Argument of Attorney General. 207 U. S. see 2 Labbatt on Master and Servant, 782, citing statutes of Tennessee, Georgia and Ohio. See also H. R. Rep.. No. 2335, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. As to the construction of the act, it is limited to subjects within the control of Congress and does not affect any matters not within such control. Whether a particular carrier is engaged in interstate or foreign commerce within the meaning of the act is a question to be determined as the occasion arises. As the States, in the exercise of their police powers, may enact legislation of the kind here in question, although it may incidentally affect interstate commerce, by a parity of reasoning, Congress, in the exercise of its authority to regulate interstate commerce, may enact such legislation, although it incidentally affects state commerce. There is an essential difference between the power of Congress over an article or commodity which ceases to be a subject of interstate commerce the moment its interstate transportation ceases, and the instrumentality by which such commodity may be transported. Johnson v. Southern Pacific, 196 U. S. 1; Voelker v. Chicago &c. Railway, 116 Fed. Rep. 867; S. C., 129 Fed. Rep. 522, 528; United States v. Great Northern Railway, 145 Fed. Rep. 438. It is not contended that Congress can regulate the exclusively local business in which a common carrier may be engaged. If a railroad company operating an interstate road were also operating a purely local line, this act would not apply to such line, because, in respect thereto, the railroad company would not be a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce. The act would no more apply to a purely local line of the company than to any other business-the mining of coal, for instance-in which it might be engaged. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, can be distinguished as the present statute discloses on its face that it is intended as a regulation of interstate and foreign commerce, being expressly confined to common carriers engaged in such commerce. The "main purpose 207 U.S. Argument of Attorney General. of the act is not "to establish a regulation applicable to all trade, to commerce at all points," but simply to regulate an instrumentality of interstate commerce. It is not "designed to govern commerce wholly between citizens of the same State," but simply to protect interstate commerce. Local commerce, if affected at all, is affected only indirectly and incidentally. It has never been held that Congress was divested of control over the instrumentalities of interstate commerce simply because local commerce might incidentally be affected by its regulations. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25; The "Beef Trust Case," Swift v. United States, 196 U. S. 375; New York & New Haven v. Int. Com. Comm., 200 U. S. 361. On its face this statute relates only to interstate commerce. It seeks only to regulate the liability of a common carrier engaged in such commerce to its employés—that is, the persons employed by it for the purpose of carrying on its business, and the only business referred to is trade and commerce between the several States. It is a remedial statute and should, therefore, be liberally construed so as to accomplish the end in view. If to construe the statute to extend to employés of such carrier not engaged in or connected with the interstate business of the carrier would render the statute unconstitutional, such construction manifestly ought to be rejected. The elementary rule that a statute should not be construed so as to render it unconstitutional when a constitutional construction is open to the court hardly needs to be argued. United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214; United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629; Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 678; James v. Bowman, 190 U. S. 127; The Trade-Mark Cases, distinguished. The statutes there involved were, on their face, plain attempts to regulate matters beyond the control of Congress, and so also in Illinois Central Railroad v. McKendree, 203 U. S. 514. This case falls under McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U. S. 102, 112; Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80; Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U. S. 123; In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 563. Argument of Attorney General. 207 U. S. Nor does the fact that the act extends to all employés of common carriers engaged in interstate and foreign commerce, irrespective of the danger of their particular employments, vitiate it. The business of common carriers forms a proper basis of classification and special legislation. It is not necessary for the legislature to go further and differentiate between the different classes of employés of such carriers according to the degree of danger to which they may be subjected, although possibly it may do so. As is well known, there is every variety of risk in the conduct of such carriers and the power of the legislature to distinguish, select and classify objects of legislation necessarily has a wide range of discretion, and it is sufficient to satisfy the demands of the Constitution if the classification is practical and not palpably arbitrary. Tullis v. Lake Erie & Western Railroad, 175 U. S. 352, 353, referring to Orient Insurance Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557. The law is equitable, but were it otherwise, the injustice or harshness of the rule would be no just cause for declaring it invalid. In that case, as has been often held, the remedy lies not with the courts, but with the legislature. If necessary, under Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457; the general language of the statute might be restricted to those employés of common carriers engaged in interstate commerce whose business is of a hazardous nature, as it was the dangers of transportation which were intended to be remedied. And see Jones v. Guaranty and Indemnity Co., 101 U. S. 626. These matters relate to the application of the statute to particular cases, and do not affect its constitutionality. The act in question has recently been held to be constitutional by several Federal courts. Plummer v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., Circuit Court, Western District of Washington, Hanford, J., decided March 2, 1907; Spain v. St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Co., District Court, Eastern District of Arkansas, Trieber, J., decided March 13, 1907; Kelley v. Great Northern Railway Co., Circuit Court, District of Minnesota, 207 U.S. Argument for Defendants in Error. Morris, J., decided March, 1907; Snead v. Central Georgia Railway Co., Circuit Court, Southern District of Georgia, Eastern Division, Speer, J., decided March 25, 1907. Mr. J. M. Dickinson, with whom Mr. Charles N. Burch and Mr. Blewett Lee were on the brief, for defendants in error in No. 216: The Employers' Liability Act is not a regulation of commerce and is, therefore, unconstitutional and void. The Government of the United States is one of enumerated powers, and unless authority can be found in the National Constitution for the enactment of any particular legislation, then such authority does not exist. The Constitution of the United States specifies what powers Congress has and it has those powers therein specified and none other, except such as are necessarily implied to carry into effect those which are granted. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 195; Veazie & Young v. Moor, 14 How. 568; Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 19 Wall. 584; Tucker on Const. of U. S., § 250; Cooley's Const. Lim. (7th ed.), 11; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275; The Lottery Cases, 188 U. S. 321; Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 278. This power of Congress must be exercised in a constitutional way. It is not destructive of the rights and guaranties which are to be found in other sections of the Constitution and the amendments thereto. The power to regulate commerce cannot be so exercised as to deprive a citizen of property without due process of law, but must be exercised in subordination to the limitations and guaranties of the Constitution. Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312. The Employers' Liability Act prescribes no rule for the regulation of commerce, whether commerce be understood to be either traffic or intercourse. It defines the liability of an interstate carrier to his employés, creates new rights of action in favor of such employés, and takes away from the common carrier defenses heretofore available. Such legislation is not a regulation of commerce, and Congress has no more Argument for Defendants in Error. 207 U. S. power to define the shity of common carriers, engaged in interstate commerce, to their employés, than it has power to legislate on the domestic relations of merchants engaged in interstate commerce. The argument that this act is a constitutional regulation of interstate commerce proceeds upon the fundamentally erroneous theory that Congress has power to regulate persons engaged in interstate commerce in all the relations of Efe,-whereas, the power conferred by the Constitution is only the regulation of the commerce itself. No argument to sustain the constitutionality of the act in question can draw any support from the Safety Appliance Acts of March 2, 1893, April 1, 1896 and March 2, 1903. Those acts definitely apply to instrumentalities of inter state commerce. While undoubtedly Congress has power to enact laws to carry into effect and to execute other laws, which it may constitutionally enset: but the laws to be carried into effect must be constitutionally enacted: the laws which carry into execution the constitutional powers of the Government, must be necessary and proper; that is they must be appropriate. Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603; Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304: M° Culloch v. Margiand, 4 Wheat. 316, 423. It is a general rule, that what cannot be done directly from defect of power, cannot be done indirectly. Wayman v. Southard, 10 Whest. 50. The court will determine for itself whether or not merely giving a right of action against common carriers of interstate commerce to their employés is of itself a regulation of commerce. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313: Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299. State statutes giving rights of action for torts against interstate carriers have been held not to be regulations of interstate commerce. Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99, 103. A Federal statute, therefore, giving similar rights of action is not a regulation of interstate commerce. Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, does not hold that giving |