demand? But was not the measure adopted by Minifters of at laft paying off the advances of the Bank, a fufficient proof that they diftrufted these theories? The Chancellor of the Exchequer formerly boafted of the facility with which money was raifed, and the low rate of intereft at which he borrowed; but was it more difficult to pay off the advances of the Bank when money could be borrowed at 4 per cent. than now when it is feven?

In neglecting the means of faving the Bank from the neceffity of ftopping payment, the Chancellor of the Exchequer had been guilty of a moft culpable breach of duty. Admitting even that the Bank was wrong in narrowing its discounts, was it not independent, and entitled to manage its own affairs? In not paying the advances which compelled them to fuch a conduct, the Minifter, by whofe fault it was occafioned, is responfible for the confequences. Here then he fubmitted to the Houfe the charge and the evidence on which it refted for their decifion; though it was perfonally directed against the Chancellor of the Exchequer, he did not mean to felect him alone from the rest of his colleagues, who were equally amenable to the juftice of their country. However the talents of an individual might render him fitter to carry it into execution, yet the fyftem was common. It was that fyftem of unremitting malevolence which had commenced with his Majefty's reign, and which had pervaded every part of Public Administration which he attacked. To this fyftem it was owing that we had loft America; to this fyftem was the prefent war to be afcribed; to this fyftem was to be afcribed that determined hoftility to the principles of freedom which every public measure had marked. Hence arofe that rancour which enflamed with the prospect of gratifying its deteftable hopes, and which had in the moment of fuccefs neglected every opportunity of concluding peace; to this spirit, unchaftifed by misfortune, unenlightened by experience, was owing the defperate refufal to put an end to the war, which had brought us to a ftate of things when he could no longer be fanguine that any man could make peace; when, leaft of all, it could be exepected under the aufpices of the prefent Minifters. That fyftem which loft America, had Minifters carried into Ireland, and amidst all the diftreffes in which we were plunged, it was to be added that in the prefent moment there might be reafon to apprehend that this invaluable jewel was loft to the British Crown. Oh, for fome warning voice, to proclaim to Minifters the danger and the ruin with which their fyftem is pregnant! In every thing their mean and miferable policy had been disappointed. They had tried to divide the people of Ireland by their religious principles, and they

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were now united against common oppreffion. If Ministers thought that by granting a little to withhold a great deal, they would not fucceed. Such pitiful evafions and shuffling policy could no longer be attended with fuccefs. Thefe points he had introduced that the Houfe might fee the confequences of the want of good faith in public men. They had experienced the bad effects of pursuing a fyftem contrary to good faith. Under the conduct of Minifters, it had brought us to the brink of ruin. The fyftem would be complete, if the profligate fyftem of an Administration was crowned with the fanction of Parliament. He concluded with moving the following refolutions.

1. That the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Bank, < did, at various times, and in the moft forcible terms, represent to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the danger arifing to the < Bank from the diminution of its Specie.

2. That it appears that during this period the Directors of ‹ the Bank frequently remonftrated with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on the magnitude of their advances to Government, anxiously requiring payment, or a confiderable reduction of the ‹ fame; and that the Chancellor of the Exchequer did again and again, in the moft explicit terms, promife that reduction should ❝ be made.

3. That the Chancellor of the Exchequer, inftead of per'forming the engagements did continually folicit further accom'modation, in the most anxious and preffing terms; declaring • that it was impoffible to avoid the most serious embarraffment to the public fervice, unlefs the Directors of the Bank afforded the affiftance he required.

4. That it appears, that although by these means the Directors of the Bank were induced to comply with his demands, they generally expreffed their reluctance in ftrong language; and that they at laft, that is to fay, on the 28th of July, 1796, thought it neceffary, for their own juftification, to requeft the 'Chancellor of the Exchequer to lay before his Majefty's Cabi'net their most serious and folemn remonftrance, in which they declare that, "fenfible of the alarming and dangerous state of "public credit, nothing could induce them to comply with the "demand then made upon them, but the dread that their refusal "might be productive of a greater evil."

5. That it appears, that during the above period, a confiderable portion of the Bank advances was occafioned by payments of Bills of Exchange drawn on the Treasury from • abroad.

6. That it appears, that it had seldom been the custom of ⚫ the Bank of England to advance on the account of such Bills, more than from 20,000l. to 30,000l. and that even during the

American

< American war fuch Bills never exceeded at any one time the fum of 150,000l. The wifdom of our ancestors having forefeen and provided against the mifchief of fimilar advances, by a Claufe in an Act palled in the 5th year of William and Mary; by which the Governor and Company of the Bank of England were restrained from advancing money to Government on any ' other fecurities than thofe on which a credit is granted by Parliament.

7. That it appears, that from and after the year 1793, at which time an Act of Parliament paffed, containing a Claufe by which the Directors of the Bank are indemnified for the advances they had made on Bills drawn from abroad, and exempted in future from the penalties of the faid Act of • William and Mary, refpecting fuch advances to Government, the amount of Treasury Bills paid at the Bank continued pro'greffively to increafe, and that between the 1st of January, 1795, and the 25th of February, 1797, fums to the amount of upwards of 15,000,000l. were at different periods advanced to Government upon this head.

8. That it appears, that the Directors of the Bank did, at various times, during the years 1795, 1796, and 1797, apply to the Chancellor of the Exchequer for repayment of such advances, and reprefented to him the extreme inconvenience to themselves and to the public, of continuing the fyftem of making Treasury Bills payable at the Bank; and that they even declared they conceived it to be "an unconftitutional mode of raifing money, and what they were not warranted by their charter to "confent to."

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9. That it appears, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer did, at various times, during that period, promife to reduce the advances on that head within the fum of 500,000l. and likewife fo to arrange his payments as to put an end to the account; but that, nevertheless, the faid promifes were not adhered to by him, and that the advances on Treafury Bills, during the whole period from January 1795, to the 28th of February, 1797, amounted on an average to the fum of 1,320,000l. and upwards, and on the day laft mentioned flood at 1,619,049).

10. That it appears to this Houfe, that foreign remittances to a much larger amount than ever were known in a fimilar period of the most expenfive wars in which this country has been involved, have taken place fince the year 1793.

11. That the extent of fuch remittances, occafioned at fo early a period as the end of the year 1794, and the beginning of the year 1795, great alarm in the minds of the Directors, which they at various periods communicated to the Chancellor of the Exchequer; and that on the 3d of December, 1795, the

Court

Court of Directors, under the apprehenfion that it was intended to grant a further Loan to the Emperor, came to a Refolution by which they declared it their unanimous opinion, that fhould fuch a Loan take place, it would be most fatal in its 'confequences to the Bank of England. That they communicated fuch Refolution to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who aflured them he fhould lay afide all thoughts of it, unless the fituation of things relative to the Bank fhould fo alter as to render such a Loan of no importance or inconvenience to them.

12. That on the 5th of February, 1796, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, after ftating, in converfation with the Governor and Deputation from the Bank of England, his opinion of the neceffity of further affifting the Emperor, promifed however to take no ftep in that bufinets without previoufly communicating to them his intention.

13. That on the 11th of February, 1796, the Directors of the Bank pafied unanimously the following Refolutions:

"Refolved, That it is the opinion of this Court, founded upon "the experience of the effects of the late Imperial Loan, that, if

any further Loan or advance of money to the Emperor, or to "any other foreign State, fhould, in the prefent ftate of affairs, "take place, it will in all probability prove fatal to the Bank " of England.

"The Court of Directors, therefore, do most earnestly de"precate the adoption of any fuch meafure, and they folemnly "proteft against any refponfibility for the calamitous confe"quences that may follow thereupon."

To which Resolution, when communicated to him, the 'Chancellor of the Exchequer returned for anfwer, "That, "after the repeated intimations which he had given to the Go"vernor, &c. of the Bank, that no further Loan to the Empe"ror would be refolved on without previous communication "with the Bank, he did not fee any reafon for thefe Refolutions; "that he did fuppofe they were adopted in a moment of alarm, " and that he should confider them in that light."

14. That, both from the general tenor of the faid answer and from its particular reference to the fubftance and matter of the Refolutions then communicated to him, he gave the Governor, &c. of the Bank to underftand that he was bound by promife to them to negotiate no Loan for the fervice of his Imperial Majefty, nor to make any remittance either to his faid Imperial Majefty or any foreign prince, under any pretence whatfoever, without previoully communicating fuch his 'intention to the Bank of England; that the Directors fo understood him, and that, in their opinion, unlefs his anfwer

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to this Refolution was meant to apply to the whole of its contents, the conduct of the Chancellor of the Exchequer was 'difingenuous.

15. That nevertheless the Chancellor of the Exchequer for 'fome time prior to February 11, 1796, clandeftinely remitted, and did for feveral months fubfequent, clandeftinely remit for various foreign fervices, large fums of money, in defiance of his repeated promifes, and particularly in violation of the engagements which were implied in the affurances given by him the Bank of England upon their Refolution of the 11th February.

16. That it appears that if the faid advances of the Bank to Government had been paid off when required, or confiderably reduced, the Bank would have been enabled to reduce, if expedient, the amount of its outstanding notes; and that fuch option would have been of effential fervice to its interefts. 18. That it appears from the evidence of the perfons con'nected with the Bank, that if the said advances had been paid off when required, or confiderably reduced, the Bank would have been enabled to give more extended aid to the mercantile intereft of Great Britain in the way of discount.

18. That it appears that if the advances on Treasury Bills had been paid off when required, and as the Chancellor of the Exchequer had promifed, and the foreign remittances abftained from, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer had likewife promifed, there would have exifted no neceffity for the Order of Council.

19. That it appears to this House upon the most attentive 'confideration of the circumstances above stated, that the Chan'cellor of the Exchequer has been guilty of a criminal inattention to the public intereft, and a high breach of duty, by which the credit of the nation has been materially impaired.'

The Chancellor of the Exchequer, before entering upon the extenfive fubject which was embraced by the speech of the Honourable Gentleman who had juft fat down, thought proper to say a few words on the preliminary topic upon which he had touched. He had begun with ftating his diffent from the opinion of the Secret Committee, and from what he supposed to be the almoft unanimous opinion of the House, that Government were not juftifiable, under all the circumftances of the cafe, in issuing the Order of the 26th of February, prohibiting the Bank from paying their notes in fpecie. The opinion of the Honourable Gentleman was, that it would have been better that the Bank should have been drained of their last guinea, than that this Order should have been interpofed. As he (Mr. Pitt) found, however, that the Committee were unanimously of a different opinion, that the

House