[146]

tached from the stove. so that the stove is com

plete without them and tuey are complete with APPEAL from the Court of Claims.

The history and facts of the case appear
in the opinion of the court.

Messrs. S. F. Phillips, Solicitor-Gen. and
John S. Blair, for appellant.

Messrs. Wm. E. Earle and J. J. Darling-
ton, for appellee.

Mr. Justice Blatchford delivered the opin. [149] ion of the court:

The

out being attached; and it also states that they
may be attached to the stove by lugs or hooks,
either cast in the back of the stove, with a cor-
responding eye in the side of the case surround-
ing the reservoir, or in the top and side of the
reservoir, or the hook and the eye may be re-
versed. A detachable base pan existed before,
and hearths and ash pans existed attached by
lugs and hooks in the same way as the defend- In this case, the appellee recovered a judg-
ant's base pan. A portable reservoir was old, ment in the Court of Claims against the United
with an escape pipe or flue forming a part of States for $929.50. That court found the follow-
the reservoir. A damper for the middle flue ing facts: in 1827, James Stoney, of South Caro-
was old. A warming closet below a base pan lina died, leaving a will, which was duly proved
and that below a reservoir were old. In view of and contained the following provision:
the state of the art, there was no invention, in other equal part or share of my personal prop-
claim 1 of the patent, in using to attach the base erty, charged and chargeable with the payment
pan an old mode used in attaching other pro- of half of the said annuity to my beloved wife,
jecting parts of the stove. Claim 2 is merely Elizabeth, together with all the lands I possess
for an aggregation of parts and not for a pa- on the South side of Broad Creek on the Island
tentable combination, there being no patentable of Hilton Head, I give and devise unto such
relation between a portable reservoir with a flue person or persons as I shall hereafter appoint
in its rear side and the existence or portability my executor or executors, to and to the use of
of a base pan beneath it. In claim 3 there is them or him, my executor or executors, their
merely an aggregation of parts, there being no heirs executors and assigns, upon the trust, nev-
patentable relation between a damper for the ertheless, and to and for the intent and pur-
middle flue of a three flue stove, and the exist-pose hereinafter expressed and declared of and
ence or portability of a base pan or the exist-
ence of a warming closet.

concerning the same; that is to say, upon trust
for the sole benefit of my beloved daughter,
The decree of the Circuit Court is reversed, with Martha S. Barksdale, for and during her nat-
costs in this court to the Excelsior Manufactur-ural life, free from the debts, contracts and en-
ing Company on both appeals, and the case is re-gagements of any husband to whom she may
manded to the Circuit Court, with direction to dis- be allied, or the claims of his creditors; and up-
miss the bill, with costs.
on the death of my said daughter, Martha S.
Barksdale, it is my will, intention and desire
James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. that the trusteeship above created in my exec-

True copy. Test:

UNITED STATES, Appt.,

v.

SAMUEL G. LAWTON.

(See S. C., Reporter's ed., 146-151.)

utor or executors over the said part of my real
estate and personal property shall immediately
dissolve and expire; and if my said daughter,
Martha S. Barksdale, shall have any lawful is-
sue living at the time of her death, then I give
and devise the said part of my real and person-
al property to such issue, him, her or them and
their heirs forever." A tract of land known
as the Hill Place, in St. Luke's Parish, South
Carolina, was a part of the estate so devised.
Recovery of surplus on tax sale-construction of Martha S. Barksdale, named in the will, entered
Act-right of claimant case followed.
into possession of the Hill Place, under the de-
vise, and continued in possession until dispos-
*1. Land subject to a direct tax was sold for its non-sessed, in consequence of the tax sale herein-
payment, and was bought in for the United States,
for the sum of $1,100, under section 7 of the Act of after mentioned. After the making of the will
June 7, 1862, ch. 98, as amended by the Act of Feb- she became the lawful wife of Joseph A. Law-
ruary 6, 1863, ch. 21, 12 Stat. at L., 640, the tax, pen-ton.
alty, interest and costs being $170.50. No money was
The appellee is her lawful and only liv-
paid. The United States took possession of the landing issue. In November, 1862, the direct tax
and leased it and afterwards sold all but fifty acres commissioners of the United States assessed a
for $130, under the Act of June 8, 1872, ch., 337, 17 direct tax on the Hill Place, amounting to $88,
Stat. at L., 330. The land was not redeemed. Ap-
plication by its owner was made to the Secretary of and in December, 1873 (a mistake, probably,
the Treasury for the $929.50 surplus, and, no action for 1863), it was sold for non-payment of the
being taken thereon, he sued in the Court of Claims tax. The amount of the tax, penalty, interest
to recover that sum; held, that he was entitled to and costs was $170.50. The property was struck
2. Whether section 12 of the Act of June 7, 1862, ch. off for the United States by the tax commis-
98, 12 Stat. at L., 422, in regard to the disposition of sioners, for the sum of $1,100, and a tax cer-
one half of the proceeds of the subsequent leases
and sales of land struck off to the United States at a tificate, which is now on file in the office of the
sale for the non-payment of the tax, applies to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, was issued
land in this case, quære.
missioners having bid in the property for the
therefor, but no money was paid, the tax com-
United States. The board of tax commission-
ers took possession of the land in the name of
the United States, and from time to time leased
Submitted Jan. 4, 1884. Decided Jan 21, 1884. ing does not appear.
the same.
The amount realized from the leas-
The United States is
I still in possession of fifty acres. The remainder

recover it.

3. No question as to the disposition of such pro-
ceeds can affect the right of the claimant in this case
to the $929.50.

4. The rulings in U. S. v. Taylor, 104 U. S., 216
(XXVI.], applied to this case.
[No. 1127.]

*Head notes by Mr. Justice BLATCHFord.

[148]

was sold at public sale, in December, 1875, for | case, there would have been a surplus of
$130, under the provisions of the Act of June $928.50 paid into the Treasury, and held for
8, 1872, ch. 837, 17 Stat. at L., 330. No appli- the owner. It can make no difference that the
cation under that Act and the Acts supplement- United States acquired the property by bidding
ary thereto, for redemption of the property, was $1 more. To withhold the surplus from the
ever made. It does not appear that the appellee owner, would be to violate the 5th Amendment
ever parted with his interest in the remainder of to the Constitution and to deprive him of his
the tract, except as dispossessed by the tax sale, property without due process of law or to take
or that he ever assigned his right to receive the his property for public use without just com-
surplus remaining from the purchase money. pensation. If he affirms the propriety of sell-
Mrs. Lawton died in April, 1880. It does not ing or taking more than enough of his land to
appear that during her lifetime any demand was pay the tax and penalty and interest and costs,
made upon the Treasury for the surplus. In and applies for the surplus money, he must re-
May, 1882, the appellee applied to the Secre- ceive at least that.
tary of Treasury for any surplus_proceeds
of the sale which might be in the Treasury.
No action was taken thereon, and nothing has
been paid to the appellee on such application.
We think that this case is governed by the
rulings of this court in U. S. v. Taylor, 104 U.
S., 216 [XXVI., 721]. In that case the land
sold for the non-payment of the tax was sold to
a person who paid the purchase money to the
United States and the surplus proceeds were in
the Treasury. It was held that the provision
of section 36 of the Act of August 5, 1861, ch.
45, 12 Stat. at L., 292, in regard to the surplus
of the proceeds of sale, was not repealed by
anything in section 12 or any other section of
the Act of June 7, 1862, ch. 98, 12 Stat. at L.,
422. It was also held that the Court of Claims
had jurisdiction of a suit for such proceeds
when the application to the Secretary of the
Treasury and the bringing of the suit therefor,
both of them, occurred more than six years
after the sale for the non-payment of the tax.

The present case differs from the Taylor Case only in this, that the land was in this case bought in by the tax commissioners for the United States and no money was paid on the sale. It was so bought in for a sum which exceeded by $929.50 the tax, penalty, interest and costs. This was done under the authority of section 7 of the Act of June 7, 1862, as amended by the Act of February 6, 1863, ch. 21, 12 Stat. at L.,640, which authorized the commissioners to bid off, for the United States, land sold for the tax at a sum not exceeding two thirds of its assessed value, unless some person should bid a higher sum, and also provided that at a sale any land which might be selected, under the direction of the President, for government use, might be bid in by the commissioners, under the direction of the President, for and struck off to the United States. The land in the present case having been struck off for and bid in for the United States at the sum of $1,100, we are of opinion that the surplus of that sum, beyond the $170.50 tax, penalty, interest and costs, must be regarded as being in the Treasury of the United States, under the provisions of section 36 of the Act of 1861, for the use of the owner, in like manner as if it were the surplus of purchase money received by the United States from a third person on a sale of the land [150] to such person for the non-payment of the tax.

It was unnecessary to go through any form of
paying money out of the Treasury to any officer
and then paying it in again to be held for the
owner of the land. But, so far as such owner
is concerned, the surplus money is set aside as
his as fully as if it had come from a third per-
son. If a third person had bid $1,099 in this

The appellants rely very much on the provisions of section 12 of the Act of 1862, which require that one half of the proceeds of subsequent leases and sales of land struck off to the United States at a sale for the non-payment of the tax, shall be, under certain circumstances, paid to the State in which the land lies; and contend that those provisions apply to the land in this case bought in under the Act of 1863. The view urged is, that if the United States pays to the appellee the $929.50, and to the State one half of the proceeds of subsequent leases and sales of the land, they will pay out more than the surplus of the proceeds of the original sale. It is not necessary to determine whether section 12 of the Act of 1862 applies to the land in this case, even if it would be proper to do so in a case where the State is not represented, as a claimant to the proceeds of leases and sales. No question as to the disposition of such proceeds can properly affect the right of the appellee to this surplus money. His claim is to the surplus money arising on the original sale, and not to any proceeds of any dealing with the land by the United States afterwards.

The application made to the Secretary of the Treasury for the surplus not having been complied with, the appellee was entitled to bring this suit, as on an implied contract to pay over the surplus. It not having been paid to the [151] trustees under the will or to the life tenant, the appellee, as remainder man, is clearly entitled to it.

The judgment of the Court of Claims is affirmed.

True copy. Test:

James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. 8.

EDMOND J. HART, Piff. in Err.,

v.

MARION SANSOM ET AL.

(See S. C., Reporter's ed., 151-156.) adjudication-suit to remove cloud on title-effect of service by publication.

Former

*1. A decree of a state court for the removal of a

cloud upon the title of land within the State, ren-
dered against a citizen of another State, who has
been cited by publication only, as directed by the

*Head notes by Mr. Justice GRAY.

NOTE.-Service of notice to appear and defend;
when necessary to validity of a judgment. See note to
Hollingsworth v. Barbour, 29 U. S. (4 Pet.), 466.
Conclusiveness of judgments. See note to Bk. of U.

S. v. Beverly, 42 U. S. (1 How.), 134.

Estoppel by judgment. See note to Aspden v. Nixon, 45 U. S. (4 How.), 487.

[152]

local statutes, is no bar to an action by him in the
Circuit Court of the United States, to recover the
land against the plaintiff in the former suit.
2. In a suit, to recover land and to remove a cloud
upon the title thereof, brought in a court of the
State in which the land is, against W., H. and others.
the petition alleged that W. ejected the plaintiff and
unlawfully withheld possession from him; that H.
set up some pretended claim or title to the land;
that the other defendants held recorded deeds there-
of, which were fraudulent and void; and that the
pretended claims and deeds cast a cloud upon the
plaintiff's title. Due service was made on the other
defendants; and a citation to H., who was a citizen
of another State, was published as directed by the
local statutes. All the defendants were defaulted;
and, upon a writ of inquiry, the jury found that H.
claimed the land, but had no title, of record or oth-
erwise, and returned a verdict for the plaintiff.
Judgment was rendered that the plaintiff recover
the land of the defendants, and that the deeds men-
tioned in the petition be canceled and annulled, and
the cloud thereby removed, and for costs, and that
execution issue for the costs; held, that this judg-Dorsey and Hart; the issue of a citation direct-
ment was no bar to an action by H. in the Circuit
Court of the United States, to recover the land
against the plaintiff in the former suit.

son County as aforesaid, are fraudulent and
void, and that the said pretended claims and
deeds, and each and all of them, cast a cloud
upon the title of the plaintiffs;" and praying
That they have judgment that the cloud upon
the title of the plaintiffs, created by the several [153]
deeds aforesaid, be removed, and that the said
deeds and each and all of them be declared null
and void, and be canceled and discharged of
record; and that the title of the plaintiffs in and
to said premises and every part thereof may be
confirmed and established as against said de-
fendants and each and every of them and all
persons claiming through or under them," and
for a writ of possession, damages and costs.
That record also showed the issue and due serv-
ice of citations to all the defendants except

[No. 958.]

Submitted Jan. 2, 1884. Decided Jan. 21, 1884.
[N ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United
IN

in

The history and facts of the case appear
the opinion of the court.
Messrs. H. J. Leroy and W. Hallett Phil-
lips, for plaintiff in error.
Mr. A. S. Lathrop, for defendants in error.

Mr. Justice Gray delivered the opinion of
the court:

This is a writ of error sued out by Edmond J. Hart, a citizen of Louisiana, to reverse a judgment rendered against him in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Texas, in an action brought by him against Marion Sansom and the heirs at law of Thomas M. League, citizens of Texas, to recover a tract of land in Johnson County, in that State, of which they had dispossessed him.

At the trial, Hart proved his title, under a patent from the Republic of Texas to League and a deed, with general covenants of warranty from League, dated August 19, 1846, and both recorded on December 9, 1879; and it appeared that the defendant Sansom held possession of the land, under a lease from the other defendants and as their tenant.

ing the sheriff to serve Hart, being a citizen of
Louisiana, by publication, and the sheriff's re-
turn showing the execution of the citation by
four successive weeks before the return day;
such publication in a newspaper of the county
and a like service by publication on Dorsey, a
and a

That record further showed a default of all
the defendants; and that, upon a writ of inquiry,
the jury assessed damages against Dorsey and
Hart; found as facts the issue of the patent to
League and the title of the plaintiffs as his heirs,
that Hart claimed said land, and that a deed
was made by Dorsey and recorded, as alleged
in the petition, but that Hart and Dorsey re-
spectively had no title, of record or otherwise;
and returned a verdict for the plaintiffs, and
that they recover the land described in the pe-
tition.

That record finally showed a judgment that the plaintiffs recover of the defendants the premises described, and that the several deeds in the plaintiffs' petition mentioned, be and the same are hereby annulled and canceled and for naught held, and the cloud thereby removed, and for costs; and that execution issue for the costs.

The circuit court against the plaintiff's objection, admitted the judgment in evidence, instructed the jury that it devested the plaintiff of his title to the land, and directed a verdict for the defendants.

The plaintiff, deriving his title under a deed with covenants of general warranty from League, is entitled to maintain this action against League's heirs, who are estopped by those covenants, unless the former judgment in the action brought by them in the state court has adjudicated the title as between them and the present plaintiff. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the nature and effect of that judg ment.

The defendants offered in evidence the record
of a judgment rendered by the District Court of
Johnson County, on August 24, 1875, upon a
petition filed June 11, 1873, by the heirs at law
of League, who died intestate November 5, 1865,
against Virgil Wilkerson, Orlando Dorsey and
several other persons, and Hart; alleging that
Wilkerson ejected the plaintiffs from this land,
and unlawfully withheld possession thereof
from them; that, on October 29, 1870, the de-
fendant Dorsey, by deed, duly recorded, con-
veyed to some of the other defendants than
Wilkerson and Hart, three fourths of the land,
reserving in that deed the remaining fourth to
himself, and that other deeds, particularly set
forth, of parts of the land were afterwards made
to the rest of such other defendants, and re-
corded; that the defendant, Hart, "sets up some
pretended claim and title to said land;" and that The petition alleged that Wilkerson was in
"The defendant, Wilkerson, is a naked tres-possession and that the other defendants, ex-
passer upon the land of the plaintiffs; and that
the several other defendants' several deeds,
which appear upon the record of deeds of John-

The petition combined, in accordance with [154]
the practice prevailing in that State, an action
in the nature of ejectment to recover possession
of the land and a suit in equity to remove a
cloud upon the plaintiff's title; and the service
by publication was in the form authorized by
the local statutes against non-residents. 1 Pas-
chal, Dig. of Laws of Texas, 4th ed., art. 25.

cept Hart, held recorded deeds, which were
fraudulent and void and cast a cloud upon the
plaintiffs' title. But as to Hart, it did not al-

The

lege that he was in possession or was in privity | rendered, by actual service upon him within its with the other defendants, or that he held any jurisdiction; and constructive service by publideed, but only that he set up some pretended cation in a newspaper is not sufficient. claim and title. And the verdict finds that he courts of the State might, perhaps, feel bound claimed the land but had no title of record or to give effect to the service made as directed by otherwise therein. The judgment is that the its statutes. But no court deriving its authority plaintiffs recover the land of the defendants from another government will recognize a and that the deeds mentioned in the petition be merely constructive service as bringing the and are annulled and canceled, and the cloud person within the jurisdiction of the court. thereby removed, and for costs; and execution The judgment would be allowed no force in is awarded for costs only, and not for any writ the courts of any other State; and it is of no or process in the nature of a writ of possession greater force, as against a citizen of another or habere facias. State, in a court of the United States, though held within the State in which the judgment [156] was rendered. Hollingsworth v. Barbour, 4 Pet., 466, 475; Boswell v. Otis, 9 How., 336; Bischoff v. Wethered, 9 Wall., 812 [76 U. S., XIX., 829]; Knowles v. Gas-Light Co., 19 Wall., 58 [86 U. S., XXII., 70]; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S., 714 [XXIV., 565]. See, also, Schibsby v. Westenholtz, L. R. 6 Q. B. 155; City of Mecca, L. R. 8 P. D., 106.

It is difficult to see how any part of that judgment, except for costs, is applicable to Hart; for that part which is for recovery of possession certainly cannot apply to Hart, who was not in possession; and that part which removes the cloud upon the plaintiffs' title appears to be limited to the cloud created by the deeds mentioned in the petition, and the petition does not allege, and the verdict negatives, that Hart held any deed.

But if there is any judgment, except for costs, against Hart, it is, upon the most liberal construction, only a decree removing the cloud created by his pretended claim of title and is no bar to the present action.

Generally, if not universally, equity jurisdiction is exercised in personam and not in rem, and depends upon the control of the court over the parties, by reason of their presence or residence, and not upon the place where the land lies in regard to which relief is sought. Upon a bill for the removal of a cloud upon title, as upon a bill for the specific performance of an [155] agreement to convey, the decree, unless otherwise expressly provided by statute, is clearly not a judgment in rem, establishing a title in land, but operates in personam only, by restraining the defendant from asserting his claim, and directing him to deliver up his deed to be canceled, or to execute a release to the plaintiff. Langdell, Eq. Pl., 2d ed., secs. 43, 184; Massie V. Watts, 6 Cranch, 148; Orton v. Smith, 18 How., 263 [59 U. S, XV., 393]; Vandever v. Freeman, 20 Tex., 334.

It would, doubtless, be within the power of the State in which the land lies to provide by statute that, if the defendant is not found within the jurisdiction or refuses to make or to cancel a deed, this should be done in his behalf by a trustee appointed by the court for that purpose. Felch v. Hooper, 119 Mass., 52; Ager v. Murray,

105 U. S., 126, 182 [XXVI., 942, 944]. But in
such a case, as in the ordinary exercise of its
jurisdiction, a court of equity acts in personam,
by compelling a deed to be executed or can-
celed by or in behalf of the party. It has no
inherent power, by the mere force of its decree,
to annul a deed or to establish a title.

In the judgment in question, no trustee to act
in behalf of the defendant was appointed by
the court, nor have we been referred to any
statute authorizing such an appointment to be
made. The utmost effect which can be attrib-
uted to the judgment, as against Hart, is that
of an ordinary decree for the removal by him
as well as by the other defendants, of a cloud
upon the plaintiff's title.

Such a decree, being in personam merely, can only be supported against a person who is not a citizen or resident of the State in which it is

(See S. C., Reporter's ed., 156-162.)

Bridge, when a work of internal improvement—
municipal bonds to aid-tax.

A wagon bridge across the Platte River is a work
of internal improvement, within the meaning of the
Statute of Nebraska of February 15, 1869; and that
statute makes it the duty of County Commissioners
to levy a tax on the taxable property within a pre-
cinct in whose behalf bonds have been issued under
that statute to aid in constructing such a bridge,
and without regard to any limit imposed by, or
sufficient to pay the annual interest on the bonds,
voted in accordance with, chapter 9 of the Revised
Statutes of 1866.

[No. 1236.]

Submitted Jan. 4, 1884. Decided Jan. 21, 1884.
[N

ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United

States for the District of Nebraska.
The history and facts of the case fully appear
in the opinion of the court.

Messrs. Wm. H. Munger, Lewis A.
Groff, and Carroll S. Montgomery, for
plaintiff in error.

Mr. Wm. Marshall, for defendants in er

ror.

Mr. Justice Gray delivered the opinion of

the court:

This is a writ of error to reverse a judgment of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska, denying a peremptory [157] writ of mandamus to command the County Commissioners of the County of Dodge, in the State of Nebraska, to levy a special tax upon

*Head note by Mr. Justice GRAY.

valuation of the taxable property within the
precinct, and was entered on the records of the
county; and that a tax of one mill had since been
annually levied. A general demurrer to the an-
swer was overruled by the circuit court, and
judgment entered accordingly; and thereupon
this writ of error was sued out.

the taxable property within Fremont Precinct, | upon by the voters of the precinct, contained a
a local subdivision of that county, to pay and provision that the tax levied in any one year
satisfy two judgments obtained by the petitioner should not exceed one mill on a dollar of the
against the county, in that court, upon interest
coupons attached to bonds issued by the Coun-
ty Commissioners in behalf of the precinct on
September 1, 1871, under the Statute of Ne-
braska of February 15, 1869, for the purpose of
building a wagon bridge across the Platte River
in that precinct, and purchased by the petitioner
in good faith, in the usual course of business,
and without notice of any defects or infirmities;
each of which judgments provided that they
should be paid by such a levy.

The decision of this case depends upon the peculiar provisions of the statutes of Nebraska, and an examination of those statutes leaves us in no doubt how it should be decided.

In the Revised Statutes of 1866, the 9th chapter, concerning county commissioners, contained the following provisions:

To an alternative writ of mandamus, alleging the facts above stated, the County Commissioners filed an answer alleging that the bonds, which were signed and sealed by the County "Sec. 19. The said commissioners shall have Commissioners, were in this form: power to submit to the people of the county, at "United States of America, State of Nebraska: any regular or special election, the question It is hereby certified that Fremont Precinct, whether the county will borrow money to aid in the County of Dodge, in the State of Nebras- in the construction of public buildings, the ka, is indebted unto the bearer in the sum of question whether the county will aid or con$1,000, payable on or before twenty years after struct any road or bridge, or to submit to the date, with interest at the rate of ten per cent people of the county any question involving an [159] per annum from date. Interest payable an- extraordinary outlay of money by the county; nually on the presentation of the proper cou-and said commissioners may aid any enterprise pons hereunto annexed. Principal payable at designed for the benefit of the county as aforethe office of the County Treasurer, in Fremont, said, whenever a majority of the people thereof Dodge County, Nebraska; interest payable at shall be in favor of the proposition as provided the Ocean National Bank, in the City of New in this section. York. Sec. 20. When county warrants are at a deThis bond is one of a series issued in pur-preciated value, the said commissioners may, suance of and in accordance with a vote of the in like manner, submit the question whether a electors of said Fremont Precinct at a special tax of a higher rate than that provided by law election held on the 11th day of November, shall be levied; and in all cases when an addiA. D 1870, at which time the following propo- tional tax is laid, in pursuance of a vote of the sition was submitted: people of the county, for the special purpose of repaying borrowed money, or of constructing or ordaining to construct any road or bridge, or for aiding in any enterprise contemplated by the preceeding section, such special tax shall be paid in money and in no other manner.

'Shall the County Commissioners of Dodge County, Nebraska, issue their special bonds on Fremont Precinct, in said county, to the amount not to exceed $50,000, to be expended and appropriated by the County Commissioners, or as much thereof as is necessary in building a wagon bridge across the Platte River, in said [158] precinct; said bonds to be made payable on or before twenty years after date, bearing interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum, payable annually?' which proposition was duly elected, adopted and accepted by a majority of the electors of said precinct voting in favor of the proposition.

And whereas, the Smith Bridge Company of
Toledo, Ohio, have entered into a contract with
said County Commissioners to furnish the nec-
essary materials and to build and construct said
bridge referred to in the foregoing proposition,
Therefore, this bond, with others, is issued in
pursuance thereof, as well as under the provis-
ions of an Act of the Legislature of the State of
Nebraska, approved February 15, A. D. 1869,
entitled An Act to Enable Counties, Cities and
Precincts to Borrow Money on their Bonds or
to Issue Bonds, to Aid in the Construction or
Completion of Works of Internal Improvement
in this State, and to Legalize Bonds Already
Issued for Such Purposes.'

In witness whereof, we, the said County
Commissioners of said Dodge County, have
hereunto set our hands, this
day of
A. D. 1871."

The answer further alleged that the propo-
sition to vote the bonds, submitted to and voted

Sec. 21. The mode of submitting questions to the people, contemplated by the last two sections shall be the following; the whole question, including the sum to be raised or the amount of the tax desired to be levied or the rate per annum, and the whole regulation, including the time of its taking effect or having operation, if it be of a nature to be set forth, and the penalty of its violation, if there be one, is to be published at least four weeks in some newspaper published in the county. If there is no such newspaper published, the publication is to be made by being posted up in at least one of the most public places in each election precinct in the county and in all cases the notices shall name the time when such question will be voted upon, and the form in which the question shall be taken; and a copy of the question submitted shall be posted up at each place of voting during the day of election.

Sec. 22. When the question submitted involves the borrowing or expenditure of money, the proposition of the question must be accompanied by a provision to lay a tax for the payment thereof, in addition to the usual taxes under section 16 of this chapter; and no vote adopting the question proposed shall be valid, unless it likewise adopt the amount of tax to be levied to meet the liability incurred.

Sec. 23. The rate of tax to be levied in pur