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His Grace sat down, having moved the first of the following Resolutions :
1. • That it appears to this House that subsequent to the month of June, 1795, and during the year 1796, a great diminution (was experienced in the Specie of the Bank of England.
2. “ That the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Bank, did, at various times, represent to the Chancellor of the Ex
chequer, the danger to the Bank from the diminution of its - Specie, particularly at the following periods : irth,
Do. Ditto 18th,
Nov, Ditto 3d,
Dec. Ditto 15th and 16th, Jan. 1796. . 28th,
Do, Do. gth and 8th, Feb. Do. I rith,
Do. Do. 8th, 10th, 2ift, Feb. 1797. 3. "That it appears that during these periods the Directors of & the Bank frequently remonstrated with the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, on the magnitude of their advances to Government, Ganxiously requiring payınent, or a considerable reduction of the - same; but, that nevertheless, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, - not only neglected to comply with the object of those remon
strances, but usually under pretence of the necessity of the pubclic service, renewed his demands for further aid ; and that un<der the exigency of the case, as stated to them by the Chancel<lor of the Exchequer, the Directors of the Bank were from time (to time, induced to consent to further accommodation.
4. ' That it appears that the Chancellor of the Exchequer « frequently folicited such further accommodation, in the most 6 anxious and presling terms; declaring that it was impossible
to avoid the most serious embarrassment to the public service, (unless the Directors of the Bank afforded the assistance he re?quired.
5. ' That it appears, that although by these means the Di. Srectors of the Bank were induced to comply with his demands, (they generally expressed their reluctance in strong language ; cand that they at last, that is to say, on the 28th of July, 1796,
thought it necessary, for their own justification, to request the Chancellor of the Exchequer to lay before his Majesty's Cabinet their most serious and solemn remonstrance, in which they s declare that, “ sensible of the alarming and dangerous state of 5 public credit, nothing could induce them to comply with the
“ demand then made upon them, but the dread that their refusal “might be productive of a greater evil.”
6.That it appears, that during the above period, a considerable portion of the Bank advances was occasioned by payiments of Bills of Exchange drawn on the Treasury from abroad.
7. - That it appears, that it had seldom been the custom of the Bank of England to advance on the account of such Bills, more than from 20,000l. to 30,000l. and that even during the (American war such Bills never exceeded at any one time the sum of 150,000l. The wildom of our ancestors having foreseen and provided against the mischief of similar advances, by a Clause in an Aet patled in the 5th year of William and Mary ; by which the Governor and Company of the Bank of England were restrained from advancing any lums of money, other than con such Funds on which a credit is granted by Parliament.
8. (That it appears, that from and after the year 1793, at (which time an Act of Parliament passed, containing a Clause (by which the Directors of the Bank are indemnified for the ( advances they had made out of the Bills drawn from abroad,
and exempted in future from the penalties of the said Act of (William and Mary, respecting such advances to Government, (the amount of Treasury Bills paid at the Bank continued pro'gressively to increase, and that between the ist of January, .
1795, and the 25th of February, 1797, sums to the amount of upwards of 15,000,000l. were at different periods advanced to Government upon this head.
9. "That it appears, that the Directors of the Bank did, at various times, during the years 1795, 1796, and 1797, apply to the Chancellor of the Exchequer for repayment of such ada (vances, and represented to him the ruinous consequences to
themselves and to the public, of continuing the system of making • Treasury Bills payable at the Bank; and they even declared
they conceived it to be " an unconstitutional mode of raising « money, and what they were not warranted by their charter to « consent to.”
19. « That it appears, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer • did, at various times, in that period, undertake to reduce the
advances on that head within the sum of 500,000l. and like'wife fo to arrange his payments as to put an end to the account; (but that, nevertheless, the said promises never were kept by
him, and that the advances on Treasury Bills, on the 28th of • February, 1797, amounted to 1,619,0491.
11. «That it appears to this House, that foreign remittances "to a much larger amount than ever were known in the most ex
pensive wars in which this country has been involved, have "taken place since the year 1793.
12. "That the extent of such remittances, occafioned at fo (early a period as the end of the year 1794, and the beginning c of the year 1795, great alarm in the minds of the Directors, (which they at various periods communicated to the Chancellor
of the Exchequer; and that on the 3d of December, 1795, the · Court of Directors, under the apprehension that it was in(tended to grant a further Loan to the Emperor, came to a Re« folution by which they declared it their unanimous opinion, (that should such a Loan take place, it would be most fatal in its (consequences to the Bank of England. That they communi<cated such Resolution to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who ( asíured them he should lay aside all thoughts of it, unless the « fituation of things relative to the Bank should fo alter as to (render such a Loan of no importance or inconvenience to "them. • 13. "That on the 5th of February, 1796, the Chancellor of (the Exchequer, after itating, in conversation with the Governor and Deputation from the Bank of England, his opinion of the necessity of further assisting the Emperor, promised to take no
step in that business without previously communicating to them (his intention.
14." That on the rith of February, 1796, the Directors of (the Bank passed unanimously the following Resolutions :
" Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Court, founded upon " the experience of the effects of the late Imperial Loan, that, if « any other Loan or advance of money to the Emperor, or to “ any other foreign State, should, in the present state of affairs, « take place, it will in all probability prove fatal to the Bank 6 of England.
" The Court of Directors, therefore, do most earnestly de“precate the adoption of any such measure, and they folemnly “ protest against any responsibility for the calamitous conie" quences that may follow thereupon.”
i To which Resolution, when communicated to him, the (Chancellor of the Exchequer returned for answer, " That, " after the repeated intimations which he had given to the Go« vernor, &c. of the Bank, that no further Loan to the Empe“ror would be resolved on without previous cominunication « with the Bank, he did not see any reason for these Resolutions; « that he did suppose they were adopted in a moment of alarm, " and that he should consider them in that light."
15.' That, both from the general tenor of the said answer 6 and from its particular reference to the substance and matter of the Resolutions then communicated to him, he gave the
Governor, &c. of the Bank to understand that he was bound by promise to them to negotiate no Loan for the service of his
Imperial Majesty, nor to make any remittance either to his 'Paid Imperial Majesty or any foreign prince, under any pre'tence whatsoever, without previously communicating such his 'intention to the Bank of England; that the Directors so un. 'derftood him, and that, imprelied with that belief, they
abstained from making any further remonttrance on this * fubjcct.
16." That nevertheless the Chancellor of the Exchequer for some time prior to February Jr, 1796, clandestinely remitted, 'and did for several months subsequent, clandestinely remit his
said Imperial Majesty, and other foreign princes, large sums of money, in defiance of his repeated promises, and in viola'tion of his solemn engagement with the Bank of England, and consequent upon their Resolution of the nith February.
17. That it appears that if the said advances of the Bank to Government had been paid off when required, or considera
bly reduced, the Bank would have been enabled to reduce, 'if expedient, the amount of its outstanding notes; and that such option would have been of effential service to its interests.
18. "That it appears from the evidence of the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Bank, that if the faid advances had been paid off when required, or considerably reduced, the Bank would have been enabled to give more extended aid to the mercantile interest of Great Britain in the way of "discount.
19. "That it appears that if the advances on Treasury Bills had been paid off when required, and as the Chancellor of the Exchequer had promised, and the foreign remittances abstained from, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer had like. wile promised, there would have existed no necessity for sufpending the due and ordinary course of the Bank payments (in cash.
20. “That it appears to this House, upon an attentive examination of the evidence reported by the Secret Committee, upon Ca minute perusal of the correspondence between the Governor
and Directors of the Bank of England and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, during the years 1795, 1796, and 1797; and after a thorough review of the whole circumstances of the case, " that the neglect of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in dita
charging or sufficiently diminishing the amount of the sums ad(vanced to Government by the Bank of England, his perseversance in directing Treasury Bills of Exchange, to an amount un' exampled, to be paid at the Bank, his frequent promises and constant breach of those promises to reduce their amount within No. 36. 8 H
(the sum of 500,000l. and the enormous amount of his remit(tances to foreign princes in Loans and Subsidies, were the prin(cipal and leading causes which produced the necessity for the Order of Council on the 26th of February Jaft.'
The Earl of Liverpool agreed, he said, with the Noble Duke, in the complex nature of the subject; the difficulty of forming a proper view of it; and the great room it allowed for erroneous conclusions. For his part, he had to oppose a simple, but true and well-founded statement, to these propositions of the Noble Duke, which required that flow of splendid eloquence, that specious line of argument, he had just exhibited to set them off, and to impress them on the attention of their Lordships. A Committee had been appointed by their Lordships to inquire into the causes that induced the Order of Council ; that Committee had proceeded agreeable to their powers; and he would ask their Lordships whether there could be any fairer way or mode of bringing the subject more fully before the House, and to enable it to judge of the truth of its report, than by submitting to their Lordships inspection at the same time all the documents and all the evidence upon which they had founded it? With respect to the conduct of the Committee, he would aver, that none could be more fair or candid. No witnesses which any member of it proposed were refused to be examined. What questions were objected to, or what accounts withheld ? He defied the Noble Duke to point out any. It was not poslible that any inquiry could be conducted with more candour. There was one of the Noble Duke's conclusions he wished more particularly to observe upon, namely, that which attached blame to the conduct of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. With refpect to that Minister, he was examined upon oath before the Committee, and examined in the same manner as any of the other witnesses. He would leave their Lordships to reflect a little upon this circumstance:---A man, the fubject of accusation, who was obliged to give evidence before those who accused him; he believed there hardly existed, in the records of the magistracy of our country, an instance entirely similar. He then adverted to the circumstances of the paper, the summary which had so large a share of the Noble Duke's reprehension. He thought it entirely corresponded with its title, and was, as far as it went, an accurate and modest statement of what it professed to describe.
His Lordship obferved, that the diminution of Bank Notes, according to the Noble Duke's position, would increase the quantity of specie, was absurd ; that it might decrease the demand for them was the only view in which the observation was intelligible. But to come more immediately to the subject in