The Development of Corporate Governance in China
Edward Elgar, 1999 - 129 páginas
This important and timely book examines how corporate governance has and should be developed in China to meet the challenges of enterprise and financial reform. It highlights key economic, social and political issues that China has to confront in order to transform the state owned industrial enterprises into a competitive and modern corporate sector.On Kit Tam critically appraises the main analytical frameworks and models of corporate governance in industrialized countries. He then assesses China's development in terms of current Western debates in relation to the role, function and evolution of corporate governance arrangements. He examines how the Chinese government has adopted a top-down approach combined with a market based Anglo-American model. The author also presents surveys of company directors, managers and supervisors reporting the current environment and analyses the choices available in the light of China's particular problems. He concludes with suggestions for a model of corporate governance in China.This book will be welcomed by economists and those interested in management studies, Chinese reform, international business, Asian studies, industrial organization and business strategy.
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Corporate governance and the creation of modern corporations
Corporate governance issues relating to China
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