peace, fimply, and without any reftitution or compenfation whatever, except fuch as might poffibly refult from the application of the prin ciple declared at the end of the fourth article of the memorial already delivered to the Minifter for Foreign Affairs.

But if, during the negotiation, any alteration shall take place in the ftate of things in this refpest, it will then be proper to agree upon the reftitutions and compenfations to be made on each fide.

With regard to the Kepublic of the United Provinces, his Britannic Majetty and his Allies find themfelves too nearly interested in the political fituation of thofe Provinces to be able to confent in their favour to the re-citablishment of the flatus ante bellum, as with refpect to terri oral poffeffions, unlefs France could, on her part, re-initate them in all respects in the fame political fituation in which they stood before the war.

If at leaft it were poffible to re-establish in those Provinces, agreeably to what is believed to be the wifh of a great majority of the inhabitants, their ancient conftitution and form of government, his Majefty might then be difpofed to relax, in their favour, from a very confiderable part of the conditions on which the present state of things obliges him to infift.

Bu if, on the contrary, it is with the Republic of Holland in its prefent ftare, that their Britannic and Imperial Majefties will have to treat, they will feel themselves obliged to feek, in territorial acquifitions, thofe compenfations, and that fecurity, which such a state of things will have rendered indifpenfible to them.

Reftitutions of any kind, in favour of Holland, could in that cafe be admitted in o far only as they fhall be compenfated by arrangements calculated to contribute to the fecurity of the Auftrian Netherlands. The means of accomplishing this object will be found in the ceffions which France has exacted in her Treaty of Peace with Holland, and the poífethon of which by that Power would in any cafe be obfolutely incompatible with the fecurity of the Austrian Netherlands in the hands of his Imperial Majetty.

It is on thefe principles that his Britannic Majetty would be ready to treat for the re-enablifhment of peace with the Republic of Holland in its prefent fa e. The details of such a discussion must neceffarily lead to the confideration of what would be due to the intereft and the rights of the House of Orange.

My Lord,

Letter addreffed by Lord Malmesbury to the Right Honourable Lord Grenville. Paris, Dec. 20, 1796. R. Ellis returned here from London on Thurfday lait, the 15th inftant, at five P. M. and delivered to me the difpatches, No. 11 and 12, with which he was charged by your Lordship.

MR

Although nothing can be clearer, more ably drawn up, or more fatisfactory than the inftructions they contain, yet as it was of the latt importance that I fhould be completely matter of the fubject before I faw the French Minister, I delayed afking for a conference till late on Friday evening, with a view that it should not take place till Satur. day morning.

Ile appointed the hour of eleven A. M. on that day, and it was near one before we parted. Although what is faid by M. Delacroix before he has communica ed with the Directory cannot be confidered as officially binding, and probably may, in the event, be very different from what I fhall hear when he speaks to me in their name, yet as it is impoflible they fhould not nearly conjucture the nature of the overtures I hall make, and of course be prepared in fome degree for them,

it is material that your Lordship fhould be accurately acquainted with the first impreffions they appear to make on M. Delacroix.

I prefaced what I had to communicate with faying, that I now came authorized to enter with him into deliberation upon one of the mott important fubje&ts that perhaps ever was brought into difcuffion; that its magnitude forbade all fineffe, excluded all prevarication; fufpended all prejudices, and that, as I had it in command to speak and act with freedom and truth, I expected that he, on his part, would confider thefe as the only means which could or ought to be employed, if he wished to fee a negotiation, in which the happinefs of millions was involved, terminate fuccesfully: That, for greater precision, and with a view to be clearly understood in what I was about to propofe I would give him a confidential memorial, accompained by an official note, both which, when he had perufed them, would freak for themfelves. The memorial contained the conditions, on the accomplishment of which his Majefty confidered the refloration of peace to depend. The note was expreflive of his Majefty's readinefs to enter into any explanation required by the Directory on the fubject, or to receive any contre-projet refting on the fame bafis, which the Directory might be difpofed to give in: That, moreover, I did not hefitate declaring to him, in conformity to the principles which I had laid down, and from which I certainly never fhould depart at any period of the Negotiation, that I was prepared to answer any questions, explain and elucidate any points, on which it was poffible to forefee that doubt or mifconceptions could arife on the confideration of thefe papers. And having faid thus much, I had only to remark, that I believed, in no fimilar negotiation which had ever taken place, any Miniter was authorized, in the first instance, to go fo fully into the difcuffion as I now was: That I was fure neither the truth of this remark, nor the manifeft conclufions to be drawn from it, would efcape M. Delacroix's obfervation.

I then put the two papers into his hands. He began by reading the note, on which of courfe he could only expreis fatisfaction. After perufing the confidential memorial with all the attention it deferved, he, after a fhort pause, faid, that it appeared to him to be liable to infurmountable objections; that it feemed to him to require much more than it conceded, and, in the event, not to leave France in a fituation of proportional greatnefs to the Powers of Europe. He faid, the Act of their Conftitution, according to the manner in which it was interpreted by the beft Publicifts (and this phrafe is worthy remark), made it impoffible for the Republic to do what we required. The Auftrian Netherlands were annexed to it; they could not be difpofed of without flinging the nation into all the confution which muft follow a convocation of the Primary Affemblies; and he faid, he was rather furprifed that Great Britain fhould bring this forward as the goveining condition of the Treaty, fince he thought he had, in fome of our late converfations, fully explained the nature of their Conditution to me. I replied, that every thing I had heard from him on this point was perfectly in my recollection, as it probably was in his, that though I had liftened to him with that attention I always afforded to every thing he faid, yet I had never made him any fort of reply, and had neither admitted nor controverted his opinion: That although I believed I could easily difprove this opinion from the fpirit of the French Constitution itself, yet the difcuffion of that Conftitution was perfectly foreign to the object of my miffion; fince, even allowing his two pofitions, viz. that the retroceflion of the Auftrian Netherlands was in. compatible with their laws, and that we ought to have known that beforehand; yet that there exifted a droit public in Europe, paramount

to

to any droit public they might think proper to establish within their own dominions; and that if their Conflitution was publicly known, the treaties exifting between his Majelly and the Emperor were at least equally public, and in thefe it was clearly and diftin&tly announced, that the two Contracting Parties reciprocally promife not to lay down their arms without the restitution of all the dominions, territories, &c. which may have belonged to either of them before the war: That the date of this tipulation was previous to their annexing the Auftrian Nether. lands to France; and the notoriety of this ought, at the very moment when they had paffed that law, to have covinced them, that, if adhered to, it must prove an infurmountable obstacle to peace. I applied his maxim to the Weft India iflands, and to the fettl ments in the Eaft Indies; and asked him, Whether it was expected that we were to wave our right of poffeffion, and he required fill to confider them as integral parts of the French Republic, which must be restored, and on which no value was to be fet in the balance of compenfation?

I also stated the pollible cafe of France having loft part of what she deemed her integral dominions, instead of having added to them in the course of the war, and whether then, under the apprehension of still greater loffes, the Government, as it was now compofed, should confider itself as not vested with powers sufficient to fave their country from the impending danger, by making peace on the conditions of facrificing a portion of their dominions to fave the remainder? M. Delacroix daid, this was ftating a cafe of neceffity, and fuch a mode of reafoning did not attach to the prefent circumftances. I readily admitted the firt part of this propofition, but contended, that if the power exifted in a cafe of neceffity, it equally exitted in all others, and particularly in the cate before us, fince he himself had repeatedly told me, that peace was what this country and its Government withed for, and even wanted.

M. Delacroix, in reply, fhifted his ground, and by a string of arguments founded on premifes calculated for this purpose, attempted to prove, that, from the relative fituation of the adjacent countries, the prefent Goverment of France would be reprehensible in the extreme, and deferve impeachment if they ever permitted the Netherlands to be feparated from their dominions; that by the partition of Poland, Ruffia, Auftria, and Pruffia had increafed their power to a moft formidable degree? that England, by its conquefts, and by the activity and judgment with which it governed its colonies had doubled its strength.

Your Indian empire alone, faid M. Delacroix with vehemence, has enabled you to fubfidize all the Powers of Europe against us, and your monopoly of trade has put you in poffeffion of a fund of inexhauftible wealth. His words were, «Votre empire dans l'Inde vous a fourni les moyens de falarier toutes les Puiffances contre nous, et vous avez accapare le commerce de miniere que toutes les richeffes du monde fe verient dans vos coffres."

From the neceflity that France fhould keep the Netherlands, and the left bank of the Rhine, for the purpose of preferving its relative fituation in Europe, he paled to the advantages which he contended would refult to the other Powers by such an addition to the French dominions. Belgium (to ufe his words), by belonging to France, would remove what had been the fource of all wars for two centuries paft; and the Rhine being the natural boundary of France, would enfure the tranquillity of Europe for two centuries to come. I did not feel it neceffary to combat this prepofterous doctrine; I contented myself with reminding him of what he had faid to me in one of our last conferences, when he made a comparison of the weaknets of France under its monarchs, and its ftrength and vigour under its Republican form of Government. "Nous

ne

the fommes plus dans la decrepitude de la France Monarchique, mais dans toute la force d'une Republique adolefcente," was his expreffion and I inferred, from this, according to his own reafoning, that the force and power France had acquired by its change of government was much greater than it could derive from any acquifition of territory; and that it followed, if France, when under a regal form of government, was a very just and constant object of attention, not to fay of jealoufy, to the other Powers of Europe, France (admitting his axiom) was a much more reasonable object of jealoufy and attention, under its prefent Conftitution, than it ever had yet been, and hat no addition to its dominions could be feen by its neighbours but under impreffions of alarin for their own future fafety, and for the general tranquillity of Europe. M. Delacroix's anfwer to this was fo remarkable that I muft beg leave to infert it in what I believero be nearly his own words: "Dans le tems revolutionaire tout ce que vous dites, my Lord, e oit vrai---rien n'égaloit notre puiffance; mais ce tems n'existe plus. Nous ne pouvons plus lever la nation en maffe pour voler au lecours de la patrie en danger. Nous ne pouvons plus engager nos concitoyens d'ouvir leurs bourfes pour le verfer dans le trefor national, et de fe priver même du nec ffaire pour le bien de la chofe publique." And he ended by faying, that the French Republic, when at peace. neceffarily mult become the moft quiet and pacific power in Europe. I only obferved, that in this cafe, the paffage of the Republic from youth to decrepitude had been very fudden; but that still I never could admit that it could be a matter of indifference to its neighbours, much leis one neceffary fecurity to itfelf, to acquire fuch a very extensive addition to its frontiers as that he had hinted at.

This led Monf. Delacroix to talk of offering an equivalent to the Emperor for the Auftrian Netherlands; and it was to be found, according to his plan, in the fecularization of the three ecclefiaftical Electorates, and several Bishopricks in Germany and in Italy.

He talked upon this fubject as one very familiar to him, and on which his thoughts had been frequently employed.

He spoke of making new electors, and named, probably with a view to render his fcheme more palatable, the Stad holder, and the Dukes of Brunswick and Wurtemberg, as perfons proper to replace the three ec clefiaftical Electors which were to be re-formed.

It would be making an ill ufe of your Lord@hip's time to endeavour to repeat to you all he faid on this fubject; it went in fubftance (as he himfelf confeffed) to the total fubversion of the prefent Conftitution of the Germanic body; and as it militated directly against the principle which both his Majeity and the Emperor laid down to diftinctly as the basis of the peace to be made for the empire, I contented myself with reminding him of this circumftance, particularly as it is impoffible to difcufs this point with any propriety till his Imperial Majesty becomes a party to the negotiation. I took this opportunity of hinting, that if on all the other points France agreed to the proposals now made, it would not be impos ble that fome increafe of territory might be ceded to her on the Ger manic fide of her frontiers, and that this, in addition to the Dutchy of Savoy, Nice, and Avignon, would be a very great acquifition of ftrength and power. Monfieur Delacroix here again reverted to the Conit tution, and faid, that the fe countries were already conftitutionally annexed to France. I replied, that it was impoffible, in the negotiation which we were beginning, for the other Powers to take it up from any period but that which immediately preceded the war, and that any acquifition or diminution of territory which had taken place amongit the Belligerent Powers since it first broke out, mut neceffarily become fubject matter for negotiation, and be balanced against each, other in the final arrange

ment

ment of a general peace. "You then perfift," said M. Delacroix, « in applying this principle to Belgium?" I answered, "Moft certainly; and I fhould not deal fairly with you, if I hesitated to declare, in the outfet of our negotiation, that on this point you must entertain no expectation that his Majesty will relax, or ever consent to fee the Netherlands remain a part of France."

M. Delacroix replied, he faw no profpect in this cafe of our ideas ever meeting, and he defpared of the fuccefs of our negotiation. He returne ed again, however, to his idea of a poflible equivalent to be found for the Emperor; but as all he propofed was the alienation or dismember. ment of countries not belonging to France, even by conqueft, I did not confider it as deferving attention, and it is certainly not worth repeating to your Lord.hip.

I need no obferve that all the equivalents propofed, however inadequate to the exchange, were offered as a return for our confent that the Netherlands fhould remain part of France; of course the admitting them in any fhape would have been in direct contradiction to my inftructions. M. Delacroix touched very flightly on Italy, and the courfe of our converfation did not bring this part of the subject more into difcuffion.

I must add, that whenever I mentioned the restoration of the Netherlands to the Emperor, I always took care it should be understood that thefe were to be accompanied by fuch fur her ceflions as fhould form a competent line of defence, and that France could not be permitted to keep poffeffion of all the intermediate country to the Rhine; and I particularly dwelt on this point, when I held out the poffibility of admitting an extension of the limits of France on the fide of Germany. But as the French Minifter no lefs ftrenuously opposed the reftitution of the Netherlands to the Emperor, than I tenacioufly infifted upon it, the further extension of my claim could not of course become a fubject of argument.

I believe I have now, with a tolerable degree of accuracy, informed your Lordship of all that the French Minifter faid on my opening myfelf to him on that part of my intructions which more immediately relatesto Peace between Great Britain, his Imperial Majefty, and France. It remains with me to inform your Lordship what paffed between us on the fubject of our refpective allies.

On the articles referving a right to the Court of St. Petersburgh, and to that of Lisbon, to accede to the Treaty of Peace on the ftrict ftatus ante bellum, the French Minifter made no other remark than mentioning the Allies of the Republic, and by inquiring whether I was prepared to fay any thing relative to their interefts, which certainly the Republic could never abandon. This afforded me the opportunity of giving in the confidential Memorial B. relative to Spain and Holland, and I prefaced it by repeating to him the tubftance of the first part of your Lordship's No. 12.

Although I had touched upon the fubject of the Spanish part of St Domingo, when I had been fpeaking to M. Delacroix on the Peace with France, yet as it did not become a matter of dicuffion between us till I came to mention the Peace with Spain, I thought it better to place all that paffed on the fubject in this part of my difpatch; it was the only point on which he entered; but I by no means infer from his not bringing forward fome claims for Spian, that we are not to hear of any in the courfe of the negotiation; on the contrary, I have little doubt that many, and moft of them inadmiffible, will be made before' it can end. He, however, was filent on them at this moment, and con- " hed all he had to fay to combating the idea that Spain was bound by the Treaty of Utretcht not to allienate her poffeffions in America.