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herent power to appoint officers necessary to its complete organization, such as a clerk or secretary. Opinion of June 8, 1871, 13 Op.

577.

sioners of the District of Columbia, either directly or indirectly, to make the principal and interest of the 3.65 bonds, which they are hereby authorized to issue, payable in coin, by expressing on the face of the bonds that the principal and interest thereof will be paid in coin. Opinion of Aug. 11, 1874, 14 Op. 445.

40. The board may not only declare what shall be deemed nuisances, but provide by contract or otherwise for the removal of nuisances, if necessary, at the expense of the District. Ibid. 47. Their duty as to the preparation of the 41. Semble that the power given to the board bonds will be discharged in entire conformity to make and enforce regulations is confined to with the requirements of the statute by makpreventing domestic animals running at large ing them payable in dollars simply, without in the streets, and the sale of unwholesome introducing any qualification therein respectfood; but that this power includes the powering the kind of money in which they are to be to fix penalties for the violation of such regulations, at least in the absence of any legislation on the subject. The enforcement of such penalties, however, must be through the ordinary tribunals and magistracy of the District. Ibid.

42. By the 3d section of the act of July 23, 1866, chap. 215, which remains in full force, no valid license for the sale or disposal of intoxicating drinks within the District of Columbia can be issued without the approval of the Board of Metropolitan Police. Opinion of Dec. 10, 1873, 14 Op. 339.

43. The board is bound to act on all licenses duly presented for approval; but it is not required to approve every license so presented, though as regards such license a full compliance with the other provisions of the license laws is shown. Ibid.

44. The power conferred upon the board is wholly discretionary, and may be exercised by it as the circumstances of each case in its judgment seem to require. Ibid.

IV. Sinking Fund.

45. Upon consideration of the provisions of section 13 of the act of March 3, 1877, chap. 117, section 7 of the act of June 11, 1878, chap. 180, and section 3 of the act of March 3, 1879, chap. 182: Held that a previous requisition on the Secretary of the Treasury by the Commissioners of the District of Columbia is necessary to authorize a warrant for disbursing the sinking fund of the District by the Treasurer of the United States. Opinion of Sept. 29, 1879, 16 Op. 632.

V. Bonds and other Securities of. 46. The act of June 20, 1834, chap. 337, confers no power upon the sinking-fund commis

paid. Ibid.

48. The intention of the act, manifestly, is that the principal and interest of such bonds shall be paid in whatever may constitute, when the payment is to be made, lawful money of the United States. Ibid.

49. The amendment of the 7th section of the act of June 20, 1874, chap. 337, made by the act of February 20, 1875, cháp. 94, supplies by legislative authority, in the particular clause to which it relates, nothing more than what was previously necessary to be supplied by construction, in order to give the clause any meaning or effect whatever, consistent with its obvious purpose. It does not really introduce any modification of the former law, but merely renders the meaning thereof more plain and explicit. Hence the pledge of the faith of the United States, with respect to the payment of the principal and interest of the District of Columbia 3.65 bonds, is not made any more complete thereby, but remains precisely as it was before. Opinion of Mar. 13, 1875, 14 Op. 545.

50. The word "guarantee" does not aptly describe the undertaking of the United States in relation to those bonds; though, practically, such undertaking, when regarded as a security, may be equivalent to an unqualified guarantee; inasmuch as the particular means and sources of revenue by and from which the United States promises to provide for the payment of said bonds, interest and principal, are unquestionably adequate to that end. Ibid.

51. The bonds of the District of Columbia, which the commissioners of the sinking fund of the District were authorized to issue by an act of the District legislative assembly, passed June 20, 1872, are not affected by the provisions of the 16th section of the act of March 3,

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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN STATES-DRAFTS OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.

required aid, which of such persons is the lawful incumbent of the office. Opinion of May 15, 1874, 14 Op. 391.

4. Review of the respective claims of Elisha Baxter and Joseph Brooks-each of whom hav

1875, chap. 162, requiring the destruction by burning of all bonds, sewer-certificates, and other obligations of the cities of Washington and Georgetown and of the District of Columbia, “paid or redeemed," &c., there not having been such a redemption of the first-ing made application for Executive aid to supmentioned bonds as to require them to be destroyed. Opinion of Mar. 29, 1875, 14 Op. 554. 52. Those bonds may be disposed of by the commissioners of the sinking fund agreeably to the provisions of the aforesaid act of the District legislative assembly, subject to the restriction respecting the sale thereof which is imposed by the 10th section of the act of June 20, 1874, chap. 337. Ibid.

53. The faith of the United States is, by section 7 of the act of June 20, 1874, chap. 337, and the amendatory act of February 20, 1875, chap. 94, pledged for the payment of the interest and principal of the bonds known as the 3.65 District of Columbia bouds. Opinion of Oct. 22, 1875, 15 Op. 56.

54. The holders of overdue coupons of the 8 per cent. certificates issued under the act of the legislative assembly of the District of Columbia, approved May 29, 1873, are entitled to interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum; and such interest should be allowed by the Treasurer of the United States where such coupons are tendered in payment of taxes for special improvemements within the said District. Opinion of June 8, 1880, 16 Op. 515.

press an insurrection in Arkansas-to be recognized by the President as governor of that State. And upon consideration of the constitution and laws of the State, the decisions of its highest judicial tribunal, and the actual determination of the controversy between those partics by the general assembly of the State, which, according to the rulings of the said tribunal, had exclusive jurisdiction of the matter in controversy: Advised that Elisha Baxter be recognized by the President as the lawful governor of the State. Ibid.

DOMICILE.

1. The question of the domicile, nationality, or competent forum of a slave, depends on that of his master. Opinion of June 13, 1855, 7 Op.

278.

2. Hence, if a crime be committed by a slave in the Indian country, and his master is a citizen of the United States, he must be tried by the district court. Ibid.

3. But if the slave of a Cherokee commit a crime against a Cherokee, and in the Cherokee Nation, he is triable by the Cherokees. Ibid.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN STATES.

1. Instruction as to alleged obstruction of legal process, indicating what acts are regarded as constituting an emergency to justify the intervention of the armed force of the United States. Letter of Jan. 20, 1854, to United States marshal, 8 Op. 445.

2. Consideration of the circumstances in which the President may employ the military and naval force of the Union to suppress insurrection in one of the States. Opinion of July 19, 1856, 8 Op. 8.

3. Where calls are made upon the President, under section 4, Article IV, of the Constitution, by two persons, each claiming to be governor of the same State, to protect the State against domestic violence, it of necessity devolves upon the President to determine, before giving the

DOWER.

1. Marriage, seisin, and death of the husband are essential to the right of dower. Where the seisin is not sufficiently proved, dower cannot be allowed. Opinion of Jan. 29, 1827, 2 Op. 47.

2. Where land has been mortgaged jointly by husband and wife, the wife is dowable of the equity of redemption, after the death of her husband. Opinion of July 27, 1859, 9 Op.

377.

DRAFTS OF FOREIGN GOVERN-
MENT.

The question whether the United States will pay, according to their original tenor, drafts drawn by the Mexican Government under the

Mesilla convention, or suspend the payment at the subsequent request of said Government, is matter of political not of legal determination. Opinion of Nov. 25, 1855, 7 Op. 599.

DRAWBACK.

See CUSTOMS LAWS, IX.

DUTIES.

See COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION, III; CUSTOMS LAWS; INTERNAL REVENUE.

EASEMENT.

1. The Secretary of the Navy has no authority to grant to the city of Chelsea, Mass., a right to construct and maintain a sewer upon the grounds of the United States naval hospital at that place. To authorize the grant of such right an act of Congress is necessary. Opinion of Oct. 1, 1878, 16 Op. 152.

2. A right to send rays from a light-house across a private close, unobstructed by future erections thereon by the owner, is an easement which must be gained by the United States in the usual way, i. e., by grant, express or implied, from the owner of the close. In the absence of such a grant by the owner, his right to build upon the close remains intact; and, if he is unwilling to make a grant, the United States are left to have recourse, under the law of eminent domain, to condemnation of the property for the public purposes involved. Opinion of Sept. 29, 1879, 16 Op. 631.

EIGHT-HOUR LAW.

ceives in private employment. Opinion of Nov. 25, 1868, 12 Op. 530.

2. The act of June 25, 1868, chap. 72, known as the eight-hour law, has nothing to do with the compensation to be paid to workmen in the navy-yards, that being still left to be determined under the provisions of the act of July 16, 1862, chap. 184, so as to conform, as nearly as is consistent with the public interest, with the rate of wages of private establishments in the immediate vicinity of the respective yards. Opinion of April 20, 1869, 13 Op. 29. 3. There is nothing in the latter statute requiring workmen in the navy-yards to be paid the same price for eight hours' labor which private establishments pay for ten or twelve, unless the amount of services rendered or the quality of work make the fewer hours in the navy-yards equivalent in value to the longer time hired in private establishments, or for

some other reason make it consistent with the public interest. The conclusions of AttorneyGeneral Evarts, in his opinion of November 25, 1868 (12 Op. 520), referred to and approved. Ibid.

4. The act of June 25, 1868, chap. 72, declaring that "eight hours thall constitute a day's work," left the subject of compensation to be regulated upon principles in force at the time of its passage. The President, by proclamation dated May 19, 1869, directed that thereafter no reduction should be made in the wages of Government employés on account of the reduction in the hours of labor: Held that persons serving the Government as laborers, workmen, and mechanics are not entitled to receive, for the period intervening between the date of the act and the date of the proclamation, the wages of a day of ten hours for working eight hours-the Government being under no obligation to pay more for the past because it has agreed to pay more for the future. Opinion of May 31, 1871, 13 Op. 424.

5. The provisions of the act of June 25, 1868, chap. 72, declaring that eight hours shall constitute a day's work for all laborers, workmen, and mechanics employed by or on behalf of the United States, are not applicable to mechanics,

1. The act of June 25, 1868, chap. 72, constituting eight hours a day's work for all Gov-| ernment laborers, does not absolutely require that employés of the Government must receive as high wages for their eight hours' labor as similar industry in private employment re-workmen, and laborers who are in the employceives for a day's labor of ten or twelve hours; but it simply requires that the same worth of labor shall be compensated in the public employment at the same rate of wages that it re

ment of a contractor with the United States. That act was not intended to extend to any others than the immediate employés of the Government. Opinion of May 2, 1872, 14 Op. 37.

statute, may be certified by the AttorneyGeneral as vesting a valid title in the United States. Ibid.

4. The United States cannot take private land for the construction of a road in one of the Territories without some legal form of ex

6. The interpretation of the act of June 25, 1868, chap. 72, commonly called the eighthour law, given in opinion of May 2, 1872, reaffirmed. Opinion of May 18, 1872, 14 Op. 45. 7. Section 2 of the act of May 18, 1872, chap. 172, relating to the settlement of accounts for the services of laborers, workmen, and me-propriation, either by act of Congress or of the chanics employed by the Government between Territory. Opinion of July 7, 1855, 7 Op. 320. June 25, 1868, and May 19, 1869, was designed to have a broad and liberal construction; and, interpreted in this wise, its provisions may be taken to include all persons who were thus employed and paid by the day, although they may not come within the description of "laborers, workmen, and mechanics," regarding these words in their more strict signification. Opinion of Oct. 24, 1872, 14 Op. 128.

8. The circular of the Navy Department of March 21, 1878, announcing that "the Department will contract for the labor of mechanics, foremen, leading-men, and laborers on the basis of eight hours a day," but that all workmen "electing to labor ten hours a day will receive a proportionate increase of their wages," is in accordance with section 3738 Rev. Stat., embodying what is commonly known as the eight-hour law. Opinion of July 9, 1878, 16 Op. 58.

9. That section prescribes the length of time which shall amount to a day's work when no special agreement is made upon the subject. It does not forbid the making of contracts fixing a different length of time as the day's work. Ibid.

EMINENT DOMAIN.

1. The United States may lawfully make title to land in one of the States by expropriation as of the eminent domain of such State, and with assent thereof. Opinion of April 24, 1855, 7 Op. 114.

2. The act of the legislature of Maryland, empowering the United States to acquire land in said State for the use of the Washington aqueduct, is not in conflict with the Constitution either of that State or of the United States. Ibid.

3. The acquisition of land by the United States through the means of a statute process of expropriation is a "purchase," which, if done in strict accordance with the form of the

5. It is in the power of either of the States to take land of its citizens for public use by special act and without intervention of jury, but on payment of reasonable indemnity, ascertained by commissioners. Opinion of Aug. 11, 1856, 8 Op. 31.

6. A public use of the United States is a public use of each of the States of the Union. Ibid.

7. The eminent domain of the Mexican Republic in Texas passed to the new Republic or State, and never vested intermediately in the United States. Opinion of Jan. 26, 1857, 8 Op. 333.

8. If, however, such eminent domain could have been held in suspense, it would have been vested in the State on its admission into the Union, in virtue of the inherent coequality of the several States. Ibid.

9. All lands in America are held by titles derived from the Government, and whether with or without express reservation, are held by the grantee and his assigns subject to the eminent domain of the Government. Ibid.

10. Constitutional provisions for securing indemnity to private persons, for property taken for public uses, impliedly recognize the reserved right of the Government. Ibid.

11. On these points the law is substantially the same, both in Spanish and British America. Ibid.

12. The assessment made by the jury in the proceedings, under the statute of the State of California of February 14, 1859, for the condemnation of land for the erection of fortifications at Lime Point, California, will be accepted by the Government when the amount thereof is paid into the proper county treasury and a deed is demanded for the premises from the sheriff of the county. Opinion of March 20, 1861, 10 Op. 18.

13. The deed for land to which the United States may acquire title by condemnation under the said statute is not required to be approved by the Attorney-General under the joint resolution of September 11, 1841. Ibid.

14. The authorized agent of the United States will be protected, in the payment of the amount assessed by the jury as the value of the land, by taking the receipt of the county treasurer as his voucher for such disbursement. Ibid.

15. It seems that the United States may acquire private property for public use, in conformity with the laws of a State passed in the exercise of its own eminent domain. Opinion of June 26, 1867, 12 Op. 173.

16. Property owned by a State, and held for public uses, is not private property within the meaning of a law of the State providing for compensation to owners of private property appropriated to the use of corporations existing in the State, and such property is not subject to condemnation for the public use of the United States under that law. Ibid.

is a personal privilege, which he may waive. Opinion of March 15, 1825, 1 Op. 706.

4. If consent be given that depositions of witnesses abroad may be used on a trial, the point of time at which the consent shall be expressed will not affect the competency of the testimony. Ibid.

5. A receipt acknowledging that money had been received in part payment for a Virginia military land-warrant, but importing on its face that more was due, is not sufficient evidence of assignment; it is only evidence of an incomplete contract. Opinion of Aug. 31, 1827, 2 Op. 56.

6. Our courts hold that foreign laws are matters of fact, and should be proved like other facts. Opinion of Oct. 16, 1828, 2 Op. 168. 7. A receipt, dated 1785, acknowledging the receipt of money in part payment of a Vir

ment, nor is it evidence of an assignment. Opinion of Oct. 13, 1829, 2 Op. 276.

17. The mode of acquiring lands by the ex-ginia military warrant, is not per se an assignercise of the right of eminent domain can be resorted to only in cases where provision is made therefor by statute. Opinion of July 30, 1870, 16 Op. 370.

ENLISTMENT.

See ARMY, XVI; NAVY, XII.

ENROLLMENT OF VESSELS. See COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION, II.

EVIDENCE.

1. It is not the right of offenders on trial for violation of the laws of the United States to call upon the officers of the Government to exculpate themselves from charges that such officers had given their sanction to the offensive proceedings. Opinion of March 18, 1806, 5 Op. 695.

2. Where payment was to be made, under act of May 24, 1824, chap. 144, for the relief of certain assignees: Held that the notes of the assignor exhibited by the assignees were prima facie evidence of the debt, though the administrator might controvert it. Opinion of Aug. 13, 1824, 1 Op. 692.

3. The rule of law that no evidence shall be given against a prisoner except in his presence

8. There is no law which makes entries in the books of the paymaster of the Marine Corps, charging officers of that corps with sums of money, admissible as evidence in the settlement of their accounts. Opinion of Feb. 17, 1830, 2 Op. 319.

9. Depositions should not be admitted in courts-martial, except under certain restrictions, and in cases not capital. Such courts should adhere to rules of evidence established in courts of common law jurisdiction. Opinion of June 4, 1830, 2 Op. 344.

10. Legal evidence from competent sources (excluding the oaths of claimants and all interested parties) is what is intended by the word "proof" contained in the act of the 29th May, 1830, chap. 208. Opinion of June 21, 1836, 3 Op. 126.

11. The commissioner may prescribe the mode and kind of proof, how and by whom it should be taken, but cannot prescribe anything as proof which is not such in fact, nor any rule as to its weight and force. Ibid.

12. The Department of War may receive any credible evidence, written or oral, coming from any disinterested source, which may tend to establish the fact that Choctaw heads of families signified to the agent, within due time, their intention to remain and become citizens of the States. 1836, 3 Op. 134.

Opinion of June 27,

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