torious in the work; and we cannot love God for it, for the labour and self-denial was not borne by him. And further: if one being, by an act of his authority, should cause another innocent being to suffer, in order that he might be loved who had imposed the suffering, but not borne it, it would render him unworthy of love. If God had caused Jesus Christ, being his creature, to suffer, that he might be loved himself for Christ's sufferings, while he had no connection with them, instead of such an exhibition, on the part of God, producing love to him, it would produce pity for Christ, and aversion towards God. So that, neither God, nor Christ, nor any other being, can be loved for mercy extended, by self-denials, to the needy, unless those self-denials were produced by a voluntary act of mercy upon the part of the being who suffers them. And no being, but the one who made the sacrifices, could be meritorious in the case. It follows, therefore, incontrovertibly, that if Christ was a creature-no matter of how exalted worth--and not God; and if God approved of his work in saving sinners, he approved of treason against his own government; because, in that case, the work of Christ was adapted to draw, and did necessarily draw, the affections of the human soul to himself, as its spiritual Saviour, and thus alienate them from God, their rightful object. And Jesus Christ himself had the design of drawing men's affections to himself in view, by his crucifixion: says he, " And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me. This he said signifying what death he should die:" thus distinctly stating that it was the

self-denials and mercy exhibited in the crucifixion that would draw out the affections of the human soul, and that those affections would be drawn to himself as the suffering Saviour. But that God would sanction a scheme which would involve treason against himself, and that Christ should participate in it, is absurd and impossible, and therefore cannot

be true.

But if the divine nature was united with the human, in the teaching and work of Christ-if "God was in Christ, [drawing the affections of men, or] reconciling the world to himself"-if, when Christ was lifted up, as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, he drew, as he said he would, the affections of all believers to himself; and then, if he asscended, as the second person of the Trinity, into the bosom of the eternal Godhead-He thereby, after he had engaged, by his work on earth, the affections of the human soul, bore them up to the bosom of the Father, from whence they had fallen. Thus the ruins of the fall were rebuilt, and the affections of the human soul again restored to God, the Creator, and proper object of supreme love. O the length, and the breadth, and the depth, and the height of the divine wisdom and goodness, as manifested in the wonderful plan of salvation! "Great is the mystery of godliness: God was manifest in the flesh-justified in the Spirit—seen of angels—preached unto the Gentiles-believed on in the world-received up into glory." Amen! Blessing and honour, dominion and power be unto Him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb, for ever and ever: Amen and

amen.

CHAPTER XVI.

CONCERNING THE INFLUENCE OF FAITH IN CHRIST UPON THE MORAL DISPOSITION AND MORAL POWERS OF THE SOUL.

It has been demonstrated that the teaching and atonement of God the Saviour would draw to him, by faith, the affections of the human heart. We will now inquire what particular effect that faith in Christ, which works by love, has upon the moral disposition, the conscience, the imagination, and the life of believers.-Would faith in Christ, as a divine suffering Saviour, quicken, and regulate, and harmonise the moral powers of the soul?

1. The influence of faith in Christ' upon the moral disposition of the soul.

When its disposition is affected the soul is affected to the centre of its being. By disposition, is meant the desires or predilections of the heart, which influence the choice of the will to good or evil. The radical difference of character in spirits depends upon their disposition. The spirit that has a settled love for sin and hatred for holiness, is a devil, whether it be in time or eternity-embodied or disembodied. And that spirit which has a settled love for holiness, is a benevolent spirit, in whatever condition it exists. A devil or malignant spirit, is one that seeks its gratification in habitually doing evil. A holy being or benevolent spirit, is one that finds its gratification in habitually doing good. Whatever, therefore, affects the moral disposition of the soul, affects radically the character of the soul. It becomes, therefore, a ques

tion of the deepest interest, What effect will faith in Christ have upon men's moral disposition?

The solution of this inquiry is not difficult. Is Jesus Christ holy? All Christendom, sceptics and believers, answer in the affirmative. Now, the love of a holy being will, as a necessary result, counteract unholiness in the heart. Holiness is the antagonist principle of sin. The soul cannot love a holy being, and at the same time cherish those principles and exercises which it is conscious are offensive to the soul of the beloved object. From the nature of the case, love to holiness will produce opposition to sin. Love is the fulfilling of the law, and sin is the transgression of the law; so that, while the soul is entirely actuated, in all its exercises, by pure love to Christ, those exercises of the heart cannot be sinful.

When the heart is attached to any being, especially when that being is lovely and pure in his character, it becomes averse to every thing which, from its evil nature, causes suffering to the object of its affections. There are few things which will cause one to feel so sensibly the evil of sin, as to see that his sins are causing anguish to one that he loves.

It is said of Zaleucus, a king of the ancient Locri, that he enacted a law, the penalty of which was, that the offender should lose both his eyes. One of his sons became a transgressor of that law. The father had his attachment to his son, and the law he himself had promulgated, as righteous in its requirements and in its penalty. The lawgiver, it is said, ordered his son into his presence, and required that one of his eyes should be taken out; and then, in

order to show mercy to his son, and at the same time maintain the penalty of the law, he sacrificed one of his own eyes as a ransom for the remaining eye of his child. Now, we do not refer to this case as a perfect analogy, but to show the moral effect of such an exhibition of justice and self-sacrificing mercy. As man is constituted, it is perfectly certain that this transaction would produce two effects: one upon the subjects of the king, which would be to impress upon every heart that the law was sacred, and that the lawgiver thus regarded it. This impression would be made much more strongly than it would have been if the king had ordered that his son should lose both his eyes because it manifested, in the strongest manner possible, his love for his son, and his sacred regard for his law. If he had allowed his son to escape, it would have exhibited to his subjects less love for his law, and if he had executed the whole penalty of the law upon the son, instead of bearing a portion of it himself, he would have manifested less love for his son. The king was the lawgiver; he, therefore, had the power to pardon his son, without inflicting the penalty upon him, and without enduring any sacrifice himself. Every mind, therefore, would feel that it was a voluntary act on the part of the king; and such an exhibition of justice and mercy, maintaining the law and saving his own son, by his own sacrifice, would impress all minds with the deepest reverence for the character of the lawgiver, and for the sacredness of the law.

But another effect, deep and lasting in its character, would be produced upon the son who had trans