacies in the usual way. For full information on this subject, we beg to refer to our article mentioned above; but we may here observe, that in framing a bequest to a charity, it is obvious that two points should be carefully attended to: 1st, that the charitable legacy should be clearly confined to the pure personalty; and, 2dly, that it should be made the primary charge on that fund: but care should also be taken, that if it be necessary that the general legacies should abate, that the charitable legacy should abate in like proportion; for that, we apprehend, is usually the intention. We think the following forms would be sufficient, and they are perhaps as brief and as simple as the subject will admit of. FORM OF BEQUEST OF A LEGACY. "I give the sum of £ for the use and benefit of the Infirmary for the counties of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Northumberland and Durham; the same to be paid to the Treasurer for the time being of the institution, whose receipt shall be a good discharge for the same. And I direct, that a sufficient part of my pure personal estate, before any other payment thereout, shall be applied in payment of the said charitable legacy; but the same to abate with my other legacies if necessary." FORM OF BEQUEST OF A RESIDUE. "I give, &c. And I direct that such part of my personal estate as I cannot lawfully bequeath to charitable uses, and as is applicable by this my will to the payment of my debts and legacies, shall be the primary fund for payment of the same." W. C. W. ART. VIII.-LIABILITY OF INFANTS IN RESPECT OF CONTRACTS.' THE privilege which an infant possesses is given to him for his own benefit and protection, and for that intent and object alone, so that it cannot be defined by any fixed rules, but must necessarily vary with circumstances. Since, however, the privilege has been adjudicated upon in numerous instances, it is proposed to consider what it is in reference to contracts entered into by the infant with or without deed.2 His contracts, like all other person's contracts, must either affect his own interest or affect the interest of others, as when he contracts in consequence of an authority entrusted to him by a third person; and as there is a clear distinction between such contracts, it is necessary to consider, 1st. Those contracts which are entered into by him and affect his own interest, whether they be entered into by simple contract or specialty; 2dly. Those contracts which do not affect his own interest, but take effect from an authority entrusted to him. Before entering into the divisions of the subject, it is necessary to state that the privilege of an infant is a personal privilege, of which he alone can take advantage, and his contracts, when voidable, can be avoided only by himself, his heirs, or his personal representatives.3 Although an infant is bound by some of his contracts during his minority, (as will be shown hereafter,) besides his contracts for necessaries, it is the privilege of infancy that no action (except for necessaries) shall be brought on any contract entered into by an infant, either against himself at any time of his life, or his representatives after his death, whether the contract is a simple contract or a specialty, unless the infant ratifies the contract after age.* The entire law of infancy in all its branches has been digested by Mr. Macpherson in his able and very valuable work entitled A Treatise on the Law relating to Infants, published in 1842; but the great extent of the subject prevented him from going fully into the doubtful questions of liability. The work contains nearly six hundred pages, exclusive of Appendix and Index, as it is.-Edit. Baycott, 2 H. B. 515; Perkings, s. 12. 2 Burrows, 1808. 3 Keene v. 4 It is indeed stated in Woodfall's Landlord and Tenant, 2d edit. p. 601, that infancy is a good plea in debt for rent, but "as a lease made to an infant is not void but voidable only, if it be beneficial to him he is liable to an action for the rent reserved." Kelsey's case, Cro. Jac. 320, is cited as an authority, but on referring |