of the cattle. Although the title to the land | claimant a standing in the courts of the State, constituting the range was in the United States and enabled him to maintain possession as and the land was not inclosed, the right of the against anyone not having the title of the UnitGriffiths to use it for the pasturage of their ed States. The bill alleges that the complaincattle was recognized and respected by their ant did not know the nature of the affidavit he neighbors and other stock raisers in the county. had filed, but supposed that by the statement It had excellent springs, furnishing water to he had made in court he had become a citizen. cattle roaming over a large extent of country, On the day following July 16, Godey filed in and was capable of supporting from one to the Probate Court of the County a petition for three thousand head. It had, therefore, a special letters of administration on the estate of great value, proportionate to the number it the deceased, and on the 19th of July he was could support. In April, 1870, one Pedro appointed special administrator. The comAltube, a member of the firm of Peres & Co., plainant, as surviving partner, was entitled to large cattle dealers in California, who was fa- wind up the affairs of the partnership, but he [90] miliar with Kern County and with the charac- consented that Godey should receive full letters [91] ter of the range, desired to purchase it for his of administration and, as administrator, settle firm and offered for it, with the stock, $12,000. the estate of the deceased; without prejudice, John Griffith died on May 21, 1870, intestate, however, to his rights as surviving partner to leaving surviving him two brothers, the com- an undivided half of the proceeds of the estate plainant and Morris Griffith, his only heirs at after the payment of its debts and the expenses law. The partnership property of the deceased of administration. Godey thereupon resigned and the complainant remained in the latter's pos- as special administrator and was appointed full session. It consisted, principally, of horned cat-administrator. He seems to have considered tle, horses and the range mentioned. The broth- the consent of the complainant as authorizing er Morris, who would have been a proper party him to settle up the partnership business as adcomplainant, declined to take part in the suit. ministrator, and accordingly he at once took Ellis Griffith, the surviving partner, was a possession of all its personal property. man of weak mind, without any knowledge August following he filed his inventory, acof business, and barely able to read and write. companied with his affidavit that it was a stateAmong his neighbors were the defendants Go- ment of "all the estate of the deceased" which dey and Williams. Godey was an old resident had come to his knowledge and possession. He of the county, a man of means and had the en- did not include in it the range or any land. The tire confidence of the complainant. On the 9th property mentioned was valued by appraisers of June, within a month after the death of the appointed by the court at $3,283.50, and conintestate, Altube spoke to Godey about pur-sisted of one hundred and forty-two horses valchasing the range, and stated that he would give for it, with the stock. $12,000; the sum he had offered previously in April; but Godey then had no control over the range and could therefore give no title to it. The complainant and the deceased were aliens, and on the 15th of July, 1870, upon the advice of Godey, the complainant declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, and soon afterwards, upon similar advice, filed an affidavit in the office of the clerk of the county to the effect that he had taken up one hundred and sixty acres of the range where the springs were. This proceeding was had under a statute of California passed in 1852, which gave the 8. C., 21 Am. Rep., 348; Crane v. Reeder, 21 Mich., 24; S. C., 4 Am. Rep., 430; Jackson v. Fitzsimmons, 10 Wend., 9; 8. C., 24 Am. Dec., 198; Elmondorff v. Carmichael, 3 Litt., 472; S. C., 14 Am. Dec., 86; White v. White, 2 Met. (Ky.), 185; Hinkle v. Shadden, 2 Swan., 46; Collingwood v. Pace, 1 Vent., 413; Vermont v. Boston. etc., R. R. Co., 25 Vt., 433; Burk v. Brown, 2 Atk., 399; Halyburton v. Kershaw, 3 Dessaus., 106; Fry v. Smith, 2 Dana, 38. At common law an alien cannot be a tenant by the curtesy, as he cannot take an estate by operation of law. Foss v. Crisp, 20 Pick., 121; Copeland v. Sands, 1 Jones (N. C.), 70; Reese v. Waters, 4 Watts & S., 145; Hatfield v. Sweden, 54 N. Y., 280. So, at common law, alien women cannot acquire dower. Exception was early made in England in favor of aliens married to Englishmen by license of the King, and later as to all women married to natural born or naturalized subjects. Co. Litt., 31, b; 1 Greenl. Cruise, 159; Stat. 7 & 8 Vict., ch. 66; 2 Bl. Com., 131; Cong. Ch. v. Morris, 8 Ala., 182; Sistare v. Sistare, 2 Root, 468; Sewall v. Lee, 9 Mass., 363; Mick v. Mick, 10 Wend., 379. By Act of Congress the widow of a citizen is entitled to dower, irrespective of her nativity. 10 Stat. at L., 604; U. S. R. S., sec. 1994. By Act of Congress, a naturalized citizen may take and transmit real estate as a native born citizen. In ued at $9 each, one hundred and twenty-seven cattle valued at $15 cach, a wagon and harness valued at $100, and a branding iron valued at fifty cents." On the 16th of that month, upon representations of Godey, an order was obtained from the court, that the horses and cattle be sold, as perishable property, and, on the 27th of the same month, they were accordingly sold together with thirty-one horses not mentioned in the inventory, but subsequently found to belong to the partnership, and a few articles of little value also omitted from the inventory, all of which were bid off by the defendant Williams for $2,077.50. No portion of this sum was paid by Williams at the time. Three weeks U. S. R. S., sec. 2172; State v. Penney, 5 Eng. (Ark.), A conveyance by an alien, at common law, vests In most States, the common law disabilities of aliens have been abolished or greatly modified by statute. See, note to Governeur v. Robertson, 24 U. S. (11 Wheat.), 332; Farrell v. Enright, 12 Cal., 450; Starks v. Traynor, 11 Humph., 292; Rubeck v. Gardner, 7 Watts, 45; Whiting v. Stevens, 4 Conn., 44; Stokes v. Fallon, 2 Mo., 32; Stemple v. Herming houser, 3 Iowa, 408; Moore v. Tisdale, 5 B. Mon., 352; Greer v. Sankston, 26 How. Pr., 471; Buchanan v. Deshon, 1 Har. & G., 280; Beard v. Knox, 5 Cal., 252 Goodrich v. Russell, 42 N. Y., 177; Eutashe v. Roadaquest, 11 Bush, 42. In England alien friends may now take and hold lands for residence or business for twenty-one years. Stat. 7 & 8 Vict., ch. 66. The common law disability of claiming through an alien ancestor has been removed in England. Stat. 11 & 12 Wm. III., ch. 6. Non-resident aliens may take lands by descent under the Statute of Massachusetts. Lumb v. Jenkins, 100 Mass., 527. afterwards he paid $600 on account; the balance was not paid until after the sale to Altube as hereinafter mentioned. The sale was, however, reported by Godey under oath to the probate court as having been made for cash. On the 17th of September, 1870, the complainant executed a conveyance of his claim of one hundred and sixty acres to the defendant Godey for the sum of $500. In the bill he alleges that he did not know the contents of the instrument, but signed it at Godey's request without intending to convey any interest in the range and that he received no consideration for it. [92] He was not then nor at any other time informed of the offer made for the range and stock by Altube, of the firm of Peres & Co. [93] Soon after this conveyance, Godey informed Altube that he and Williams would sell him the range and stock for $13,000. Altube accepted the offer on condition that a certain squatter on the land should be removed. They bought off the squatter for $500, and, on the 7th of November, 1870, Altube paid the $13,000 for the range and stock, which sum was equally divided between them. In the accounts filed by the administrator, the sum bid by the defendant, Williams, and the amount of $450 obtained from the sale of cattle in another county, were stated as the proceeds of the whole estate, and they were applied to various claims, the largest of which was held by the administrator, and to meet sundry expenditures, until a balance of only $453.05 was left. On the 8th of July, 1872, the probate court made a decree approving of the accounts and directing that three fourths, that is $339.78, be awarded to the complainant, a receipt for which was given by Mr. Brundage, who appears to have been an attorney, acting under an agreement, that he should receive, as his compensation, one half of what he should collect. No money was actually paid to the complainant, but the amount was indorsed on a note of his held by Godey. The present bill was filed to charge the defendants as trustees of the partnership property which came into their hands, and compel them to account for the proceeds obtained by them on its sale to Altube. Its prayer is not in form for this specific relief, but for an accounting for the value of the property or such other relief as may be just. The court below was of opinion that as the two Griffiths, who composed the partnership, were both aliens and had never taken any steps to become citizens of the United States, and as the range was on unsurveyed public lands of the United States, which they had never inclosed, they had in it no such property interest as to require the administrator to include the claim in his inventory of the property of the deceased. The court also held that the proofs did not sustain the allegations as to the misappropriation of the other property, or of its sale at an inadequate price. The bill was accordingly dismissed, and from the decree the case is brought by appeal to this court. Gould, 3 Story, 536; Mallett v. Dexter, 1 Curt. Walls v. Walker, 37 Cal., 426; Cromwell v. Brundage received no money; he had therefore no authority to give a receipt, and the receipt he did give is not binding on the complainant. Story, Agency, secs., 98, 103, 109, n. 6-181; Wittenbrock v. Bellmer, 57 Cal., 12; Prest.. etc., v. Watson, 1 Rawle, 330. Nothing that Ellis, as cestui que trust, could do had the effect to estop him, unless done with a full knowledge of the facts, etc., and fairly. Wheeler v. Smith, 9 How.; 82; Michoud v. Girod, 4 How., 561; Beeson v. Beeson, 9 Pa. St.. 300; Yellow Jacket Co. v. Stevenson, 5 Nev., 224. The objections to the account were withdrawn before a hearing, and they were never passed on by the probate court; hence, there is no bar. Jenkins v. Eldredge, 8 Story, 295; In Ro People, etc., Inst., 19 Bank. Reg., 493; Hough v. Waters, 30 Cal., 309. These possessory claims have been uniformly recognized as property; they have been taxed as such and they have passed like any other property by inheritance and sale. This court and the Supreme Court of California have recognized and upheld the validity of such conveyances. Sparrow v. Strong, 3 Wall., 97 (70 U. S., XVIII., 49); Lamb v. Davenport, 18 Wall., 314 (85 U. S., XXI., 761); Wilson v. Madison, 55 Cal., 5. No counsel appeared for appellees. Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion of the court: It is well established that a settlement of an administrator's account, by the decree of a probate court, does not conclude as to property accidentally or fraudulently witheld from the account. If the property be omitted by mistake or be subsequently discovered, a court of equity may exercise its jurisdiction in the premises, and take such action as justice to the heirs of the deceased or to the creditors of the estate may require, even if the probate court might, in such case, open its decree and administer upon the omitted property. And a fraudulent concealment of property, or a fraudulent disposition of it, is a general and always existing ground for the interposition of equity. Here, all the property of which the defendant Godey, as administrator of the deceased, took possession belonged to the partnership of which the complainant was the surviving partner. The portion coming to the deceased was merely the one undivided half after payment of the debts of the partnership. Only upon such portion could the court properly authorize adminProceedings in the probate court do not affect istration. The administrator, however, interthe jurisdiction of a court of equity over an preted the consent of the complainant that he administrator's accounts in case of fraud. might settle the estate of the deceased as authorPratt v. Northam, 5 Mason, 103; Gould v.ity to take the whole partnership property under Messrs. Frank W. Hackett and Stetson & his control equally as if it were the separate | erty is grossly inadequate, a court of equity property of the deceased, though the consent will, upon proper and reasonable application expressly reserves the rights of the complainant of the injured party or his representatives or as surviving partner. The complainant, it appears, was a man of weak intellect, without any knowledge of business and hardly able to read and write; and it is evident that he was ignorant of the nature and extent of his rights over the partnership property after the death of his brother, who [94] had had the principal management of it. Under such circumstances, the administrator was bound to the utmost good faith in his dealings with the property and should be held, in its disposition, to the responsibilities of a trustee of the complainant, though we leave the proceedings of the probate court undisturbed. heirs, interfere and set the conveyance aside." The complainant does not ask to have the conveyance to Godey set aside, but he asks that Godey may be compelled to account to him for the amount received for the property, of which he had thus fraudulently obtained a conveyance. It is plain, also, that the defendant Williams participated in the fraudulent design. He never paid anything on his bid for the horses and cattle at the probate sale, until weeks afterwards, and then less than one fourth of the amount; it was not until after the cattle and horses were purchased by Altube that he paid the balance, The cattle range, which constituted the prop- although he knew that the probate sale could erty of greatest value belonging to the partner- be made only for cash, and that the amount ship, was not taken possession of by the ad- bid by him had been reported to the court as ministrator, though by the law of California, cash paid. He knew, also, that the property then in force, all property of an intestate, real did not belong to the deceased, but to the partor personal, went into the hands of that officer, nership between him and the complainant, and for purposes of administration. Curtis v. Sut that the latter had not relinquished his partter, 15 Cal., 259, 264. He plainly had a design nership rights. He therefore took the properto secure the range to himself at a trifling cost, ty with notice of those rights and of the rela knowing that a large price was offered for it, tion as trustee which the administrator bore to and could at any time be obtained. The whole the complainant. The record shows that all administration seems to have been conducted the partnership property was sold within six by him to carry out this design. He first takes months after the death of the deceased, so as to steps to have the cattle and horses of the part-net over $12,000, and that out of that sum the nership sold as perishable property, upon the complainant received only $500. The defendrepresentation that they were likely to decrease ants made a large profit out of the transactions, in value, become worse by keeping, and were which they divided between them. They subject to loss and expense and, therefore, that should, therefore, be required to account to the their sale would be best for the estate; yet he complainant, as surviving partner of the dewell knew that a sale of the cattle separate from ceased, for their unjust gains. In such accountthe range would be much less advantageous ing, they should be charged with the amount than with it, and the falsehood of the alleged received by them from the sale to Altube, and [96] necessity appears from the fact that the range be credited with the amount paid by defendant was amply sufficient for the support of the cat-Williams for the property purchased at the protle and that they were never removed from it. He next persuades the complainant to declare his intention to become a citizen, and to file a claim to one hundred and sixty acres of the range, inclosing the springs, and then obtains a deed from him for the trifling consideration of $500. The complainant alleges that he never knew the contents of the instrument he signed and never received the consideration named. But, assuming that he is mistaken in this particular, he was not informed of the value of the range; nothing was said to him of the price offered for it, and which Godey knew was ready to be again offered. bate sale, the sum of $500 paid by defendant Godey for the conveyance of the possessory claim, and the $500 paid to remove the squatter from the land, the balance to draw interest until decree. The error of the court below arose from treating the possessory right to the cattle range on the public lands, as it was then held by the partnership on the death of John Griffith, as not constituting any property of value which could be recognized as such by the courts, the claimants being both aliens who had never taken any steps to be naturalized. But the Constitution of California then in force invested foreigners, who were bona fide residents of the State, with the same rights, in respect to the possession and enjoyment of property, as native born citizens. Art. 1, sec. 17. And the possessory right to the range, though held by aliens, was respected by their neighbors and all cattle dealers of the country, and had a market value, as shown by the price which others were ready to pay for it. No sooner was this conveyance obtained than Godey opened communication with Altube, offering to sell the range and stock for $13,000. The offer was accepted on a condition which was complied with by an expenditure of $500. [95] A sale was then effected and the $13,000 paid to the defendants and, as if to show that the transaction was the result of a conspiracy, the proceeds were equally divided between them. It was a case of deception and fraud practiced upon a man of weak intellect, and the rule which is stated in Allore v. Jewell, 94 U. S., 511 [XXIV., 263], to be settled law is applicable: "That, wherever there is great weakness of mind in a person giving a conveyance of land, arising from age, sickness or any other cause, though not amounting to absolute disqualification, and the consideration given for the prop-puted. The responsibility of trustees does not depend upon the validity of the title of the grantor of the trust property. If the right or interest transferred to them can be sold for a valuable consideration, it is to be treated as property; and corresponding duties devolve upon the trustees with respect to its sale as upon the sale of property, the title of which is undis The decree of the court below must be reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to enter a decree in conformity with this opinion; and it is so ordered. True copy. Test: of the Supreme Court, it is the only final judgment in the case, and the record of it can be found nowhere else but in the Circuit Court of La Crosse County. To that court, therefore, according to many James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. decisions of this court, the writ of error was properly directed to bring the record here for review. Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat., 246; Ath WILLIAM H. POLLEYS ET AL., Plffs. in Err., erton v. Fowler, 91 U. S., 146 [XXIII., 266]. v. BLACK RIVER IMPROVEMENT COM PANY. (See S. C., Reporter's ed., 81-84.) Writ of error, to what State Court directed time for bringing-filing of 1. Where, on appeal, the Supreme Court of a State reversed a judgment of an inferior court and remanded the cause to that court, with directions to enter judgment, the writ of error from this court was properly directed to the inferior State Court, to bring the record here for review. 2. The rule requiring a writ of error to be brought within two years after the entry of judgment, is applicable to writs of error to the State Courts, in like manner as to circuit courts. 3. A writ of error is not brought until it is filed in the court which rendered the judgment; and the time within which it must be brought begins to run from the day the judgment is filed and entered in such court. [No. 1094.] Submitted Nov. 17, 1884. Decided Jan. 12, 1885. IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of Wisconsin, The history and facts of the case sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court. Mr. S. U. Pinney, for defendant in error, in support of motion. Messrs. M. P. Wing and I. C. Sloan, for plaintiffs in error, contra. Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of [82] the court: This is a writ of error to the Circuit Court of Wisconsin for the County of La Crosse, and a motion is made to dismiss it. The first ground of the motion is that the writ should have been directed to the Supreme Court of the State and cannot be rightfully directed to the circuit court of the county. It appears that the defendant in error here was plaintiff in the Circuit Court of La Crosse County, and brought its action against Polleys and others for relief in regard to their obstructing the navigation of Black River and its branches. The circuit court denied the relief and dismissed the bill. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State reversed this judgment and delivered an opinion that plaintiff was entitled to relief in the premises; and it made an order remanding the case to the circuit court, with directions "To enter judgment in accordance with the opinion of this (that) court." It appears, by the cases cited to us and by the course of proceedings in such cases in the Wisconsin courts, that the record itself is remitted to the inferior court and does not nor does a copy of it remain in the Supreme Court. Though the judgment in the circuit court was the judgment which the Supreme Court or dered it to enter, and was in effect the judgment It is insisted that the writ of error was not brought within time. Section 1008 of the Revised Statutes declares that "No judgment, decree or order of a circuit or district court, in any civil action at law or in equity, shall be reviewed in the Supreme writ of error is brought or the appeal taken Court, on writ of error or appeal, unless the within two years after the entry of such judgment, decree or order." This rule is applicable to writs of error to the State Courts in like manner as to circuit courts. [83] Scarbrough v. Pargoud, 108 U.S.,567 [XXVII., 824]. In the case of Brooks v. Norris, 11 How.,204, construing the same language in the Judiciary Act of 1789, it is said "That the writ of error is not brought, in the legal meaning of the term, until it is filed in the court which rendered the judgment. It is the filing of the writ that removes the record from the inferior to the appellate court, and the period of limitation prescribed by the Act of Congress must be calculated accordingly." This language is repeated in Mussing Y. Cavazos, & Wall., 355 [73 U. S., XVIII., 810], and in Scarbrough v. Pargoud, supra. Though the writ of error in this case seems to have been issued by the clerk of the Circuit Court of the United States on the 10th day of May, 1884, and is marked by him for some reason as filed on that day, it is marked by the clerk of the court to which it is directed, namely: the Circuit Court of La Crosse County, as filed on the 29th day of that month. It is not disputed that this is the day it was filed in his office. This must be held to be the day on which the writ of error was brought. The judgment which we are asked to review by this writ was entered in the Circuit Court of La Crosse County, May 24, 1882. It is signed by the Judge on that day, and is expressly dated as of that day, and it is marked filed on that day over the signature of the clerk of that court. This is the judgment, the entry of the judgment, and on that day the plaintiff in error had a right to his writ, and on that day the two years began to run within which his right existed. It seems that the courts of Wisconsin, either by statute or by customary law, keep a book called a judgment docket. In this book are entered, in columns, the names of plaintiffs who recovered judgment, and the defendants against whom they are recovered. In another column is entered the amount of the principal judgment and the costs and the date of the judgment itself. This record is kept for the convenience of parties who seek information as to liens on real estate or for other purposes. This docket, however, is made up necessarily after the main judgment is settled and entered in the order [84] book, or record of the court's proceedings, and it may be many days before this abstract of the 6. Letters patent No. 85963, granted to said Richjudgment is made in the judgment docket, ac-ardson January 18, 1869, for an improvement in safecording to the convenience of the clerk. It is the record of the judicial decision or order of the court found in the record book of the court's proceedings which constitutes the evidence of the judgment, and from the date of its entry in that book the Statute of Limitation begins to run. It follows that the writ of error in this case was brought five days after the two years allowed by law had expired; and it must be dis missed. So ordered. ty-valves for steam boilers or generators, are valid. by the means described in Richardson's ́laims, al- True copy. Test: CONSOLIDATED SAFETY-VALVE COM- v. CROSBY STEAM GAGE AND VALVE COMPANY. CONSOLIDATED SAFETY-VALVE COM- CROSBY STEAM GAGE AND VALVE (See S. C., Reporter's ed., 157-179.) Letters patent for steam safety-valves-construc tion of-original inventor—sufficient description in patent-patent valid-extent of patent-infringement-profits and damages and injunction, when allowed. 1. Letters patent No. 58294, granted to George W. Richardson, September 25, 1866, for an improvement in steam safety-valves, are valid. 2. Under the claim of that patent, namely: "A safety-valve, with the circular or annular flange or lip c c, constructed in the manner or substantially in the manner shown, so as to operate as and for the purpose herein described," the patentee is entitled to cover a valve in which are combined an initial area, an additional area, a huddling chamber beneath the additional area and a strictured orifice leading from the huddling chamber to the open air, the orifice being proportioned to the strength of the spring, as directed. 3. Richardson was the first person who made a safety-valve which, while it automatically relieved the pressure of steam in the boiler, did not, in effecting that result, reduce the pressure to such an extent as to make the use of the relieving apparatus practically impossible, because of the expenditure of time and fuel necessary to bring up the steam again to the proper working standard. 4. His valve was the first which had the strictured orifice to retard the escape of the steam, and enable the valve to open with increasing power against the spring, and close suddenly, with small loss of pressure in the boiler. 5. The direction given in the patent, that the flange or lip is to be separated from the valve seat by about one sixty-fourth of an inch for an ordinary spring, with less space for a strong spring and more space for a weak spring, to regulate the escape of steam, as required, is a sufficient description, as matter of law, and it is not shown to be insufficient, as a mat ter of fact. *Head notes by Mr. Justice BLATCHFORD. 113 U. S. tended surface an annulus surrounding the disc; 9. The fact that the prior patented valves were 10. Suits in equity having been begun, in 1879, for Argued Dec. 10, 11, 1884. Decided Jan. 19, 1885. APPEALS from the Circuit Court of the Unit ed States for the District of Massachusetts. Butler, for appellant. Millett and Clement H. Hill, for appellee. ion of the court: Safety-Valve Company, a Connecticut Corpo- son, of the City of Troy, in the County of "Be it known that I, George W. RichardRensselaer, in the State of New York, have invented a new and useful improvement on a safety-valve for steam-generators, and I do hereby declare that the following is a full, clear and exact description of the construction and operation of the same, reference being had to the annexed drawings, making a part of this specification, in which Figure 1 is an end view of my improved safety-valve and its seat, as seen from the bottom; Figure 2 is an end view of the valve alone, as seen from the bottom; Figure 3 is a vertical section at x x, Figure 1, of the valve and seat in position; Figure 4 is a vertical section at y y, Figure 2, of the valve alone. Sim |