entitled under existing laws. The act and resolution must be read as in pari materiá. Opinion of Jan. 4, 1815, 4 Op. 352. 32. The representatives of a lieutenant in a Virginia State regiment, afterwards transferred to the continental establishment, who in his lifetime obtained a judgment against said State for commutation of five years' full pay in lieu of half-pay for life, and received payment thereof in 1792, are not entitled, under existing laws, to be allowed a claim for further compensation for services rendered by their ancestor. Opinion of June 2, 1847, 4 Op. 590. 33. This claim was considered and rejected by the Department in 18 33, on the ground that it had been paid. Ibid. 34. It is not provided for in the third section of the act of July 5, 1832, chap. 173, and cannot be allowed except under special authority from Congress. Ibid. 35. Congress having resolved that the claim of the representatives of Churchill Gibbs was provided for by the act of July 5, 1832, chap. 173, and the House of Representatives having again resolved to that effect, after the Executive Department had decided otherwise, it is now the duty of the Executive Department to liquidate it. Opinion of March 27, 1849, 5 Op. ❘ 82. 36. The acts of Congress of the 3d March, 1835, and 12th August, 1848, chap. 166, are legislative interpretations of the act of 5th July, 1832, chap. 173, and expressions of opinion that it was the purpose of the third section of the act of 1832 to provide for Virginia commutation claims for half-pay, as well as those for half-pay; and those legislative interpretations and opinions are binding on the Executive, and require the allowance of the present claim. Opinion of March 27, 1849, 5 Op. 83. 37. The Executive has no authority to allow the claim of Col. J. M. Cresey for disbursements made by him in organizing a regiment of volunteers during the war with Mexico, under the authority of Major-General Gaines; but the claim, being meritorious, is commended to the favorable consideration of Congress. Opinion of May 18, 1849, 5 Op. 102. 38. The joint resolutions of July 16, 1846, and March 3, 1847, and the act of June 2, 1848, chap. 60, require the troops for which disbursements should be made to have been mustered and received into service. Ibid. 39. The representatives of Thomas Armstead, a captain who served in a Virginia regiment in the Revolutionary war prior to 21st May, 1782, when he became a supernumerary, to the 3d of April, 1783, and who died 1st September, 1809, to whom the Virginia legislature allowed $2,400 in 1826 as commutation, without interest, and to whom Congress subsequently allowed halfpay from 21st May, 1782, to said 3d April, 1783, are not now entitled to have the account reopened and restated, so as to allow interest on the said commutation. Opinion of Oct. 31, 1849, 5 Op. 164. 40. The relatives of a deceased officer or soldier are not entitled, under the act of July 19, 1848, chap. 104, to receive three months' extra pay on account of services of the ancestor, unless the ancestor were thus entitled at his demise. Opinion of Nov. 2, 1849, 5 Op. 168. 41. Such claims rest upon the ground that they are his statutory representatives; and, as such, they can only take that which the deceased himself could have taken had he sur vived. And as those who did not engage for the war, for five years, or for any other specific period, and who were never honorably discharged, were not themselves entitled, their representatives have no valid claim. Ibid. 42. A claimant representing himself to have been impressed into the British service after the action between the Chesapeake and Leopard, in 1807, when Great Britain and the United States were at peace, and not stating what his conduct was during the action to save the ship, nor what was his behavior afterwards, does not bring his case within the provisions of the act of April 23, 1800, chap. 33. The claim of John Strahan, therefore, as the same now appears before the Executive Department, is inadmissible. Opinion of Nov. 20, 1849, 5 Op. 185. 43. The account of the Chickasaw Nation is to be considered now as having been properly opened and restated, and the balance found due by the accounting officers is properly chargeable to the appropriation for the subsistence and removal of the Indians. The contract with William M. Gwin, assigned to Corcoran & Riggs, is valid, and should be paid out of the fund otherwise payable to the Chickasaws. Opinions of Jan. 3 and March 7, 1850, 5 Op. 226, 233. 44. The claim of the administrators of Com modore James Barron, commander of the State navy of Virginia during the war of the Revolution, for commutation-pay and interest, should be allowed. This opinion is founded upon the judicial decisions of the courts in Virginia that officers of the navy of that State, during the Revolutionary war, who served to its close, were equally entitled with officers of their line to commutation-pay under the Virginia act of 1790, and upon reasons stated in other similar cases. Opinion of Jan. 31, 1859, 5 Op. 227. Secretary of the Treasury, arising upon the claim of Whitemarsh B. Seabrook and others, considered and answered. Opinion of April 29, 1858, 9 Op. 139. 50. In the matter of the claims of Commander Ringold and Lieutenant Harrison: Held that those officers are entitled to duty-pay under the sixth section of the act of 1857, chap. 12 (section 3, act of March 3, 1859, chap. 76). Opinion of May 9, 1859, 9 Op. 336. 51. Under the joint resolution of March 3, 1863, No. 32, the Secretary of the Navy has power to adjust an equitable claim for articles furnished for the marine service during the time specified in the resolution where the specitic quantity to be delivered was not named in the contract, but where that quantity is caOpinion of May 18, 45. The administrator of John Rush, a sailing-master in the Navy, who became insane whilst in the service, and was placed on halfpay in the hospital at Philadelphia, where he remained until his death, in 1837, but for whom payment was not made after the death of his father, in 1813, has a just claim on the Depart-pable of ascertainment. ment for the arrearage of pay, although the | 1863, 10 Op. 485. name of the insane man was dropped from the Navy Register. But as there is no appropriation from which the payment can be made, an estimate of this claim should be presented to Congress, and an appropriation asked for to enable the Department to pay it. Opinion of Feb. 11, 1851, 5 Op. 298. 46. The Secretary of State may sanction the reimbursement of lieutenants of the Corps of Topographical Engineers for personal expenses incurred in the execution of the sixth article of the treaty of Washington of 1842, and in reconstructing the maps showing the boundaries under that treaty. Opinion of Feb. 14, 1853, 5 Op. 671. 47. The Government is not responsible for, and cannot be charged with, money paid by a purser to his successor in office, which money did not belong to it. Opinion of March 12, 1854, 6 Op. 358. 48. When the accounting officers of the Treasury, in settling the accounts of a disbursing officer of the United States, have allowed an alleged payment upon a genuine receipt of the party to whom the money purports to have been paid, the latter cannot be suffered to claim the money of the Government in his own name on the pretense that he gave the receipt without actually receiving the money; and if he be aggrieved, his remedy is against the disbursing agent of the Government. Opinion of Nov. 23, 1854, 7 Op. 40. 52. A court-one "Provisional Justice" Smith-constituted under authority of General Saxton, at Beaufort, S. C., rendered a judgment against a Government contractor in an attachment proceeding instituted by a subcontractor. An execution having issued thereon to the provost-marshal of the district, it was found that the property attached had been used by Government officials in the construction of a naval dock. The subcontractor (plaintiff) claimed that he was entitled, on the settlement of the accounts at the Navy Department, to payment of the value of the property of the defendant which had been attached and afterwards taken for the use of the Government: Held that "Provisional Justice" Smith had no legal existence as a court, and that his judgment had no legal validity, and could not control or govern the action of the Navy Department upon the said accounts. Opinion of Sept. 12, 1864, 11 Op. 86. 53. The claim of William Ward, a resident of Norfolk, Va., for supplies furnished the Navy Department, may now be lawfully paid. Opinion of Nov. 21, 1836, 12 Op. 96. 54. The President advised that no ground exists for reversing the order of the Secretary of War disallowing the claim of Messrs. Snow, Coyle & Co. for publishing the evidence in the case of the assassination conspiracy. Opinion of June 5, 1867, 12 Op. 140. 55. No injunction exists which can restrain 49. Certain questions propounded by the the claimant, Joseph Nock, from receiving the full amount of the judgment recovered by him in the Court of Claims. Opinion of Aug. 7, 1868, 12 Op. 438. 56. The D., L. and N. Turnpike Company owned a turnpike in Kentucky, over which, during the late rebellion, large numbers of horses, mules, and wagons belonging to the United States, employed in transporting military supplies, were driven by the forces engaged in prosecuting the war; and for this use of their road the company were allowed and paid by the War Department one-half the rates of toll as established by the laws of the State, the company, however, receiving the same under protest, and claiming to be entitled to full rates of toll. Demand having since been made by the company for the difference between the amount thus received and the amount thus claimed: Held that this is substantially a claim to be paid for damages caused by the operations of war, and that under existing legislation no authority exists for allowing any part of it. Opinion of June 22, 1869, 13 Op. 107. 57. No government has ever admitted a strict legal obligation on its part to make full compensation for such injuries as are incidental to the actual operations of war. Ibid. 58. A steamboat belonging to a resident of Wheeling, Va. (now West Virginia), was taken by her owner before the rebellion to New Orleans, La., where he remained with her until May, 1861, when he left her in charge of an agent and returned to the former place. She was subsequently captured by a United States gunboat on Red River, brought back to New Orleans, then in possession of the United States forces, and turned over to and used by the military authorities there until November, 1862, when she was restored to her owner, who now claims compensation for her use under the joint resolution of December 23, 1869: Held that, waiving the question whether the boat was not at the time of her capture to be regarded as enemies' property, the claim is not within the purview of that enactment. Opinion of July 7, 1870, 13 Op. 281. 59. The proviso of that resolution is to be construed as if it read: "Provided, That such steamboats or other vessels were in the insurrectionary districts by virtue of an authority specially appropriate to vessels of the United States within districts in insurrection," &c. Ibid. 60. There is nothing in the resolution which warrants its extension to vessels in insurrectionary districts under a charter or contract between private persons, whether made before the rebellion or afterward, or made between rebels, enemies, or loyal persons, such as is ordinarily required for the hiring of vessels, but not such as was specially appropriate for vessels entering the insurrectionary districts. Ibid. 61. Claim for rent of property known as Kalorama, in the District of Columbia, occupied for military purposes during the late rebellion, being for the difference between the rate demanded and the rate already paid to claimant by the Government: Held not to be valid upon the facts presented. Opinion of Jan. 12, 1871, 13 Op. 370. 62. It appearing in the case of the steamer Nellie Baker that in 1864 a claim for the hire of that steamer was before the Quartermaster-General, and that there was then a discussion between him and the owners as to the amount due; that he finally adjudged the amount due to be $4,200; and that the owners, though dissatisfied, accepted this sum at the time as all that could be got upon their claim: Held that this action is conclusive so far as the Departments are concerned, such settlements having the character of final judgments. Opinion of Jan. 12, 1871, 13 Op. 372. 63. Claimant contracted to transport military supplies, for which service, by the terms of his contract, he was to be paid "according to the actual distance traveled from the place of departure to that of delivery, the distance to be indorsed on the bill of lading by the officer or agent receiving the supplies." Having performed his part of the agreement, claimant received payment according to the distances indorsed on the bills of lading by the proper officer, which were the reputed distances at the date of the contract. From surveys afterward made it appeared that the actual distances exceeded those indorsed as aforesaid, and claimant asks to be paid for the difference: Held that, there being no evidence that either party had in view, when the contract was entered into, any distances other than those which were then currently accepted, the claim is not well founded. March 20, 1871, 13 Op. 393. Opinion of military authorities of the United States, was, under a general order issued thereby, turned over to the company owning the road, to be worked by such company on its own account, subject to the condition that the company should "carry all Government freight at such tariff as may be established by the Quartermaster-General." Troops and Army stores were subsequently transported over the road, for which service, up to November 1, 1865, payments were made to the company at rates established by the Quartermaster-General, and receipts in full were given by the company therefor without protest: Held that no claim is admissible for additional compensation in respect of such service on the ground that the company was entitled to more than what was paid; the acceptance of the amount allowed 64. In April, 1865, the marine dock at Mobile, Ala., with aquantity of lumber and other materials, the whole belonging to the Mobile Marine Dock Company, was seized by the military authorities and used in the Government service until in November, 1865, the materials having been consumed in the mean time, when the dock was turned over to the officers of the company. Claim being made by the latter for the use of the dock and for the value of the materials, &c.: Held that the claim originated during the war for the suppression of the rebellion, and that its settlement is prohibited by the act of February 21, 1867, chap. 57. Opinion of Jan. 2, 1872, 13 Op. 555. the military authorities and the receipt given therefor constituting a final settlement as between the Government and the company. Opinion of May 3, 1872, 14 Op. 592. 65. A claim for money expended in defray-by ing the expenses of a delegation of Cherokees visiting the capital by authority of the Government, in the year 1870, may be allowed out of the appropriation made by the resolution of July 13, 1870 (No. 110). Opinion of June 18, 1872, 14 Op. 55. 66. Giving to the act of July 25, 1866, chap. 241, granting lands to the State of Kansas to aid in building the Kansas and Neosho Valley Railroad, which road subsequently came into the ownership of the Missouri River, Fort Scott and Gulf Railroad Company, a natural and reasonable construction, the claim of that company to be allowed compensation from the Government for transportation performed over said road is inadmissible, notwithstanding there may have been no notice given by the Government to the company, previous to the perform ance of the transportation, that it was to be done at the latter's expense. Opinion of July 25, 1872, 14 Op. 69. 69. By charter-parties made in October, 1862, the steamers General Meigs and General Burnside were hired to the Government, to be used in the military service for the term of six months, commencing from the 15th of that month, at a per diem of $300 for each, with the privilege of purchase at a stated amount at the end of three months. On the 2d of February, 1863, the Quartermaster-General issued an order to purchase the steamers under the provisions in their charter-parties, the purchase to date as of the 15th of January previous. That order was not finally carried into effect until the 13th of May following, on which day bills of sale, transferring the steamers to the United States, antedated the 15th of January, 1863, were executed and delivered by the owners thereof, who also made out bills for the pur 67. An internal-revenue officer while in pur-chase-money, bearing the date last mentioned, suit of an escaped prisoner shot and killed the latter, for which the officer was indicted in a State court, tried, and acquitted; and having sustained a considerable outlay in his defense, he afterward presented at the Treasury a claim against the Government for reimbursement of the amount: Advised that there is no law authorizing the reimbursement. Opinion of July 26, 1872, 14 Op. 71. 68. In June, 1865, the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, being then in the possession of the and received payment of the same. The owners furthermore made out bills against the Government for reimbursement of expenses incurred in running the steamers during the period between the 15th of January and the 13th of May, and received payment thereof. A claim, however, was subsequently presented by them for compensation for the use of the steamers during that period, at the charter rate of $300 per diem, deducting the amount already received for reimbursement of running expenses: Held that this claim, under the circumstances, has no validity. Opinion of Aug. 7, 1872, 14 Op. 84. 70. By the second section of the act of February 27, 1875, chap. 108, the allowances to be admitted in favor of the railway companies settled with under that act are limited to the following subjects: First, payments made by them in cash; second, credits authorized by the general course of the business regulations of the Departments for transportation performed. But no abatement or increase in the amount of either the one or the other is admissible. Opinion of May 27, 1875, 15 Op. 1. 71. The award made by the PostmasterGeneral in favor of George Chorpenning, December 23, 1870, under the joint resolution of July 15, 1870, was not in its nature binding upon the United States until paid, and might be rendered null by the action of Congress at any time prior to its payment. Opinion of July 23, 1875, 15 Op. 20. 72. Congress having, before payment thereof, by joint resolution of February 9, 1871, repealed the joint resolution of 1870, under which the Postmaster-General had acted, and by subsequent acts (see 16 Stat., 519, 572; 17 Stat., 82) forbidden payment to be made out of appropriations under control of the PostOffice Department, the award thereupon ceased to have any efficacy. It does not now constitute a valid foundation of claim, and an action would not be maintainable thereon. NOTE, 15 Op. 26.) Ibid. (See 73. Former opinion in the case of the Biddle Manufacturing Company referred to (see opinion of August 2, 1875), and for reasons stated advised that payment of the claim be suspended for a reasonable time, say thirty days. Opinion of Aug. 19, 1875, 15 Op. 34. 74. Under section 7 of the act of March 2, 1867, chap. 169, and section 39 of the act of June 6, 1872, chap. 315, also the appropriation act of March 3, 1875, chap. 129, John D. Sanborn is entitled to such sums only as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (within the limit of the appropriation) has agreed to pay, and the payment whereof is approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, for services of the following description, viz: "For detecting and bringing to trial and punishment persons guilty of violating the internal-revenue laws, or conniving at the same, in cases where such ex penses are not otherwise provided by law." Opinion of March 27, 1876, 15 Op. 88. 75. The independent action of each of those officers (the Commissioner and the Secretary) is necessary to warrant payment; neither can delegate to the other his powers. Ibid. 76. In the case of John D. Sanborn, upon examination of section 7, act of March 2, 1867, chap. 169 (section 3463 Rev. Stat.); act of July 20, 1868, chap. 176; act of March 3, 1869, chap. 121; act of April 10, 1869, chap. 15; act of July 12, 1870, chap. 251; act of March 3, 1871, chap. 113; section 1, act of May 8, 1872, chap. 140 (section 256 Rev. Stat.); section 39, act of June 6, 1872, chap. 315; section 1, act of March 3, 1873, chap. 226; section 1, act of June 19, 1874, chap. 328; and section 1, act of March 3, 1875, chap. 129: Held that the offer of “a reward for taxes recovered by reason of information furnished by the claimant," contained in Treasury Circulars No. 99, No. 99 revised, and No. 99 second revision, was authorized by law. Opinion of July 5, 1876, 15 Op. 133. 77. But no rate of compensation for information furnished being established by those circulars, the rate fixed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue must in each separate case have the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury in order to warrant payment. Ibid. 78. Previous to the act of June 22, 1870, chap. 150 (sections 363-366 Rev. Stat.), C. & W. were retained, with the approbation of the Solicitor of the Treasury, to defend certain suits brought against R., formerly collector of the port of New York, for acts done by him officially. Services were rendered under this retainer between September, 1873, and April, 1875, which remain unpaid for: Held that the Treasury Department is authorized to settle and pay the claim for these services. Opinion of Sept. 26, 1876, 15 Op. 168. 79. The Continental Bank-Note Company of New York contracted to furnish and deliver to the Post-Office Department for the term of four years, commencing May 1, 1873, all the adhesive postage-stamps which might be required by the Department, and agreed to keep on hand at all times a stock of stamps sufficient to meet all orders of the Department. For the stamps delivered in pursuance of the agreement the company were to be paid at a certain rate per thousand, which was to be full compensation for everything required to be done or fur 66 |