country, in big markets than in little markets, in freedom than in regimentation, in economic peace ⚫ than in economic war. And this is the advantage that the American trade program is designed to gain.

But there is one other risk in pursuing this program-the risk that it may not succeed. There are still pessimists among us who complain that our cause is hopeless; that a freer trading system can never be restored; that nations stricken by the war cannot for years recover sufficiently to participate on equal terms in a world economy; that the tide is running so strongly toward collectivism, regimentation, and restrictionism that it would be futile to attempt to turn it back. It follows, presumably, that we, too, should collectivize, regiment, and restrict, so that, in our trade with other nations, we may fight quotas with quotas, match discrimination with discrimination, and confront public trading monopolies abroad with a public trading monopoly in the United States.

Americans want to live. If we do not seize that opportunity now, it may never be given us again.

Nothing in this world is guaranteed. In any course of action, we must weigh the relative risks, strike a balance, and take a chance. In the case of the American trade program, the balance is clear. On the one side we have our leadership in international affairs, our foreign trade, our system of private enterprise, our national security. On the other side, we have vague fears of future competition and a pessimistic prediction that our program is bound to fail. It should not be too difficult for any rational person, in full possession of the facts, to determine where the balance of our interest lies.

US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1947