to the citizens respecting any elective officer of the State, cannot be abridged or materially changed by a city's charter; hence, in charter drafting in this State, they can be either ignored or made to cover the details for putting into effect the general provisions of the constitutional amendment. In most states of the Union, these measures have been viewed with considerable distrust and it is worthy of note that the rapid overcoming of this distrust is due in large measure to the spread of the new charter movement. The principle has become so thoroughly identified with the success of commission charters, that efforts toward such charters almost of necessity embrace these provisions, with the result that the workability and the benefits they convey are becoming known by actual use and close-at-hand example.

Notwithstanding the natural inclination to their misuse, that is offered in their very nature, such misuse is not frequent. The American people seem to regard them in the light of President Wilson's expression-"a gun behind the door"- and value them for their constant influence for efficiency and honesty rather than for their serviceability in actual use.

The provisions of most new charters respecting a small elective board with large powers, makes the initiative, referendum and recall of particular value; in fact, they fit in naturally with the development of modern charters. Outside of those states having constitutional provisions therefor, a new city charter would be incomplete without them.

PUBLIC SERVICE UTILITIES

A problem that has played a large part in the history of maladministration in our cities is that raised by the custom of granting franchises to individuals or corporations for the operation of public service utilities. Our mistaken policy in this regard has contributed a shameful chapter of corrupt political influence and poor public service.

The struggle against this evil antedates the new charter movement by many years. It began soon after the beginning of franchise granting, and still continues. But the old story is rapidly being replaced with a happier one, as a result of several victories in popular attacks on the wrongs, and also from a

changed and more enlightened attitude on the part of public service corporations themselves. The change has been materially helped by the new charter movement which from the first recognized the importance of the problem.

A modern charter should carefully safeguard the rights of the city to regulate, within reason, the operations under any such franchise it may grant and the price to be charged for service rendered; to require full publicity of the business incident thereto, to settle labor disputes which might threaten the service and thereby the public's convenience, to regulate the use of the city's streets, to purchase at a fair price the utility constructed under any such franchise, and to refuse to grant any such franchise but operate such utility as a municipal enterprise.

What is intended to be almost model charter provisions on this franchise problem are to be found in "The Digest of Short Ballot Charters," published by Professor Beard, of Columbia University, which publication might be referred to as a textbook on the commission charter movement.

ELECTION METHODS

If, as has been stated, the supremacy of the people's will is the basis of a democracy, it follows that a system of voting whereby the real will of at least a majority of the electors is effectively and understandingly expressed, is an important feature in any scheme of democratic government. Against this lies the fact, which few students of public affairs dispute, that our present system of voting falls far short of this requirement. Hence comes an important principle in charter drafting, that of providing for "Effective Voting."

The evil to be remedied is the patent fact that the real will of the people (or in other terms, the public welfare) and the vote-expressed will are often radically different. If it be urged that this is due to popular indifference, it is sufficient to reply that a proper election method secures popular interest.

One indictment against prevailing voting systems is the fact that the officer elected is often the choice of but a small part of the electorate. I have in mind a certain ward in Minneapolis, my former home. At a recent election, there were three

democratic candidates for the position of councilman. The nominee received about 400 votes in the primaries. Of the six republican candidates, the nominee received about 750 votes in the primaries. There was a total of over three thousand votes cast. At the election, the bitterness aroused in the republican primaries caused a bolt to the democratic nominee and he was elected. Remember that the councilman is supposed to be a representative in a legislative body, under a purely representative form of government. Yet, in this case, the man sent to represent those three thousand voters was not the first choice of to exceed four hundred of them.

The last governor of Massachusetts was elected by about 38 per cent of the votes cast and persons well qualified to speak say that it is certain that the remaining 62 per cent preferred any one of the other candidates to the one elected. The mayor of Salem, Massachusetts, was elected by 24 per cent of the votes. And these examples are not at all out of the ordinary.

In considering a remedy for these conditions, let us stop to ask what voters are called upon to do at the polls. One thing is to register a decision on a question or as between candidates for an office other than a representative; and another is to select representatives to a representative body. In the first case, the system of voting should be designed to register the will of a majority of the voters. In the latter case, the system should provide that the choice of that number of voters entitled to representation should be selected as such representative. In city charter drafting this distinction should be carefully noted and election provisions accord therewith. When the plan of limiting the elective officers to a board of representatives is adopted, the election method provided should be that best calculated to secure the real representatives of all the people on that board.

One reform introduced in many cities provided for selecting the city board at large instead of from wards. The change compelled successful candidates to measure up to a city-wide standard, and produced a marked improvement in the average qualifications of councils in cities adopting the plan.

A study of the old systems showed one trouble to be that the voters at the polls expressed their wishes only partially; and

that a remedy lay in a system that permitted such an expression of judgment that each vote would be effective in influencing the result, no matter how the voters, taken collectively, grouped themselves. This developed the preferential primary, whereby the voter could express on a single ballot a first, second and subsequent choices. Various plans of counting such ballots are in use with more or less satisfaction. The Bucklin or Grand Junction plan, adopted in several cities, provides that in case the first choices do not decide the election, the second choices shall be added to the first. This is open to the manifest objection that a second choice preference is given the same weight as a first. Another plan is to have each ballot count for all preferences expressed thereon, but with a value for a first choice say twice as great as for a second, and a value for a second choice twice that for a third, and so on. This obtains practically the same result as the so-called "Nansen Preferential Primary System," devised by Professor Nansen, of Australia; but he used a cumbersome tabular system of counting which makes the plan unwieldy. However, this plan has met with many strong endorsements among economists, often being referred to as the "Infallible Nansen System."

The fact that in actual use the preferential primary has largely served the purpose for which intended; to wit, the securing to the voter such a broader expression of his will that a much larger percentage of the votes are effective in influencing the result, fixes it in the list of reform measures that are gradually lifting city government to a higher plane.

But there remained the second evil under the old methods, that of the misrepresentation the people secured in their supposedly representative bodies. It was early noted that, with constituencies based on a geographical subdivision, it was possible, by securing a bare majority in a few close districts, to control the representative body. Ofttimes a political party casting less than 50 per cent of the votes obtained control of the body, while the representatives of the party casting considerably more than half the votes, were in a minority. The system known as gerrymandering grew out of this fact and accentuated the evil.

Let attention be called to one of the evils of our present system by an example. In a city election, five councilmen are to be chosen at large. There are eight candidates. Two thousand five hundred votes are cast. The fact will be accepted without argument that 500 voters who are a unit in wanting a certain individual as their representative on the council, should have him. But assume, as is very often the case, that one or two of the candidates are exceptionally popular. "A" receives 1,200 votes; "B," 800 votes. Then the remaining 500 votes are scattered among the six other candidates with the result that three councilmen are elected by receiving an aggregate of about 350 votes, or a little more than 100 each. Thus, in the council, 100 voters have an equal voice with 1,200 voters. In other words, remembering that 500 voters are entitled to have a representative, 700 of the votes cast for "A" and 300 of those cast for "B" were absolutely wasted, and it was the wasting of these votes that allowed 100 voters to elect a councilman.

Take another example. Five councilmen to be elected'; twelve candidates. Two thousand five hundred votes cast. The candidates run quite evenly, the votes being distributed as follows: "A," 300; "B," 275; "C," 250; “D," 225; "E," 200; with the remaining twelve hundred fifty votes scattered among the seven defeated candidates, none receiving more than 200 votes.

In this case, one-half the votes elected all five councilmen, which is equivalent to saying that one-half the voters have no representation, because their votes are wasted on unsuccessful candidates.

A system that results in 100 voters having a voice equal to that of 1,200 voters; and permits 350 voters to elect three out of five councilmen with 2,500 votes cast, is not a representative system but decidedly misrepresentation.

Note another fact. Under such a system it is frequently possible for a group of voters, numbering say 150, by uniting on one of their number, to elect him. The only condition

required would be the unusual popularity of one or two candidates. Thus an anarchist or any person notoriously unquali fied for the trust might easily be elected by a few supporters, while such a result would never be possible if the system