Messrs. Chauncey Smith, Lester L. Bond, Francis H. Kales and Chas. M. Reed, for appellee.

Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court:

The history and facts of these cases sufficient- | ances found due after the ascertained deductions ly appear in the opinion of the court. See, also, had been made, and this is assigned for error. the report of the opinion of this court when As a general rule, a patentee is not entitled to inthey were here before, R. R. Co. v. Turrill (Ca- terest on profits made by an infringer. The wood Patent), 94 U. S., 695 (XXIV., 238). reason is that profits are regarded in the light Messrs. George Payson and James H. Ray- of unliquidated damages, Parks v. Booth, 102 mond, for appellants. U. S., 106 [XXVI., 58], but in many of the cases it is said that circumstances may arise in which it would be proper to add interest. Mowry v. Whitney, 14 Wall., 653 [81 U. S., XX., 866]; Littlefield v. Perry, 21 Wall., 230 [88 U. S., XXII., 582]. Here, as has been seen, in effect, the original decrees rendered in July, 1874, The effect of the judgments in these cases, were affirmed in 1876, to the extent of the preswhen here on the former appeals, as reported ent recoveries. The cases were only sent back under the name of the Carood Patent, 94 U. S., to ascertain how much should be deducted from 695 [XXIV., 238], was to affirm the decrees then those decrees for errors in the accounts as then appealed from, so far as they charged these ap- stated. If the decrees had been entered origipellants respectively with the profits made from nally for the present amounts, the patentee the use of the infringing machines known as would have been entitled to interest from 1874. the "Illinois Central," the " 'Etheridge," and That was settled in R. R. Co. v. Turrill, 101 U. the "Whitcomb," and to reverse as to the prof- S., 836 [XXV., 1009], which was one of the its made by the use of the "Bayonet Vise," the cases affirmed in whole at the former hearing in "Michigan Southern," and the "Beebee & this court. Under these circumstances, it seems Smith," which were adjudged to be non-infring- to us not at all inequitable to allow interest on ing machines. The total amount of profits aris- the corrected amounts from the date of the masing from the use of all the machines, infringing ter's report in 1879. The cases are entirely difand non-infringing, was settled, and the judg- ferent in this particular from what they would ment of the court was that the profits had prop- have been if the original decrees had been reerly been estimated by comparing the cost of versed for error in the principles of the accountmending on the machines with the cost of mend-ing. Those decrees may very properly be coning on a common anvil. This was found to be about thirty-six cents per foot mended, in favor of the machines. P. 709 [-]. Nothing was left open for further inquiry but the amounts of the former recoveries for the use of the non-infringing machines. It was quite right, therefore, for the circuit court, when the cases went back, to direct the master to ascertain from the old evidence, if possible, and, if not, from new, how much should be deducted from the old decrees on account of the erroneous recoveries. The true way of determining this clearly was to find out what part of the profits for which the original decrees were rendered had been made by the use of the non-infringing machines. This the master attempted to do, and in the case of the Illinois Central Company there is no doubt in our minds that the conclusion he reached was entirely correct. In fact, we do not understand that this is disputed. It is argued that a sufficient allowance was not made in the accounting for cut rails, but that question was settled by the original decree, and could not be re-examined on this reference. The inquiry now is limited to the amount of mending done by the use of the non-infringing machines and its comparative cost.

[303] In the case of the Michigan Southern and Northern Indiana Company, the evidence is not as satisfactory as in that of the Illinois Central. The shop books in which the accounts for repairing rails were kept, if kept at all, were not produced and had probably been destroyed as of no value before the accounting took place. In their absence it is difficult to determine with accuracy what the facts were, but upon full consideration we are satisfied the circuit court did not in its decree underestimate the amount of deduction to be made in favor of this Company.

sidered as affirmed in part and reversed in part,
the new reference being had only to find out
the exact extent of the reversals.

Since the present appeals were taken, the pa-
tentee has died, and the appellants now suggest
that the causes of action do not survive, and
the suits cannot be further prosecuted in the
name of the legal representatives of the deced- [304]
ent. As to this, it is sufficient to say that what
was called by Chief Justice Marshall, in Gordon
v. Ogden, 3 Pet., 35, " the silent practice of the
court" has always been the other way. It is
every day practice to revive such suits, and the
books are full of cases in which this has been
silently done, no one apparently entertaining a
doubt of its propriety.

The decree in each of the cases is affirmed.
Mr. Justice Blatchford did not sit in these
cases, and took no part in their decision.

True copy. Test:

James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S.

WABASH, ST. LOUIS AND PACIFIC
RAILWAY COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,

v.

JOHN F. KNOX.

(See S. C., Reporter's ed., 304, 305).

Jurisdiction as to amount.

Where the judgment below was for $5,237.15, but the record shows that of this amount $727.42 was admitted to be due and a formal tender of that sum was made, the amount in dispute here is no more than was in dispute below, and as that was less than $5,000, this court has no jurisdiction.

[No. 1136.]

Submitted Jan. 14, 1884. Decided Jan. 28, 1884.
NOTE.-Jurisdiction of U. S. Supreme Court de-

pendent on amount. See note to Gordon v. Ogden,28

In making up the decree, interest was added from the date of the master's report on the bal-U. S. (3 Pet.), 33.

United States. J. had died in 1873, and C. had been appointed administrator in his place, and substituted as plaintiff. The case was brought into this court, by the defendant, by a writ of error. Before it was heard here, L. compromised the judgment with the defendant, in 1879, receiving in full $9,401.42, and entered satisfaction of the judgment on the record. C. then moved the circuit court to

Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opin-bate Court. The circuit court heard the motion on

ion of the court:

The judgment in this case was for $5,237.15, but the record shows in many ways that of this amount $727.42 was admitted to be due. A formal tender of that sum was made on the 26th of February, 1883, and the money deposited in court for Knox, the plaintiff, where it remained until the 14th of March, nine days after the judgment was rendered, when it was withdrawn by the Railroad Company, without prejudice, on the order of the court, and with the consent and agreement of Knox. The bill of exceptions also shows an admitted liability of the Company for the amount of the tender. The case is, therefore, in all material respects, like that of Tintsman v. Nat. Bk., 100 U. S., 6 [XXV., 530], where the writ was dismissed, although the [305] judgment was for $8,233.59, because, by an agreed statement of facts in the record it appeared that the defendant admitted he owed

$5,099.59 of the amount recovered. To the

same effect is Jenness v. Nat. Bk. [ante, 67],de-
cided at the present Term. The amount in dis-
pute here is no more than was in dispute below,
and that was less than $5,000.

The motion to dismiss is granted.
True copy. Test:

vacate the satisfaction, on the grounds that L. had no authority to enter it, and had been notified by C., after the compromise had been made and before the satisfaction had been entered, that he would not ratify the compromise, and that the compromise was unlawful because not authorized by the Proaffidavits, and found as a fact, that J., while administrator, entered into a contract with L. and T., whereby they agreed to prosecute the claim for a portion of the proceeds, with full power to compromise it as they should please, and that the claim was a doubtful one, and held that the compromise was rightly made and that the plaintiff was bound by the contract of J., and denied the motion. On a writ of error by the plaintiff, held:

1. This court cannot review such finding of fact, any, not being an error of law;

there being evidence on both sides, and the error, if

2. The contract made was not champertous or unlawful, and J. had authority to make it; coupled with an interest, the death of J. did not im3. The contract having given to L. and T. a power pair the authority to compromise, and C. was bound by it;

4. L., having continued to be a copartner with T., 80 far as this case was concerned, had authority to make the compromise without the co-operation or consent of T. [No. 203.]

Submitted Jan. 16, 1884. Decided Feb. 4, 1884.

Nes for the Eastern District of Missouri.

ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United

The history and facts of the case appear in the opinion of the court.

Messrs. T. W. B. Crews and John W. Booth, for plaintiff in error.

Messrs. S. F. Glover and J. R. Shepley,

James H.McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. for defendant in error.

C. S. JEFFRIES, Admr. of ALLAN A. KEN-
NEDY, Deceased, Piff. in Err.,

V.

MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
OF NEW YORK.

Mr. Justice Blatchford delivered the opinion of the court:

On the 19th of August, 1871, one Allan A. Kennedy died in Franklin County, Missouri, having two policies of insurance on his life, one in the Economical Life Insurance Company, of Providence, R. I., for $5,000, and the other in the Mutual Life Insurance Company, of New York, the defendant in error, for $10,000. Charles W. Jeffries was appointed administraContract between administrator and attorneys to tor of Kennedy, by the Probate Court of Frankprosecute claim for a share of the proceeds-lin County. At that time Joseph S. Laurie and when lawful-review of finding-compromise, when valid.

(See 8. C., Reporter's ed., 305-310.)

*K. died in Missouri, in 1871, having a policy of insurance on his life. J. was appointed there his administrator. L. and T., copartners as attorneys at law, brought a suit on the policy, in which, after a long litigation, there was a judgment for the plaint*Head notes by Mr. Justice BLATCHFORD.

Thomas W. B. Crews were attorneys at law and copartners as such, in St. Louis, Missouri. The policies were put into their hands for suit, and they brought a suit on each in the name of Jeffries, as plaintiff, in the State Court of Missouri. The suits were both of them removed into the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri. In each suit an answer was put in setting up a breach of a warranty by the assured, in that, in the application for the insurance, he stated that he was a single man when he was a married man. In the suit against the Economical Company there was a demurrer to the answer, on the ground that the answer failed to allege that the misstatement was material to the risk. The demurrer was overruled by the circuit court and a judgment was entered for the defendant. On a writ of "Power of attorney revoked by death or insanity of error, this court affirmed the judgment, at Ocprincipal. See note to Hunt v. Rousmanier, 21 U.S.tober Term, 1874. 22 Wall., 47 [89 U. S.,

NOTE.-Compromise of a disputed claim, binding: payment of less sum for greater. See note to Oglesby v. Attrill, 105 U. S., XXVI., 1186.

Champerty, what is: how it differs from maintenance; purchase of land in suit. See note to Lewis v. Bell, 58 U. S., XV., 203.

Attorney's compensation, contingent on success or from proceeds of suit; a fixed sum or a percentage. Purchase of interest in the suit or subject of litigation by attorney. See note to McMicken v. Perin, 59 U. S., XV., 504.

78 Wheat.), 174.

XXII., 833]. In the suit against the defendant without the order of the Probate Court of
in error, which is the suit now before us, there
was a reply to the answer, alleging that, under
the policy, the misstatement was not a breach of
a warranty, and that the statement was the rep-
resentation of the agent of the Company, and
[307] not that of the assured. In January, 1873,
Charles W. Jeffries died, and the plaintiff in
error, Cuthbert S. Jeffries, was appointed in his
place administrator of Kennedy, and was sub-
stituted as plaintiff in this suit in March, 1873.
In November, 1873, while the suit against the
Economical Company was pending in this
court, this suit was tried in the circuit court
before the court without a jury. That court
rendered a judgment for the plaintiff. The de-
fendant brought the case to this court by a writ
of error, and at October Term, 1875, the judg-
ment was reversed, on the authority of the case
in 22 Wallace, and a new trial was awarded. In
April, 1877, the case was again tried, and before
a jury, which found a verdict for the plaintiff,
but the circuit court set it aside. The case was
tried again before a jury, in October, 1877, and
a verdict was rendered for the plaintiff, on
which a judgment in his favor was entered, Oc-
tober 9, 1877, for $13,495. On the 27th of Oc-
tober, 1877, the defendant sued out a writ of
error returnable to this court at October Term,
1878. The case was docketed here, and the ap-
pearance of Joseph S. Laurie was entered for the
defendant in error, the present plaintiff in error,
and that of O. H. Palmer for the plaintiff in
error, the present defendant in error. In Feb-
ruary, 1879, Mr. Laurie compromised the judg.
ment with the Mutual Company. Interest at 6
per cent was computed on the judgment from
its entry to November 22, 1878, and added, and
an abatement of $5,000 was then made, and the
remainder, $9,401.42, was paid by the Company
to Mr. Laurie. He surrendered the policy to the
Company, a stipulation signed by Mr. Laurie
and by Mr. Palmer, agreeing that the suit might
be dismissed from the docket of this court with-
out costs to either party as against the other, was
presented to this court and filed and, on the
11th of March, 1879, an order was made by this
court dismissing the writ of error, each party to
pay his own costs. On the 15th of December,
1879, Mr. Laurie, as attorney for the plaintiff,
entered satisfaction of the judgment on the mar-
gin of the record of the judgment, in the law
record book in the office of the clerk of the cir-
cuit court, in the presence of the deputy clerk,
who signed the entry as a witness, the entry
being as follows: "I hereby enter satisfaction
[308] of this judgment in full, this 15th day of Decem-
ber, 1879. C. S. Jeffries, adm'r, etc., by Joseph
S. Laurie, his att'y." The plaintiff immediately
filed a motion in the circuit court to vacate the
entry of satisfaction, alleging, as grounds there-
for, that the entry was made by Laurie without
authority from the plaintiff and in fraud of his
rights and without consulting him, and after
Laurie had been notified that the plaintiff
would not ratify the said compromise; that the
plaintiff had learned only a few days previously
of the dismissal of the writ of error in March,
1879, and of the compromise made by Laurie,
and had at once notified Laurie and the defend-
ant that the compromise was made without au-
thority from him and he would not ratify it;
and that he could not authorize a compromise

Franklin County, which order had not beer
made. The motion was supported and opposed
by affidavits, the defendant appearing by coun
sel. The court, as appears from its opinion,
which is set forth in the record, found, as a
fact, from the evidence before it, which evi-
dence is before us, that Charles W. Jeffries,
while administrator, entered into a contract
with Mr. Laurie and Mr. Crews, whereby they
agreed to prosecute the claim for a portion of the
proceeds, with full power to compromise it as
they should please, and that the claim was a
doubtful one. On the ground of such express
authority and of the doubtfulness of the claim
the court held that the compromise was rightly
made, notwithstanding the judgment. It also
held that the plaintiff was bound by the contract
made by his predecessor. An order was made
overruling the motion, and afterwards a motion
for a rehearing, founded on further affidavits,
was denied. A bill of exceptions setting forth
all the papers used on both motions, and con-
taining proper exceptions, was signed. There-
upon the plaintiff has brought the case to this
court, on a writ of error.

It is contended for the plaintiff in error that
the evidence was insufficient to warrant the
finding that there was any contract between the
first administrator and Mr. Laurie and Mr.
Crews, authorizing a compromise; that the first
administrator had no authority to make such a
contract, or to make a compromise, without the
sanction of the probate court; that the plaint- [309]
iff was not bound by the contract made by the
first administrator; and that Laurie had no au-
thority to compromise without the co-operation
of Crews.

As to the finding of fact that there was a contract by the first administrator giving to the attorneys an interest in the proceeds of the claim, with authority to compromise it, this court is prohibited, by section 1011 of the Revised Statutes, from reversing a case on a writ of error for any error in fact. In this case there was a dispute as to the fact, and evidence on both sides, and it was a fair exercise of the judgment of the court, on the evidence before it to make the finding of fact it did. Under such circumstances, an erroneous finding of the fact cannot be held to be an error of law. Hyde v. Booraem, 16 Pet., 169, 176; Parks v. Turner, 12 How., 39, 43.

There is nothing to show that the circuit court was not correct in its conclusion that the right of recovery in the suit was very doubtful, notwithstanding the judgment. This being so, as the writ of error was pending, the compromise would seem to have been a proper one for the interests of the estate. It was said by this court, in Holker v. Parker, 7 Cranch, 436, 452, speaking by Chief Justice Marshall: "Although an attorney at law, merely as such, has, strictly speaking, no right to make a compromise, yet a court would be disinclined to disturb one which was not so unreasonable in itself as to be exclaimed against by all, and to create an impression that the judgment of the attorney has been imposed on or not fairly exercised in the case."

We do not perceive that there was any want of authority in the first administrator to make the contract he did. The contract was not

Illinois, his duty being to commence and prose-
cute" all criminal prosecutions, by a person who
inquires of the attorney whether the facts commu-
nicated make out a case of larceny for a criminal
prosecution, is an absolutely privileged communi-
cation, and cannot, in a suit against such a person
larceny, be testified to by the State's attorney, even
to recover damages for speaking words charging
though there be evidence of the speaking of the
same words to other persons than such attorney.
[No. 209.]
Argued Jan. 17, 18, 1884. Decided Feb. 4. 1884.

IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United

champertous under the laws of Missouri. Duke | v. Harper, 66 Mo., 51. The attorneys did not agree to pay any part of the costs or expenses of the litigation. Nor do we find in the Statutes of Missouri which are cited, nor in any of its judicial decisions anything which forbids the making of such a contract as the circuit court found to have been made in this case. The administrator had the usual power of a trustee [310] over the estate, under his responsibility for a breach of his trust. Perry, Trusts, sec, 482; Overfield v. Bullitt, 1 Mo., 749. The authority given to him by statute (Wag. Stat., Vol. 1. p. 87, sec. 26) to commence and prosecute actions fairly includes the power to make such reasonable contracts in regard to compensation and the compromising of actions on doubtful claims as the circumstances of particular cases may justify. The fact of the enactment in Missouri of a statute, which went into effect No-W. Burnett and I. C. Robinson, for defendant vember 1, 1879, Rev. Stat. of Missouri, of 1879, Vol. 1, p. 37, sec. 242, giving power to an administrator to compound with a debtor, with

nois.

States for the Southern District of Illi

The history and facts of the case appear in
the opinion of the court.

Messrs. James K. Edsall and John B.
Hawley, for plaintiff in error.

Messrs. H. S. Greene, John M. Palmer, F.

in error.

Mr. Justice Blatchford delivered the opin

the approbation of the judge of probate, does ion of the court:
not imply that the power did not exist before

This is an action on the case, brought by

without such approbation. This transaction Timothy Gruaz against Rudolph Bircher, to
occurred before such enactment. An adminis-recover damages for the speaking and publish-
trator has general power to dispose of the per- ing of false, malicious, scandalous and defam-
sonal effects of his intestate; 2 Williams, Exrs., atory words, charging the plaintiff with being
6th Am. ed., p. 998; and to compound a debt, a thief and with having stolen the money of
if it is for the benefit of the trust estate. (3 Id.,
p. 1900, and note g.) And, even when statutes
exist providing for compromises with debtors
with the approval of a probate court, it is held
that the right to compromise which before ex-
isted is not taken away, but may be exercised
subject to the burden of showing that the com-
promise was beneficial to the estate. Wyman's
Appeal, 18 N. H., 18; Chouteau v. Suydam, 21
N. Y., 179; Chadbourn v. Chadbourn, 9 Allen,

173.

the defendant, meaning the crime of larceny. The suit was commenced in a State Court of Illinois, and was removed by the defendant into the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Illinois. At the trial before a jury a verdict was rendered for the plaintiff June 6, 1879, for $6,000 damages. on the next day the defendant filed a motion for a new trial. On the 14th of June the der abating the case was moved for, on behalf defendant died; on the 12th of July an orof the defendant, and on the 16th of August the court overruled the motion for a new trial and the motion for an order of abatement, and entered a judgment for the plaintiff, against Bircher, for $6,000 and costs, as of June 7, 1879. [312] The order for judgment recited that the hearIt is apparent, from the record, that Mr. ing by the court of the motion for a new trial Laurie continued to be a copartner with Mr. was, when it was filed, postponed to a then Crews so far as this case was concerned. That future and convenient day of the same Term, being so, he had authority to make the compro-ing of the motion. Leave was given to the exand that the defendant died pending the hearmise in question without the co-operation or consent of Mr. Crews. ecutor of the defendant to prepare a bill of exThe bill ceptions and to take a writ of error. of exceptions being signed, it was filed by the

The contract made by the first administrator having given to the attorneys a power coupled with an interest, the authority to compromise was not impaired by the death of the first administrator, and his successor was bound by the contract. Story, Agency, secs. 476, 477.

No error of law is found in the proceedings in the Circuit Court, and its orders, made January 26, 1880, and March 10, 1880, are affirmed. True copy. Test:

executor, and the writ of error was issued. Various errors are assigned, and among them that James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. the circuit court did not grant the motion to

abate the suit, and that it rendered a judgment
against Bircher after his death. But it is un-
necessary to pass on those questions, because
we are of opinion that the judgment must be
reversed for another error committed at the
trial.

NOTE.-Attorney and client; privileged communications between; when attorney will be compelled to testify; how long privilege continues. See note to Blackburn v. Crawford, 70 U. S., XVIII., 186.

Libel and slander: privileged communications to magistrate or grand jury charging a crime.

A complaint submitted to a magistrate for the purpose of enforcing justice against a person ac

*A communication made to a State's attorney, in cused of crime does not subject the complainant to

*Head note by Mr. Justice BLATCHFORD.

an action for libel, whether the charge be true or
false. Bailey v. Dean, 2 Barb., 297; Reid v. McLen-

Three witnesses for the plaintiff gave evi- agent and handled his funds, rented his farms dence tending to prove the speaking to them by and had failed to account for a large amount the defendant of more or less of the words set of money, he told me, and he charged him in forth in the declaration; and afterwards C. L. this conversation with having stolen his money, Cook was sworn as a witness for the plaintiff, and he said he wanted to know if there was and 'testified that he was State's attorney for any law in this State to prosecute a man for Madison County, Illinois; that he had a slight that. I have no objection to state any words. I acquaintance with Bircher; and that he knew remember his making the charge that he had Gruaz. The following proceedings then oc- stolen his money, but I can't swear that the curred: "Q. I will ask you if you had any word 'thief' was used at that time; that it was conversation with Doctor Bircher with regard in substance, undoubtedly. My impression is to Gruaz, and, if so, when was it? Counsel for that this was the March Term, 1878, of the defense asked witness if at that time he was oc- Circuit Court of Madison County either that cupying the same position he now holds. A. or October Term, 1877; my recollection, and Yes, sir. Q. It was communicated to you decided impression is that it was the Spring while you held that position and were acting Term, 1878. Dr. Bircher went into the grand in that capacity, whatever was communicated jury room and gave his statement to the grand to you by Bircher? A. Yes, sir. (Defendant's jury. He was anxious, of course, to have the counsel object to the witness testifying to mat- indictment found, and he evidently believed or ter disclosed to him by the defendant under the so expressed himself. Counsel for defendant circumstances stated, on the ground that such objected to witness stating his opinion about communications are to be treated as privileged.) what defendant evidently believed. The Court. The Court. I will ask the witness if he regard- He said he went before the grand jury, and ed it professionally as a privileged communica- said he seemed to be in earnest in his movetion? A. I had never met defendant before; he ments, but he didn't say what took place bewas introduced to me by a citizen of our place, fore the grand jury. Don't know, I suppose. and he informed me that he wanted to talk Witness. No, I don't know. Cross-examinawith me with regard to a matter he wanted to tion. Major Prickett introduced Bircher to me; bring_before_the grand jury. (Objected to.) never saw him before in my life. I was certain The Court. I will allow the witness to state he came to see me as prosecuting attorney, in what the doctor said on that occasion. Of good faith. That was his business, as he stated course, if he made the communication to the it to me. After he made his statement to me I witness in good faith, there would be no mal- advised him to go before the grand jury; diice about it, and I shall instruct the jury to rected him to their room. He went there by (313) disregard it. The objection is overruled; to my advice. Hold on-I don't say that; I ad- [314] which ruling of the court the defendant at the vised him that he had a good case. He came time excepted. A. As I stated, I had at that to me and I showed him where the grand jury time no acquaintance with defendant whatever. room was. He stated his case to me as State's He inquired for the State's attorney, and was in- attorney. I then directed him where to go, troduced to me, and he spoke of his affairs. and said I should prosecute it as vigorously as He said he wanted to bring a matter before the possible, if the indictment was found. In regrand jury in regard to Mr. Gruaz. I talked gard to the advice I gave him, I rather enwith him in regard to the nature of the matter, couraged him to drop the thing; I told him he and he talked pretty freely in regard to it, and better sue Mr. Gruaz first, and see if he I directed him to the grand jury room. He couldn't get judgment against him, and so put said a good many things. He was evidently it in a better shape to prosecute him. He stated in earnest at the time, expressed himself very his case, and I thought from his statement that freely in regard to him. I would not like to he would have few, if any, witnesses besides swear to the exact words used, or that anybody himself, and that it would be doubtful, howused at the time. I can give the substance of ever honestly he might believe that he had what he said, I suppose. He wanted to prose-cause, it would be doubtful whether the jury cute Gruaz for stealing, was the amount of it. I recollect this: he charged him with having stolen his money, and I asked him how, and he told me how it had been done. Gruaz was his

don, 44 Ga., 156; Harstock v. Reddick,6 Blatchf.,255; Noonan v. Orton, 32 Wis., 106; Bunton v. Worley, 4 Bibb., 38; S. C., 7 Am. I ec., 735.

Slander does no tlie for a criminal charge made by an affidavit before a magistrate. Sanders v. Rollinson, 2 Strob., 447.

An affidavit in support of an application to the Governor, to recall, or modify a warrant to arrest a fugitive from justice, is not privileged. Hosmer v. Loveland, 19 Barb., 111.

A complaint to a grand jury, containing a charge of perjury, is privileged, although before its presentation it was exhibited to the persons by whom it was signed. Kidder v. Parkhurst, 3 Allen, 393; Klinch v. Colby, 46 N. Y., 430; Vandezee v. McGregor, 12 Wend., 545; Lake v. King, 1 Mod., 58.

Charges of crime made to a police officer bona fide are privileged, though made intemperately and in the presence of third persons. Brown v. Hathaway, 18 Allen, 239; Davies v. Snead, 5 L. R. Q. B., 608. Slander will not lie for words charging a crime uttered before a justice of the peace in conse

would bring a bill; so I advised him to bring a
civil suit; but, said I, you are here, and you
mustn't think hardly of me if the grand jury
don't find a bill; and I directed him to the

quence of which the person charged was committed,
but not indicted. Shock v. McChesney, 4 Yeates,
507; S. C., 2 Am. Dec., 415.

Words spoken before a magistrate by a complain-
ant who has caused one's arrest for a crime, after
the defendant has been brought in, averring the
truth of his complaint, are not actionable. Allen v.
Crofoot, 2 Wend., 515; S. C., 20 Am. Dec., 647.

Words in an affidavit, upon which a search warrant is granted, are not actionable. Vausse v. Lee, 1 Hill (S. C.), 197; S. C., 26 Am. Dec., 168.

Communications, made in good faith to publio officials having power to remedy the evils complained of, are privileged and express malice must be shown to destroy this privilege. Howard v. Thompson, 21 Wend., 319; S. C., 34 Am. Dec., 238; O'Donaghue v. McGovern 23 Wend., 31; Smith v. Kerr, 1 Edm., 193; Newfield v. Copperman, 42 N. Y. Super. Ct., 306; Hosmer v. Loveland, 19 Barb., 116; Van Wyck v. Aspinwall, 17 N. Y., 193; Ormsby v. Douglass, 37 N. Y., 480.