The Federalist: Design for a Constitutional RepublicUniversity of Illinois Press, 1989 - 181 páginas Carey's introduction is followed by chapters on republicanism, separation of powers, federalism and limited government. An evaluative conclusion rounds out the text which is enriched by endnotes that constitute a usefully annotated bibliography. Carey treats "Publius" as a single authored work notwithstanding the disparate authorship of the 85 essays. Despite the unresolved tensions among the key ideas presented, he argues that a basic unity and therefore a single voice informs The Federalist as a whole. ISBN 0-252-01609-2: $22.95. |
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Página 20
... prevent the same passion or interest from overcoming a majority , nor are there any impedi- ments which prevent such majorities from executing their will as soon as the common passion or interest is felt . This he holds is why " such ...
... prevent the same passion or interest from overcoming a majority , nor are there any impedi- ments which prevent such majorities from executing their will as soon as the common passion or interest is felt . This he holds is why " such ...
Página 25
... prevent the fluctuations between anarchy and tyranny so common to the republican form . Moreover , it would seem to follow that the initial motivation would be reinforced once these interests perceived the benefits of such a government ...
... prevent the fluctuations between anarchy and tyranny so common to the republican form . Moreover , it would seem to follow that the initial motivation would be reinforced once these interests perceived the benefits of such a government ...
Página 28
... prevent factions from ruling also serve to prevent nonfactious or just majorities from rul- ing ? 15 While this issue arises logically from Publius's analysis , at no point does he address it directly , so that we are obliged to deduce ...
... prevent factions from ruling also serve to prevent nonfactious or just majorities from rul- ing ? 15 While this issue arises logically from Publius's analysis , at no point does he address it directly , so that we are obliged to deduce ...
Contenido
Chapter | 3 |
Federalism | 23 |
Limited Government | 115 |
Derechos de autor | |
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Términos y frases comunes
Antifederalists argument assembly authority bill of rights bills of attainder branches citizens classical republicanism common constituents concern confederate Congress contends context courts critics danger declare discussion effects of faction encroachments ernment essay executive exercise extended republic theory federacies federal Federalist 51 Federalist Papers fit characters functions habeas corpus impartial individuals instance institutions interests judges judicial judicial review judiciary laws legislative legislature liberty limited maintain majority factions matter means ment Montesquieu morality Moreover national government nature necessary nonfactious objects operate opinion parties passions Philadelphia Convention political political science popular majorities posed position problem of factions proper proposed Constitution proposed system protect Publius believed Publius writes Publius's conception Publius's solution pure democracies question reason regard regime remarks render representatives republican government republican principle respect role rule Senate sense separation of powers serve society stitution tion tyranny union veto