affords no ground for belligerent recognition; it is not belligerency in the technical sense. If neutral States can be prevailed on to exchange neutrality for single intervention, the case will, of course, be altered, and belligerency may again be recognised. France and England, by intervening in favour of Poland, could, at any time, have given a jural character to her struggles against Russia; but they could not have recognised Poland as a belligerent, without coming to her aid, because such belligerency could have had no adequate basis in fact. In the case of the Southern States of America, on the other hand, there was a measure of political life and organisation which seemed to give chances of success sufficient to justify belligerent recognition. The Southern States professed to fight as one single political entity, and did so fight, very bravely, up to the point at which they abandoned the unequal struggle.

Again, in the case of mutual political exhaustion, belligerent recognition jurally ceases at the point at which jura universalia or jura privata are encroached on. The law of nations spreads her wings over the interests of humanity, and shelters the sanctity of the hearth and the home. When States in paroxysms of hatred or fanaticism begin to feed the conflagration with the elements of human life and progress, the period for double intervention has arrived.

I am quite aware that in accepting the modern doctrine of the exclusively public character of belligerency, or, in other words,

much as Irishmen, unless the Imperial Treasury shows more liberality to Scottish institutions than it has done for many years past, we shall probably soon have a cry for Financial Autonomy.

that " war is a relation of a State to a State and not of an individual to an individual,” I am conceding what Mr Hall1 justly observes has been claimed as "the argumentative starting-point of attack on the right of capture of private property at sea." Whether it be a starting-point which justifies that attack, is a question which I reserve for future consideration.

For the present I shall assume that jura publica alone are at stake, and the rule with reference to jura publica seems to be that belligerent recognition warrants their entire exhaustion, but that it does not travel beyond them either into the wider region of universal human rights, or into the narrower region of individual rights. The question of the limits of jural belligerency thus identifies itself with the question of the limits of State right; and this question, as it seems to me, will be best determined by eliminating from the rights of the State those which, though manifested in the concrete within its borders, belong either to mankind as a whole, or to man as a person.

CHAPTER XI.

JURA UNIVERSALIA ARE EXEMPTED FROM THE RIGHTS WHICH

BELLIGERENCY CONFERS.

In studying the doctrine of recognition, we have seen that the separate existence to which the State lays claim is not an isolated existence. On the contrary, it is an existence which

1 International Law, p. 60.

binds it to the members of the family into which it is admitted by new duties corresponding to the new rights which it recognises.

These new rights and new duties are, as it were, the tendrils by which it clings to, or rather the ducts by which it draws nutriment from the parent stem, and it is on their preservation that the permanence of its international existence depends. Now these rights, with their corresponding duties, consist in the mutual recognition by the recognised State and the recognising States of the ultimate objects of human existence, and in their mutual respect for the means by which humanity struggles on to the attainment of these objects. In allowing the State to assume a character of conditional independence, and emancipating it from the restraints of that guardianship which, as we have seen, is the jural relation between civilised and barbarous States, the recognising States reserve to themselves, for the common benefit, certain rights of supervision, closely analogous to those which the State itself reserves over its free and adult citizens.

International, like national citizenship, involves duties by the States which are its recipients, both to humanity in the aggregate and to the human individual, and places both classes of duties under the protection of the recognising States. As national citizenship can be jurally exercised only in accordance with the rights of the nation (jura publica) and the rights of the individual (jura privata), so international citizenship can be exercised only under the corresponding obligations which international recognition imposes. Let us try, then, to define these obligations.

Of the persons and things which the laws of war remove from the arena of international strife, on the ground that the rights of humanity, as represented by recognising States, override those of the separate States recognised, the following enumeration may perhaps suffice.

(A) Persons.

1. The clergy or ministers of all religions.—This exemption rests on the assumption that, whatever may be the value of religious teaching in other respects, its tendency will be to inculcate a morality higher than that of the community to which it is addressed. The law of nations being an ethical and not a theocratic system, does not presume to enter the theological field, and expressly repudiates all wars for the propagation of dogma or of ritual. The Thirty Years' War, like the present German conflict with Ultramontanism, was professedly a political, not a religious war; and even as regards Mahometanism, or heathenism, it is only in so far as the immorality of their doctrines is politically manifested that their ministers sink to the level of ordinary non-combatants.

2. The clerisy, or cultivators of science, learning, and art, which know no political boundaries.

3. Legislators and ministers of State, including sovereigns, except when engaged in the direct performance of military duties.

4. Judges, magistrates, and practising lawyers, on the ground that they are engaged in administering the municipal system which the interests of humanity demand till another be established.

Even in the case of semi-barbarous States like Turkey, the

municipal law of which is not recognised by the States which profess to recognise its political existence, this rule applies; and some respect, beyond that shown to ordinary non-combatants, might be fairly claimed even for a Turkish kadi, on the ground that the law which he is supposed to administer to his fellow-countrymen is preferable to no law at all.

5. Physicians and surgeons, apothecaries, dressers and nurses in hospitals, and all other medical persons, whether engaged in private practice, or serving in the field.

It is in the name of humanity that the Red Cross Association steps in between the combatants and lays claim to the wounded indiscriminately on both sides.

6. Correspondents of the press.

In addition to the officials of the Croix Rouge1 as the representatives of neutral beneficence, there is another class of representatives whose recent appearance on the scene of conflict marks the growth of sympathy and the increasing sense of responsibility on the part both of neutral and belligerent nations. Before quitting the subject of those rights which, in virtue of their universality, transcend the rights of belligerency, it thus becomes important that we should determine the jural position of those non-combatant critics and reporters whose labours now exercise so great an influence on the communities who are the ultimate repositories of the powers which, for the time being, have been confided to the armies in the field.

The system of military reporting, as a private enterprise carried on by newspapers, began with the brilliant letters to

1 La Croix Rouge, son passé et son avenir, par Gustave Moynier, 1882. VOL. II.

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