"convention of delegates, who shall have been appointed by the several States, [to] be held at Philadelphia, for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation, and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions therein_as_shall, when agreed to in Congress, and confirmed by the States, render the federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the Union." 23 The urgent need for such a convention was set out in a letter by James Madison to Edmund Randolph, Governor of Virginia, dated February 25, 1787. "Our situation is becoming every day more and more critical. No money comes into the federal treasury; no respect is paid to the federal authority; and people of reflection unanimously agree that the existing Confederacy is tottering to its foundation. Many individuals of weight, particularly in the eastern district, are suspected of leaning toward monarchy. Other individuals predict a partition of the States into two or more confederacies. It is pretty certain that, if some radical amendment of the single one cannot be devised and introduced, one or the other of these resolutions-the latter no doubt-will take place." 24 Another letter from Madison to Randolph, dated April 8, 1787, sets forth some of the evils to be corrected and some of the obstacles to be overcome. He says: "I hold it for a fundamental point that an individual independence of the States is utterly irreconcilable with the idea of an aggregate sovereignty. * The first step to be taken is, I think, a change in the principles of representation. According to the present form of the Union, an equality of suffrage, if not just towards the larger members of it, is at least safe to them, as the liberty they exercise of rejecting or executing the acts of Congress is uncontrollable by the nominal sovereignty of Congress. Under a system which would operate without the intervention of the States, the case would be materially altered. A vote from Delaware would have the same effect as one from Massachusetts or Virginia. Let the national government be armed with a positive and complete authority in all cases where uniform measures to all that some change in the manner of apportioning taxes was necessary, and that the rule of five to three came nearer to "splitting the difference" than any that had been suggested, the article, as so amended, was adopted without opposition. 19 An ADDRESS TO THE STATES drawn up by Mr. Madison was passed nem. con. on April 26, 1783, and sent out with the proposed amendments to the Articles of Confederation, asking them to instruct their respective delegates to agree to the same. The Address said of the rule for supplying the common treasury "by the several States in proportion to the whole number of white and other free citizens and inhabitants, of every age, sex and condition, including those bound to servitude for a term of years, and three-fifths of all other persons except Indians not paying taxes:" 20 * "Although not free from objections, [it] is liable to fewer than any other that could be devised. The only material difficulty which attended it in the deliberation of Congress, was to fix the proper difference between the labor and industry of free inhabitants and all other inhabitants. The ratio agreed on was the effect of mutual concessions." 21 Nothing but criticism and objections to these proposed amendments and the suggestion of numerous others resulted from this "Address." Things went from bad to worse. A convention of delegates met at Annapolis in September, 1786, and recommended the calling of a convention of all the States to revise, amend or alter the Articles of Confederation, so as to make the government more efficient. The delegates from New York were instructed by its legislature to move in Congress for the calling of such a convention. 22 This, in the opinion of Madison "conduced much to decide the point," and on February 21, 1787, Congress adopted a resolution calling a 1. Elliott, V.,81. 1 Elliott, I., 98–9. 10 Elliott, I., 95. "convention of delegates, who shall have been appointed by the several States, [to] be held at Philadelphia, for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation, and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as shall, when agreed to in Congress, and confirmed by the States, render the federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the Union." 23 The urgent need for such a convention was set out in a letter by James Madison to Edmund Randolph, Governor of Virginia, dated February 25, 1787. "Our situation is becoming every day more and more critical. No money comes into the federal treasury; no respect is paid to the federal authority; and people of reflection unanimously agree that the existing Confederacy is tottering to its foundation. Many individuals of weight, particularly in the eastern district, are suspected of leaning toward monarchy. Other individuals predict a partition of the States into two or more confederacies. It is pretty certain that, if some radical amendment of the single one cannot be devised and introduced, one or the other of these resolutions—the latter no doubt-will take place.' 24 Another letter from Madison to Randolph, dated April 8, 1787, sets forth some of the evils to be corrected and some of the obstacles to be overcome. He says: "I hold it for a fundamental point that an individual independence of the States is utterly irreconcilable with the idea of an aggregate sovereignty. * * The first step to be taken is, I think, a change in the principles of representation. According to the present form of the Union, an equality of suffrage, if not just towards the larger members of it, is at least safe to them, as the liberty they exercise of rejecting or executing the acts of Congress is uncontrollable by the nominal sovereignty of Congress. Under a system which would operate without the intervention of the States, the case would be materially altered. A vote from Delaware would have the same effect as one from Massachusetts or Virginia. Let the national government be armed with a positive and complete authority in all cases where uniform measures * are necessary, as in trade, &c, &c. ment. The change in the principle of representation will be relished by a majority of the States, and those too of most influence. The Northern States will be reconciled to it by the actual superiority of their populousness; the Southern, by their expected superiority on this point. This principle established, the repugnance of the large States to part with power will in a great degree subside, and the smaller States must ultimately yield to the predominant will." 25 In another place he says: "But the radical infirmity of the 'Articles of Confederation' was the dependence of Congress on the voluntary and simultaneous compliance with its requirement by so many independent communities, each consulting more or less its particular interests and convenience, and distrusting the compliance of others." 26 The day appointed for the meeting of the Convention was the second Monday in May, 1787, but the 25th was the first day upon which a sufficient number of members appeared to represent a majority of the States. They then elected George Washington their President and proceeded to business. 27 The sessions lasted from May 25 to Nov. 17, when the Constitution in its final form was signed by delegates representing a majority of the States and sent to the respective States for ratification. There were were well-nigh irreconcilable differences of opinion on many points, and the debates, always animated, seem to have been marked at times with ill temper. 28 25 Elliott, V., 107. 26 Ibid., 112. 27 Elliott, I., 120. 28 It is interesting at this time, when it is seriously proposed to form a League of Nations, to settle international disputes and secure peace, to follow these debates and study with care the solution of questions which are bound to arise in any such attempt. The first and most important question will be in what proportions shall the respective nations be represented in such a League. Shall the greatest have only the same vote in determining questions arising as the least; or shall representation be apportioned to the nations on the basis of comparative populations, or comparative wealth? How shall the League arrive at and enforce its decrees? How shall it be provided with funds, ships, armies, etc., to carry out any of its objects? Shall it be through the voluntary contributions of the constituent nations? The failure of the Articles of Confederation to secure The delegates to the Constitutional Convention were all impressed with the weakness of the existing Confederation and the necessity of strengthening the central government, but they were divided, by conflicting interests and jealous fears, into many hostile groups and it seemed, at times, as though it would be impossible to reach an agreement. The majority of the delegates, like Madison, came to the Convention with the settled purpose of doing away with the Confederacy of "independent sovereign States" and of framing a central government, which should have supreme control in regard to raising revenues, armies, etc., and an independent executive and judiciary to compel the people of the respective States to respect its laws. A strong minority, however, wished only to patch up the old Articles of Confederation and still retain the feature of independent State action on all matters recommended by Congress. They also were very determined to adhere to the existing system of voting by Stateseach State to have an equal vote, regardless of size, wealth, or population. This was the attitude of the small States, generally. 29 One may infer, with reas money, arms and men during the war of the Revolution; and the failure of the German Diet, in 1866, to restrain its most powerful member, Prussia, in its open defiance of the Diet's decision of its dispute with Austria over Schleswig-Holstein, furnish instructive object lessons. Much also can be learned from the debates in the Constitutional Convention of 1787. The delegates may not have been infallible, but they were, probably, the wisest and most experienced statesmen of their day and they went about their work with all due seriousness. That their views were influenced largely by the interests of the respective states they may have represented, is apparent, and the same thing may be expected of any assembly of delegates convened for the purpose of organizing a League of Nations. Rhode Island, the smallest of the States, having an area of only 1,248 square miles, refused to send delegates to, or have anything to do with, the Convention. New Hampshire, with an area of only 9,341 square miles, much of it mountainous and sparsely settled, was not represented until the Convention had been in session two months. Oddly enough, a majority of the delegates from New York, with its area of 58,768 square miles (then including Vermont) and its great agricultural and commercial advantages, sided with the little States and vigorously opposed the substitution of representation in proportion to numbers, for the existing method of voting by States, regardless of size, or population. When the prin ciple of representation in proportion to numbers was finally adopted, Yates and Lansing, of New York, left the Convention, never to return, as did Luther Martin, of Maryland. |